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Abstract 
The French presence in the South Pacific since 1981 is a topic which has 
been unevenly treated by accounts both in English and in French. Coverage has 
been skewed by selective interest in certain controversial issues such as nuclear 
testing in French Polynesia, the question of whether or not New Caledonia 
might attain independence, and the Rainbow Warrior bombing. French South 
Pacific Policy under Mitterrand (1981-1993) offers more dispassionate coverage 
of the character and implications of the French presence in the region, placing 
the aforementioned issues within the context of French Government policy. 
Part 1 examines the administration of the French Pacific Territories since 
1981. Similarities and contrasts in the economic, social and political problems 
confronting New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia are 
outlined. Particular reference is made to the influence of French party policy on 
the statute reforms undertaken in these territories, namely the succession of laws 
which were introduced in New Caledonia, culminating with the promulgation of 
the Matignon Accords in 1988, and the French Polynesian Internal Autonomy 
Statute of 1984. Statute reforms were not undertaken in Wallis and Futuna, 
a1though party political life was transformed at territorial level. Discussion of the 
varying fortunes of the three French Pacific Territories is concluded with an 
overview of their situations in the early 1990s: the prospects for continued peace 
and cooperation in New Caledonia, the constraints imposed on Wallis and 
Futuna by its isolation, lack of resources and small size, and the troubles French 
Polynesia has experienced because of local political instability and the 
suspension of nuclear testing. 
Part 2 considers French foreign policy in the South Pacific since 1981. 
French views on the role the South Pacific plays in the geostrategy of the Fifth 
Republic are scrutinised to ascertain the motives behind French diplomatic 
efforts in the zone. This examination leads to coverage of the implications for 
French diplomacy of nuclear testing in French Polynesia. The challenge to 
France's sovereignty over its Pacific territories posed by South Pacific Forum 
campaigning for decolonisation is assessed. So too are French aid and 
cooperative efforts with regional states, activity which suggests that controversy 
and confrontation were not all invariably evident in the period under 
consideration. 
The work concludes with a view of the interplay between domestic 
issues in the French Pacific Territories and French regional diplomacy. While 
much remains to be done, Paris has to an extent succeeded in promoting the 
integration of the French Pacific, and in improving the Fifth Republic's standing 
in the region. 
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Terms and Conventions 
Autonomy 
Although normally understood as synonymous with 'independence', 
'autonomy' is used in a narrower sense in this work. In the French Polynesian 
political context since the 1970s, 'autonomy' has come to imply a form of 
territorial self-government within the French Republic. 
Caldoche 
Generally, a French citizen of European origin born in New Caledonia or, more 
rarely. a French citizen born in metropolitan France or in French Algeria who 
has been assimilated into New Caledonian society. 
Demi 
A French Polynesian of mixed ethnic origin. 
Departements d'Outre-Mer-Territoires d'Outre-Mer 
France's Overseas Departments and Territories. This is the official term used to 
designate French possessions in the Caribbean, and in the Atlantic, Pacific and 
Indian Oceans. The expression DOM-TOM is understood to include French 
possessions which are neither Territories nor Departments: for example Saint-
Pierre and Miquelon, and Mayotte, which are Territorial Collectivities; 
Clipperton, which is a Public State Domain; and Tromelin, the Glorieuses, Juan 
de Nova, Bassas da India and Europa, islands with no particular statute. Corsica 
is considered by French administrators to be a part of mainland France, even 
thou~h it is a Department separated from metropolitan France by a stretch of the 
Mediterranean. 
Departement d'Outre-Mer 
French Overseas Department. The Caribbean islands of Guadeloupe and 
Martinique. Guyane in South America, and Reunion in the Indian Ocean are all 
DOM. They are administered broadly according to the same laws as mainland 
French Departments. 
Franc de la Communaute Financiere du Pacifique 
Pacific Financial Community Franc. Commonly referred to herein as the French 
Pacific Franc. F CFP has been described by various French sources as meaning 
"Franc des Colonies Fran~aises du Pacifique", "Change du Franc Pacifique" 
and "Cours Fran~ais du Pacifique". "Franc de la Communaute Financiere du 
Pacifique" is the official designation used by the IEOM, the French body 
responsible for the circulation of currency in the DOM-TOM. The French Pacific 
Franc is also inaccurately called the "Central Pacific Franc" in Australia and 
New Zealand. 
Kanak 
A contentious word, used increasingly in French since the 1970s to describe 
those of New Caledonia's Melanesian inhabitants who support independence. 
This form of the word is rejected by many New Caledonians who do not 
support independence, and by French language purists, who prefer the 
Oallicised spelling Canaque. This version is in turn derived from the Polynesian 
word 'Kanaka', used by Europeans in the nineteenth century to describe 
Melanesians. 'Canaque' was rejected by Melanesian nationalists because it was 
perceived as being inauthentic. 'Kanak' is, in tum, disliked by many French 
political and linguistic conservatives for its pro-independence overtones, and 
due to the supposed ugliness of the letter 'k', which is seldom used in French. 
'Kanak' is used invariably in its adjectival form by many supporters of New 
Caledonian independence. During the 1980s, 'Kanak' also became widely used 
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in the English-speaking South Pacific. In this thesis, the tenn tKanakt is used 
specifically to describe pro-independence Melanesians in New Caledonia. For 
grammatical reasons, it is not used invariably. 
Maohi 
The traditional name for the rural indigenous inhabitants of what became French 
Polynesia. Nationalists in French Polynesia call themselves Maohis as an 
expression of indigenous identity in preference to 'Polynesian', 'Maohi' is used 
in this work to denote those French Polynesians who advocate independence. 
Melanesian names 
These can be a source of confusion. Various French and English language 
sources sometimes use different spellings for the names of prominent figures in 
the Kanak nationalist movement. To confuse the matter further, French language 
sources use accents with Melanesian names. These accents are usually omitted 
in English language texts. Moreover, some French sources use accents for 
certain Melanesian names while other French sources do not. As Melanesian 
languages have no written tradition, it is problematic deciding which European 
renderings of Melanesian names, if any, might be considered correct. When 
referring to a Melanesian name from New Caledonia, the author employs what 
appears to be the most commonly used French variant of that name, and retains 
French accent marks. The removal of such accent marks might otherwise render 
the pronunciation of the name in question even less accurate than the French 
version. When referring to Melanesian names from countries where English is 
the official language, no accent marks are employed. With names from Vanuatu. 
where both French and English are official languages, the spelling most 
prevalent among English language sources is used. 
Metro 
A mainland French citizen living in a Pacific TOM. 
Metropole 
Mainland France, as opposed to the DOM-TOM. Hence, metropolitan. 
Moruroa/Mururoa 
The ato]] where France has conducted the bulk of its nuclear tests since 1966 is 
the subject of an orthographical debate as well as a political one. In the 
Tuamotuan Polynesian dialect, the atoll's name is 'Maruroa'. This spelling was 
superseded in the twentieth century by 'Momroa', the Tahitian version of the 
atoll's name. In the 1960s, during the establishment of the French nuclear 
testing programme, the French military mistakenly attributed the name 
'Mururoa' to the atoll. This became the official French spelling, and the version 
commonly used by other Western governments. This variant is rejected by 
Tahitians and anti-nuclear campaigners. The spelling 'Momroa' is employed in 
this thesis. 'Momroa' is described by conflicting sources as meaning "the wide, 
dark, threatening horizon", "the place of the great secret" and "the long fish 
trap". 
South Pacific 
For the purposes of this thesis, the South Pacific is defined as the area bounded 
by the Equator, Papua New Guinea and Australia, Antarctica, and South 
America. As an assertion of the particularism of the island micro-states of the 
region, some writers define the South Pacific as an area excluding Australia and 
New Zealand. Due to the important role Australia and New Zealand have played 
in South Pacific politics, this thesis includes them in the region. The zone is not 
however considered to encompass those South American states bordering the 
Pacific, whose relations with the South Pacific remain marginal, and whose 
relations with France should be considered in a Latin American context. 
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Likewise, Antarctica is not considered to be a part of the South Pacific due to its 
different geographical and political situation. 
Territoire d'Outre-Mer 
French Overseas Territory. France's four TOM are New Caledonia, Wallis and 
Futuna, French Polynesia and the French Austral and Antarctic Lands. Unlike 
French Departments, they are governed according to their own statutes, and 
have greater administrative autonomy. 
Wallisian 
Except in certain instances where specific contrasts are drawn between 
Wallisians and Futunans, 'Wallisian' is usually inclusive of Futunans as well. 
For the sake of brevity the text refers mainly to 'Wallisians' rather than to 
Wallisians and Futunans'. 
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Introduction 
La France y a ete longtemps peryue. de maniere largement 
tendancieuse il est vrai, comme un Etat passeiste, peu soucieux de 
specificites et cultures locales, desireux de maintenir coOte que 
coOte une souverainete de type post-colonial sur ses territoires et 
imposant a la region son arrogance nucIeaire. 
Louis Le Pensec, Minister of the DOM-TOM (1988 to 1993).1 
France's maintenance of its South Pacific presence into the 1980s has 
not always been regarded with enthusiasm by the newly independent island 
states in the region. Continued support by the Fifth Republic for its South 
Pacific territories stood in marked contrast to the policy implemented in the 
1970s by its traditional colonial rival, Great Britain. The British decision to 
withdraw from the bulk of its territories east of Suez involved the granting of 
independence in the 1970s to all but the most insignificant of its South Pacific 
dominions, Pitcairn Island. The denouement of the British withdrawal came in 
1980, when the contrasting policies of France and Britain stood out during the 
troubled decolonisation of the Franco-British Condominium of the New 
Hebrides. French reluctance to abandon interests in the archipelago caused 
antagonism, both with the British, and among the emerging indigenous political 
class.2 While Great Britain was concerned with reducing its global role in order 
to concentrate on domestic problems, France wished to retain its interests in this 
distant group of islands. Paris's will to do so after the declaration of Vanuatu's 
independence in July 1980, and in the face of hostility from VP Governments, 
is evidence of a level of interest in the South Pacific that has since diminished in 
Whitehall. 
Certain a~pects of the French presence in the South Pacific have been 
regarded with misgivings by regional governments. New Caledonia's continued 
status as a TOM in the face of indigenous nationalist demands for decolonisation 
during the 1980s appeared anachronistic. Most South Pacific governments 
mohilised from the mid-1980s to support New Caledonian independence, 
issuing statements to the effect that the territory's decolonisation had been 
postponed too long. Following British decolonisation of the South Pacific, 
French withdrawal from New Caledonia was assumed by regional governments 
to be an historical inevitability. Paris insisted that the question of New 
Caledonia's administrative status was a domestic policy matter which had to be 
resolved within the constitutional framework of the Fifth RepUblic. This stance 
was looked on with a mixture of apprehension and contempt by many regional 
leaders. In the mid-1980s, the representatives of neighbouring countries such as 
Australia, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands acted on the assumption that they 
had every right to comment on New Caledonia's internal politics and to voice 
support for territorial sovereignty. The territory's political stability or lack 
thereof impinged, they argued, on considerations of regional security. 
South Pacific opposition to nuclear testing in French Polynesia is of less 
recent origin. The first regional protests began three years before French nuclear 
tests commenced in French Polynesia in 1966.3 France's affirmation of the 
legality of conducting its nuclear tests on French territory was seen by islanders 
as arrogant, for the territory in question was situated in the Pacific, and the 
effects of nuclear tests did not necessarily respect international boundaries. 
French declarations that the tests represented no threat to island inhabitants or to 
the environment were received with disbelief. The British and American 
governments had offered similar assurances concerning the safety of their 
Pacific nuclear testing in the 1950s. Decades later some of these assurances 
were proven to be empty and the fallout effects of these tests on island 
communities left behind a fear of things nuclear among islanders long after these 
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two nations had abandoned Pacific nuclear testing in 1962.4 France's 
commencement of testing in the Pacific, after Britain and the United States had 
abandoned it there, was taken as a threatening affront to island populations. 
As Le Pen sec pointed out, such contentious issues have contributed to 
the perception among island states that France is living in the past, clinging to 
policies seen as the products of a European colonialist mentality. 
France's defence of its interests in the face of South Pacific critiques has 
ranged from conciliatory but unbending explanations of government policy 
through to reactions such as the cutting of ministerial contacts with Australia in 
. January 1987 and the bombing of the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior in 
Auckland Harbour in July 1985. These and other French reactions in the 1980s 
provoked further discord with South Pacific nations, contributing to a climate of 
distrust of French motives. Even France's more placid activities, such as its 
development of aid to the South Pacific, have on occasion ~ome the subject of 
political debate. The reduction of French aid to Vanuatu was used periodically in 
an attempt to soften criticisms in Port Vila of French policies. France's aid and 
development loans to places such as the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and the Cook 
Islands were interpreted, erroneously or not, as attempts to sway island 
opposition to French nuclear testing, and support for New Caledonian 
independence. The validity of such claims will be examined in chapter 8. 
The image of France's role in the South Pacific tends to become distorted 
when viewed through the prism of regional political interests that emphasise 
causes celebres.5 To gain a better understanding of French policy, this work 
will be orientated toward a consideration of French Governments' views of the 
role of the Fifth Republic in the South Pacific from 1981. Particular emphasis 
will be placed on state policy goals in the zone, and on the political philosophies 
and debates associated with this policy formulation. Assessment will be made of 
the extent to which various· aspects of government policy in the South Pacific 
have been implemented from 1981 to 1993. This orientation does not diminish 
the importance of the controversial subjects of possible New Caledonian 
independence and of French nuclear testing. It does however, permit a closer 
examination of the motivations behind, and of the implementation of, a range of 
French policies during the period under discussion. South Pacific responses to 
France's actions in the region have tended to ignore or misunderstand the 
influence of determining factors in its policy such as the constitutional 
framework of the Fifth Republic, the political ideologies of governing parties in 
Paris, those parties' dealings with the territorial leaders of the French Pacific, 
not to mention the metropolitan French electorate's ignorance of, and 
indifference to, this distant area. 
Immediate mention here is restricted to just two examples of South 
Pacific misconceptions relating to French policy in the zone. Many South Pacific 
governments in the 1980s held that New Caledonian independence was 
impending, while exhibiting little perception of a major reason as to why it 
should not be: the constitutional practice of the Fifth Republic allowed the 
granting of sovereignty to a French territory only when a majority of voters 
there had expressed support for self-determination. During the 1980s the 
nationalist movement in New Caledonia did not command the support of a 
majority of the local electorate. Socialist Governments in Paris were constrained 
to realise that the majority of the New Caledonian electorate opposed 
independence. Socialist leaders were bound to the rules of French constitutional 
law, however much some among them might have sympathised with Melanesian 
nationalist aspirations. This political constraint was either ignored or misread by 
neighbouring countries which supported New Caledonia's decolonisation. 
Irrespective of formal democratic considerations, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 
and Papua New Guinea backed independence claims in New Caledonia due to a 
shared belief in Melanesian nationalism. In the 1980s the Australian Labor 
Government expressed support for steps toward New Caledonian self-
determination "according to the wishes of the people of New Caledonia"6 when, 
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paradoxically. the majority of the New Caledonian electorate opposed 
tndependence. 
Similarly. after the establishment of a French Socialist Government in 
1981, regional political leaders misread its attitude toward nuclear deterrence. 
Some, holding the erroneous assumption that the mainstream French Left shared 
the widespread anti-nuclear sentiments professed by Labour parties in the South 
Pacific, assumed in 1981 that the new administration opposed nuclear testing. 7 
However Fran~ois Mitterrand, the first Socialist President of the Fifth Republic. 
was elected in May 1981 on a political platform which included support for the 
maintenance of France's nuclear deterrent.8 He had in fact advocated some fonn 
of French nuclear deterrent as early as 1971.9 The gap between the perceptions 
of South Pacific political representatives and the realities of the French political 
scene could at times be quite marked. 
Other misconceptions also existed. This work, with its emphasis on the 
French view of France's regional involvement, aims in part to dispel these 
misconceptions, while in the process permitting a greater understanding of 
various idiosyncrasies revealed by French policy makers in the period under 
examination. 
The starting point of 1981 has been chosen for this study because it was 
the year of the accession to power of the Fifth Republic's first Socialist 
Government. It will be seen that during Mitterrand's two terms of office since 
then, the South Pacific impinged on metropolitan French political life to a greater 
extent than previously. The decolonisation of the New Hebrides stimulated the 
realisation in Paris that French interests in the South Pacific were not immune to 
pressures for change. Before the 1980s, the South Pacific had appeared from 
Paris to be a zone of political inertia compared with areas such as Indo-China 
and Africa, where France had been forced to decolonise in the 19508 and 1960s 
when faced with the rise of indigenous nationalist movements. The installation 
of a reformist Socialist Government, combined with the perceived precedent of 
New Hebridean decolonisation, raised the hopes of New Caledonia's 
Melanesian nationalists. By the middle of the 1980s, the possibility of New 
Caledonian independence had been propelled to the forefront of metropolitan 
French political debate. This was the first time that decolonisation matters had 
assumed such importance in Paris since the French withdrawal from Algeria in 
1962. WhiJe the continuation of nuclear testing in French Polynesia was never 
placed in question by Mitterrand in the 1980s, France's resolve to protect its 
testing programme from possible foreign disruption. to the extent of sinking the 
Rainbow Warrior. provoked one of the major domestic political scandals of the 
decade. The advent of these problems coincided with a growing realisation 
among French Ministers that the Fifth Republic had hitherto neglected its 
interests in the Pacific in favour of concentrating on areas of greater French 
influence in Europe, Africa and the Middle East 
The extent to which French Governments responded to South Pacific 
issues since 1981, and the forms that their responses assumed, comprise the 
overalJ concern of this work. Analysis is offered of the administration of the 
three Pacific TOM (New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia), 
and of external relations with South Pacific nations. The interplay between 
French domestic policy and external policy in the area is considerable: an 
examination of the former contributes to an understanding of the latter and vice-
versa. The responses of neighbouring countries to political developments within 
France's Pacific territories cannot be assessed adequately without some prior 
analysis of those developments themselves. Furthermore, as much as Paris 
might have wished the exclusion of foreign critiques and lobbying over its 
policies in the TOM, debate over New Caledonia and French Polynesia became 
international. New Caledonia was the subject of concerted lobbying by the 
South Pacific Forum in the UN from 1986. Similar lobbying on French nuclear 
testing dates back to the 1960s. 
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Part 1 of this thesis concentrates on France's political relationship with 
its South Pacific territories since 1981. After an introductory chapter on the state 
of government policy relating to the French Pacific in the months preceding 
Mitterrand's election, a chapter each is devoted to New Caledonia, Wallis and 
Futuna, and French Polynesia. These chapters concentrate on the various 
administrative and development problems that those three territories presented to 
French Governments. 
Part 2 examines France's external relations with South Pacific nations 
from 1981. The opening chapter of part 2 consists of an introduction to French 
perceptions of the South Pacific and a survey of regional French diplomacy. The 
following three chapters consider the influence of nuclear and decolonisation 
issues on France's presence in the South Pacific, and the increasingly important 
role French aid and co-operation have played in expanding French regional 
integration. A thematic approach is used in part 2. A case-by-case study of 
French associations with all seventeen foreign territories in the South Pacific is 
not the intention of this work, even assuming that there is a great deal to be said 
about French contacts with places such as Pitcairn Island or Easter Island. 
Nevertheless most of the South Pacific island states, from larger ones such as 
Fiji to the smallest ones, have their links with France considered to some degree 
in part 2. 
The conclusion presents an assessment of the implementation of French 
internal and external policy in the South Pacific since 1981. An assessment is 
made of the extent to which France has achieved its policy goals under 
Mitterrand's presidency. 
Some mention must be made of the sources drawn on in the preparation 
of this thesis, of their biases, and of the extent of their reliability. Material 
consulted includes documents which are predominantly of French and South 
Pacific origin: government statements, statistics, reports and parliamentary 
papers, academic works, partisan political publications, and journalism. Some 
of these sources are more reliable than others. For instance, press reports of 
events discussed within this work sometimes contain factual errors and 
contradictions, misspelt names, and misleading conclusions. In some instances, 
press reports are the only references to certain events to which access is to date 
possible. The contemporary and thus still sensitive nature of many aspects of the 
topic under discussion has precluded examination of government archives taken 
for granted by scholars researching the more distant past. 
In mentioning the subjective nature of sources, ideological and 
nationalistic influences should not be ignored. As will be seen, many of the 
individuals quoted in this work have resorted to dubious claims while under 
these influences. A not inconsiderable amount of the literature concerning 
France's South Pacific presence in the 1980s has been detrimentally influenced 
by chauvinism and ideological dogmatism, accentuated by the mutual 
incomprehension sometimes evident between France and the Anglophone South 
Pacific. Caution must be exercised when dealing with such material, although it 
can be useful for illustrating divergent positions and conflicting interpretations 
of political questions. 
Another limitation of accounts about France and the South Pacific, is that 
in them the controversial has often overshadowed the commonplace. There 
exists a more abundant literature on the Rainbow Warrior bombing than on 
French development aid to the South Pacific.1o Similarly, New Caledonia's 
turbulent politics in the 1980s prompted the publication of more books than have 
been devoted to French Polynesia's comparatively placid political evolution. ll 
Such subject biases to be found in the existing literature on France in the South 
Pacific during the 1980s can be a hindrance, channelling attention toward 
sensational episodes rather than toward the durable and substantial 
developments of the period. In this study, certain key flash points must of 
necessity be discussed. Adequate analysis of Franco-New Zealand relations in 
the 1980s could not be made while ignoring the Greenpeace affair. But rather 
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than dwelling on the minutiae of incidents such as the Rainbow Warrior 
bombing, emphasis here will be on the policy context of these events and on 
their wider implications. Rather than recapitulating journalistic exposes, this 
study concentrates on the evolution of French government policy and its 
implementation in the South Pacific since 1981. 
Nevertheless, some assessments made in this text may be considered 
debatable. Judging from the empassioned nature of much preceding 
argumentation involving aspects of this topic, such a response is to be expected. 
While this study endeavours to present a balanced view of its subject, some of 
its conclusions will prompt disagreement. This work's conclusions are, of 
course, the author's own. 
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1 Louis Le Pensec: "Les DaM-TOM dans leur environnement regional" in VAfrique et I'Asie 
modemes no.l64 printemps 1990, p.11. 
2 See John Beasant: The Santo Rebellion: all imperial reckoning; Walter Lini: Beyond 
Pandemonium: from the New Hebrides to Vanuatu. 
3 For a history of South Pacific opposition to French nuclear testing in the 1960s and 1970s, 
see Stephen Bates: The South Pacific Island Countries and France: a study in inter-state 
relations chs.l, 3. Regional opposition to French nuclear testing in the 1980s is considered in 
more detail in chapter 6 of this work. 
4 For an account of United States and British nuclear testing in the Pacific, see Jane Dibblin: 
Day of Two Suns: US nuclear testing and the Pacific islanders. 
5 David Robie: Blood on their Ballner. Natiollalist Struggles ill the South Pacific and 
Greenpeace New Zealand: Chronology: the French presence in the South Pacific 1838-/990 are 
just two examples of this tendency, being books which focus on the issues of New Caledonian 
independence and French nuclear testing from an anti-nuclear and pro-independence viewpoint. 
6 BiIJ Hayden, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Australian Foreign Affairs Review 
May 1983 p.186. Cf. ihid. July 1983 p.375, October 1984 p.1086. Cf. chapter 7 for further 
information on Australia's stance toward New Caledonia. 
7 For example, in Papua New Guinea. the Trade Union Congress was delighted with the 
arrival of a French Socialist Government because it thought the new administration would be 
anti-nuclear. The Congress displayed dismay and anger when the administration's pro-nuclear 
stance later became apparent: PNG Post-Courier 6 January 1982. Likewise, the PNG 
Government expressed its hope that Mitterrand would respond to South Pacific nations' 
demands for an end to French nuclear testing: ibid. 12 May 1981. Three years later, such 
misconceptions still persisted in high quarters. On 5 November 1984, David Lange, then 
Prime Minister of New Zealand, claimed mistakenly that in continuing nuclear testing the 
Socialist Government was carrying out a nuclear policy different from the platform the PS had 
campaigned on in 1981: 711e Press 6 November 1984. 
8 See the "110 propositions pour la France" in Fran<;ois Mitterrand: Politique 2. /977-/98/ 
p.324. 
9 Catherine Nay: Les Sept Mitterrand p.189. 
10 The Rainbow Warrior bombing has heen the main subject of twelve books and far more in 
part: see the bibliography. Hundreds of articles have heen written about this subject since 
1985. French development aid in the South Pacific has yet to receive such extensive coverage. 
II More than 25 boob written specifically ahout New Caledonia's political problems have 
been published since 1981. Fewer hooks concentrating on French Polynesian political issues 
have been published since that date: see the bibliography. Wallis and Futuna is the most 
poorly served of the three French South Pacific territories. No books with that territory'S 
politics as their main subject were published in the period under discussion. 
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Part 1 
The French Pacific Territories since 1981 
1 6 
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1. Prelude. 1980: the View from Paris 
A Quiet Year 
In political terms, 1980 was largely uneventful for France's three South 
Pacific TOM. No major new force for change there emanated either from Paris, 
or from the territories themselves. This situation contrasted sharply with the 
years preceding and following 1980. For instance in 1979 a new territorial 
administration had been appointed in New Caledonia and the Kanak nationalist 
PI had been founded there, while 1981 marked the advent of the frrst French 
Socialist Government since the 195Os. 
By 1980, six years had passed since the election of President Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing. Since 1974 the liberal-conservative Governments appointed 
in Paris by Giscard d'Estaing had maintained their majority in Parliament in 
spite of internal Gaullist dissent and electoral challenges from the two major 
parties of the French Left, the PS and the PC. New Caledonia's redefined 
territorial statute had been in operation for three years, and the modifications to 
the French Polynesian statute, promulgated in 1977, were functioning without 
major problems. The controversy which had accompanied the land, social and 
economic reforms introduced in New Caledonia since 1978 by Paul Dijoud, the 
Secretary of State to the DOM-TOM, had receded, if not disappeared. Although 
by the end of 1980 Dijoud's reforms had been implemented, at that stage it was 
too soon to assess their overall effects.1 This consideration did not hinder the 
French Government in jUdging from its vantage point in Paris that administrative 
reforms in the Pacific territories were progressing well.2 
Within those territories themselves in 1980, no new development of 
great consequence was time tabled. In New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and 
French Polynesia, neither territorial nor municipal elections were scheduled to 
provoke the hurried formation of the multitudinous, fractious parties that usually 
accompanied these events. The only elections to take place in the territories that 
year were for the Senators for Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia. Their 
results, on 28 September, represented a victory for political continuity. In Wallis 
and Futuna Sosefo Papilio, a representative for the conservative RPR, received 
the votes necessary for the renewal of his term in office for a further nine 
years.3 In doing so, he bolstered the dominant role that local Gaullists had held 
in the territorial administration since the early 1960s. In French Polynesia Daniel 
Millaud, a representative of the Giscardian UDF, was also re-elected.4 
In 1980 the French Government was more preoccupied· with events 
unfolding in the Franco-British Condominium of the New Hebrides than with 
the Pacific TOM. Fearful speculation asserted that the decolonisation of the New 
Hebrides might start a 'domino effect', that would somehow encourage the rise 
of Kanak nationalism in New Caledonia.5 However, this argument ignored the 
different political situations in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. The 
former's nascent Kanak nationalist movement had yet to attain the electoral 
strength of the New Hebridean VP. In 1980, secession from the French 
Republic represented an issue of prime importance for only a small minority in 
French Polynesia. Secession did not constitute an issue at all in Wallis and 
Futuna, where the desirability of links with France was almost unanimously 
affirmed. France's recognition of the independence of two East African TOM, 
the Comoros in 1975 and of Djibouti in 1977, were events held by French 
Governments under the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing to have no 
consequence for the Pacific TOM. The potential of the Comoros and Djibouti as 
'dominoes' whose attainment of sovereignty might set a precedent for the 
French Pacific was assumed to be negated by their distance.6 
18 
The Eighth Plan 
Independence was not a question contemplated in metropolitan 
administrative planning for the French Pacific in 1980, at least not in the political 
sense. The encouragement of economic independence there was however 
deemed desirable by state planners in Paris. While it was held to be desirable to 
maintain sovereignty over the components of the DaM-TOM, it was also 
considered preferable that they become lighter financial burdens for the French 
State. Published by the General Planning Commission in July 1980, the Eighth 
Plan for the DaM-TOM considered the lack of financial self-reliance of the 
Pacific TOM, and of the DaM-TOM in general, as a troublesome concern which 
needed to be addressed.7 Scheduled for implementation between 1980 and 
1985, the Plan declared that the economies of the Pacific TOM, like those of the 
DaM, were too dependent on metropolitan France and that greater self-
sufficiency should be instilled in them. Deficiencies in the production base of the 
DOM-TOM had to be overcome if lasting economic development was to take 
place there: 
Le d~veloppement de I'appareil productif des D.O.M.-T.O.M. doit etre 
I'objectif majeur du VllIe Plan. 
En efTet, qu'it s'agisse des d~partements ou des territoires d'outre-mer, 
une att~nuation de la d~pendance de leur ~onomie par rapport aux transferts 
publics passe par une plus grande contribution des activit~s locales de 
production ~ Ia creation de revenus et d'emplois sur place. Compte tenu du 
plafonnement des activit~s traditionnetIes, cette contribution suppose une 
profonde diversification de I'~conomie grAce l la mise en reuvre d'autres 
activit~s agricoles, industrielles, artisanales ou touristiques, ainsi que par 
I'exploitation des ressources de Ia fo~t et de la mer. 
Une teUe orientation n'est certes pas nouvelle dans les D.O.M.-
T.O.M. Mais les r~sultats enregistr~s jusqu'l pr~sent, bien que non 
n~gtigeabIes, sont loin de correspondre aux besoins.8 
Some critical analysis of the unspoken assumptions underpinning this text 
should be offered, as certain peculiarities are apparent in it. 
The tacit assumption above is that the economic dependence of the DOM-
TOM was inherently a bad thing. This had been a long-standing assumption in 
metropolitan French analysis of the role of the DaM-TOM in the Republic. It 
was argued that they should transcend the pejorative image of being "les 
danseuses de la France" or "les confettis de l'Empire",9 dependent on financial 
assistance from Paris, by making a greater productive contribution to the 
national economy and becoming more self-reliant. On the other hand it might be 
asked whether this lack of economic independence was necessarily a bad thing 
for the Republic. If France wished to retain its global possessions, the 
encouragement of economic self-reliance might be a negative tendency. Were 
any of the DaM-TOM to become financially self-reliant, greater local demands 
for political independence could be encouraged. It would be contrary to the 
national interest if, for example, the establishment of economic independence in 
French Polynesia were to be followed by the demand of an electoral majority for 
self-determination. What then would become of the French nuclear testing 
programme? 
Furthermore the metropolitan French preference for the DaM-TOM to 
become financially less dependent on state subsidies might marginally reduce 
state expenditure, but it should be asked if this was a realistic goal. Many 
regions of metropolitan France could not claim to be economically self-reliant. 
Why should the DaM-TOM be any more capable than them of reaching a state 
of financial self-support? If the small population and resource bases of the 
DOM-TOM are taken into consideration their prospects of achieving self-
sufficiency do not appear to be great. Bernard Poirine, a French economist, 
described in 1992 this fixation with berating the lack of self-reliance in the 
19 
DOM-TOM as inappropriate. He asked in particular why so much French 
analysis of the economic situation of French Polynesia should concentrate on the 
unproductive nature of the territorial economy, and its level of state subsidies. 
Did not French Polynesia, as host to the French nuclear testing programme, play 
an economic role comparable to that of any large metropolitan French garrison 
town? 
On De songerait pas a calculer [ ... ] la balance des ~hanges d'une ville de 
garnison m6tropolitaine avec Ie reste de la Nation, encore moins a savoir si la 
contribution de ses habitants aux activit6s "productives" dans l'agriculture et 
l'industrie est suffisante pour que cette ville pr6sente les caracteres d'une 
6conomie "viable", "6quilibr6e", "productive", "autonome", ou loute autre 
qualificatif fortement teint6, qu'on Ie veuille ou non, de jugement de valeur ou 
d'a priori id6010gique et politique. [ ... ] Personne ne songe a penser que les 
habitants d'une ville de garnison m6tropolitaine sont "assist6s" ou 
"improductifs" parce qu'i1 n'y a pas d'usine ou de paysans a eet endroit, mais 
beaucoup de fournisseurs de services "improductifs,,[ ... ].10 
Poirine pointed out that any orientation that stressed that French Polynesia, or 
the rest of the DOM-TOM, should pay their way, could only be justified from a 
traditional colonial perspective which assumed that these domains were not an 
integral part of the Fifth Republic or, for that matter, from an anti-colonialist 
perspective, on the grounds that economic self-sufficiency constituted one of the 
prerequisites for independence. 11 Whatever the reason, from both constitutional 
and economic perspectives, it was faulty logic to assume that the DOM-TOM 
should be anything more than minor, dependent components of a larger national 
structure. 
Official assumptions about development should also be critically 
scrutinised. Development or progress in the DOM-TOM was assumed by the 
officials and politicians who prepared the Eighth Plan to be synonymous with 
the expansion of capitalism there. The creation of new enterprises and the 
exploitation of natural resources would lead to the creation of jobs and 
commercial prosperity. This approach was Eurocentric in that it aimed to raise 
the material standard of living of the inhabitants of the DOM-TOM to a level 
similar to that of the metropolitan French. The indigenous tribal societies of 
New Caledonia, French Polynesia and of Wallis and Futuna were considered 
underdeveloped by the criteria expressed in the Eighth Plan because of the low 
penetration of European commercial values there, and because of continued 
tribal reliance on subsistence agriculture. However was it necessarily desirable 
for indigenous inhabitants of the Pacific TOM to see their traditional societies 
further eroded by the spread of the cash economy? Those living in the tribal 
milieu might not enjoy all the material conveniences of twentieth century 
European consumer societies, but these conveniences were not necessarily 
desirable if their acceptance involved abandoning communal socio-economic 
structures for a European society centred on the individual and orientated toward 
market capitalism. Tribal authorities would argue that such 'development' could 
break up traditonal societies and produce harmful effects on the tribal 
subsistence economies of the Pacific TOM.t 2 The exploitation of natural 
resources advocated by the Eighth Plan might also have destructive 
consequences for the environment in tribal domains, disrupting subsistence 
farming and hunting. The construction of tourist resorts could claim prime 
agricultural land, and open cast mining could destroy it, while logging could 
deprive local game of its natural habitat. What was considered 'development' 
and 'progress' in Paris could be perceived as the exact opposite by the 
indigenous inhabitants whose traditional lifestyles were touched by this change. 
The administrative outlook expressed in the Eighth Plan was not the only 
criterion which might be applied to the situation of the DOM-TOM, and the 
official view should not be accepted without question as the sole relevant 
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approach. Nevertheless, in order to better understand how the DOM-TOM were 
viewed from Paris, discussion in this work must of necessity follow the frames 
of reference offered by the Eighth Plan. Whether the document offered a realistic 
response should be asked. The objective of reducing the economic dependence 
faced by the DOM-TOM was offered with great verve, although remained easier 
said than done. The desirability of a diversification of local economic activity 
had been declared repeatedly in preceding state plans to no great effect. 13 What 
remained to be determined was whether the French Government could translate 
this target into durable results. 
In terms of what in Paris was considered to be underdevelopment, the 
Pacific TOM shared many of the obstacles of the DOM, as well as possessing 
their own peculiar disadvantages. These disadvantages stemmed largely from 
the geographical location of the French Pacific. After noting the general 
dependence of the DOM-TOM on metropolitan France, the Eighth Plan indicated 
that the Pacific TOM were disadvantaged compared to the DOM because of their 
greater distance from French markets. This greater distance implied high freight 
costs for exports from the French Pacific to the mainland, rendering produce 
uncompetitive. This consideration, and the narrow range of exports from the 
TOM to their immediate Pacific neighbours, combined to act as a powerful 
disincentive to the growth of local production through export-led economies. 14 
The Eighth Plan stressed the need for the encouragement of commerce in the 
French Pacific and with its regional neighbours in order to improve export 
opportunities from the TOM.15 It was assumed that it would be more profitable 
to sell products from the French Pacific in the Pacific basin as a result of the 
relative proximity of potential markets there and the consequently lower freight 
costs involved. 
Di versified cxport growth from the French Pacific had been mediocre in 
the late 1970s. Wa11is and Futuna's economy remained centred on subsistence 
agriculture. In New Caledonia and French Polynesia, local agricultural 
production had failed to meet the greater demands of local consumption 
stimulated by territorial population growth. 16 The profitability of the only major 
New Caledonian export, nickel, was, like French Polynesian copra, constantly 
in flux owing to the instability of these commodities' prices on the international 
market, although the difference was that, unlike nickel, copra declined 
steadily. 1 7 
Tourism, at that time the only other major area of economic development 
for the latter two territories, was noted as not having progressed to as great an 
extent as in the DOM.t 8 For European and American travellers the French 
Pacific did not represent as convenient a destination as the French Caribbean. 
The greater distance of the Pacific TOM from Europe and the eastern seabord of 
North America, and the higher airfares that resulted for European and American 
travellers, posed an obstacle to competitiveness with less distant holiday 
destinations. An increase in revenue from tourism would be dependent on 
encouraging visitors from the Asia-Pacific region, for whom the French Pacific 
represented a cheaper destination than it did for Europeans and the inhabitants of 
the east coast of North America. Much remained to be done in expanding 
tourism. 19 
The EEZs of the French Pacific also offered great potential for economic 
exploitation although few advances had been made in this field by the end of the 
1 970s. The Eighth Plan noted that the Pacific territories' fisheries should be 
exploited beyond the artisanallevel then prevalent.20 Once again, commercial 
growth in this sector was dependent on improving regional trade, as frozen fish 
shipped from the Pacific TOM could not compete successfully in metropolitan 
France with the lower market prices of fish from the Atlantic Ocean. As 
shipping frozen fish to Europe was uneconomic, more profitable export markets 
had to be found in the Pacific basin. 
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It was asserted in the Eighth Plan that agricultural activity in the Pacific 
TOM, as in the Caribbean and other DOM, needed to be increased to the point 
that production would fulfill the demands of local consumers.21 The document 
expressed the belief that such territorial self-sufficiency would reduce the 
demand for expensive imported food, shipped from as far away as Europe. The 
prospect of increasing local food production to the point where meat and 
vegetables could be exported to markets such as Japan and New Zealand was 
also optimistically contemplated.22 Barriers to these potential exports were 
ignored; notably, Japanese tariffs on imports and New Zealand's ability either to 
produce its own food or to import it more cheaply from places other than the 
French Pacific. 
Reviving agriculture in the Pacific TOM presented a particular challenge. 
Agriculture in French Polynesia and New Caledonia had declined markedly 
since the 1960s.23 In French Polynesia, this decline had been accentuated by the 
arrival of the nuclear testing programme. The presence of the programme 
permitted a rapid expansion of tertiary sector employment. Not only were 
workers required on the test sites, they were needed in Papeete to staff support 
services for the nuclear pro gramme. Traditional agriculture was abandoned by 
farmers attracted by the lucrative employment opportunities that the programme 
created.24 In New Caledonia, the boom in the nickel industry from 1969 to 
1972 had likewise accentuated the diminution of agricultural activity to the 
advantage of more profitable employment in the mining sector. To the contrary, 
subsistence agriculture in Wallis and Futuna could not be described as declining, 
but it was unlikely to expand to any great extent for want of more arable land. 
With the notable exception of nickel mining in New Caledonia, which 
dominated the territorial economy, local industry represented another 
underdeveloped sector in the French Pacific. The Eighth Plan advocated the 
creation of light industry and small artisanal enterprises.25 The growth of these 
businesses would serve to diversify local economies and create employment 
opportunities. Evolution in the industrial sector, as with tourism, fisheries and 
agriculture, would be encouraged through government loans and subsidies. 
Competition from imported goods would be discouraged by tariffs. 26 What 
effect import tariffs might have in discouraging trade between the Pacific 
territories and their neighbours was not discussed. 
One major obstacle to economic diversification in the Pacific TOM was 
purely internaL The Eighth Plan described the distorting and stifling effect that 
the presence of a well-paid civil service had on private sector growth in the 
DOM-TOM. The gap between public sector salaries, and the lower incomes 
private sector workers received, acted as a major barrier to entrepreneurial 
growth.27 Local inhabitants, it was argued. were less likely to start their own 
businesses when better paid employment was offered in civil service posts. 
Locals were also Jess likeJy to be promoted to major administrative positions 
than the generally better qualified metropolitan French citizens who dominated 
this sector. The presence of metropolitan civil servants served both to undermine 
the growth of entrepreneurial activities in the Pacific TOM, and obstructed locals 
seeking to obtain high-ranking positions in the territorial bureaucracy. 
It was proposed that public sector salaries should be reduced to make 
this employment less attractive.28 However, lowered salaries would not reduce 
the size of administrative bodies in the DOM-TOM. With or without salary 
reductions, civil service posts would remain attractive to locals for the career 
stability they offered. Taking into account the added public sector work implied 
under the Eighth Plan by projected government development programmes that 
were advocated, it was unlikely that the preponderance of civil service posts 
would diminish in years to come. Whether lasting local economic growth and 
entrepreneurial initiatives could be built on the basis of a plan directed from 
Paris wa..c; a complicated question which was left unanswered. 
A lack of educationalqual"ifications. particuhirly in management and 
commerce, disadvantaged the majority of the inhabitants of the French Pacific. 
The Eighth Plan mentioned that education in the Pacific TOM was lagging 
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behind the general educational standards of the DOM, which were themselves 
recognised as being lower than those of metropolitan France.29 The number of 
people who had received secondary school education in French Polynesia was 
particularly 10w.3o In Wallis and Futuna, there existed a significant number of 
adults who had not progressed beyond primary school level. 3 I The educational 
disadvantages of the inhabitants of the French Pacific prevented most of them 
from obtaining public service work. Private sector opportunities that would 
enable unqualified workers to shape their own careers were limited. 
Unemployment in the Pacific TOM was aggravated by high local birth rates . 
. Every year, more school leavers arrived on the employment market than there 
were jobs on offer. Simply put, population increase in the Pacific TOM was 
outstripping territorial occupational growth, an employment problem France was 
also experiencing on a nationalleve1.32 The Eighth Plan detailed the importance 
of educating more locals to a higher level than was prevalent. The inhabitants of 
the French Pacific would need to be offered wider educational opportunities, 
including vocational training and better access to tertiary education. 
After summarising all these difficulties, the Eighth Plan concluded on an 
optimistic note. It was stated that for all the drawbacks still facing the DOM· 
TOM, living standards there had improved during the 1970s thanks to reforms 
undertaken by the State. Perhaps, it was suggested, this improvement was the 
very reason for the dissatisfactions and rising aspirations of the inhabitants of 
theDOM-IDM: 
[ •.• J en raison m~me de ce progres, les populations d'outre-mer aspirent 
desormais a un modele de vie qui implique que Ie developpement soit toume 
resolument vers Ie monde modeme. 
[ ... ] en raison des faibles capacites contributives locales, Ie developpement a 
ete surtout Ie fait de la metropole. Mais les donnees ont changes outre-mer: 
apr~s 35 aos d'une evolution en profondeur des structures economiques et 
sociales, it est desormais possible, voire indispensable, d'envisager aujourd'hui 
une plus grande participation des populations locales a leur propre 
devetoppemenl 
[ ••• J Et les actions que Ie Plan propose n'ont de sens que dans la mesure ou 
eUes contribuent a donner aux populations concemees les conditions de leur 
bonheur, de leur q,anouissement et de leur plenitude.33 
As presented here, the changes implemented during the presidency of 
Giscard d'Estaing formed a continuation of broader development trends 
undertaken in the DOM-TOM since the end of World War II. Under Giscard 
d'Estaing, the French Government recognised the importance of consulting with 
the inhabitants of the DOM-TOM to some extent in the formulation of 
administrative schemes. None the less, the impetus for change, and the direction 
that change would take, would continue to be determined in Paris. Consultation 
with local leaders did not equate with relinquishing control of funding or policy 
formulation. Whether this choice was preferable to decentralisation was to be 
partially tested with the granting under Mitterrand of greater autonomy to the 
DOM-TOM in the 1980s. What conclusions might be drawn from this process 
in the Pacific TOM will be considered in the following chapters of part 1. 
The important emphasis in the conclusion of the Eighth Plan was that the 
French Republic was continuing to promote modernity and social change in the 
DOM-TOM through the execution of benevolent reforms which promised 
greater happiness to their fortunate recipients. No hint was offered in the 
document's text that the shape and direction of government reform in the DOM-
TOM might not have been to the liking of some of its inhabitants. For the 
leaders of the FI, the prospect of New Caledonia remaining under French 
administration appeared stifling for Kanak aspirations to self-determination. In 
French Polynesia, supporters of the minority Maohi nationalist parties asserted 
that in some respects the living standards of Polynesians had deteriorated since 
World War II. Far from being benevolent, post-war change resulting from the 
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establishment of the nuclear testing programme in French Polynesia had, they 
argued, impacted negatively on the territory's economy and inhabitants.34 The 
Eighth Plan did not venture so far as to question the very presence or structure 
of French administration in the DOM-TOM, and could not really be expected to 
do so, but preferred instead to suggest that some adjustments of existing 
structures might serve to solve remaining problems. 
Parliamentary Debate 
The reference to Republican continuity in the conclusion to the Eighth 
Plan for the DaM-TOM echoed words that Dijoud had offered in the National 
Assembly on 10 June 1980.10 a debate on the DaM-TOM, he declared that "Ie 
Gouvernement poursuit activement et resolument dans l'outre-mer l'reuvre qui a 
ete accomplie par la Ve Republique depuis plus de vingt ans".35 Within this 
broad framework, it was suggested, all was proceeding well in the French 
Pacific. Rene de Branche, the UDF spokesman, offered this positive balance 
sheet of government achievements there: 
En Nouvene-Cal~onie, Ie nouveau slatut vote en 1976 a ~u une tees 
large approbation de la population et fonctionne de mani~re satisfaisante. Uoe 
majorit~ hom08~ne et constructive travaille en collaboration avec 
l'administration, lala realisation du plan de developpement a long terme qui est 
devenu la charte de ce temtoire. L'6poque, pourtant recente, ou nous assistions 
au decbainement des passions, au jeu irresponsable de certains partis et ou 
l'angoisse regnail face l un avenir incertain. est deja oubIioo. C'est un beau 
succ~s a porter a J'actif du Oouvernement, de Ia majorite et du Secretaire d'Etat 
charge de ces territoires. 
En Polynesie fran~aise. I'U.D.F. estime que Ie statul actnel du 
territoire est le meilleur cadre institutionnel possible. Le president de 
l'assemblee territoriale et ]e vice-president du Gouvernement ont d'aiUeurs 
constate recemment que ce statut avait Iargement permis a l'Etal et au territoire 
de travailler conjointment au developpement economique et social.r ... 1 
Dans les territoires d'outre-mer. comme dans les departements d'outre-
mer et en metropole, rU.D.F. veut construire une societe plus juste et plus 
fraternet1e.36 
De Branche's words exhibit an unabashed optimism for the future 
stability of New Caledonia and French Polynesia that events later in the 1980s 
and in the 1990s were to overshadow.37 The optimism characteristic ofDijoud, 
de Branche and of other UDF members in the Government, was shared neither 
by their Gaullist colleagues in the RPR, nor by representatives of the Left during 
this National Assembly debate. 
Although the speakers in the debate tended to generalise indiscriminately 
about the differing situations faced by the various components of the DOM-
TOM, the discussion provides a useful starting point for an examination of 
French party policy concerning the French Pacific in the 1980s. To what extent 
the stances of the PS, PC, RPR and UDF later contradicted or affirmed the 
generalised observations offered by their representatives in this debate will be 
highlighted in the three following chapters,38 
The DOM-TOM debate provided evidence of growing differences 
between RPR and UDF members of the majority in the National Assembly. 
Bernard Pons, the Secretary-General of the RPR, made an effort to disassociate 
his party from government reforms. Pons thereby implicitly rejected Dijoud'g 
statement affuming government policy continuity in relation to its Fifth Republic 
antecedents.39 After presenting a tribute to GauDist DOM-TOM administration 
under the Fifth Republic,40 Pons expressed the fundamental position of the 
RPR: continued links with the OOM-TOM represented "un element essentiel de 
la dignite et du rayonnement fran~ais". He added that the party had lIune autre 
politique" from that practised by Dijoud: 
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Chacun pourra se rendre compte que cette politique fonne un tout coherent par 
l'ensemble des aspects economiques, financiers, fiscaux, sociaux et culturels 
qu'elle recouvre; par la m6thode, celie de la decentralisation. 
Notre premier objectif est de lever les obstacles au d6veloppement et h 
l'am6nagement du territoire. Notre volont6 est de restaurer une confiance que 
trop d'incertitudes et, je Ie rep~te, trop d'erreurs, ont contribu6s h entamer 
dangereusement 41 
In what way his policy might differ from that of Dijoud was difficult to 
ascertain. Pons would not have the opportunity to test his capacity to restore 
confidence in the DOM-TOM until March 1986, when he was appointed 
Minister to the DOM-TOM. To what extent he achieved decentralisation in the 
Pacific TOM during his two years as Minister will be considered in more detail 
in chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
It was clear that the loss of confidence, uncertainties, and errors referred 
to by Pons was the supposed responsibility of UDF Ministers. Dijoud riposted 
by saying that the RPR too had been part of the Government under Giscard 
d'Estaing's presidency. If any blame deserved to be apportioned, some must 
belong to the RPR. 42 Pons appeared to be making the most of the debate on the 
DOM-TOM in order to steer the RPR out of association with the UDP in this 
policy area. It was a manreuvre repeated by other RPR Deputies in various areas 
of debate during the months preceding the presidential elections in 1981. For 
Jacques Chirac, the RPR leader, to compete successfully against Giscard 
d'Estaing's candidature in those elections, a platform of consensual agreement 
with the UDF was the least desirable basis upon which to run a campaign. An 
examination of the extent to which differences really existed between the RPR 
and the UDF over DOM-TOM policy in the late 1970s lies outside the scope of 
this work. But, as will be seen, this was not to be the last occasion when 
rhetoric driven by electoral considerations outweighed a more disinterested 
appreciation of the situation in the DOM-TOM. 
PS Deputies who spoke during the debate were also hostile to the 
optimistic pronouncements of the UDF representatives. They did however 
largely concur with the terms in which the Eighth Plan described the economic 
disadvantages of the DOM-TOM. Joseph Franceschi, the PS spokesman, 
summarised these problems in much the same manner as the Eighth Plan did, 
albeit in a less neutral and guarded tone, as befits an opposition representative. 
He mentioned the overwhelming of traditional agriculture and small businesses 
in the DOM-TOM by an inflated tertiary sector.43 He described how the cycle of 
rural migration linked to declining agricultural production, and expanding urban 
unemployment, was related to the collapse of local production. While agreeing 
with government analysis of the troubles of the DOM-TOM, Franceschi 
criticised government attempts to solve these difficulties. Unlike UDP 
representatives, Franceschi wondered aloud whether the aforementioned 
problems could be resolved. He questioned whether the inhabitants of the DOM-
TOM would ever attain the living standards of metropolitan France and 
contended that government initiatives in the DOM-TOM had failed: 
Malgr6 de gros moyens en hommes qualifi6s, en capitaux et en soutiens 
politiques, I'action gouvernementale a globalement echou6 dans l'outre-mer 
fran~is. Elle est en etTet inadapt6e et ne s'attaque pas aux causes. [ ... ] 
Certes, elle a pennis d'obtenir un certain nombre de resultats positifs 
que l'objectivit6 commande de ne pas meconnaitre: on y assiste etTectivement h 
une certaine croissance economique, meme si la modernisation s'accompagne 
de l'6limination des petits producteurs; it est vrai que Ie niveau de vie moyen 
augmente, meme si, en l'occurrence, la moyenne ne veut Tien dire tellement 
elle masque une dispersion des revenus; et it faut reconnaitre qu'it existe dans 
les d6partements et lerritoires d'outre-mer one bonne infrastructure tant scolaire 
que sanitaire, sociale et economique. Mais, meme si des 616ments ne sont pas 
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n~gatifs, com bien Ie requisitoire est-it accablant, tant l'khec est patent, la 
situation ~tant grave et les problemes fondamentaux·laisses sans solution aussi 
bien dans Ie domaine ~onomique que dans les secteurs social et culturel!44 
These lucid observations were to remain valid while PS representatives were in 
government during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
For the PS in 1980, reform in the DOM-TOM needed to advance beyond 
administrative tinkering of the sort envisaged by the Government. Franceschi 
talked of how it was necessary to eradicate the last vestiges of colonialism.45 He 
added that "une nouvelle politique economique, sociale et culturelle est a 
preconiser~ sans oublier qu'il faut rendre la parole aux interesses".46 The 
reforms that he deemed necessary to achieve this goal did not however differ 
substantially from the orientation of the Eighth Plan. Neither did his recognition 
of the importance of consulting the inhabitants of the DOM-TOM. In almost 
Giscardian terms, Franceschi emphasised the importance of regional 
development, as well as job creation, centred on an expansion of commercial 
agriculture, manufacturing and tourism.47 Only rhetorical differences existed 
between the PS reform proposals he described and government initiatives 
already under way. He mentioned, for example, the need for "une veritable 
refonne agraire" in the DOM-TOM, displaying the tacit assumption that Dijoud's 
agrarian reforms in New Caledonia and elsewhere were somehow less than 
authentic. Franceschi's employment of some Marxian class analysis of social 
differences in the DOM-TOM also distinguished the PS from the liberal strand in 
the Government's outlook. He aligned the PS on the side of the oppressed in 
their struggle against "les exploiteurs",48 although this proclamation represented 
evidence more of the differing ideological cultures of the UDF and the PS than 
of differing poJicy goals. 
The majority of the comments uttered by Franceschi neither constituted 
startling policy initiatives nor offered new insights. For instance, on the 
question of the possible independence of one or more of the DOM-TOM, he 
stated: 
Si une majorit~ authentique, notamment dans les territoires d'outre-mer. 
r~lame l'ind~pendance, it faut la lui donner sans d~lai. Mais la grande majorit6 
de la population, surtout dans les departements d'outre-mer, se d~Iare toujours 
francaise. II faut tenir compte de eette volont6 et de eet ~tat de fait.49 
These and other words prompted a cry of "Tres bien!" from Roch Pidjot, the 
sole FI parliamentary representative, but it is difficult to see in what respect the 
position of the PS differed from that of the UDF or the RPR on this issue. The 
precondition that Franceschi stated as necessary for territorial independence 
("une majorite authentique") was quite in keeping with constitutional practice 
that had been recognised and observed under Giscard d'Estaing and his Fifth 
Republic predecessors. 
Neither de Gaulle nor Giscard d'Estaing would have disagreed with PS 
policy touching on this question as it was outlined by Franceschi. Originally, 
article 76 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic permitted a French TOM to 
accede to independence if this option was advocated by a majority in its 
Territorial Assembly, but only within four months from the promulgation of the 
Constitution on 4 October 1958, as stipulated in article 91.50 Algeria's accession 
to independence in 1962, after a referendum which indicated that the majority of 
Algerian voters wished to relinquish French nationality, pushed back the 
barriers of this constitutional limitation. Not only had the deadline in article 76 
passed, it was in any case inapplicable to French Algeria. Under the Fifth 
Republic French Algeria was comprised of a number of Departments, and was 
therefore constitutionally ineligible for independence. In allowing Algeria to 
secede, de Gaulle set a precedent for change. Subsequently a new interpretation 
of the Constitution was formulated in 1966 by the Gaullist Minister Rene 
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Capitant.S1 Known as the Capitant Doctrine, this interpretation argued that 
article 53 of the Constitution, which mentioned that "les populations interessees" 
had to be consulted over any change in status of French territory,52 overrode 
article 76. It was extrapolated that should it become apparent that a local majority 
in some part of the Republic might favour independence from France, the 
French Government should consult this group via a popular referendum. If the 
majority of voters in such a referendum backed independence, then France 
would relinquish its sovereignty over the territory in question. This 
interpretation gained widespread acceptance in government circles.53 Using this 
new approach, France granted independence to the Comoros and Djibouti in 
1975 and 1977 respectively. Apart from these two TOM, no other part of the 
Republic has gained sovereignty under the Capitant Doctrine. The limits of the 
doctrine would be tested in the unlikely event of a DOM pressing for 
independence. 
Nor did Pons disagree with Franceschi's observation about the 
geostrategic importance of the DOM-TOM to France. The Socialist 
representative stated: 
GrAce It elles [les DOM-TOM], la France possede la troisi~me zone 
~onomique maritime du monde. [ ... J Ces d6partements et territoires d'outre-
mer, enlin, ont une importance stra~gique et poJitique que nul ne conteste.54 
It is apparent from the speech made by Franceschi that in 1980 the PS 
did not in any way advocate the abandonment of the DOM-TOM. Overall, the 
PS policy summary he provided was uncontroversial. Social reform was 
promised, although such reform had already begun under Dijoud. On the basis 
of the comments offered, it was difficult to discern how any future Socialist 
administration proposed to break fundamentally with previous policy conduct in 
the OOM-TOM. 
To the left of the PS, PC Deputies offered the most scathing critiques of 
government policy. Unlike the PS, the PC was not convinced of the necessity of 
retaining French control over the DOM-TOM. Since its foundation in 1920, the 
PC had favoured the concept of France decolonising its possessions.55 Maxime 
Gremetz, speaking for the party, went so far as to conclude that in supporting 
links with the DOM-TOM, the three leaders of the UDF, RPR and of the PS 
demonstrated fundamental agreement: "MM. Giscard d'Estaing, Chirac et 
Mitterrand sont d'accord pour refuser aux peuples d'outre-mer de decider 
librement de leur sort. "56 
This remark was overstated, but contained a grain of truth. In so far as 
they were unprepared to abandon constitutional precedent, none of the three 
were prepared to do as Gremetz suggested. Implicit in his words was the 
assumption that, given the opportunity, the PC would offer minority groups in 
the DOM-TOM their sovereignty. To date, the PC has not had the electoral 
strength to do so. It is highly improbable it will ever have sufficient votes to 
exercise a determining role in overturning the constitutional status quo. The PC 
was the only major party in the National Assembly which was hostile to French 
ties to the DOM-TOM. Communist Deputies were consequently isolated from 
exerting any major influence on DOM-TOM policy throughout the 1980s. 
RegardJess, the PC repeatedly criticised the UDF, the RPR and the PS for their 
refusal to grant independence to electoral minorities in the DOM-TOM, as the 
case of New Caledonia illustrated. 
The end of Giscard d'Estaing's presidency in 1981 created possibilities 
for new directions in DOM-TOM policy and thus for change in the French 
Pacific. Some aspects ofUDF, RPR. PS and PC policies mentioned above were 
modified under changing circumstances in the years that followed. But the 
fundamental positions of the four main parties as expressed in 1980 did not 
change and exerted considerable influence on political debate concerning the 
Pacific TOM from 1981. The UDF maintained its focus on the importance of 
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promoting state-guided liberal refonns and modernisation that would close the 
gap in the standard of living between the French Pacific and metropolitan 
France. In keeping with its conception of Republican tradition, the RPR 
regarded itself as the more legitimate guarantor of the well-being of the Pacific 
TOM. Contemptuous of Giscardian and Socialist refonns, it advocated a fonn 
of decentralisation (notably in New Caledonia) as the most efficacious method 
of restoring local confidence in the Republic. The PS also expressed contempt 
for refonns under Giscard d'Estaing, and desired greater change in the French 
Pacific. The Socialists claimed solidarity with the disadvantaged there, although 
they did not initially have any refonn proposals for these people that were 
markedly different from those already set in motion. Lastly, the PC acted as 
critic to the reformist approaches of all three of the other major parties, 
continuing its tradition of entrenched and simplistic anti-colonialism. 
Such was the Parisian political backdrop to France's Pacific territories in 
the months preceding the election of Mitterrand in 1981. The extent to which the 
Parisian view of the Pacific TOM was prompted to change in the years that 
followed, and the effects of such change, constitute the subjects of the following 
three chapters. 
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"Art. 91. - Les institutions de la RepubJique prevues par 1a presente Constitution 
seronl mises en place dans Ie delai de qualre mois a com pIer de sa promulgation." Cited in Le 
Mong Nguyen: La Constitution de la Ve Repub/ique pp.457, 460. 
51 O. Duhamel & Y. Meny: Dicliomraire constitutionnel p.58. 
52 "Nulle cession, nul echange, nulle adjonction de territoire n'est val able sans Ie 
consenternent des populations interessees." Cited in Nguyen: La Constitution de La Ve 
Repuh/ique p.454. 
53 See Jacques Ziller: Les DaM-TOM pp.141-142. 
54.T0. COlllptes rendlls. Debats de l'Assel1lblee Nationale II juin 1980 p.1663. 
55 See Jacques DaJloz: La guerre d'lndochine 1945-1954 p.30. 
56 Le Monde 12 juin 1980. 
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Table 1. New Caledonia. Basic Information 
Land Area: 18,S7Skm2. 
Maritime Zone: I,4S0,OOOkm2. 
Population (1989): 164,173. 
Average Population Density: 8.8 inhabitants per km2. 
Currency: F CFP (IFF = 18.18.F CFP). 
GOP (1988): 224,498MF CFP. 
Average GOP per capita" (1988): 1,372,061F CFP. 
Principal Economic 
Activities: 
Administrative Status: 
Political Representation: 
Nickel mining, tourism. 
French Overseas Territory. 
One Senator in the French 
Senate. Two Deputies in the 
French National Assembly. 
Source: ITSEE: Tableaux de I'Economie CaLedonienne 1991. 
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2. New Caledonia 
L 'Etat doit veiller a effacer toute trace de colonialisme. 
President Mitterrand, speaking to the Council of Ministers, 
14 May 1986.1 
En ecoutant Mitterrand, j'ai eu Ie sentiment qu'll ne connaissait pas 
Ie dossier. Pour lui, il y a un probleme colonial, et moije pense 
que ce n'est pas Ie cas. 
Bernard Pons, RPR Minister of the DOM-TOM in 1986, recalling 
Mitterrand's speech.2 
The Advent of Mitterrand 
Mitterrand's idealistic remark concerning New Caledonia and its derisory 
commentary by Pons are symptomatic of the conflicting responses to the 
territory made by French political leaders of the Left and Right during most of 
the 1980s. In evidence are two different frames of reference. Mitterrand employs 
a term which is denied any relevance by Pons. Lack of consensus on the validity 
of ideologically loaded words such as 'colonialism' provoked much similar 
disagreement among French politicians in the 1980s. 
The series of periodically violent confrontations that accompanied the 
rise of the Kanak nationalist movement in New Caledonia prompted much 
polemicising in Parisian political circles. Conflicting definitions of key concepts 
such as 'racism', 'equality', 'liberty' and Justice' were applied by leaders and 
commentators of all political persuasions in debate over New Caledonia.3 
Socialist, liberal and conservative rhetoric all invoked the traditions of the 
French Republic, European 'progress', and 'democracy', which liberals and 
conservatives used in contrast with Melanesian 'tribalism', 'primitivism' and 
'terrorism'.4 Leftist hyperbole employed negatively charged words such as 
'coloniaHsm' and 'oppression' to describe the New Caledonian situation. These 
words were contrasted with the desirability of Melanesian 'liberation'. If any 
meaningful analysis is to be made of French government policy in New 
Caledonia, care must be exercised in distinguishing this political rhetoric from 
reality. 
The sophistic tendencies of French political leaders were not the 
monopoly of anyone party. Moreover such declamation was by no means 
foreign to New Caledonian political debate in the years preceding these troubles. 
The French presidential election campaigns conducted in New Caledonia in April 
and May 1981 are revelatory in this respect. During this period the leaders of the 
conservative RPCR, the New Caledonian political party with the biggest 
support, sought to discourage votes for Mitterrand. After the poor national 
showing in the first round of Jacques Chirac, the RPR candidate, the RPCR 
stressed the necessity to re-elect Giscard d'Estaing. Accordingly, a vote for 
Giscard d'Estaing would help preserve the stability of territorial institutions, 
whi1e a vote for Mitterrand was portrayed as a step toward undermining those 
institutions.s In displaying opposition to change by largely voting for Giscard 
d'Estaing in the second round on 10 May 1981, the New Caledonian electorate 
proved to be at odds with the national majority vote for Mitterrand. (Tables 2 
and 3) The national political mandate for the Socialists, contrasting with the 
territorial block behind the RPCR, was symptomatic of the gulf between political 
outlooks at national and territorial level from 1981. Differences between the 
RPCR and the Socialists were to form a major barrier to the construction of 
policy consensus between Paris and Noumea in the 1980s. 
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The RPCR painted an uncertain future for the tenitory should Mitterrand 
be elected. RPCR leaders sought to discredit Mitterrand in the eyes of the 
predominantly conservative New Caledonian electorate by linking him with two 
concepts viewed negatively by its members. The first of these concepts was 
'change'. To accentuate the threatening image of possible change under a future 
Socialist President, 'Marxism', the second negative concept, was invoked. 
Jacques Lafleur, the RPR Deputy for New Caledonia and one of the founders of 
the RPCR, predicted the imminent arrival of Soviet style administration for 
France should the PS receive widespread support in the legislative elections.6 
This prospect was abhorrent to New Caledonian conservatives, partly due to the 
anti-colonialist stance of the PC. 
It may be observed in hindsight that predictions offered by Lafleur 
concerning a Communist takeover of French institutions were erroneous. There 
existed speculation early in 1981 that a Socialist Government under Mitterrand 
would be constrained to make concessions to the PC in order to maintain 
majority backing in the National Assembly. Such an eventuality did not come to 
pass. The PS obtained a sufficiently large majority in the French legislative 
elections of June 1981 to forestall this scenario. (Table 4) The electoral decline 
of the PC became apparent in the elections and has continued into the 1990s. 
(Tables 9, 13, 15, 21) If at national level the threat of Communism was 
exaggerated, at territorial level this was even more the case. No Communist 
party had been present in New Caledonia since the 1940s.7 Only marginal New 
Caledonian support was evident for Georges Marchais, the PC candidate in the 
first round of the presidential elections. As he received but 3.40% of the 
territorial vote (see Table 3), it could not be said that a local PC revival was 
imminent. The gap between New Caledonian political assessment and reality 
could indeed be wide. 
The threats supposedly posed to New Caledonia by change and Marxism 
were to be repeated with some frequency by local conservatives after the national 
successes of the PS in the French legislative elections. Of the two concepts, the 
prospect of change proved to be the real challenge to conservative interests in the 
territory. Just what forms change would take in New Caledonia were a Socialist 
Government to be elected was not clear to the territorial electorate early in 1981. 
There were three principal reasons for this. 
Firstly, direct PS representation and support in New Caledonia were 
absent. Unlike the RPR, which had maintained close ties with the RPCR from 
the time of the latter's formation in 1978 (RPCR representatives in the National 
Assembly and Senate sit in the RPR group), the Socialist presence in New 
Caledonia in 1981 was marginal and fragmented. The PSC had been established 
by local European activists in 1976,8 although it did not have any formal link 
with its metropolitan counterpart of the sort the RPCR enjoyed with the RPR.9 
After the PSC became a member of the FI in 1979, its influence was confined to 
that of a minor member in the Melanesian nationalist coalition.10 The socialist 
vote formed the expression of a minority of predominantly European voters in 
the western Grande Terre. Melanesian UC votes for Mitterrand and the PS were 
to be of greater significance during the elections of 1981. (See Table 5) Far from 
strengthening the position of the PSC, Mitterrand's victory in the presidential 
elections served to undermine it. A fledgeling pro-Mitterrand party, the RCMP, 
sprang up in the wake of his success, proclaiming the imminence of socialist 
ascendancy in the territory.11 The result was a split in New Caledonia's already 
marginal socialist vote, caused by divisions evident in the PSC.12 
The main link for the FI with PS representatives in Paris was through 
Pidjot, the coalition's only parliamentary representative there.l3 A senior 
member of the UC, the oldest and largest party within the FI, Pidjot had been a 
Deputy for New Caledonia since 1964. Although Pidjot did not belong to the 
Socialist group in the National Assembly, he did have direct access to PS 
Deputies. Owing to its parliamentary representation, its stable organisation, and 
Table 2. French Presidential Elections, 1981. 
National Results 1 
First Round: 26 April 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Giscard d'Estaing (UDF) 
Mitterrand (PS) 
Chirac (RPR) 
Marchais (PC) 
Others 
Second Round: 10 May 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Mitterrand 
Giscard d'Estaing 
36,266,560 
29,402,235 
81.07% 
28,912,416 
Votes 
8,181,538 
7,486,139 
5,206,477 
4,457,137 
3,616,784 
36,351,056 
31,208,353 
85.85% 
30,321,723 
Votes 
15,700,287 
14,621,436 
Source: Le Monde 28 avril, 12 mai 1981. 
1 Not including French votes cast in foreign countries. 
% of votes 
cast 
27.83 
25.47 
17.71 
15.16 
12.3 
% of votes 
cast 
50.31 
46.85 
Table 3. French Presidential Elections, 1981. 
New Caledonian Results 
First Round: 26 April 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Giscard d'Estaing (UDF) 
Mitterrand (PS) 
Chirac (RPR) 
Marchais (PC) 
Others 
Second Round: to May 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Giscard d'Estaing 
Mitterrand 
73,279 
48,401 
66.05% 
48,076 
Votes 
23,471 
11,218 
8,479 
1,647 
2,392 
73,086 
52,719 
72.13 % 
52,289 
Votes 
34,250 
8,039 
% of votes 
cas t 
48.49 
23.18 
17.52 
3.40 
4.94 
% of yotes 
cast 
64.97 
34.22 
Source: A. Clark: "New Caledonia and the new France" in 
New Zealand International Review September/October 
1981 pp.25-26. 
33 
its large membership, the UC was best placed to negotiate on behalf of the Fl. 
Considering that such PS policy as existed on New Caledonia was not 
articulated from a unified local base with formal links to the metropolitan party, 
and taking into account the conservative voting preferences of the majority of the 
territorial electorate, it is not surprising that votes for socialist parties in the 
territory were low. 
The second hindrance to wider local understanding of PS policy on New 
Caledonia in 1981 was that policy's lack of depth when considered alongside the 
rest of Socialist policy. The PS had not formulated any detailed reform 
proposals for the administration of the territory. New Caledonia remained far 
from the forefront of metropolitan French political debate in 1981. The policy 
orientation of the PS, as of its opponents, was devoted to questions of more 
immediate concern to metropolitan French voters. Land reform, and the rise of 
Kanak nationalism in New Caledonia appeared to be marginal, parochial 
concerns when viewed from Paris, where national unemployment, social 
welfare reform and economic recovery constituted more pressing issues. Neither 
the PS election manifesto, finalised at the Creteil party congress in January 
1981,14 nor Mitterrand's accompanying presidential election manifesto (the "110 
propositions pour la France") made any specific mention of New Caledonia.15 
This policy gap did not augur well for either the PS or New Caledonia. PS 
leaders were to spend their five years in government from 1981 belatedly and 
not very successfully formulating rushed legislation in response to increasing 
tensions in the territory. 
The third barrier to wider New Caledonian comprehension of PS aims 
was, paradoxically. its main advocate in the territory; the Fl. What little PS 
policy on New Caledonia existed tended to be ftltered through the intermediary 
agency of PI representatives. PI declarations in favour of Mitterrand and the PS 
in the elections of 1981, and the PI interpretation of PS policy for the territory, 
hinged on the question of independence. The electoral support of the FI for the 
PS rested on certain statements offered by the Socialists which appeared to 
support New Caledonian self-determination. The negative response to the PS 
offered by the New Caledonian conservative majority stemmed directly from the 
FI's promotion of the PS as the party most likely to give the territory its 
sovereignty. To ascertain what PS policy implied for the future of New 
Caledonia, a distinction must be drawn between what that policy actually stated 
and the interpretation placed on it by the Fl. 
Initial contacts between the FI and the PS involved no policy ambiguity. 
The first links between the two formations were consolidated in November 
1979, several months after the PI formed to contest the territorial elections in 
July of that year. Pierre Declercq, the UC Secretary-General, was instrumental 
in setting up a meeting in Paris on 9 November between UC leaders and the PS. 
Declercq and Pidjot met with Pierre Beregovoy, then a member of the PS 
executive,16 and issued the following joint communique: 
Le parti socialiste et Ie Front independantiste condamnent la politique 
colonialiste que la majorite mene en Nouvelle-CalMonie, qui se traduit 
particuJierement par l'opposition l l'emancipation politique. Le Front 
independantiste a exprime la juste revendication d'independance du peuple 
canaque et sa volonte de garantir les droits fondamentaux de l'homme dans 
l'independance. Le parti socialiste a exprime sa pleine solidarite au Front 
independantiste dans la lutte qu'it mene contre la politique de Ja droite et it a 
reaffirme sa volonte de soutenir et de garantir Ie droit du peuple canaque a 
d&:ider librement de son avenir.l7 
This communique was couched in the classic polemical style of the 
French Left and employed ideologically charged terminology of the variety noted 
earlier. It should be noted that at this time the FI did not confine itself to 
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obtaining PS backing for its claims. A similar statement was signed between the 
PI and the PC) 8 
The guarantee by the PS to the "peuple canaque" of a freely detennined 
future was clear and unambiguous in its support of Kanak self-detennination. 
However the statement made no mention of the non-Kanak majority in New 
Caledonia. What would become of the majority of the New Caledonian 
population that was content to stay French? It was this aspect of the declaration 
which aroused the ire of the RPR and UDF, and was to give them grounds for 
pointing out that the communique advocated an undemocratic policy which 
would go against the interests of a majority of the local population. Pierre 
Messmer, a former Prime Minister and the RPR Deputy for Moselle, commented 
on the declaration in May 1984: 
Autrement dit. les socialistes promettaient Ie pouvoir et I'independance A une 
minorite, sans se soucier de la majorite [en Nouvelle-CaIedonieJ. Bel exemple 
de democratiel 19 
However Melanesians had become a minority in New Caledonia as a 
consequence of government policy under the Fifth Republic. From the 1950s, 
and particularly during the nickel boom of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Paris 
had approved of the migration to the territory undertaken mainly by metropolitan 
French and Wallisians. In 1972 Messmer himself had described the territory as 
one of the last 'colonies de peuplement' in the world where a developed nation 
could settle its inhabitants. As Prime Minister that year he advocated entrenching 
French influence there through a "massive immigration" of metropolitan French 
citizens.2o From a Kanak nationalist perspective, this advocacy was not 
necessarily democratic either, in that French migration to the territory drastically 
diminished the likelihood of New Caledonia becoming independent via a one-
person one-vote self-determination referendum. 
It was this immigration that the joint communique of September 1979 
made reference to when condemning the "politique colonialiste" of the majority 
implemented in New Caledonia. In recognising the right of "Ie peuple kanak", as 
opposed to the wider New Caledonian population, to claim sovereignty, the PS 
accepted the PI perspective on this issue rather than that of Messmer. PS 
endorsement of the right of the inhabitants of the DOM-TOM to accede to 
independence dated back to the party's first government programme, issued in 
1972.21 The Socialist Project, a party manifesto adopted in January 1980, 
restated this policy in terms more favorable to the FI.22 The joint communique 
between the PI and the PS went further than either of these general policies in 
offering specific recognition to the FI as the representative of the "peuple 
canaque" and in expressing "sa pleine solidarite" with its push for sovereignty. 
Mitterrand's own position on the possibility of New Caledonia becoming 
independent was less clear. Speaking in the National Assembly on 23 November 
1979, he appeared to support the message of the joint communique issued earlier 
that month, without stating precisely where he stood on the issue of Kanak 
independence.23 
Statements by Mitterrand on New Caledonia, like those of the PS, were 
neither abundant nor detai1ed before the elections in 1981. No conclusive 
evidence existed that Mitterrand supported the independence programme of the 
FI before 1981. While he affirmed the right of the TOM to accede to 
independence in lei et Maintenant,24 a book published in 1980 which outlined 
his political views, he did not clarify under what conditions, although he 
probably meant under established constitutional arrangements whereby 
independence could be gained through a majority vote in a self-determination 
referendum. Mitterrand did not address the question of whether he was 
amenable to granting independence to a territorial electoral minority. 
Consequently, PI campaigning for Mitterrand was not iriitially very vigorous. 
Table 4. French Legislative Ejections, 1981. 
National Results 
First and Second Rounds: 14, 21 June 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
36,257,433 
25,508,800 
70.35% 
25,141,190 Valid votes 
Party 
pst 
RPR 
lIF 
PC 
Others 
Votes 
9,432,362 
5,23 t ,269 
4,827,437 
4,065,540 
1,584,582 
% of votes 
cas t 
36.98 
20.51 
18.92 
15.94 
6.21 
Sea ts 
269 
83 
61 
44 
3 1 
Source: L'annee politique, economique et .sociale en France 
1'981 p.141. 
1 Here and in the other tables, PS is assumed to include not only the PS 
proper but also allied parties of the Left. 
Table 5. French Legislative Elections, 1981. 
New Caledonian Results 
First Round: 14 June 
First constituency 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Pidjot (UC) 
Wetta (RPCR) 
Naisseline 
(LKS/FULK/PSC) 
Cherrier (FNSC) 
Haudra (RCMP) 
Second constituency 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Lafleur (RPCR) 
Camerlynck (FNSC) 
Burck (UC) 
Chivot (CSC) 
Orezzoli (RCMP) 
Others 
(east coast and Loyalty Islands) 
23,863 
13,316 
55.80% 
13,193 
Votes % of votes 
5,160 38.75 
3,419 25.68 
3,223 24.20 
1,248 9.37 
143 1.07 
(west coast and Noumea) 
49,504 
30,542 
61. 70% 
29,977 
Votes % of votes 
16,289 53.33 
5,549 18.17 
4,486 14.69 
1,570 5.14 
1,068 3.50 
1,015 3.32 
Sec.:ond Round: 21 .lune 
First constituency 
Registered voters 23,854 
Votes cast 15,201 
Turnout 63.73% 
Valid votes 15,117 
Candidate Votes % of votes 
Pidjot (UC) 6,348 41,76 
Wetts (RPCR) 5,252 34.55 
Naisseline 
(LKSIFULK/PSC) 3,517 23.14 
cast 
cast 
cast 
Source: us Nouvelles Catedoniennes 15 juin 1981, 22 juin 1981. 
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The UC urged its members to vote for Mitterrand in the first round of the 
presidential elections, but did not mobilise to campaign for Mitterrand until 
immediately before the second round.25 The FULK urged its followers to 
abstain in both rounds due to the lack of debate offered by election candidates on 
the issue of independence.26 Other FI members left to their followers the 
decision of whether to vote for either Mitterrand or Marchais, or to abstain.21 
With the additional exception of the unconvinced Palika, most of the PI 
campaigned for Mitterrand prior to the second round of the elections. In doing 
so, the majority of the PI was affIrming its rejection of continuity under Giscard 
d'Estaing, opposition to the RPCR line, and the hope for social change should 
Mitterrand be elected. 
Whether such social change would lead to independence for New 
Caledonia was an issue which Mitterrand chose not to address. Pidjot received a 
letter from Mitterrand after the first round that illustrates the presidential 
candidate's care in avoiding the question of independence. The emphasis in the 
letter to Pidjot was on social reform.28 While affirming the need for social 
justice and the righting of neo-colonialist wrongs, no mention was made of self-
determination. 
Declercq asserted after Mitterrand's victory in the second round that for 
the VC, independence was not a campaign issue, and that the debate on that 
subject still lay ahead.29 However, Pidjot clearly regarded any projected PS 
territorial reforms as the first step toward an independent New Caledonia.30 
Although during the legislative elections the PS displayed no prolixity on the 
topic of its past declaration of solidarity with Kanak nationalism, neither did it 
offer any indication that it had abandoned this commitment. The Government of 
Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy remained silent on this issue in the fust few 
months after its appointment in June 1981.31 
The advent of Mitterrand as President and the installation of the Fifth 
Republic's first Socialist Government implied an uncertain future for New 
Caledonia, one in which existing territorial administrative structures were to be 
transformed, although not to a prearranged agenda, under the new Socialist 
order. To that extent, the cited predictions both of local conservative leaders and 
of Kanak nationalists were correct. That the arrival of a PS administration in 
Paris necessarily implied the beginning of a territorial transition to independence, 
as local conservatives feared, and as Kanak nationalists hoped, was by no 
means certain. Neither was it certain that major political parties in New 
Caledonia, including the FI, would be receptive to changes implemented from 
Paris. 
Whatever specific reforms for the territory the Mauroy Government was 
contemplating, circumstances were predisposed against their positive reception 
in Noumea. New Caledonia's Territorial Assembly was dominated by elements 
hostile to the PS: the conservative RPCR and the liberal FNSC.32 The FNSC 
had backed Giscard d'Estaing and the UDF in the elections of 1981. The 
disparate minority elements within and outside the PI which had campaigned for 
the Socialists to varying degrees (or not at all) did not constitute a stable platform 
for the promotion of Socialist reforms. Were the Mauroy Government to show 
any hesitation in discussing conditions for New Caledonian self-determination, 
Kanak critics had the potential to be just as vehement as those of the FNSC and 
of the RPCR should independence be pushed to the centre of political debate. 
Whatever course the new Government might choose in New Caledonia, it ran 
the risk of alienating either the greater or smaller part of the territorial electorate. 
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The Giscardian Heritage: New Caledonia in 1981 
New Caledonia had become a TOM in 1946 under the Fourth Republic, 
an event of pivotal imponance in the shaping of its political and social 
development until 1981. It was under the Fourth Republic that local party 
politics took form. The impetus for this formation was provided by newly 
enfranchised Melanesian voters, represented by the uc.33 UC demands for 
social, land, and administrative reforms in the 1950s marked the starting point of 
political events that led to the rise of Melanesian nationalism from the middle of 
the 1970s. The greater territorial autonomy advocated by the UC in the 1950s 
received recognition in 1956 under the 'loi-cadre Defferre', a Socialist 
Government administrative reform promulgated in Paris which aimed to facilitate 
the transition of France's African TOM to greater autonomy, but which equally 
applied to its Pacific TOM. After 96.51 % of voters in New Caledonia backed 
continued adherence to France in a self-determination referendum held in 
September 1958,34 the internal administrative autonomy the Defferre law ceded 
was revoked under the Fifth Republic. 
The pace of liberal reform slowed from 1958. In the 1960s conservative 
political groupings coalesced into a united front which came to dominate local 
government at the same time as the UC experienced increasing internal divisions 
and a loss of confidence. De Gaulle reduced local administrative control and 
centralised local government around the High Commissioner, the state 
representative to the territory. The Billotte laws of 1969 accentuated the trend 
toward centralisation by est~blishing 32 communes administered according to 
metropolitan French law. Formerly the administration of communes had been a 
direct territorial responsibility. The Billotte laws in addition passed control of 
mineral resources to Paris. The nickel boom from 1969 to 1972 accentuated the 
stifling of UC plans for greater territorial autonomy. Migrating French citizens 
from mainland France and the other two Pacific TOM who arrived to partake of 
New Caledonian economic prosperity furthered the reduction of the local 
Melanesian population to minority status,35 and thereby entrenched the electoral 
power of ]oca] conservative parties. These immigrants to New Caledonia 
shunned the political agendas of local Melanesians and displayed support for 
conservative parties led predominantly by Caldoches. 
The frustration of Melanesian aspirations to greater social and 
administrative participation in a more autonomous New Caledonia during the 
1960s and 1970s led an increasing number of Melanesians to abandon hope of 
developing their identity within the French Republic. The frustration of Kanak 
demands for internal reform caused the leaders of those in the UC and its break-
away parties in the late 1970s to accept that Melanesian particularism could only 
be recognised through independence from France. The birth of Kanak 
nationalism occurred just before Paris opted for a programme of liberal reforms 
in New Caledonia, intended to recognise at least some Melanesian aspirations. 
For Kanak nationalists, Paris's recognition of the desirability of change 
represented a belated response that offered them little. 
The Socialist electoral victories of 1981 effectively brought Dijoud's 
reforms in New Caledonia to an end just over two years after their introduction 
there. Too few of the Dijoud Plan's goals had been achieved in the interim to 
permit a balanced assessment of it. The pattern of a newly appointed 
Government in Paris cutting short the policy activity of its predecessor in New 
Caledonia was to be repeated later in the 1980s. However some analysis of the 
plan can serve as a basis for comparison with subsequent reforms. 
The Dijoud Plan was presented to the New Caledonian Territorial 
Assembly on 21 February 1979. The ten year development plan proposed a 
series of reforms which would assist local economic expansion, and aimed to 
eliminate some of the social inequalities Melanesians faced. The UC criticised 
the plan as inadequate. Like the redefiniton of the territorial statute in 1976,36 the 
Table 6. New Caledonia's Exports and Imports 1980-1990 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Exports(MF CFP) 29,556 33,194 27,124 23,511 35.862 48,618 24,165 24,832 67,237 75,003 46,413 
Imports(MF CFP) 35,041 40,435 43,732 42,202 49,605 52,648 59,382 63,353 65,386 88,608 86,929 
Coverage 
Rate (%) 84.3 82.1 62.0 55.7 72.3 92.3 40.7 39.2 102.8 84.6 53.4 
Sources: ITSEE TEC 1988 p.201, TEC 1991 p.20? 
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Dijoud Plan did not devolve existing state administrative responsibilities for 
New Caledonia. Oijoud's assertion that New Caledonia was underpopulated and 
should be opened to more immigration37 was not well received by Kanak 
nationalists, who resented the fact that the Melanesian population had already 
been reduced to a minority in the territory. Another contentious point was 
represented by Oijoud's assumption that acceptance of the plan by the Territorial 
Asembly would imply a commitment to a ten-year moratorium on the question of 
New Caledonian independence.38 This assumption was unacceptable to the DC 
and the other Melanesian parties which were to form the PI in July 1979. In 
recognition of some of the advantageous aspects the plan held for Melanesians, 
the DC abstained from voting on the plan rather than directly opposing it. 
Territorial Councillors from other pro-independence parties took their opposition 
further by boycotting the assembly debate. In spite of this opposition, the 
Territorial Assembly approved the Dijoud Plan through the support of the 
RPCR, the FNSC and the PSC.39 These representatives were receptive to the 
economic assistance the plan offered to New Caledonia, and regarded a 
moratorium on self-determination positively. 
In response to an economic decline in New Caledonia, territorial trade 
growth represented a major concern of the plan. By 1979, the nickel boom had 
receded into the past. Metallurgy and mining, the single most important 
productive sector of the territory's economy, was in decline due to the instability 
of the international market. This trend was reflected in falling New Caledonian 
production and through its declining percentage of territorial GDP: 27.53% in 
1974; 15.93% in 1979.40 The average price of a kilogram of nickel fell from 
around 125F CFP in 1974, to a low of around 70F CFP in 1978, before 
climbing to a short-lived peak of about 140F CFP in 1979 that tailed off in years 
to follow.41 These variations influenced the fate of the territorial economy in that 
period. Total annual GOP in New Caledonia dropped to 95% of the 1974 GOP 
total in 1978, reached 101 % of the 1974 total in 1979, and declined to 93% of 
the 1974 total by 1981.42 As territorial economic fortunes were largely 
dependent on nickel exports, this decline was troublesome for New Caledonia. 
The Dijoud Plan expressed the need for local economic diversification 
and for the creation of import substitution industries in terms which were to be 
repeated on a larger scale in the Eighth Plan for the DOM-TOM. An agriCUltural 
revival in New Caledonia was projected.43 The importance of increasing tourism 
in the territory was outlined. Mining would be diversified through the 
introduction of foreign investment, while other industries had to be encouraged 
to increase territorial self-sufficiency. The Plan also pointed out the desirability 
of exploiting local maritime resources. 
The means to these ends foreshadowed the orientation of the Eighth 
Plan. A diversification of New Caledonian economic activities would be 
undertaken through government initiatives such as the establishment of credit 
facilities,44 encouragement of foreign investment in mining and fisheries,45 and 
the improvement of the territorial educational, technical and administrative 
infrastructure.46 New Caledonia would be aided in its economic expansion by 
the development of closer economic relations with its Pacific neighbours, who 
would provide it with export markets.47 The initiative for these links would, of 
necessity, have to originate from Paris. Foreign relations remained the 
prerogative of the State rather than of the Territorial Assembly. 
By 1981, only the beginnings of these reforms had been set in motion. 
The effects of the Dijoud Plan on the New Caledonian economy in 1980 and 
1981 were not remarkable. In that period, the local balance of trade did not 
improve. The value of exports covered 84.3% of the value of imports in 1980, 
and 82.1 % in 1981.48 The territory depended on state subsidies to stabilise its 
balance of payments. However generous by the standards of the day, the 
territorial budget proposed by Dijoud in February 1979 of 130 billion CFP for 
the next ten years would have been inadequate in addressing this ongoing 
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balance of payments problem.49 (Table 6) Government spending in New 
Caledonia was to outstrip this projection in the 1980s.50 
Dijoud's recognition of the inhabitants of New Caledonia was a major 
policy innovation for a French Minister, as it included land. cultural and social 
policy renovations as well as administrative reforms, although it entailed certain 
conceptual limits. While Dijoud hoped to encourage New Caledonians to 
participate in the development of their territory, he refrained from going so far as 
delegating greater administrative powers to them.51 The Dijoud Plan, like the 
Eighth Plan, failed to answer the question of how meaningful local participation 
in territorial policy formation was to take place while Paris retained executive 
and financial control. Dijoud and his ministerial colleagues were not prepared to 
reduce the powers of the French State, possibly because greater autonomy might 
allow territorial leaders to steer reform in a direction deemed undesirable in 
Paris. 
The manner in which the Dijoud Plan addressed the interests of 
indigenous Melanesians is of particular importance in the context of the 
increasing vehemence of Kanak calls from the late 1970s and into the 1980s for 
greater recognition of their identity and problems. The unwillingness of Dijoud 
to respond to the demands of Kanak parties to their satisfaction contributed to 
the foundation of the PI and its call for more radical reform in greater recognition 
of indigenous particularism. 
Part of the objection of the PI to the Dijoud Plan resided in the treatment 
of the recognition of Melanesian cultural identity. Here the interests of 
Melanesian cultural particularism clashed with stress on cultural pluralism within 
a dominant French culture. Dijoud's plan was the first for New Caledonia which 
recognised and supported Melanesian culture as well as local European culture, 
but it did so within the wider context of establishing recognition of ethnic 
plurality in the territory.52 Dijoud's aim was to promote Melanesian culture 
while considering it a component within the Fifth Republic.53 Melanesian 
culture would be encouraged, not as the basis of Kanak nationhood, as Kanak 
parties would have preferred, but as a regional culture, in the same way as Paris 
reluctantly began giving recognition to Breton, Basque, Occitan and Corsican 
culture in metropolitan France in the early 19708. In much the same fashion as in 
Brittany, Euskadie, Occitanie and Corsica. indigenous culture in New Caledonia 
would be encouraged through the organisation of indigenous language courses, 
the funding of traditional artisanal activities, and through the establishment of 
cultural centres.54 Another target of the plan was to consolidate the character of 
the European community in the territory.55 Assuming this consolidation was 
necessary, a debatable point given the already existing dominance of European . 
culture in New Caledonian educational institutes, the media. business and 
administration, it could only grate on the sensibilities of Kanak nationalists. 
Equally controversial to Kanaks was the plan's target to integrate the cultures of 
Wallisians, Tahitians, Indonesians and other non-European immigrant minorities 
into the local cultural milieu. Kanaks tended to regard these minority 
communities in New Caledonia as interlopers, whose presence deprived Kanaks 
of work and land. Henceforth these non-indigenous minorities were to receive 
state cultural funding as well. Rather than promoting harmony through 
pluralism, the Dijoud Plan served to aggravate Kanak disenchantment through 
the recognition of non-indigenous cultures. The FI would have preferred a 
recognition of Kanak exc1usivism in response to the status of the indigenous 
Melanesian population as the single largest ethnic group and as the prior 
occupants of New Caledonia. 
As part of the cultural reforms in the Dijoud Plan three bodies, the 
Melanesian Cultural Institute, the Bureau of Vernacular Languages, and 
Melanesian Promotion (a territorial initiative) were founded. The last of these 
bodies began its work in August 1979, and prepared a broad agenda for 
Melanesian land, educational, legal, cultural and womens' rights. This agenda 
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was boycotted by the FI, which argued that Franck Wahuzue, the chainnan of 
Melanesian Promotion, represented neither its interests, nor the better interests 
of Melanesians in general. At the time of his appointment, Wahuzue was an 
RPCR Temitorial Councillor. 56 The refusal of the FI to cooperate with 
Melanesian Promotion was part of a wider rejection of the cultural policy 
installed under the Dijoud Plan. 
The most contentious issue of all addressed by the Dijoud Plan was land 
reform. Confrontations between European landowners and Melanesian tribes 
over tribal land claims had multiplied from 1976. Melanesian tribes were 
increasingly claiming the return of lands they had been forced to abandon 
decades earlier during European rural settlement. The growth of tribal 
popUlations, the return of unemployed Melanesian youths from Noumea since 
the start of the economic depression from the mid-1910s, and the growth of 
Kanak identity contributed to this trend. Arguably the most racially divisive 
issue in New Caledonia, land redistribution was an immediate concern to Kanak: 
nationalists, for whom the return of ancestral lands often meant the enhancement 
of traditional tribal pride and identity,51 
The Dijoud Plan recognised the importance of land to Melanesian 
identity, but could not accept tribal ownership as a privileged form of land tenure 
under French law. On the contrary, individual rather than tribal title was 
promoted in the Dijoud Plan. As part of the goal to encourage cash cropping, it 
was hoped that Melanesians could, through land redistribution, be encouraged to 
establish themselves as freehold farmers outside the tribal milieu.58 The Plan 
mentioned that European landowners would be subject to land purchases by 
means of government funds administered by the territory, although this would 
only be done Ita l'amiable" ,59 The forced eviction of rural Europeans was not 
envisaged, but later this position was revised when the FNSC furthered tribal 
interests by lobbying at territorial and national level for compulsory purchase. 
The FNSC held that various European landowners were holding up land 
redistribution by refusing to sell land they were not cultivating, whether because 
they thought the price was not good enough, andlor because they opposed 
passing it over to Melanesians. This aspect of the land reform proposals outlined . 
in the Dijoud Plan was modified by a land refonn law adopted by the National 
Assembly on 20 December 1980, which allowed under certain circumstances for 
land to be purchased compulsorily from Europeans in favour of tribal claims.60 
European landowners resented this tum-around. 
After decades of government neglect of land refonn the redistribution of 
New Caledonian land undertaken during the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing 
was a major achievement. Land redistribution steadily increased in the late 
1910s. Approximately 2,OOOha were reattributed in 1977, 4,OOOha in 1978, 
8,OOOha in 1919, and 1O,000ha in 1980.61 Tribal landholdings in New 
Caledonia increased from an estimated 374,OOOha in 1916,62 to over 375,OOOha 
in 1978,63 and to more than 316,OOOha by 1980.64 It is plain that not all of the 
reattributed land went to Melanesian tribes. Private Melanesian ownership of 
land increased substantially in this period, to the point that by 1981, 162 
Melanesians either tenanted or owned 15,750ha outside the tribal milieu.65 
Nevertheless, these individual titles represented a minor proportion of 
Melanesian land holdings. The large scale conversion of tribal holdings to 
individual tenancy did not appear to be an immediate prospect 
Much controversy surrounded redistribution of land to tribal title. The 
RPCR contested the priority it believed was accorded to tribal land claims, 
preferring to encourage modern individually owned farms rather than what it 
perceived as economically backward tribal land tenure. Rural Kanak activists 
advocated much wider redistribution and contested the Plan's recognition of 
individual Melanesian land tenure, while some European landowners believed 
that reforms had already gone too far. The latter group's grievances were to 
40 
increase, as the land reforms undertaken by Dijoud presaged greater changes to 
be introduced under Socialist Governments in the 1980s. 
In New Caledonia from 1981, Socialist Governments were to build on 
the Dijoud Plan's guarded, liberal reforms until 1983, before accelerating the 
rate of change in the territory to a pace far beyond that envisaged by Dijoud. 
New Caledonia and Henri Emrnanuelli 
Henri Emmanuelli, Mauroy's frrst Secretary of State to the DaM-TOM, 
offered a moderate and somewhat conventional initial message to the inhabitants 
of the DaM-TOM on 25 May 1981. Emmanuelli expressed his intention of 
furthering social justice in the DaM -TOM, and of consolidating their links with 
the Republic, as his contribution to the Socialist "redressement national" which 
aimed to renovate French society. 66 His message appeared reassuring for the 
FNSC and the RPCR, although it inevitably failed to address the nationalist 
agenda of the FI, or indeed the pro-independence stances of other nationalist 
parties in the DaM-TOM. 
Emmanuelli was, as might be expected, a novice as far as New 
Caledonia, and the DOM -TOM in general, were concerned. Like previous 
appointees to the post he had not had direct experience in the administration of 
this domain. With a career in banking before his election as a PS Deputy for 
Landes in 1978, he could not be described as an habitue of DaM-TOM policy.67 
He had a knowledge of economics and finance which was to serve him in 
understanding. New Caledonian economic difficulties, but he did not have the 
opportunity to overcome these problems during his 22 months overseeing the 
DaM-TOM. From 1981 to 1983 New Caledonia's capacity for self-sufficiency 
slid drastically due to the drop in the international market value of nickel, the 
ongoing decline of local agricultural production, and the limited progress in 
promoting the creation of new businesses in the primary and secondary sectors. 
In 1981, territorial exports covered 82.1 % of the value of imports. In 1982, this 
figure fell sharply to 62.0%. By 1983 it had declined further to 49.4%.68 This 
trend served to underline the pressing need for territorial economic development. 
While preoccupied with a policy agenda designed to assist the most 
disadvantaged group within New Caledonia, namely its indigenous 
Melanesians, Emmanuelli neglected the overall economic well-being of New 
Caledonia. 
Emmanuelli's first contact with New Caledonia was on 7 August 1981, 
the beginning of a five day visit. During this visit, he avoided the question of 
New Caledonian independence. In his speech to the Territorial Assembly on 11 
August he called instead for radical social change through land reform and 
Melanesian development. Emmanuelli deplored the inequalities and injustices he 
had witnessed during his brief stay, and concluded from them that "Ie terme 
colonial n'a pas ete tout a fait evacue" from New Caledonia.69 He denounced the 
state of land distribution, announcing that more must be done to increase tribal 
domains, a conciliatory message for the Fl. Social equality would be furthered 
by adapting education to local needs, and by the introduction of a personal 
income tax system intended to redistribute private wealth for public spending. 
These observations were not greeted with enthusiasm by the RPCR Territorial 
Councillors present. The RPCR did not recognise an ethnic problem in New 
Caledonia, and held that its troubles were solely the result of a depressed 
economy.70 Redistributing more land to Melanesian tribal societies was 
considered a detrimental commitment. This undertaking would not assist the 
resurgence of commercial agricultural production, as Melanesian tribes preferred 
subsistence agriculture to cash cropping. Income tax was perceived by the 
RPCR as a state infringement of individual liberties. 
Overall, Emmanuelli announced: 
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[ ... J il est juste temps de modifier en profondeur la r~i~ ~onomique et 
sociale, qu'U s'agisse du systeme de production 00 la place des importations est 
d~mesuree, ou encore des probl~mes agraires, 00 it est 6vident qu'it faut sans 
tarder faire une nouvelle repartition de la terre.71 
The difficulties he addressed were the same ones which had concerned Dijoud. 
Emmanuelli's response was not dissimilar either, apart from the left-wing veneer 
in his speech provided by adjectives such as 'colonial'. The administrative 
dirigisme of Emmanuelli's predecessors appeared likely to continue, although he 
attempted, unconvincingly, to render this prospect more acceptable. He 
recognised the need to avoid an imposition of solutions, although he maintained 
that if the Government were to find itself confronted with indecision or inertia at 
territorial level, it would impose its judgement.72 In an attempt to reassure the 
conservatives present, Emmanuelli rounded off his speech with a stirring 
evocation of the nobility and virtue inherent in French Republican values.73 
In August, whereas the UC was prepared to wait in order to give the 
new administration time to come to terms with the situation in New Caledonia, 
the other Kanak parties believed that the Government had shelved any idea of 
independence and therefore boycotted Emmanuelli during his visit. 74 By 
October, the leaders of the UC had also become impatient. Pidjot and Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou, then an PI Territorial Councillor and the Mayor of Hienghene, 
unsuccessfully lobbied the Government in Paris.?5 The visit culminated in a 
discussion with Mitterrand at the Elysee on 26 October. In response to Tjibaou's 
questioning about what position he held on the recognition of Kanak 
sovereignty, Mitterrand did not deny the right of Kanaks to claim independence, 
but pointed out that as President he was obliged to take into account the interests 
of those New Caledonians opposed to independence as well. 76 
Emmanuelli, when questioned in early October 1981 by an Australian 
journalist on his Government's attitude to the political programme of the FI, 
gave a similarly measured, constitutionally impeccable response. His criterion 
for offering self-determination to New Caledonia, or to any other component of 
the DOM-TOM, was consistent with Franceschi's outline of PS policy offered in 
the National Assembly debate held on 10 June 1980. Accession to independence 
would be dependent on a local electoral majority advocating this option.77 In the 
absence of majority backing for independence the PI would have to wait. 
The PS displayed internal solidarity over this position, but no such 
consensus was evident among the socialist minority groups in New Caledonia. 
In October 1981, the PSC split over the question of promoting independence. A 
new party, the Parti Socialiste de Nouvelle-Caledonie, was formed. It adopted 
the stance of the PS regarding independence. The remainder of the PSC 
continued favouring immediate self-determination.18 The gaps between the New 
Caledonian sympathisers of the PS had not closed. 
At this time neither Mitterrand nor the Mauroy Government could afford 
to express messages of solidarity with the PI such as that of 1979. Tensions in 
New Caledonia had been heightened by the murder of Declercq on 19 September 
1981, the first assassination of a politician in the territory. Ka~ak militants 
occupied farms around Canala from the following day to pressure the 
Government into recognising their nationalist claims. The official response was 
to send in gendarmes and to condemn the tactics of violent confrontation, a 
reaction repeated as troubles continued sporadically into 1982.19 A government 
stand in support of Kanak nationalism at that point risked provoking further 
violence from extremist conservative elements in New Caledonia. As far as the 
Mauroy Government was concerned, discussion of independence would have to 
wait until the PI enjoyed wider support for its position. 
In the meantime, Paris intended to provide the basis for Melanesian 
social advancement through reforms under the existing territorial statute. On 13 
December 1981 government aims were announced by Emmanuelli in Noumea. 
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He presented to the Territorial Assembly the case for implementing legislation in 
New Caledonia by ordinance. Such a measure would permit the Mauroy 
Government to legislate rapidly without the constraint of having to gain the 
assent of Parliament. 80 The Territorial Assembly rejected this proposal in a vote 
on 22 December.81 The RPCR and FNSC were unenthused about giving assent 
to a Socialist Government to fast track legislation which might be ill-conceived. 
This opposition counted for little in legislative terms. Under the Constitution, the 
Government was only required to consult with the Territorial Assembly 
concerning legislation directly affecting New Caledonia, prior to presenting that 
legislation to Parliament. Noumea could oppose legislation emanating from 
Paris, but held no power of veto over it. 82 
Emmanuelli cited two reasons for recourse to legislation by ordinance. 
The ftrst involved the dominance of the FNSC and the RPCR in the Territorial 
Assembly, which he stated would block normal channels of legislation.83 His 
explanation did not square well with his professed respect for the wishes of the 
local majority on the question of self-determination. It was considered 
permissible for the FNSC and the RPCR to form a block against independence, 
but not for them to stand in the way of social reform. Emmanuelli omitted 
mention of the fact that under the territorial statute, whatever the stance of the 
majority of the Territorial Assembly, Paris held more administrative power than 
Noumea, and could forestall initiatives by the Territorial Assembly of which it 
disapproved.84 Ordinances were not necessary to control the Territorial 
Assembly. Emmanuelli later admitted that he wanted to circumvent Parliament to 
some extent. He cited the raft of other Socialist reforms tabled for consideration 
by Parliament in 1982, and claimed that had his proposals been tabled as bills, 
their legislation would have been delayed until late 1983.85 More to the point, 
Emmanuelli wanted to avoid obstruction in the National Assembly and the 
Senate from the RPR and UDF of the sort that would delay and hinder his 
decentralisation bill for the DOM in late 1982.86 
The paradox of a Socialist Government adopting extraordinary powers to 
fast track legislation for New Caledonia while simultaneously expressing 
support for decentralisation, whether elsewhere in the DOM-TOM, or in 
metropolitan France, did not pass unnoticed. The RPR concentrated on this 
contradiction during the National Assembly's debate on Emmanuelli's ordinance 
bill on 14 January 1982. Didier Julia, an RPR Deputy, chided: 
En effet, quand on veut decentraliser, on decentralise et quand on veut 
administrer de Paris, on administre de Paris; mais on ne peut pas administrer de 
Paris, sous pretexte de decentraliser.87 
The logic of M. Julia's argument was clear enough, although the RPR 
was to ftnd itself following in the footsteps of Emmanuelli in similar fashion 
between 1986 and 1988. Like the Mauroy Government in 1982, the Chirac 
Government in this later period was not prepared to cede the administrative 
powers which would have allowed the Territorial Assembly to formulate its own 
administrative structures. 
Thanks to both the PS majority and the support of the PC, the National 
Assembly approved recourse to ordinances. The finalised law allowed the 
Government to legislate by ordinance until 31 December 1982. Ordinances 
issued would have to be ratifted by Parliament by 28 January 1983.88 
Of the seven ordinances approved under the new law, three were of 
special signiftcance.89 The ftrst of these, Ordinance no.82-878, established the 
ODIL. The ODIL aimed to encourage rural commerce, and was jointly 
administered by government, territorial, and communal representatives. 
Ordinance no.82-879 created the OCSTC, an institution with a wider mandate 
than its Giscardian forebear, the Melanesian Cultural Institute. The OCTSC was 
assigned the role of coordinating existing bodies related to Melanesian culture, 
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including the territorial museum and archaeological department. There was no 
hint in the ordinance of the cultural pluralism advocated by Dijoud. The 
promotion of things "Canaque" was considered an overriding priority. 
Ordinance no.82-880 created the Land Office, which had as its conflicting tasks 
the redistribution of land in favour of Melanesian tribal claims. and the 
encouragement of land use for agricultural production. The individual 
Melanesian land tenure advocated under Dijoud was not mentioned, and the 
ordinance expressly recognised that triballand claims took precedence over 
those of Europeans. 
The ODIL. OCSTC and the Land Office formed the tripodal base for 
Emmanuelli'g renovation of New Caledonia, a renovation which would 
strengthen Melanesian identity and supposedly promote balanced dialogue: 
Au total, c'est It un remodelage politique, oconomique et social du Territoire que 
Ie gonvemment vent parvenir, Jorsque chacune des communautes disposera l 
nouveau des moyens d'un dialogue &tuilibre, Ie destin de Ia Nouvene~CaJ&Jonie 
pourra alo18 etre repris en main par les Caledoniens eux-m&nes, 6tant bien 
entendu que cela nOCessite un changement radical et rapide des mentaJites.90 
Emmanue1li overestimated the capacity of New Caledonian leaders to change 
their mentalities. In particular, he underestimated the entrenched conservatism of 
the RPCR. It was an error of judgement to be repeated by his successors up to 
the end of Socialist rule in March 1986. 
The response of the RPCR to Emmanuelli's refonns was strenuously 
negative, particularly as the FNSC had aligned itself with the FI in the frrst half 
of 1982. As had been the case with land reform in 1980, the FNSC and the 
RPCR found themselves holding divergent positions on social reform, with the 
fonner being more responsive to change. The liberal FNSCdid not find the 
renovations as unpalatable as did the RPCR. Government avoidance of the issue 
of independence helped Emmanuelli to gain the confidence of the FNSC, which 
asserted that Socialist reforms would calm Kanak militantism. In January 1982 
the party joined with the PI to vote in the Government's proposed personal 
income tax: system for New Caledonia.91 By June, FNSC support for 
government initiatives had led it to form an alliance with the PI that resulted in 
the formation of a new territorial Government CounciL Tjibaou was appointed 
Vice-President, subordinate only to the High Commissioner. The PI held four 
seats on the Government Council, and the FNSC had two, while the remaining 
member was an independent. The balance of power in the Territorial Assembly 
shifted to the advantage of the FI. Its 14 councillors fonned a coalition with the 
seven FNSC representatives. The remainder of the chamber consisted of 13 
RPCR Territorial Councillors and two independents.92 This alliance was to 
survive until late 1984. It upset the previous conservative dominance of 
territorial institutions, and provoked a conservative backlash. 
The RPCR argued in vain that the Territorial Assembly should be 
dissolved and new elections should be called, on the grounds that the FNSC had 
betrayed its supporters by aligning with the FI.93 Members of an extreme-right 
group, the MOP, illegally occupied the Territorial Assembly on 22 July and 
shouted at FI and FNSC Councillors to resign, before riot police were called in 
and a melee broke out.94 Faced with FI and FNSC unwillingness to address this 
argument, Lafleur provoked a by-election for his post as Deputy on 5 September 
1982 to test his support. His re-election was achieved with an impressive 
mandate. He obtained 86.26% of the vote after campaigning against a political 
unknown.95 With 23,345 votes, Lafleur gained 7,056 votes more than he had in 
the legislative elections of 1981. (Table 5) It was probable that large numbers of 
former FNSC supporters had voted for him. For all the posturing this gesture 
involved, it did serve to underline the strength of the RPCR vote. The FIlFNSC 
alliance succeeded in further alienating the RPCR from the Government's 
political, social and economic remodelling of the territory. 
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Although the FI had moderated its agenda by forming an alliance with 
the FNSC to promote Socialist refonn, the rift between the Mauroy Government 
and the PI over immediate self-determination remained. The FI backed 
Emmanuelli's refonns for their promise of improving Melanesian welfare but 
had not abandoned support for independence. Having failed to achieve its earlier 
target of Kanak independence by September 1982,96 the UC still retained hopes 
of achieving sovereignty by September 1984.97 The minority parties in the PI 
still shared the hope for independence with the UC, even if they disagreed on the 
need to wait so long. 
Lemoine: in Search of Conciliation 
In March 1983, EmmanueUi's involvement with New Caledonia came to 
an end as a result of a portfolio reshuffle under Prime Minister Mauroy. 
Emmanuelli was appointed Secretary of State to the Budget, a post where his 
banking experience could be used to greater effect. In the weeks prior to his 
reappointment, it was apparent that the evolution of mentalities he had hoped for 
in New Caledonia had yet to materialise. Confrontation between Kanaks, 
Europeans and the forces oflaw and order broke out on 10 January 1983. Two 
gendarmes were killed when a Kanak protest over logging compensation for a 
Melanesian tribe escalated into violence, resulting in the arrest of 18 Kanaks. 
The RPCR and LKS organised demonstrations, the fonner against Kanaks, and 
the latter in defence of them.98 The decision by Mauroy and Mitterrand to shift 
Emmanuelli to another portfolio may have been motivated by a realisation that he 
had not managed to gain the confidence of the majority of New Caledonians, as 
well as by disappointment at the checks imposed on his decentralisation refonns 
in the DOM. 
For Emmanuelli's replacement, Georges Lemoine, New Caledonia was 
to become a preoccupying aspect of the DOM-TOM portfolio. Intermittent 
violence, and the deterioration of relations between the RPCR and the FIlFNSC 
coalition, were symptomatic of worsening rifts which needed to be addressed by 
Paris. The Mauroy Government resolved to respond to the situation in New 
Caledonia by redrawing the territorial statute, with the aim of promoting greater 
social justice. 
Consultations with local party leaders over the drafting of a new 
territorial statute had begun during Emmanuelli's last months in office, but it 
was under Lemoine that the bulk of preparatory work for a new statute took 
place. The responsibility for the implementation of Emmanuelli's ordinances 
also rested with Lemoine. The establishment of the new offices instituted by the 
ordinances took place slowly. Pidjot complained to the National Assembly on 17 
November 1983 that the OCSTC was still not operational, thanks to delay in 
nominating a director.99 The ODIL was also slow in starting; it was established 
eight months behind schedule.10o The Land Office had less trouble in this 
respect, although it remained to be seen whether its land redistribution could 
keep pace with tribal demands. 
Lemoine took up the post of Secretary of State to the DOM-TOM with 
greater knowledge of the DOM-TOM and New Caledonia than Emmanuelli had 
had in 1981. With Lafleur among others, Lemoine had been on the committee 
which drew up the Eighth Plan for the DOM-TOM in the late 1970s.101 Lemoine 
had become personally acquainted with other New' Caledonian political leaders 
during his time as Secretary-General of the Association of French Mayors.102 
Lemoine's contacts and skills of negotiation were to be tested to their limit and 
ultimately fell short of producing a local entente. 
In Noumea on 20 May 1983 Lemoine announced his policy priorities for 
New Caledonia to the Territorial Assembly. His pronouncements on the 
recognition of Melanesian culture, land rights and territorial development echoed 
those of Emmanuelli. Unlike Emmanuelli, Lemoine addressed the issue of self-
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determination in his first speech to the Tenitorial Assembly. He mentioned that 
independence was not ruled out by the Government, but he was suggestively 
vague as to whom voter eligibility in a self-determination referendum might 
apply: 
Parler d'autodetermination signifie qu'un choix soil propose aox habitants du 
Tenitoire. Et quand je dis que l'avenir du Tenitoire sera l'affaire de tons Ies 
habitants, j'entends les veritables habitants elmen entendu j'en exclns ceux qui 
sont de passage pour une mission temporaire.1Q3 
The conditions under which a referendum might be held had not been touched 
on by Emmanuelli. It was a sensitive subject. In keeping his statement vague, 
Lemoine wished to avoid upsetting either RPCR or PI sensibilities: at that time 
the FI wanted the franchise to be restricted to exclude immigrants with no 
parents born in New Caledonia, a concept which the RPCR rejected as 
undemocratic. Moreover, for Lemoine the referendum was not a pressing matter 
which demanded detailed exposition.104 
Lemoine realised that the validity of any new statute would be 
undermined in the absence of some form of cooperation between New 
Caledonian political leaders. During his speech he took the opportunity to 
propose negotiations with local parties over the forthcoming statute. Lemoine 
devoted his efforts in the following months to the organisation of multilateral 
discussions between the Government and the main New Caledonian parties. 
After considerable negotiation by government representatives, delegations from 
the FI, the FNSC, the RPCR and the Mauroy Government, agreed to converge 
on Nainville les Roches, in metropolitan France, for discussions from 8 to 12 
July 1983. The Nainvi1le les Roches discussions resulted in a joint declaration 
which was intended to provide the basis for a consensual solution to New 
Caledonia's future. (Appendix 2) The Government, the FI and the FNSC signed 
this declaration. The RPCR did not. 
In the context of PS policy, the Government's signature to article 1 
involved no change in its previously announced position.' The willingness of 
signatories to confirm the abolition of the colonial heritage in New Caledonia 
and the recognition of the equality of Melanesian culture, with a role for custom 
law in forthcoming reforms, was in line with past statements promoting 
recognition of the tenitory's Melanesians. The recognition of the legitimacy of 
the "peuple kanak" and its innate right to independence in article 2 marked a 
reaffirmation of the PS's joint statement with the FI in 1979. The explicit 
recognition of the rights of non-Kanaks to participate in any self-determination 
referendum harked back to the joint FlIPS statement's reference to the just 
claims of the Kanak people and its willingness to recognise fundamental human 
rights under independence. Article 3 was the boldest undertaking, in that it 
committed the Government to a timetable on self-determination for the flrst time. 
The granting of greater administrative powers at territorial level was 
characterised as a desirable precondition to a referendum. 
The principal shortcoming of the Nainville les Roches declaration was 
that the RPCR could not agree to its definitions. Apparent in objections voiced 
by the RPCR to the declaration was a divergent ideological frame of reference, 
of the sort discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The declaration's advocacy 
of "l'abolition du fait colonial", and ula legitimite du peuplekanaktl was 
repugnant to RPCR leaders. lOS They did not accept that reference to colonialism 
was appropriate to statute discussions, and saw no need to confirm its abolition 
when New Caledonia had not constitutionally been a colony since the days of 
the Third Republic. Mention of the legitimacy of the Kanak people jarred on 
their Republican sensibilities. All citizens were considered equal under French 
law, and granting special recognition to one group in New Caledonia was 
regarded as an unsettling precedent. Just how the Kanak people might be 
defined was another point open to debate. RPCR leaders pointed out that while 
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the FI claimed to speak for Melanesians, not all Melanesians supported 
independence or thought of themselves as Kanaks. The most prominent example 
was Dick Ukeiwe, a Loyalty Islander who attended the Nainville les Roches 
negotiations as an RPCR delegate. 
RPCR representatives had come to Nainville les Roches to discuss a new 
statute, not to be drawn into debate on self-determination conditions. In any 
case, the terms in which self-determination was mentioned were offensive to 
them. To recognise the innate right of Kanaks to independence was interpreted 
as provocative. To proceed to state that Kanaks recognised the rights of other 
ethnic groups in New Caledonia to participate in a self-determination vote was 
regarded as presumptious. The right of non-Kanaks to vote was granted by the 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic, not by the FI, the self-appointed 
representative of Kanaks. By this stage, the RPCR was supportive of greater 
territorial autonomy, particularly if that autonomy would reduce Socialist 
Government control over New Caledonia.106 But its representatives would 
neither admit the primacy of Kanak nationalism nor consent to a statute that 
might lead to independence.1 07 Without the adherence of the RPCR, the 
Nainville les Roches declaration was a hollow accomplishment. Consensus 
could not be built without the cooperation of this major New Caledonian party. 
For its part, the PI too soon became dissatisfied with the Nainville les 
Roches declaration. At the end of July, a joint statement by the UC, LKS, 
FULK and the PSC downplayed the importance of the declaration, calling it 
"une declaration d'intention, d'ailleurs peu claire, du gouvernement 
franyais".108 Suspicion remained that the Government was not really supportive 
of Kanak independence. There was some cause for this suspicion. Neither 
Mitterrand nor the Mauroy Government had offered the unreserved backing of 
Kanak independence that would have been preferred by the Fl. That recognition 
of Kanaks' innate right to independence had been accorded was not indicative of 
backing for Kanak independence. Under French law the right of Kanaks to 
independence was no greater or lesser a right than that which any other segment 
of the population of the TOM enjoyed. The joint UC/LKS/FULKIPSC statement 
denounced ongoing government reforms as "une tentative de demobilisation du 
peuple kanak et d'une mise en place d'une politique contraire a son interet". To 
the contrary, the Nainville les Roches declaration was far from having a 
demobilising effect on Kanaks, as the joint statement itself reflected. As to 
whether the policy being implemented was contrary to Kanak interests, that 
remained to be seen. The reforms already undertaken by the Socialists had 
offered positive recognition of Kanak claims to social reform. The 
UC/LKS/FULKjPSC statement in addition expressed fears that the 
"propositions a Nainville les Roches concernant un statut d'autonomie transitoire 
vers l'Independance kanak Socialiste soient detournees vers une autonomie 
figee". This sentence was based on a possibly wilful misreading of the Nainville 
les Roches declaration, which had not described the new statute as a preliminary 
to Kanak independence, whether socialist or of any other nature. It was possible 
that Kanak independence would not be attained however, particularly if the FI 
found itself without the majority electoral support necessary to gain 
independence through a self-determination vote. 
In the RPCR, reverse Suspicions existed about the intentions of the 
Mauroy Government. It was assumed that the Mauroy Government intended to 
promote Kanak independence through the implementation of a transitional statute 
prior to a self-determination vote. Ukeiwe thundered against it in December 
1983: 
QU'entendez-vous par statut evolutif et de transition? Evolutif vers quoi? 
L'anarchie polilique? La politique des petits copains? Le malheur de la 
Nouvelle-Ca16donie et ses habitants? L'effondrement konomique et social? De 
transition? A nouveau, je vous demande vers quoi? La guerre civile? La 
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domination assuree des anglo-saxons ou pire encore des pays de l'Est, de 
Cuba? 109 
The promulgation of what became known as the Lemoine Statute was followed 
by civil unrest from November 1984, but it was a campaign organised by 
Kanaks discontented with the pace and extent of Socialist recognition of their 
demands. The reforms alone could not justifiably be described as promoting 
chaos by recognising Kanak demands for independence. 
Of the three main New Caledonian parties, only the FNSC seemed 
content with the Nainville les Roches declaration. It asserted, like Lemoine, that 
the document could form the basis of a consensual solution in New Caledonia. 
Christian Boissery, an FNSC spokesman, described his party colleagues as "les 
gardiens de l'esprit de Nainville",110 who would act as local mediators between 
the RPCR and the FI. Lemoine mistakenly took the Nainville les Roches 
declaration as a green light for further reform. He believed that the meeting had 
provided the basis for the consensus which he desired; "un veritable consensus 
qui est dans l'esprit et la sagesse des peuples du Pacifique Sud et qui est la 
forme oceanienne de notre democratie",111 Lemoine pressed on after Nainville 
les Roches and tried to establish a new administrative base for New Caledonia, 
despite the fact its three main political parties remained at odds on the question of 
independence. 
Consensus in New Caledonia was nevertheless not entirely absent from 
the territory following Nainville les Roches. Unfortunately, such consensus as 
existed took the form of opposition to the forthcoming statute, On 19 April 1984 
the Territorial Assembly rejected the territorial statute bill by 32 votes to four,1l2 
It is a measure of the discontent of the FI and the RPCR that they were united in 
their opposition to Lemoine's proposals, albeit for different reasons. Included in 
the bill was mention of a self-determination referendum, scheduled for 1989. 
Lemoine had first mentioned this date for a referendum during his second visit to 
New Caledonia in November 1983.113 In conceding a date Lemoine offered 
more than Emmanuelli had, although Dijoud had offered the same date for self-
detennination as early as February 1979. For the FI, the statute proposals did 
not go far enough, while for the RPCR they went too far. 
The Government showed no sign of being overly concerned by this 
vote. Its attitude was that Paris knew what was best and that reform would 
continue regardless. The following observation is illustrative of this attitude. It 
was made by Fran90is Massot, government reporter for the Constitutional Law 
Commission, while presenting the fust reading of the statute bill to the National 
Assembly on 28 May 1984: 
Ce statut [ ... J a 6.e refure par I'ensemble de l'assemblee territoriale. tant que par 
les ind6pendantistes que par Ie R.P.C.R. Mais ce refus d6montre peut-etre qu'il 
est dans la bonne voie. En effet, les juristes n'ont-its pas l'habitude de dire 
qu'une bonne transaction est celie pour laqueUe les deux parties sont 
m~ontentes?114 
In hindsight, this appears a dangerously complacent assessment, based on 
inappropriate, folksy logic. The simplistic attitude attributed to lawyers by 
Massot is more of an old aphorism than an accurate reflection of the complexities 
of the legal trade. At the time, the Government did not consider it extraordinary 
to ignore the Territorial Assembly'S objections to the statute bill. The three major 
parties in Noumea were at odds over the statute, and in the absence of a coherent 
majority response to its plans, the Mauroy Government decided to keep going. 
As has already been noted, the Territorial Assembly had no power of veto over 
government legislation, and this was not the first time that Paris had acted 
against the wishes of Noumea. Conversely, because the Territorial Assembly 
had no power over government reforms, its members were prone to adopt 
extreme reactions in the knowledge that they were not responsible for their 
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consequences, as was seen in the absences and abstentions of Territorial 
Councillors during the vote on the Dijoud Plan. While government disregard of 
the Territorial Assembly was not out of the ordinary, it is impossible to conclude 
that Lemoine was instituting his reforms on the basis of the consensual 
discourse with territorial leaders which he had previously characterised as 
desirable. A more cautious politician might have discarded the statute bill and 
called for further negotiation, but at that time there was no reason to assume that 
the unpopularity of government reform would have any serious consequences. 
The new territorial statute,1l5 known as the Lemoine Statute, was 
adopted by the National Assembly after its third and final reading on 31 July 
1984, 14 days after Mauroy was replaced as Prime Minister by Laurent Fabius, 
leading a new Socialist Government. 321 Deputies, mainly from the PS and PC, 
voted for the statute, while 151, mainly UDF and RPR, voted against it.1l6 
Communist support was offered because the statute was considered a 
preliminary step to self-determination, although the PC criticised the 
Government for not guaranteeing Kanak self-determination.117 RPR and UDF 
criticisms were that the statute did not delegate sufficient autonomy to the 
Territorial Assembly, and was discriminatory in promoting Melanesian culture 
above others.IIS 
The first article of the statute created a State-Territory Committee charged 
with preparing the conditions for the self-determination referendum, and 
declared that" A l'issue d'un delai de cinq ans, les populations de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie et dependances seront consultees par voie de referendum 
conformement aux dispositions de l'article 53, alinea 3, de la Constitution".119 
The Government in this way applied the Capitant Doctrine formulated and used 
by its Gaullist and Giscardian forebears in the 1960s and 1970s. This step was 
in accordance with established constitutional usage, and past statements by the 
PS and Mitterrand on self-determination. The FI took exception to the terms of 
this article, as it did not offer the Kanak independence which it claimed that the 
Nainville les Roches declaration had recognised. It asserted that the innate and 
active right of Kanaks to independence set out in the Nainville les Roches 
declaration established the FI as a privileged partner, a debatable and 
controversial position.120 The FI called for electoral reform which would assure 
a pro-independence vote of a majority in New Caledonia. In February 1984 Eloi 
Machoro, the Secretary-General of the DC, announced that he had sent a 
telegramme to Mitterrand on behalf of the FI urging the repatriation of all non-
indigenous inhabitants opposed to independence.121 For the FI the "populations 
interessees" in any self-determination vote, as referred to by article 53 of the 
Constitution, would have to be predominantly pro-independence, regardless of 
whether actions taken against French loyalists constituted an infringement of 
their civil liberties under French law. It was an unrealistic stance to which the 
Mauroy Government could not accede. The mass deportation from New 
Caledonia of French citizens, on the basis of their political views would have 
been illegal. Determining just who would be eligible to vote was a controversial 
issue which was not to be durably resolved until 1988. 
Article 3 defined six new custom regions, each of which would have its 
own tribal council, in order to give Melanesian custom authority a greater role in 
territorial administration. In this respect, it was true, as the RPR and UDF 
claimed, that the statute promoted Melanesian culture above others. The Mauroy 
Government instituted this recognition of custom authority to give Melanesian 
tribal leaders a greater role in the French administration in New Caledonia. 
While the majority of tribal leaders supported the FI, this article was not 
unambiguously to the advantage of the Front. Those tribal leaders who 
sympathised with the Front did not necessarily agree with the concept of the 
foundation of a unified Kanak people to the detriment of tribal identity. While 
traditional Wallisian and Tahitian society was not given statutory recognition 
similar to that of indigenous Melanesians in New Caledonia, it could be argued 
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that the proper place for such institutional recognition was in Wallis and Futuna 
and in French Polynesia. The territorial statute of each TOM either accorded 
similar recognition to traditional culture, in the case of Wallis and Futuna, or 
was on the verge of doing so, in the case of French Polynesia, for which a new 
statute bill had also been fonnulated. I22 Freedom of religion and rights of free 
association were not threatened by the statute bill and non-indigenous immigrant 
groups were able to continue to promote their cultural interests through church 
groups, clubs and associations. European residents were not threatened by the 
creation of custom regions. French law. French education and French cultural 
values continued to play the pre-eminent role in New Caledonian life, as 
evidenced by the fonnutation, debate and promulgation of article 3 by a group of 
French parliamentarians in Paris. That objections to the ex officio presence of 
Wallisian kings in the territorial administration of Wallis and Futuna were not 
raised by RPR and UDF politicians was indicative of the degree of politicisation 
of the question of recognising traditional indigenous authority in New Caledonia 
by 1984. Recognition of Melanesian custom by the Mauroy Government was 
portrayed by the UDF and RPR as a threat to the Republic in New Caledonia, 
even if not all Melanesian chiefs were necessarily followers of the FI or of . 
1Canakindependence. 
Article 4 stipulated that the territory would be responsible in any field not 
reserved to the State under Article 5. However the list in article 5 was 
considerably longer than the list of state powers outlined in the statute of 1976. 
While the State ceded some powers to the territory, namely in the areas of 
secondary education, and audiovisual communication, it retained the bulk of its 
powers under the statute of 1976, and expanded its controls to some new areas. 
The responsibilities retained were over foreign relations, immigration, external 
communications, finance, defence, law and order, civil law to the exclusion of 
custom law and comrnerciallaw, justice and the organisation of the judiciary, the 
state public service and communal administration. l23 State control of territorial 
natural resources was expanded. Under the 1976 statute, Paris had controlled 
only mineral resources. The Lemoine Statute broadened this definition to 
encompass "exploration, exploitation, conservation et gestion des ressources 
naturelles, biologiques et non-biologiques" .124 This all-encompassing 
description of anything that could be found on land or under the sea 
demonstrated that the Governments of Mauroy and Fabius did not immediately 
intend to surrender state control of territorial resources. The State also retained 
command of the implementation of Emmanuelli's ordinances .. Paris was 
reluctant to let control of these refonns fall into territorial hands, for fear that a 
hostile administration might stall them, although it did leave open provision for 
passing the ODIL, OCSTC and the Land Office to the territory should it ask and 
should Paris agree,125 Globally, state powers over New Caledonia were not 
greatly changed by the Lemoine Statute, despite some tinkering with previous 
legislation. The RPR and the UDF were justified in pointing out the statute's 
lack of decentralisation, although neither party had made much effort in this area 
either when previously in government. 
Greater innovation was to be found in the legislation's reorganisation of 
territorial institutions, although it is doubtful that this reorganisation·1ived up to 
Massot's claim of being a "veritable decentralisation" of the territory.t26 The 
High Commissioner was replaced as the head of New Caledonia by aTerritorial 
President, elected by the Territorial Assembly. A Regional Assembly 
("assemblee des pays") was created, composed of 24 communal representatives, 
and 24 custom representatives,127 as was an Economic Expansion Committee, 
representing business and labour.128 The Regional Assembly and the Economic 
Expansion Committee were intended to be consultative bodies which would 
advise the territory on legislation within their respective fields of competence. 129 
Certain similarities can be seen between the new administrative structure and that 
50 
erected in September 1984 under the Internal Autonomy Statute for French 
Polynesia, notably the new post of Territorial President. 
The Lemoine Statute was a major undertaking for the Government, and 
for New Caledonia, but was to founder on territorial opposition which Paris had 
underestimated during the preparation of the legislation. Kanak opposition to 
government reforms was to lead to a level of political violence and civil unrest in 
New Caledonia which Lemoine could not have forseen. 
Kanak disaffection with the Government intensified during the months 
leading up to the adoption of the Lemoine Statute. Pidjot criticised the statute bill 
during its three readings in the National Assembly.1 30 He repeated earlier 
criticisms that the statute did not guarantee rapid progress toward independence, 
and attempted to amend the bill so that independence could be attained in 1985, 
without necessarily having recourse to a popular referendum.1 31 Pidjot also 
proposed that only permanent New Caledonian residents, and those inhabitants 
who had a locally born parent, should be eligible to participate in the self-
determination referendum. The electoral balance was such in 1984 that voters 
who supported independence constituted a clear minority of the New Caledonian 
electorate, reflected by the FI's possession of only a relative majority of 14 out 
of 36 seats in the Territorial Assembly. Were the self-determination referendum 
to be open to all New Caledonian voters, then the majority vote would in all 
likelihood oppose independence. 
The aim to tip the electoral balance in favour of the FI's cause was 
impractical, contentious, and extremely provocative to migrant French loyalists 
who would have been excluded from voting by its terms. Pidjot's amendments 
were rejected by the Law Commission as undemocratic. Lemoine described 
them as unconstitutional, in that they would deprive some French citizens of 
their voting rights. 132 No compensation for the electoral disadvantage that 
immigration had created for Kanaks was contemplated by the Government in 
1984, as Pidjot pointed out. 133 The Government had backed away from 
Mitterrand's statement in November 1979 that the minority status of Melanesians 
should be considered alongside the fact that immigration was its cause. The 
Socialist Government found itself defending a situation which the PS had 
criticised in opposition. Had the Government acceded to Pidjot's amendments, 
the Opposition would have had recourse to the Constitutional Council, and 
discord within New Caledonia would have increased to a dangerous level. 
Pidjot's discontent was such that he withdrew from the Socialist group 
in the National Assembly in June 1984.134 This decision was followed by the 
FI's announcement at the end of July that to protest at government refusal to 
implement legislation to the advantage of Kanak voters in the self-determination 
referendum, it was withdrawing from territorial institutions, and would boycott 
the territorial elections scheduled for November 1984. 135 Faced with the 
absence of absolute majority support from the territorial electorate, the PI 
radicalised its opposition in its own self-interest. 
The nadir of Lemoine's time as Secretary of State to the DOM-TOM 
came with the foundation of the FLNKS on 24 September 1984. Formed from 
the FI (with the notable exception of LKS, which believed the new formation 
was extremist, naIve and irresponsible), the FLNKS adopted a more militant 
approach in protesting Socialist Governments' lack of support for Kanak 
electoral primacy, and in announcing the goal of independence by 1985. The 
election boycott became part of what the FLNKS referred to in its charter as a 
"lutte de liberation nationale".l36 The FLNKS resolved to force the issue by 
setting up a provisional government of Kanaky which would unilaterally declare 
independence, and called on Kanaks to organise "la conquete de la liberte".137 
Accusing the Mauroy Government of being in league with the forces of 
colonialism in New Caledonia, the FLNKS broke off dialogue with Lemoine. 
Much of the FLNKS's position consisted of little more than vehement 
hyperbole as it did not enjoy the means by which it might convert its 
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revolutionary rhetoric into concerted armed struggle. The FLNKS faced a lack 
of resources which set it apart from the circumstances of the Algerian national 
liberation movement of the 1950s. The support base that the FLNKS claimed, 
namely indigenous Melanesians, was far less imposing than the millions from 
whom the FLN had drawn its support. The FLNKS was hindered by the 
culturally segmented, undeveloped nature of the indigenous Melanesian 
population in New Caledonia, which constituted 42.56% of the territorial 
population in 1983.138 Of the 61,870 indigenous Melanesians recorded in that 
year's census, 42% were under the age of 15.139 While the FLNKS described 
its support base as "Ie peuple kanak", indigenous Melanesians were in fact far 
from constituting a homogeneous group: they belonged to 319 tribes, speaking 
between them 27 different languages.140 Supporters of the FLNKS tended to be 
found in the least-developed parts of the territory. In 1983, 73% of indigenous 
Melanesians lived in tribal societies in the rural hinterland. which relied on 
collective, subsistence agriculture. This setting offered an unpromising base for 
the socialist nation-state heralded by the FLNKS. Although no statistics exist 
concerning the number of FLNKS activists who participated in militant protests . 
from late 1984, it was likely no more than several hundred Kanaks operated at 
the sharp end of conflict during the boycotts organised by the Front in 1984 and 
1988. These militants were not very well armed. Many of their number carried 
shotguns or hunting rifles for which ammunition was in short supply. Apart 
from the 17 Kanak activists who received six weeks' training of an unspecified 
nature in Libya from September to October 1984,141 the FLNKS is not known 
to have arranged a military training programme. Its militants' only prior contact 
with military life usually consisted of time spent in compulsory French military 
service. 
Melanesian political divisions represented another challenge to the 
concept of a unified Kanak people. The FLNKS itself was an electoral coalition 
of five parties, three lobby groups and a trade union.142 While it was 
demonstrated in the regional elections of 1985 that a large majority of 
Melanesian voters backed the concept of Kanak sovereignty, not all of them 
supported the FLNKS. In 1984 the LKS was the most prominent Kanak party 
to reject the Front's claim to represent Kanaks. Still other Melanesians, 
estimated to represent around 20% of indigneous voters in 1985, rejected Kanak 
nationalism in preference to French loyalist parties, usually the RPCR.143 
On 1 st December 1984 the FLNKS announced the establishment of the 
provisional government of Kanaky. The administration was a self-appointed one 
of dubious democratic legitimacy. While the term provisional government held 
an imposing air, in reality the body was a skeletal structure unsuited to 
governing New Caledonia, even in the unlikely circumstances that it found itself 
in that position. It was not until the second FLNKS congress in February 1985 
that the roles of the provisional government and its subordinate structures were 
defined in the most general terms. The Front did not have a detailed vision of 
what its Republic of Kanaky would be like, and had formulated neither social 
nor economic policies. Tjibaou, the president of the provisional government, 
was at the head of a shadow structure lacking in substance. power or effective 
authority. The several hundred poorly armed, loosely organised activists it could 
muster for militant action did not pose a threat to French sovereignty over New 
Caledonia. 
Any chance of achieving the territorial consensus which Lemoine had 
hoped to cement had been greatly reduced by the time of his unproductive third 
visit to New Caledonia in October 1984. The FLNKS refused to talk to him. 
The RPCR, contemplating its almost certain dominance of the Territorial 
Assembly as a result of the FLNKS election boycott, moderated its opposition in 
its own self-interest. The party pressed Lemoine for an assurance that law and 
order would be maintained during the territorial elections.144 This was done 
with some difficulty. The FLNKS active boycott of the territorial elections on 18 
52 
November 1984 caused considerable setbacks for the Government. Only 
50.13% of voters turned out. (Table 7) None the less, the boycott did not 
succeed in invalidating the elections. FLNKS roadblocks, pickets and 
occupations of rural polling booths were not widespread enough to justify a 
postponement of polling. The RPCR succeeded in sweeping the electoral field, 
gaining 34 of 42 seats as a result of the absence of the FLNKS from the ballot 
and the mass desertion of voters from the FNSC. The FNSC, representing "les 
gardiens de l'esprit de Nainville" had collapsed and was reduced to one seat. It 
was clear from the result of the elections that an overwhelming majority of the 
FNSC's supporters had deserted it because of its dialogue with the Socialists 
and the Fl. LKS gained six seats, on a moderate pro-independence platform, but 
this was scarcely sufficient basis for Lemoine's consensus-building. The centre 
ground in New Caledonian politics looked very unstable, faced with polarisation 
toward Melanesian nationalism on one hand, and RPCR conservatism on the 
other. 
By late November 1984 the Fabius Government, showing signs of 
panic, announced the need to accelerate the self-determination process in New 
Caledonia. Lemoine proposed holding the referendum before 1986.145 It 
seemed by that stage that staving off the referendum had been the cause of New 
Caledonia's mounting troubles and that an abrupt change of tack might yet 
preserve peace. The Government did not respond to UDF and RPR claims that 
postponing the referendum further might serve better to keep the peace. The 
Socialists acted to satisfy Kanak demands rather than those of French loyalists. 
However this step was unlikely to calm the FLNKS. In the absence of electoral 
reforms designed to give Kanaks an absolute majority, a more immediate self-
determination vote would not satisfy the Front's nationalist agenda and would 
lead to greater disillusionment with French institutions. Lemoine would in any 
case be incapable of engineering the cooperation necessary for setting up a 
referendum considering that he had resoundingly failed to inspire confidence in 
his statute. His assessment of New Caledonia remained out of tune with 
developments there. New Caledonia's situation had moved from the problematic 
to the critical. There were gloomy forecasts of impending armed insurrection. l46 
Lemoine, and the Government he represented, were at an impasse. 
Pisani: from Delegate to Minister 
The provisional government of Kanaky may not have had the means to 
convert its proclamation of a national liberation struggle into armed resistance 
which would overthrow French sovereignty, although it did have the potential to 
force concessions from Paris. Its existence posed an embarrassment to the 
Fabius Government, which was pilloried by the Opposition for not dissolving 
the Front as a threat to Republican law and order. On 4 December 1984, to cries 
of "Pauvre Lemoine!" from the RPR benches, Fabius announced to the National 
Assembly that he would be assuming personal responsibility for the New 
Caledonian portfolio. 147 While this decision was a measure of the extent to 
which Lemoine had failed to resolve New Caledonia's increasing difficulties, it 
also indicated the extent to which FLNKS activism had gained the attention of 
the highest authorities in Paris. No longer was New Caledonia the peripheral, 
neglected area it had been on the French political landscape in 1981. The 
territory's troubles, compounded by an increasing law and order problem as 
Kanak militancy prompted conservative reaction, were propelled to the centre 
stage of French political debate. 
At the time of the announcement by Fabius, his Government's new 
special delegate to New Caledonia had just arrived in Noumea. Edgard Pisani 
was best known for his term as Minister of Agriculture under de Gaulle in the 
early 1960s. Pisani assumed the functions which were normally the reserve of 
the High Commissioner in Noumea, as well as being assigned by Mitterrand the 
Table 7. New Caledonian Territorial Elections 
1984 
Territorial Results: 18 November 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
79,271 
39,735 
50.13% 
39,296 
Party Votes 
RPCR 27,871 
LKS 2,879 
fN 2,379 
FNSC t ,748 
Others 4,439 
% of 
cas t 
70.14 
7.25 
5.99 
4.40 
11.17 
votes Sea ts 
34 
6 
1 
1 
0 
Source: Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 20 novembre 1984, 
20 novembre 1984. 
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task of restoring law and order in New Caledonia, and to formulate reform 
proposals. Fabius summarised Pisani's mission: "dans un delai de deux mois 
[ ... ] de mettre en reuvre les mesures necessaires concernant l'evolution 
institutionnelle, Ie developpement economique, social et culturel du territoire 
ainsi que les modalites selon lesquelles sera exerce Ie droit a 
l'autodetermination" .148 
In the atmosphere then reigning in New Caledonia, this would be no 
easy task. On 25 November, the FLNKS had selected its provisional 
government of Kanaky, and on 1 December had installed its President, Jean-
Marie Tjibaou. Over 20 gendarmes had been injured during and immediately 
after the FLNKS boycott of the territorial elections.l 49 Pisani's predecessor, 
High Commissioner Jacques Roynette, had banned public assemblies and had 
received J 30 additional gendarmes from Paris on 24 November. ISO Their 
presence failed to quell the politically-motivated violence which continued in the 
wake of the territorial elections.151 FLNKS roadblocks erected for the election 
boycott remained as points of confrontation with French gendarmes. 
Farmhouses and homes were sacked and burnt down by Kanak militants. The 
circling of the mining centre of Thio by Eloi Machoro, the Security Minister of 
the FLNKS provisional government, and a band of his followers, caused the 
hurried organisation of local militias by French loyalists in other rural centres. 
Armed confrontation led to the death of two Kanaks and two Europeans at the 
end of November. 152 
The man who faced these and more deep-seated problems in New 
Caledonia had no knowJedge of the territory prior to his appointment.153 
Pisani's introduction to New Caledonia came in the form of some visits to 
ministerial officials in Paris during the days before his departure. Pisani 
complemented these meetings with a reading of official files during his flight to 
Noumea in ~he presidential jet. 154 This hasty acquaintance with territorial issues 
was not an auspicious base on which to formulate answers to New Caledonian 
political divisions. The expectation that these divisions could be overcome by an 
appointee with no prior experience of the territory, whose knowledge of the 
issues consisted of a few days spent perusing ministerial files and conversing 
with officials in Paris, was an optimistic one. 
In his favour, Pisani had long experience working on Third World 
economic development. He had also gained a reputation as an innovative 
administrator during his time as Agriculture Minister, helping to modernise the 
conservative outlooks of various rural pressure groups which stubbornly 
resisted change. In spite of these specific, technocratic qualifications, his 
appointment as government delegate to New Caledonia appeared incongruous. 
Pisani was neither a government employee prior to his appointment, nor an 
expert on New Caledonia. A high official from the DOM-TOM Ministry with 
experience in New Caledonia might have been a better choice to replace the High 
Commissioner. It might have seemed odd that Mitterrand should have entrusted 
this sensitive post to a former Gaullist Minister whose main link with the PS 
was his friendship with Michel Rocard, then Minister of Agriculture, and one of 
Mitterrand's greatest rivals. 
Part of the explanation as to why Pisani was appointed delegate to New 
Caledonia resides in the fact that he was an outsider. Two Secretaries of State 
had already had their reputations harmed by the declining fortunes of New 
Caledonia. If Pisani experienced reverses, this setback would not directly affect 
the Fabius Government in the same way as if a third Socialist Minister were 
overseeing the territory. The supervisory role over the New Caledonian portfolio 
exercised by Fabius demonstrated greater government concern for the territory 
while also installing a control mechanism over Pisani should he faiL 
Additionally, as a former Gaullist Minister, it was hopedtbat Pisani would be 
more easily able to communicate with New Caledonia's conservatives. Initially 
this was the case, but it was not to last. 
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Pisani's appointment was not without precedent. Almost thirty years 
before, another Socialist Government had chosen a maverick Gaullist to serve it 
as proconsul in a troublesome territory. Like Mitterrand's appointment of Pisani, 
the choice by Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France of Jacques Sou stelle as 
Governor-General to Algeria in January 1955 constituted an original response to 
a difficult situation. Like Pisani, Soustelle's instructions were to continue 
ongoing government reforms and to settle ethnic tensions between European 
conservatives and pro-independence indigenes.155 Again like Soustelle, Pisani 
failed, unable to reconcile the conflicting interests of these groups. 
While his Gaullist pedigree was beyond reproach, Pisani no longer 
associated with Gaullist leaders, having abandoned the movement in the late 
1960s. Although the question of independence in Algeria in the 1950s differed 
substantially from the prospects for New Caledonian independence in the 19808, 
his imaginitive approach to reform turned out to be as unacceptable to New 
Caledonian conservatives as Soustelle's had been to French Algerians. Pisani, a 
man who described himself as "un adversaire de la droite conservatrice",156 was 
to find this out by experience. Original thinking demonstrated by Pisani over 
New Caledonia became anathema to local conservatives, who wished to 
preserve their social and electoral dominance. To Pisani's dismay,157 his novel 
solutions to local troubles were to earn him the status of the most hated 
government representative in the territory during the 1980s.158 
Yet in December 1984 there still appeared to be some room for 
manreuvre for the Fabius Government. While endeavouring to maintain law and 
order, the Government did not heed calls from Pons and other RPR 
representatives to dissolve the provisional government of Kanaky.159 Mitterrand 
was perhaps mindful of his time as Minister of the Interior in 1954, when he had 
advocated, and obtained, repression of a nationalist insurrection in Algeria and 
the dissolution of the party at its head. l60 His intransigent refusal to negotiate 
with Algerian nationalists in 1954 had not forced an end of their claims. With the 
FLNKS, his response was more measured. As in Algeria, he had no intention of 
abandoning French territory, and aimed to uphold Republican law)61 However. 
this time, some attempt was made via Pisani to defuse local nationalist tensions 
through government negotiation and concessions. 
The first priority for Pisani was to re-establish law and order. In the frrst 
week of December, he negotiated an agreement with the FLNKS which involved 
the lifting of Kanak roadblocks in exchange for the release of 17 activists held in 
police custody.l62 His chances of implementing this agreement seemed 
seriously diminished by the ambush of unarmed FLNKS members near 
Hienghene on 5 December. The ambush, made by a group of Europeans and 
metis, resulted in the death of ten Kanaks, including two of Tjibaou's brothers. 
In spite of the provocation to further violence this ambush could have 
represented for the FLNKS, the coalition honoured its agreement with Pisani. 
By 12 December, Fabius was able to inform the National Assembly that the last 
of the FLNKS barricades, around Thio, had been lifted.163 Law and order had 
been restored and road communications in rural areas were reopened. 
The leaders of the Kanak national liberation struggle did not turn out to 
be as unswervingly militant as might have been believed from a reading of the 
FLNKS charter. Halting their campaign of disruption in exchange for a minor 
prisoner release, and the hope that Pisani might be receptive to Kanak demands 
for independence, were not traits characteristic of the conduct of a relentless 
campaign against French colonialism as prescribed by the FLNKS charter. The 
FLNKS executive resolved that the provisional government would gain political 
stature in Paris by not retaliating for the ambush at Hienghene.164 A belated 
realisation that the provisional government of Kanaky was of an embryonic 
nature and was not prepared to push confrontation to the extent of possibly 
provoking civil war may well also have played a part in its restraint 
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The peace remained fragile throughout December while Pisani conducted 
his consultations with local leaders over the future of New Caledonia. He did so 
in the most difficult of situations. He had been assigned the unenviable position 
of negotiating with two fiercely antagonistic camps, polarised over the issue of 
independence. The FNSC had been marginalised as a force for moderation by its 
losses in the territorial elections, and although Pisani appreciated the moderation 
shown by the LKS, he was aware that its electoral strength was insufficient to 
. playa determining role in negotiations.165 
By this stage, New Caledonia had become a cause celebre for the 
parliamentary opposition in Paris, a portfolio which for them was symptomatic 
of the purported inability of Socialist Governments to govern. Acting as the self-
appointed guardians of French Republicanism, the UDF and the RPR united in 
attacking the Fabius Government's handling of New Caledonia.166 On 21 
December, Giscard d'Estaing and six former Prime Ministers167 from the two 
parties issued a joint statement condemning the conduct of government policy, 
accusing Fabius and his Ministers of wishing to subvert the self-determination 
process and Republican law to the interests of Kanak nationalism, thus 
endangering French sovereignty over New Caledonia. Neither the RPR nor the 
UDF were formally opposed to a self-determination referendum, but both 
harboured the suspicion that the Government would rig it to the advantage of the 
FLNKS.168 
The key issue was to whom the Government would apply the expression 
"peuples interesses", mentioned in article 53 of the Constitution. RPR and UDF 
fears were not calmed by Mitterrand's statement on TFI on 16 December 1984 
that he favoured "l'emancipation" of New Caledonia "sous une forme 
d'autonomie ou d'independance" that the territory ttdoit definir lui-meme")69 
This was evidence that the Fabius Government was discarding the reluctance of 
the Mauroy Government to discuss independence in some form, paradoxically at 
a time of greater violence than in earlier years, when it had previously held back 
on the question so as not to provoke strife. PI and later FINKS activism had 
largely been effective in forcing the issue. 
The willingness of the Fabius Government to contemplate the issue of 
self-determination and some form of independence for New Caledonia gained it 
the ear of the FLNKS, but caused the RPCR to cut off dialogue. 170 The RPCR 
refused to negotiate with Pisani throughout December. For its leaders the Fabius 
Government was working in league with the FLNKS to push New Caledonia 
into independence. Lafleur referred to New Caledonia as being "en etat de 
legitime-defense",171 Considering the financial and logistical support of Lafleur 
and the RPCR for rural militias in November and December,I72 these words 
were not empty rhetoric. 
Pisani announced his Propositions for New Caledonia (hereafter the 
Pisani Plan) on 7 January 1985.173 He proposed a self-determination 
referendum for July 1985, thus confirming the government decision in 
November 1984 to hold one before 1986. Pisani also .proposed that the. 
referendum should exclude any voters who had resided in the territory less than 
three years. This formula had already been used for the self-determination 
referendum that had led to the independence of Djibouti in 1977. The 
referendum was only a partial concession to changing FLNKS demands, which 
by late November 1984 involved "une consultation referendaire qui ne fait appel 
qu'au seul peuple kanak",174 In spite of RPR and UDF claims that the 
Government was contemplating otherwise, Pisani had no intention of restricting 
the franchise to Kanaks,175 for the reason that such a move would have been in 
violation of article 3 of the Constitution.176 
Pisani announced that should an absolute majority of voters back 
independence, the Government would grant it by January 1986. This prospect 
was regarded with horror by the RPCR, the RPR, and the UDF, although it was 
by no means a foregone conclusion. An estimated 5.500 of New Caledonia's 
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79,271 voters would be excluded from the referendum, a number insufficient to 
reduce local majority support for continued ties with France evident in past 
territorial elections.177 Nor ultimately was the FLNKS satisfied by the kind of 
independence that Pisani offered. The form that independence would take, 
"independance-association", entailed the continuation of a French presence in 
New Caledonia. The Republic would maintain control over defence and foreign 
relations, and those New Caledonians who desired to remain French could do 
so, while the rest could opt for Kanak citizenship. 
The Pisani Plan entailed a compromise solution to three interests: the 
intention of the Fifth Republic to retain a geostrategic presence in New 
Caledonia; the desire of New Caledonian loyalists to remain French; and the 
demands of Kanak nationalism. Pisani aimed, by partially meeting the interests 
of the State, Kanaks and French loyalists, to bridge the gap between the interests 
of French and Kanak nationalism. Pisani's compromise was unsatisfactory to 
both the FLNKS and the RPCR. The FLNKS wanted a fully sovereign Kanaky 
with administrative authority over the territorial economy. resources, defence 
and foreign relations. The Front announced that the Pisani Plan represented a 
neo-colonialist solution, whereby France would retain sovereignty in all but 
name. 178 The RPCR for its part pointed out that once independence was 
granted, there would be no guarantee that New Caledonia would maintain its 
association with France, should an FLNKS-dominated government opt to sever 
links. 179 This was a point validated by French experience of decolonisation in 
Algeria. The Evian Accords negotiated between France and the FLN in 1962 
before Algerian independence had granted France the maintenance of certain 
strategic interests and accorded privileges to French citizens who wished to 
remain in Algeria after independence, although these provisions were abandoned 
by the FLN once in power.l80 
Whatever agreement Pisani had hoped to inspire turned improbable as a 
result of two shooting incidents that alienated both Kanaks and French loyalists 
days after the announcement of the Pisani Plan. The FLNKS cut off dialogue 
with Pisani after the fatal shooting of Machoro and an associate, Marcel 
Nonnaro, by members of the elite GIGN near La Foa on 12 January 1985. 
Controversy persists over the details of this incident.181 The FLNKS and its 
supporters claimed the deaths constituted the murder of unarmed men giving 
themselves up.182 The GIGN claimed that the pair were armed and hostile at the 
time of their deaths, which were the result of poor marksmanship intended to 
wound rather than kill. The FLNKS blamed Pisani for having given express 
orders to kill Machoro. Pisani denies this, although he does not completely rule 
out the possibility that their deaths might not have been accidental.183 Whatever 
the truth of the matter, the incident irreparably harmed relations between Pisani 
and the FLNKS. 
The RPCR, for its part, was further disillusioned with Pisani by the fatal 
shooting near Bouloupari on 11 January 1985 of Yves TuaI, a Caldoche 
teenager, by a Kanak. While the party took the opportunity to condemn Pisani 
further for failing to maintain law and order, conservative militants rioting on the 
streets of Noumea aggravated the situation by causing additional lawlessness. 184 
Pisani's response was to use his powers as state representative to declare 
a state of emergency. Public assemblies were banned, a curfew was declared, 
the transport of arms and munitions was forbidden, and the right to deport 
anyone deemed a threat to public order was invoked. 18s These were not 
promising conditions under which to continue negotiations to determine calmly 
the future of the territory. 
Mitterrand attempted to lessen tensions by visiting New Caledonia on 17 
January, but this effort was largely ineffectual. Such a brief visit could not hope 
to remedy Pisani's increasing isolation from local leaders. The trip had greater 
effect as a media coup, and as a riposte to opposition accusations that Mitterrand 
and the Fabius Government were neglecting New Caledonia. However the 
pourn 
-
Map 3. Regions Established by the 
Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute 
1985 
Region Nord 
nouvelle - caledonie 
at dependances 
(Regions at communes) 
Region 
des iles Loyaute 
mare 
er!houen~. 
- " houSllou ~ 
Region Centre 
..A~aita 
,. • du /' . .....,...._-
../' ./' noumea ,,~,.y.y.-a,-- ile des pIns 
......-- ,.,.-' 
____ . Region Sud 
SO 11<", 
Source: DTSEE: Schema de l'economie neo-catedonienne 
/985. 
57 
presidential visit gave local conservatives an opportune target for their 
discontent, and they took the chance to organise large protest demonstrations. 186 
For all his troubles, Pisani remained optimistic about the chances of 
implementing his plan.187 By March 1985, a more cautious administrator might 
have decided to adopt a reticent approach towards talk of independence, given 
the adverse reaction this word had already provoked. Heedless of the wishes of 
New Caledonian loyalists, Pisani was by this stage publicly convinced that New 
Caledonia's independence was historically "ineluctable".188 Like Lemoine, he 
possessed a misplaced optimism about his capacity to inspire consensus in New 
Caledonia. This optimism was to last beyond his official removal from Noumea 
by the Government.l89 Like Lemoine, Pisani had trouble calming political 
unrest in New Caledonia, although it is difficult to ascertain what solution could 
have satisfied both local nationalists and conservatives in 1985. 
One of the consequences of Mitterrand's visit to New Caledonia was that 
he witnessed the gulf between Pisani and New Caledonians, whether Kanak or 
10yalist.190 He responded almost immediately. The President announced on his 
return to Paris that "Ie deIegue du gouvernement compIetera et precisera les 
propositions qu'il a faites Ie 7 janvier".l91 This was the first indication of 
revisions which were to lead to an overhaul of the Pisani Plan overseen by 
Fabius. Pisani was aware of hesitations by Fabius over his plan and 
consequently sent his suggestions for revisions directly to Mitterrand on 26 
March.192 Pisani suggested to Mitterrand that the referendum should take place 
in September 1985, with independence by the end of 1987 should New 
Caledonians thus choose. This recommendation was ignored.t93 
The defini tive course of action decided on in Paris was announced by 
Fabius after a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 25 April 1985. The self-
detennination referendum would be deferred until after the legislative elections in 
1986, but would occur before 31 December 1987.194 The Government 
postponed the self-determination referendum to calm the situation in New 
Caledonia. While the FLNKS might not be satisfied, the action was intended to 
quieten opposition claims that New Caledonia was too rapidly being led to 
independence. In doing so, the Government postponed the issue of 
independence without resolving any of the fundamental differences between 
Kanaks and French loyalists in the territory. There was no likelihood of Paris 
meeting the FLNKS demand for a vote restricted to Kanaks. The fact that a 
referendum would still take place did not satisfy the RPCR position that the vote 
was unnecessary, as the FLNKS did not have the backing of an absolute 
majority of the territorial electorate, and that a referendum might be divisive if 
the Socialists decided to erode loyalist electoral predominance by restricting 
voting rights. In the interim, another transitional statute would be introduced to 
replace the Lemoine Plan. This new legislation was to respond to Kanak 
demands for autonomy by granting greater administrative responsibilities to the 
New Caledonian regions. This response was perceived by the Opposition as 
indicative of government indecisiveness and as an unmerited concession offered 
to a rowdy minority which had shown scant consideration for state authority. 
Despite its postponement, the President was not reluctant to hold a self-
determination referendum. At this stage, Mitterrand did not share the 
conservative view that setting up a referendum for New Caledonia might lead to 
self-determination claims in the rest of the DOM-TOM. He stated at the 
ministerial meeting on 25 April 1985: 
Je suis tout pret II soumettre II chaque territoire, tous les deux ou trois ans, un 
vote sur l'independance. Je suis assure que d'ici longtemps its choisiront Ie 
maintien dans la Republique fran~aise.195 
Pisani was replaced while preparations for the new territorial statute were 
being debated. He was no longer needed in Noumea by the Fabius Government, 
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and his continued presence there would only prompt further resentment from his 
local opponents. The Government adroitly removed him by promoting him to 
the newly-created post of Minister to New Caledonia, which he assumed on 24 
May 1985.196 This promotion was in effect a face-saving measure on the part of 
the Government. To dismiss Pisani outright would have constituted an 
admission of failure. While the official explanation of the appointment was that 
Pisani was needed in Paris for the preparation of the statute bill, Fabius had 
already decided his own orientation for the new statute. The post of Minister to 
New Caledonia itself was exceptional in the extreme: no other French region 
with fewer than 200,000 inhabitants could claim to have a Minister devoted 
solely to its affairs. Under Pisani, the New Caledonian portfolio attained 
unprecedented status in Paris. Emmanuelli and Lemoine had been Secretaries of 
State, junior ministers subordinate to Gaston Defferre, the Minister to the 
Interior, for whom New Caledonia was a minor, if delicate, component of the 
DOM-TOM portfolio. After the appointment of the Chirac Government in March 
1986, New Caledonia returned to being a component of this wider portfolio, 
although it was overseen by a fully fledged Minister to the DOM-TOM. 
The definitive statute,197 an amalgam of the Pisani Plan and of new ideas 
overseen by Fabius (hereafter, the PisanilFabius Interim Statute), superseded 
much of the Lemoine Statute. The new statute was intended to give the rural 
Melanesian population greater territorial representation. Article 3 created four 
new regional boundaries which were drawn up in such a way as to permit 
Kanak control over at least two and possibly three of them. (See Map 3)Each of 
these regions would be self-administering under article 4, and would have their 
own councils. Under article 22, the Regional Councils were responsable for 
their own agricultural and maritime resources, public works, cultural 
development, housing, health, industry, professional training and primary 
education. 
In increasing regional powers, the PisanilFabius Interim Statute was 
designed to decrease the influence of the Territorial Assembly (renamed the 
Territorial Congress) on regional development. The Territorial Congress also 
had its powers reduced by the re-establishment of the High Commissioner as the 
head of the territorial executive under article 25, a reversal of the situation 
created by the Lemoine Statute. Article 27 allowed the Government to legislate 
once more by ordinance, until 15 November 1985, in order to set up the 
Regional Councils, finalise the definition of territorial responsibilities, and to 
further territorial development in general. Government recourse to ordinances 
was aimed at circumventing the absolute majority enjoyed by the RPCR in the 
Territorial Assembly prior to the regional elections scheduled for September, as 
well as intended to circumvent to some extent parliamentary opposition in Paris, 
opposition which had already caused delays in the statute bill's implementation. 
The PS was the only major party in the National Assembly which voted 
for the statute bill. The PC, which until then had voted for Socialist reforms in 
New Caledonia while criticising them for not promoting rapid decolonisation, 
had lost patience. The Communists opposed the legislation as a retrograde step 
on the path to independence.198 Central to RPR and unF criticisms of the 
statute bill were its regional divisions. The Opposition complained to the 
Constitutional Council that these divisions were undemocratic, giving New 
Caledonia's rural and predominantly Melanesian inhabitants disproportionate 
representation in the Territorial Congress. The complaint was upheld on 8 
August, when the Constitutional Council announced that the statute bill was 
contrary to the Constitution on these grounds. The decision forced a 
redistribution of seats to the advantage of the South. Whereas originally the bill 
had proposed seven seats for the Loyalty Islands, nine for the North Region, 
nine for the Centre and 18 for the South, the new distribution gave three more 
seats to the South.199 This concession failed to satisfy RPR leaders, who once 
Table 8. New Caledonian Regional Elections 
1985 
Territorial Results: 29 September 
Registered voters 89,775 
Votes cast 71,995 
Turnout 80.19% 
Valid votes 71,454 
Party Votes % of votes Sea ts 
cast 
RPCR 37,147 51.60 25 
FLNKS 20,545 28.54 16 
FN 5,274 7.33 3 
LKS 4,597 6.39 1 
RPC 1,058 1.47 1 
Others 2,833 3.94 
° 
Regional Results 
North Centre South Loyalty 
Registered 
voters 15.026 14,260 48,683 11,806 
Votes cast 12,472 12,063 37,972 9,488 
Turnout 83.0% 84.59% 78.0% 80.37% 
Valid votes 12,386 11,965 37,685 9,418 
Party 
RPCR 2,889 5,004 26,612 2,642 
FI..NKS 7,383 5,433 2,820 4,909 
FN 1 2 5,262 
LKS 709 789 1,232 1,867 
RPC 1,058 
Others 347 727 1,759 
Source: Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 2 octobre 1985. 
Table 9. Tourism in New Caledonia 1980-1990 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total 78,040 78,892 84,563 88,209 90,655 47,804 57,396 60,747 61,079 79,640 84,753 
Visitors 
Sources: ITSEE: TEC 1985 p.l91, TEC 1988 p.197. 
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again lodged a plea with the Constitutional Council, although this complaint was 
rejected on 23 August, and the statute was promulgated. 
The rejection of the new statute on 31 May by the Territorial Assembly 
was as predictable as the government decision to ignore its objections. In a 
remarkable about-face, at its Hienghene congress on 26 May the FLNKS 
announced approval of the statute for the very reasons that the RPCR opposed 
it. In spite of its rejection of the statute's "logique neo-coloniale",200 the 
FLNKS decided to participate in the September elections, thus ending its boycott 
of territorial institutions. Although its timetable for independence had once again 
been lengthened by acceptance of the new schedule for the referendum, the 
FLNKS responded to the greater regional powers under the new statute. The 
reduction of Noumea's control over the Melanesian-dominated hinterland of 
New Caledonia would, they argued, permit lasting local autonomy and serve as 
a strong basis for independence.20t 
This pragmatic cooperation with French institutional reform called into 
question the commitment made by the FLNKS in its charter to attain full 
sovereignty for Kanaks through a national liberation struggle against French 
rule. Participation in the new reforms indicated that the FLNKS was not 
invariably entrenched in its opposition to French institutions.202 At the 
Hienghene congress, Tjibaou and the UC successfully urged other FLNKS 
members to employ the finance and administrative powers offered by the new 
statute as a mechanism which would enhance Kanak rural autonomy as a 
preliminary step toward independence. The acceptance of French state funding 
for regional administration underlined the slender financial means of the Kanak 
provisional government, and the inadequacy of its plans to institute 
independence unilaterally. The prospects of setting up the economic and 
administrative infrastructures necessary to achieve viable independence in 1987 
were slim, even disregarding the opposition of the local loyalist majority. It is 
doubtful whether the provisional government of Kanaky was capable of being 
more than a means of pressuring Paris. 
The new FLNKS policy of pragmatic cooperation with government 
reforms allowed it to gain 16 of the 46 seats in the regional elections on 29 
September 1985. (Table 8) All but one of these were outside the South. The 
Front also gained majority control in all except the South Region, to the dismay 
of its opponents in Noumea and Paris, who reiterated accusations of Socialist 
gerrymandering under the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute in spite of the ruling of 
the Constitutional Council.203 None the less, the RPCR confmned its overall 
majority, with 25 seats and 51.60% of the territorial vote. Other parties standing 
which opposed independence. the FN and Rassemblement Progres et 
Coutume,204 gained a combined 8.8% of the vote. This gave anti-independence 
parties over 60% of the vote. On the basis of these figures, the chance of the 
FLNKS obtaining majority support in the forthcoming referendum of 1987 
looked slight even if all its voters in September 1985 would vote for 
independence. Assuming that the turnout in the referendum would be the satI).e 
as that of the regionals, and that all 5,500 of the voters who would be excluded 
from the referendum would have desired New Caledonia to remain French, their 
disqualification would only have lowered the anti-independence vote by an 
outside theoretical maximum of 7.64%. The regional elections reconfirmed that 
an absolute majority of New Caledonian voters were opposed to the exponents 
of Kanak nationalism. 
The implementation of Socialist reform in New Caledonia was cut short 
by the change of Government in Paris in March 1986. As with the Dijoud Plan, 
it is not possible to judge the full consequences of the Pisani/Fabius Interim 
Statute; it did not survive long enough to make a lasting impact on the territory. 
The little that can be said for it is that its concessions led the FLNKS to 
participate in New Caledonia's administration, despite the contradictory 
maintenance of the provisional government of Kanaky as a reminder that the 
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coalition might yet abandon its pragmatism. The FLNKS had not surrendered its 
nationalist agenda, however it was not in a strong position to promote it It was 
prepared to wait for independence longer than either it or the PI had been in 
previous years. Kanak nationalist hyperbole on the liberation struggle had 
stumbled on the limited resources of the FLNKS to wage such a campaign, and 
on the detennination of representatives of the French State to defend law and 
order. 
A gap remained between the unrealistic Melanesian nationalist 
expectations of the FLNKS, and what Paris was prepared to concede to meet the 
Front's agenda. The eligibility conditions for the self-determination referendum, 
a major point of dissension with Paris, had not been finalised. The Chirac 
Government inherited this problem, and the potential for confrontation it 
entailed, from the Socialists. 
Although the RPCR erroneously continued to insist, in the face of 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that there was no ethnic problem in New 
Caledonia,205 its concern for economic depression in New Caledonia was 
justified. Territorial economic dependence had not been diminished under 
Socialist administration, rather it had continued its erratic course since the late 
1970s.206 The troubles of 1984 and 1985 caused a marked drop in tourist 
arrivals, disturbing the steady growth that tourism had experienced since 1980. 
(Table 9) Australian and New Zealand tourists were discouraged by reports of 
violence, although Japanese arrivals did not greatly diminish due to lack of 
coverage of local political events in the Japanese media.207 Despite property 
damage,208 rural confrontation in 1984 and 1985 did not significantly disrupt 
agricultural production. Its stagnation had preceded the troubles.209 From 1981 
to 1986, Socialist Governments were distracted from development issues by the 
debate over self-determination to the point that, by 1985, Pisani was 
preoccupied with the fonner to the effective exclusion of the latter. 
The Pons Interlude 
The electoral majority attained by the RPRlUDF alliance at both national 
level and in New Caledonia in the legislative elections of March 1986 (Tables 
10, 11) marked the beginning of a new, albeit brief, political era for New 
Caledonia. With the RPR dominating the new liberal-conservative coalition 
Government in Paris, to the relief of the RPCR New Caledonia was to be 
subject to policy priorities more conservative than those of Dijoud or his 
Socialist successors. As the inheritors of Gaullism. RPR leaders tended to 
present themselves as the purest exponents of French Republicanism, the 
guardians of the institutions and values established by the General. In 1986 there 
was no indication that this assumption had weakened. Pons, as the new Minister 
to the DOM-TOM, announced renewed government policy emphasis on DOM-
TOM policy.210 
The parliamentarians of the new majority were viscerally opposed to 
New Caledonian independence. For example Chirac held that secession would 
diminish the territory of the Republic, and would lessen the global grandeur of 
France.211 It was speculated that New Caledonian independence might also 
encourage support for Maohi nationalists in French Polynesia.21.tThe Chirac 
Government nevertheless agreed with the Socialist Governments from 1981 to 
1986 in insisting that if independence must occur, it could only legitimately take 
place if desired by a majority of the territorial electorate, and if accomplished 
within the confines of constitutional law. The RPR's insistence in the 1980s on 
observing constitutional requirements was more scrupulously legalistic than de 
Gaulle's policy conduct had been in the 1960s. With Algeria, the magnitude of 
opposition to French rule had been such that the Constitution, which did not 
allow secession of Departments from the Republic, had to be disregarded. No 
such exception would be made by the RPR for those among the 65,000 or so 
Table 10. French Legislative Elections, 1986. 
National Results 
16, 23 March 
Registered voters 37,562,173 
Votes cast 29,299,852 
Turnout 78.0% 
Valid votes 28,024,168 
Party Votes % of votes Seats 
cast 
UDF-RPRI 11,482,003 39.18 286 
PS 8,857,752 30.23 212 
PC 2,739,925 9.35 35 
FN 2,703,442 9.23 35 
Others 2,241,046 7.65 8 
Source: L'annee politique, economique et socia Ie en France 
1986 p.187. 
t The RPR and the UDP formed a coalition for the eJection. In some 
electorates, separate candidates stood for the RPR and the UDF. In others the 
two parties presented candidates on a joint list. 
Table 11. French Legislative Elections, 1986. 
New Caledonian Results 
16 March 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
90,578 
45,637 
50,38% 
44,817 Valid votes 
Party 
RPCR 
Others 
Votes 
39,677 
5,140 
% of votes cast 
86.94 
11.26 
Maurice Nenou and Jacques Lafleur were elected. 
Sea ts 
2 
o 
Sources: Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 17 mars 1986; Le 
Monde 19 mars 1986. 
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Melanesians in New Caledonia who called themselves Kanaks. In December 
1984 Jacques Toubon, the Secretary-General of the RPR, had declared to the 
National Assembly that any self-detennination referendum would have to respect 
the following legal considerations: 
La premiere condition, c'est que Ie vote soit ega} pour tous. 11 n'existe plus en 
France de suffrage censitaire, de suffrage ethnique ou de suffrage racial. La 
deuxieme condition, c'est que Ie vote soit Iibre, [ ... J que I'ordre soit maintenu 
pour que Ie vote soit regu1ier et que tous ceux qui veulent aller voter puissent y 
a11er. Troisieme condition: que Ie suffrage universel soit respec~, c'est-l-dire 
que si, en l'occurrence, les CalMoniens disent: nous sommes pour 
I'independance, qu'its la prennent, et, s'its disent qu'its sont contre 
l'independance, qu'on ne Ia leur impose pas a10rs que Ia majorite d'entre eux ne 
I'aura pas voulue.213 
As has been noted, the FLNKS was not likely to gain Kanak 
independence through a referendum which contained no electoral advantage to 
Melanesians. The RPR therefore had no hesitation in promising to adhere to the 
Fabius Government's timetable for a self-determination vote even before it 
entered government.214 
In spite of much vehement declamation by RPR Deputies over the 
refonns of the Fabius Government, and the advancement of the proposition that 
the Socialists had been steering New Caledonia toward independence, the 
position of Gaullists on self-determination for New Caledonia was essentially 
the same as that of the Socialists. The observation by Toubon that if New 
Caledonians wanted independence they could take it by constitutionally 
recognised means had been expressed in almost the same terms by Mitterrand 
when discussing the TOM in lei et maintenant: "s'lls veulent l'independance [ ... ] 
qu'ils Ia prennent".215 As was pointed out in chapter 1, the UDF shared this 
position with the PS and the RPR. 
The primacy of "Ie peuple kanak" was at best a marginal concept for the 
RPR. In 1981 Claude Labbe, President of the RPR group in the National 
Assembly, stated his party's wish for "une.tres grande ouverture aux exigences 
legitimes des differentes communautes" in New Caledonia.216 In practice this 
openness did not extend to recognising Kanak claims to privileged status, either 
through socio-economic policy aimed to improve the material situation of 
Melanesians, or through a restricted self-determination vote guaranteed to result 
in independence. French democratic principles took precedence over Kanak 
particularism. While Labbe admitted the existence of different ethnic groups in 
New Caledonia, for Pons its inhabitants were above all French. In one telling 
outburst during a National Assembly debate in 1985, Pons interjected when a 
speaker referred to the "communautes differentes" in the territory, riposting "II 
n'ya pas de communautes differentes! 11 y en a une seule!"217 This was not an 
isolated remark. In a Senate debate in 1986, Pons was to go a step further with 
another interjection in the same vein. Rolande Perlican, a PC Senator, accused 
Pons of turning his back on ''[les] interets du peuple kanak". Pons exclaimed "11 
n'y a pas de peuple kanak!"218 He asserted that the concept of a Kanak people 
could not be considered a valid one when not all of New Caledonia's 
Melanesians aspired to Kanak independence.219 With his formally democratic 
agenda of equality under law for all, Pons absolved himself on the levels of 
statutory, institutional and voting reform from recognising either Kanak identity 
or the historical disadvantages of New Caledonia's Melanesians, although his 
social reforms held the same advantages for Kanaks as for the rest of the 
territorial population. His position differed radically from that of the PC which, 
during cohabitation, continued calling for decolonisation and recognition of the 
Kanak people.220 To an even lesser extent than during the time the Socialists 
were in government, PC parliamentarians were insufficiently numerous to bring 
about such policy. 
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For Pons, and for other RPR conservatives, the concept of a single 
Kanak identity had no validity. They rested their case on the tribal and linguistic 
divisions existing among the indigenous inhabitants of New Caledonia, and on 
the fact that no Melanesian nation had existed prior to French annexation of the 
islands. They pointed out that no historical basis existed for indigenous claims to 
sovereignty and that concepts such as 'Ie peuple Kanak' and 'Kanaky' were 
recent inventions, dating from the 1970s. Although these were valid points, this 
outlook led the Chirac Government to underestimate the depth of nationalist 
sentiment amongst those New Caledonian Melanesians who referred to 
themselves as Kanaks. Whether or not the Chirac Government subscribed to the 
FLNKS view of Kanak identity, the existence of an overall majority of the 
Melanesian population in New Caledonia which called itself Kanak could not be 
discounted, even though this was the tendency of the Government due to an 
aversion to its claims of legitimacy. 
The most outstanding expression of Kanak identity, the provisional 
government of Kanaky, represented an affront to the Chirac Government's 
interpretation of Republican legitimacy. In December 1984 Messmer had 
described the provisional government as "un gouvernement illegal".221Jt was 
asserted by the Gaullists as well as by Giscardians that in establishing its 
provisional government and in actively boycotting the territorial elections in 
November 1984, the FLNKS had placed itself beyond the protection of the law 
and should be sanctioned. The arrival of the president of the provisional 
government of Kanaky in the public gallery of the National Assembly on 23 
January 1985 provoked a hue and cry, not only from RPR Deputies, but also 
from their UDF colleagues. Labbe protested at "la presence intolerable d'un 
homme qui s'est volontairement situe en dehors de la Republique". He 
demanded that Tjibaou be ejected for his assumed "responsabilite d'un certain 
nombre d'exactions commises sur Ie territoire de la Nouvelle-Caledonie".222 
Another Deputy, Jean-Claude Gaudin, described Tjibaou as "Ie president d'un 
gouvernement provisoire en rebellion ouverte contre la France".223 
This was indeed the portrayal that the FLNKS provisional government 
had presented itself since its foundation, although as a generalised Kanak 
rebellion had not occurred by January 1985, there was reason to doubt the 
accuracy of this characterisation, unless one assumed, as Gaudin did, that the 
very existence of a self-proclaimed provisional government stood as a rebellious 
act. Although from November to December 1985 107 roadblocks had been 
erected both by French loyalists and Kanaks, 96 buildings and cars had been 
torched, 41 properties had been vandalised or looted, 15 bombings has occurred 
and 86 frrearms had been confiscated,224 it is difficult to characterise this low 
intensity conflict as constituting a civil war or a rebellion. The efforts of the 
FLNKS provisional government to resist French rule appeared half-hearted 
compared to the effects of the Melanesian tribal rebellions of 1878 and of 1917 
when, respectively, approximately 1,400 and 220 people had been killed.225 
During the 1980s more than 50 people were killed as a result of sporadic 
political violence, mainly from 1984 to 1988, although Kanak activism did not 
lead to civil war for the reason that the FLNKS was not equipped to wage one. 
Rather FLNKS militant activism involved rowdy, violent pressure tactics, 
alternating with pragmatic cooperation with the French State. 
For all their hostility to the FLNKS in opposition, it should be noted that 
RPR leaders never went so far as to outlaw the Front when in government. At 
the height of the FLNKS active boycott of the presidential and territorial 
elections in April 1988 Pons announced that he had asked Chirac to dissolve the 
Front, but the Prime Minister did not go beyond considering the proposa1.226 
There was perhaps a realisation among them that such an undertaking would 
serve only to aggravate discord in the territory. However much the RPR scorned 
the FLNKS, opposed its nationalist philosophy, and decried its periodically 
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violent activism, the Chirac Government did not deny the party its legal 
existence. 
Concern for law and order formed another determining feature of RPR 
policy in New Caledonia. Gaullists maintained that blame for the surge in 
violence there from November 1984 ultimately rested with the Socialist 
Governments. Chirac declared that these administrations had failed to preserve 
the peace.227 Socialist Ministers were alleged to have encouraged divisions in 
New Caledonia by legislating discriminately in favour of Kanaks. Labbe 
declared in November 1984: tiLe gouvernement porte aujourd'hui la totale 
responsabilite des affrontements entre Caledoniens". He accused Fabius and his 
coUeagues of having taken "la voie de racisme".228 For this reason, the RPR 
called for Lemoine's resignation,229 and demanded the return of Pisani to Paris 
when violence continued into 1985. For the RPR the spread of violence in New 
Caledonia represented one of the most visible signs of deficiencies in Socialist 
Government policy conduct there. Once in government, the Gaullists found 
themselves the subject of similar allegations from the Socialists and 
Communists. To its chagrin, the Chirac Government too experienced law and 
order problems during its time in office, particularly when the FLNKS 
mobilised for its active boycott of the territorial and French presidential elections 
from April 1988. The increased poJice and military presence from 1986 to 1988, 
particularly around Melanesian tribes, had not served to dissuade violent Kanak 
activism. 230 
Pons rejected Mitterrand's thesis that there existed in New Caledonia a 
colonial situation which needed to be redressed. Pons conceded that some 
injustices existed, but claimed that these were mainly the result of Melanesian 
tribal values, which hindered local social and agricultural development.231 For 
Pons, colonialism was a word from another age with no validity in the French 
Republic in the last quarter of the twentieth century. It was claimed that New 
Caledonia had become an integral part of that Republic, just as Brittany, Savoy 
and Corsica had. although unlike them New Caledonia was a TOM which was 
constitutionally permitted to accede to independence. RPR stalwarts tended to 
make reference to colonialism in New Caledonia only when projecting scenarios 
of foreign expansion there should France withdraw. 232 
RPR criticism of the limitations of Socialist decentralisation has already 
been noted. Socialist measures were characterised either as half-hearted, 
imbalanced, or as the opposite of decentralisation; The Gaullists claimed they 
had their own concept of decentralisation. by means of which they attempted to 
transform New Caledonia while in government. A concise description of what 
form decentralisation should take in the TOM was offered in 1984 by Toubon 
during debate of French Polynesia's new statute by the National Assembly: 
[ ... J chaque territoire doit disposer d'un statut s¢cifique, repondant aux 
aspirations democratiquement exprimees par la majorite de la population ainsi 
qu'll ses earacteristiques geographiques, humaines et economiques. 
Naturellement. ces divers statuts doivent avoir des canlctt!ristiques communes 
qui sont nkessaires pour I'exercice de la dCmocratie. 11 faut qu'ils soient fondes 
sur la representativite electorate et s'ils doivent eonferer de larges pouvoirs II 
I'executif local. its doivent maintenir lll'Etat les eom¢tences necessaires II sa 
souverainete, II l'integrit6 du territoire national. lla defense. aux relations 
internationales. 
Nous sommes done bien favorables l la decentralisation comme 
partout en France, ll'autonomie interne quand un tenitoire en a Ia capacitt et 1a 
volonte, mais nous sommes contre l'independance.233 
This was decentralisation with a Republican streak, internal. autonomy 
designed to consolidate ties with Paris rather than weaken them. In New 
Caledonia, Pisani had conceived regionalisation as a preliminary step to possible 
independence. For the RPR, the delegation of administrative powers to the 
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territory should not go so far as to allow this. In New Caledonia in 1986, 
founding the administrative framework on a democratic basis by reinforcing the 
powers of the territorial executive would shore up the influence of the RPCR, 
the fonnation with the most representatives in the Territorial Congress. Under 
the PisanilFabius Interim Statute, the institution of greater autonomy at regional 
level and the restoration of the High Commissioner as the Territorial President 
had reduced the influence of the RPCR, as had the unrepresentative distribution 
of seats in the Territorial Congress (until overruled by the Constitutional 
Council), and the new regional boundaries. 
In implementing the RPR vision for New Caledonia, Pons had certain 
advantages over the Socialists. He had paid numerous visits to the territory prior 
to becoming Minister and had cultivated close relations with the conservative 
electorate and its leaders.234 His party had abiding links with the RPCR and 
enjoyed majority support in the Territorial Congress. But to his detriment, Pons 
did not have the confidence of Melanesian nationalists. His denial of Kanak 
identity, his opposition to Kanak self-determination, his affrrmation of the 
backwardness of Melanesian tribal culture, and his insistence on the importance 
of French nationalism above Kanak nationalism did not endear him to the 
FLNKS. This attitudinal gulf between Pons and the FLNKS did not presage 
well for his appeal for openness and dialogue in discussions between Paris and 
Noum6a concerning New Caledonia.235 Pons was to have a difficult time 
convincing Melanesian nationalists of his sincerity. In his first weeks as 
Minister, the opportunity for dialogue with the FLNKS remained open, but 
avenues of debate turned into dead-ends because of the mutually exclusive 
theses of Pons and the FLNKS regarding political prospects in New Caledonia. 
Pons met an FLNKS delegation in Paris on 8 May 1986, although this meeting 
produced no more than declarations of their respective positions.236 Following 
the start of government reforms in April 1986, the FLNKS announced it would 
organise passive demonstrations.237 To protest at the refusal of the Chirac 
Government to limit the franchise to Melanesians in the self-determination 
referendum, the FLNKS announced in August 1986 at its congress at We 
preparations for a campaign of civiJ disobedience and an eventual withdrawal 
from territorial institutions.238 By December 1986, the Front had cut off 
dialogue with Pons, and demanded in vain of Chirac the dismissal of his 
Minister to the DOM-TOM.239 
Immediate differences hinged on conditions for the referendum. As they 
were unrealistic demands, Tjibaou abandoned past FLNKS claims to an 
exclusively Kanak franchise for the referendum, and conceded that eligible 
voters, Kanak or not, with a least one parent born in New Caledonia might vote. 
Pons made the same response to this proposal as the Mauroy and Fabius 
Governments had when called on to restrict voting eligibility to the advantage of 
Kanaks. He rejected the proposal as discriminatory and undemocratic.24o 
Bringing policy conduct in line with the criteria used for the self-determination 
vote in Djibouti a decade before, Chirac announced at the end of January 1987 
that voter eligibility would be restricted to those who had resided in New 
Caledonia for three years of more at the time of the plebiscite.241 This was a 
major concession for the RPR, in that it also brought the referendum conditions 
in line with those proposed by Fabius in 1985. Previously, the RPR had only 
supported the exclusion of otherwise eligible voters who had lived in the 
territory less than three months.242 This concession was not capable of 
satisfying the FLNKS. Perhaps hoping for further concessions, it responded by 
stepping up its opposition to the Government. The provisional government of 
Kanaky, of which little had been heard since 1985, was reactivated in February 
1987.243 By May, the FLNKS was preparing a non-violent boycott of the self-
determination referendum,244 which had been scheduled for September. 
Part of the FLNKS lobbying against the Chirac Government entailed 
seeking presidential intervention. At the end of January 1987, Tjibaou called on 
Table 12: New Caledonian Self-Determination 
Referendum 
1987 
Territorial Results: 13 September 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
For France 
For independence 
~egional Results 
85,200 
49,453 
58.04% 
48,611 
842 
North Centre 
Registered 
voters 14,728 13,864 
Votes cast 4,720 6,116 
Turnout 32.05% 44.11 % 
For France 4,468 5,936 
For 
independence 252 180 
Source: Le Mande 15 septembre 1987. 
South 
44,648 
35,671 
79.89% 
35,291 
380 
Loyalty 
11,960 
2,946 
24.63% 
2,916 
30 
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Mitterrand to arbitrate the Front's dispute with the Government.245 Mitterrand 
professed to be alarmed by developments concerning New Caledonia. He 
described the disregard in which the Chirac Government held the FLNKS as 
reactionary, but he hesitated to interfere in government legislation for New 
Caledonia. Under cohabitation, the informal arrangement arrived at between 
Mitterrand and his political opponents in government was that the President 
retained executive control over defence and foreign policy, leaving executive and 
legislative decisions about other portfolios to Chirac. This division of 
responsibilities was necessary to reduce disagreements between the President 
and the Government which otherwise would have disrupted national 
administration. Consequently Mitterrand did not determine OOM-TOM policy as 
it was a component of internal affairs. Mitterrand had the capacity for recourse to 
the Constitutional Council if legislation could be deemed unconstitutional: he 
contemplated using this option in May 1986,246 and concluded that he had no 
justifiable grounds for doing so. Limited in his capacity to directly influence 
government legislation concerning New Caledonia, Mitterrand attempted instead 
to influence public opinion by declaring his objections to government policy 
conduct.241 But with regard to the referendum, the Chirac Government was 
fulfilling policy initiatives which Mitterrand's colleagues had set in motion.tThe 
referendum was to be held within the time limit that the Socialists had scheduled, 
and the electoral eligibility criteria applied were those envisaged under Fabius. 
Mitterrand publicly opposed what he portrayed as the heavy-handed 
approach to law and order in New Caledonia under Chirac. An example of this 
was provided by the events which followed the announcement by Pons on 6 
August 1987 of a ban on political marches.248 Pons reasoned that the ban would 
lessen the potential for confrontation between Kanaks and French loyalists, who 
had organised simultaneous demonstrations in Noumea. The FLNKS perceived 
the ban as an attempt to muzzle its protests against the referendum, and 
organised demonstrations in spite of it. On 22 August, two FLNKS marches, 
one in Thio and one in Noumea, were dispersed by gendarmes using tear gas 
and batons.249 Footage of the dispersal of the march in Noumea, with close-up 
shots of unarmed demonstrators being bludgeoned, made its way on to 
international television screens after an Australian TV crew filmed it. This 
incident, somewhat embarrassing to the Government, led PS leaders to issue 
statements opposing police brutality and declaring the pointlessness of using 
violent means to disperse unarmed, peaceful albeit illegal demonstrators.25o 
After a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 26 August, Mitterrand referred to 
the brutality involved in the dispersal, and added his objections to such 
violence.251 Presidential opposition to this incident came in spite of the fact that 
he and the Fabius Government had displayed a similar preoccupation with law 
and order in 1984 and 1985. Mitterrand could well vilify the clubbing of 
unarmed Kanak demonstrators in 1987, although this example of law 
enforcement was arguably less punitive than the deaths of Machoro and 
Nonnaro in January 1985. Comparisons might also be drawn between the ban 
by Pons of public demonstrations and Pisani's ban on public assemblies under 
the state of emergency he had declared in 1985. Deeming one of these decisions 
more authoritarian than the other would depend largely on the party sympathies 
of the person making the judgement. Mitterrand's stance was thus morally 
ambiguous; he freely criticised the implementation under Chirac of measures to 
halt civil disorder, but these measures were similar to those implemented with 
his tacit assent under Fabius. 
The territorial self-determination referendum on 13 September 1987 
confirmed what had been expected: an absolute majority of New Caledonian 
voters preferred to remain French. (Table 12) Of the 58.04% of eligible voters 
who participated in the referendum, 98.3% desired to remain in the Republic, 
while 1.7% were for independence. The territorial abstention rate was 41.96%, 
and was much higher in the North, Centre and Loyalty regions, where Kanaks 
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enjoyed an electoral majority. The LKS. with its support base in the Loyalty 
Islands. backed the boycott in a display of solidarity with the FLNKS and of 
opposition to the Chirac Government. In the absence of violent protest by the 
FLNKS, the LKS was prepared to join a boycott against a referendum wbich 
did not meet Kanak demands. The LKS moreover had less confidence in the 
Chirac Government than it had in the Socialists to formulate policy responses 
satisfactory to Kanaks. The number of abstentions in these three regions 
provided evidence of the level of general Kanak support for the FLNKS 
boycott, although not necessarily with FLNKS positions, and contrasted with 
the high participation rate in the South. 
These results were hailed by the RPCR, RPR and the FN as a triumph 
for the Republic, a strong sign of New Caledonian determination to remain 
Frencb.252 After the referendum Chirac and Pons called for the FLNKS to 
reconsider its boycott and to take part in negotiations for the new territorial 
statute.253 Tjibaou's reaction came in a statement on 14 September declaring that 
the FLNKS had not abandoned its goal of independence and retained its 
insistence on a self-determination referendum with voter eligibility conditions 
predetermined to the advantage of a majority vote for Kanak independence.254 
This declaration was not regarded by the Chirac Government as being of any 
great importance. Pons considered the referendum to be an affirmation of 
support for his ongoing reforms. As with Lemoine, this confidence was 
misplaced. Although, unlike Lemoine, Pons had local majority support for the 
bulk of his reform proposals, be had not inspired a territorial consensus backing 
his reforms. This fact was not regarded with any trepidation, although it should 
have been considering the deaths and property destruction whicb bad ensued 
under Lemoine when the FLNKS had demonstrated the extent of its discontent 
Pons did not show great public concern for the reaction of the FLNKS. As he 
had pointed out in February 1987, he did not regard the FLNKS as an 
"interlocuteur oblige".255 
A cautious Minister might have hesitated to overturn tbe existing 
territorial statute, particularly as it had not hindered the exercise of French 
sovereignty over New Caledonia, or undermined the democratic majority of the 
RPCR. If aspects of the PisaniIFabius Interim Statute were deemed faulty for 
whatever reason, they could be adjusted by legislation or by administrative 
practice designed to override specific parts of the statute, as Pons had already 
done during 1986, rather than by abandoning the whole. But these measures 
were considered inadequate and were too easily undone in the event of a cbange 
of government. Mindful of the approaching presidential elections in April 1988, 
which would probably result in a PS victory due to RPR differences with the 
UDF, after the self-determination referendum Pons prepared a new territorial 
statute. The statute turned out to be a fruitless undertaking due to the re-election 
of Mitterrand in May 1988 and the consequent installation of a new Socialist 
Government led by Prime Minister Michel Rocard. 
Pons had already committed himself to a major redefinition of the 
administrative structure of New Caledonia in 1986. Rejecting Socialist 
Government reforms,256 Pons outlined the need for an economic revival of the 
territory after the damage done in 1984 and 1985, and declared that another 
reorganisation of territorial institutions would be necessary.257 The initial step 
toward the fulfilment of this reform schedule was the promulgation in July 1986 
of what came to be called the Pons Law.258 
Article 2 of the law established special aid and development funding for 
New Caledonia. This measure responded to long-standing RPCR economic 
policy. Pons offered compensation to New Caledonians for property destruction 
suffered .from late 1984.259 Compensation allowed for 30% supplementary 
funding to individuals wishing to re-establish themselves outside Noumea, aid 
intended to encourage loyalists to re-establish themselves in the rural 
hinterland.260 Pons stimulated the economy with development subsidies to local 
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government and industry.261 In 1986 250MFF of funds262 were allocated to be 
dispensed by the High Commissioner under article 3 of the law. This spending 
fonned an interim measure designed to ftll the gap before the implementation of 
a new statute and the presumed more efficient administration it would install. 
With the aid of this funding, and coincidentally of rising nickel prices on the 
international market,263 New Caledonia experienced an increase in the value of 
its exports from 1986 to 1988. (Table 6) In spite of this expanded income, 
solutions to fundamental problems such as the territory's lack of rural 
development, its continued dependence on nickel exports, and the 
preponderance of tertiary sector employment, were not found. The Chirac 
Government found itself in the same situation as the Socialist Governments 
before it, too preoccupied with debate over self-determination and rewriting the 
territorial statute to undertake fundamental economic restructuring. 
The Government was reluctant to dispense this additional development 
funding to the FLNKS-controlled regions and preferred to dispense it in the 
South or directly to communes.264 The three FLNKS-administered regions 
found themselves marginalised under Pons, who characterised them to be 
administratively incompetent, prone to overspending, and incapable of fulfilling 
the multiple responsibilities ceded under Fabius.265 The three FLNKS Regional 
Presidents rejected this characterisation. They responded that it was 
unreasonable to expect the regions to have fulfilled their potential in a matter of 
months after their creation, and pointed out what they had achieved since 
1985.266 Allocation of regional funding assumed great importance to these three 
regions, as regional development formed the basis on which Kanak autonomy 
was to be constructed. In 1986 expenditure reductions were forced on the Centre 
and Loyalty Islands after the High Commissioner used his powers, as defined 
by the PisanilFabius Interim Statute, to annul their 1987 draft budgets. Pons 
dismissed the two regions' budget proposals as having projected expenditures 
beyond their means, declaring that his decision was financially and not 
politically motivated.267 This revision of regional funding was regarded by the 
FLNKS as a government attack on its credibility and as an attempt to erode its 
power. The decision was probably both politically and financially motivated. Its 
effect was to aggravate differences between the FLNKS and the Government. 
Articles 29 to 38 of the Pons Law eroded another key aspect of the 
establishment of Kanak identity: the reclamation of ancestral lands. A new land 
agency, the ADRAF, was established to replace the Land Office. The ADRAF 
abandoned the recognition under the Land Office of the priority of Melanesian 
tribal land claims. Existing provision for the compulsory purchase of land, 
which had been introduced under Dijoud, was removed.268 Pons declared that 
tribal land claims had largely been satisfied, and that the major hurdle to land 
reform now lay in the need to convince tribal leaders to abandon traditional 
forms of land tenure for modern, economically viable, owner-operated 
farms.269 Land distribution by the ADRAF would be multi-racial. Whil6 the 
orientation of the ADRAF was claimed by the Chirac Government to be more 
egalitarian than the Land Office, its shortcomings later became public 
knowledge. In September 1989 a report by an Inspector-General of Finances 
confirmed earlier allegations both by the FLNKS270 and by the extreme right in 
New Caledonia271 that the RPCR members and associates running the ADRAF 
were using their powers in a less than impartial manner. Collective Melanesian 
land claims were marginalised under the ADRAF from the time of its 
establishment till the departure of the Chirac Government in May 1988. Of717 
Melanesian land claims in that period, only 17 were approved, and these were 
mainly awarded to individuals.272 To the detriment of tribal claims and ethnic 
harmony, RPCR leaders and supporters, from Lafleur down, found themselves 
benefiting from personally profitable land sales made by the ADRAF.273 It was 
not until after the appointment of the Rocatd Government in June 1988 that any 
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attempt was made to set the ADRAF in order. The need to do so did not reflect 
well on the Chirac Government, or on the RPCR. 
The Regional Autonomy Statute, promulgated late in the day for the 
Chirac Government on 22 January 1988,274 furthered the government 
dismantling of Melanesian specificity as recognised under the Socialists by 
revising the organisation of territorial cultural institutions. An ethnically 
pluralistic Caledonian Culture Office was set up, "charge de la conservation et de 
la promotion de I 'en semble des cultures representees dans Ie territoire".275 The 
specific promotion of Kanak culture was avoided in preference to a multicultural 
emphasis harking back to Dijoud. The stance of the Chirac Government with 
regard to Melanesian custom authority as expressed in the Regional Autonomy 
Statute was less reformist. Article 4 retained tribal representation through a 
Custom Assembly. Not that the role of the Custom Assembly was innovative. 
Its function as a territorial advisory body, outlined under article 9 of the 
Regional Autonomy Statute, followed past legislation. 
Pons considered his Regional Autonomy Statute to be the culmination of 
his reforms for New Caledonia. Owing to the impending presidential elections, 
the legislation was contemplated with general scepticism in the National 
Assembly. It was felt that were Mitterrand elected for a second septennate 
overseeing another Socialist Government, the Regional Autonomy Statute would 
be rendered a dead letter. The PS, the PC, and even the UDF, pointed this 
out.276 This projection was later vindicated and the Regional Autonomy Statute, 
like other statutes which had preceded it in the 1980s, was to be short-lived. The 
FN rejected the legislation formulated by Pons for its espousal of regional 
autonomy, claiming that the Chirac Government was weakening territorial bonds 
with France and offering aid and finance to the enemy of the Republic, the 
FLNKS.277 The FN, hostile to Kanak nationalism as well as to RPCR electoral 
dominance in the territory, would have preferred the stripping of regional 
powers from both the FLNKS and the RPCR as part of a marked 
recentralisation in New Caledonia278 This FN preference, like the unconditional 
decolonisation still being promoted by the PC, was to remain in the realm of 
fantasy for want of wider national electoral support for such options. 
The Regional Autonomy Statute did not in fact decentralise to the extent 
that the FN claimed. Neither did it stifle regional administration to the extent that 
the Socialists claimed. On 19 January 1988, the Constitutional Council rejected a 
complaint from Socialist Deputies that the statute bill accorded too many powers 
to a proposed territorial Executive Council.279 It was asserted that the Executive 
Council would be dominated by the RPCR. However, provision was made to 
include representatives from regions where Kanak parties were electorally 
dominant, and each remaining member was appointed from the Territorial 
Congress on a proportional basis. The Executive Council consisted of ten 
representatives including the four Regional Presidents, and five Territorial 
Councillors appointed from the Territorial Congress. The High Commissioner 
experienced a reduction in his status in that he would no longer be the president 
of the territory, and would only exercise a casting vote in the Executive Council. 
A Territorial President elected by the Territorial Congress led the Executive 
Council, and assumed formal control over territorial affairs. Had they wished to 
participate in the elections scheduled for April 1988 under the new statutory 
conditions, minority Kanak parties would have enjoyed the power of veto over 
an RPCR majority in the Executive Council. Article 40 required the Council to 
have a two-thirds majority before major items such as the territorial budget could 
be passed. 
Otherwise, the Regional Autonomy Statute provided only a symbolic 
reorganisation. Under article 6 the High Commissioner retained the bulk of his 
powers as representative of the State in New Caledonia. As had been the case 
under the Lemoine Statute, he oversaw foreign relations, immigration, external 
communications, finance, defence, law and order, civil law to the exclusion of 
pourn 
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custom law and commercial Jaw, justice and the organisation of the judiciary, 
management of state bodies, communal administration. and retained control over 
natural resources.280 Like the tenns of the Lemoine Statute, some provision was 
left open to the territory to organise higher research facilities, and panial control 
was given over secondary education.281 The new territorial administration 
involved institutional rearrangements, although the basic distribution of powers 
between it and the State had not greatly changed. As had been the case under the 
Socialists, the Chirac Government was not prepared to decentralise to the extent 
of seriously diminishing state authority over New Caledonia. Ironically. the 
Chirac Government ended up promulgating a statute which did not differ greatly 
from the Lemoine Statute in its distribution of state and territorial powers, in 
spite of RPR and UDF criticisms in 1984 that Lemoine had been promoting 
excessive decentralisation to assist Kanak nationalism. But in 1984 the Lemoine 
Statute had been an interim framework prior to a self-determination vote 
concerning which the precise conditions had not been finalised. With the issue 
of self-detennination assumed to have been settled by the referendum of 
September 1987. the Chirac Government felt secure in according powers to 
territorial leaders which its members had declared risky in 1984. 
Regional responsibilities were not greatly different from those accorded 
under the PisanilFabius Interim Statute either. Article 8 of the Regional 
Autonomy Statute changed little. As they had since 1985, the regions would still 
control their own agricultural and maritime resources, health, cultural 
development, housing, public works, and professional·training. Major changes 
included the attribution of administration over tourism, as well as the removal of 
control over primary education, and the implementation of land reform. This 
aspect of the final legislation calls into question the veracity of Pons's expressed 
position in 1986 that existing regional administrative powers were too extensive: 
in 1988 he left the regions with the bulk of their responsibilities untouched. The 
decision made to leave these powers largely unchanged rendered questionable 
Gaullist claims to have a different conception of decentralisation from the 
Socialists. Their New Caledonian statute failed to demonstrate this assertion. 
Overall, the Regional Autonomy Statute did not involve a great break 
from preceding legislation. Its major innovation was a further redefinition of 
regional boundaries under article 3 which was intended to diminish FLNKS 
regional dominance. These new divisions were likely to give the FLNKS a clear 
electoral majority in two of the four new regions (the East and the Loyalty 
Islands), rather than three of the four pre-existing regions. (Maps 3 and 4) The 
aim was to counterbalance the PisanilFabius Interim Statute, which had given 
majority control of three of the four New Caledonian regions to a fonnation with 
the support of less than 30% of the territorial vote. (Table 8) Another Kanak 
advantage gained under the Socialists was struck down. Here, Pons legislated to 
the advantage of loyalist electoral interests in the same partisan fashion as the 
Fabius Government had changed boundaries to the benefit of the FLNKS with 
the PisaniIFabius Interim Statute in 1985. The Centre and North Regions 
disappeared, to be replaced by an EastlWest division of the Grande Terre. While 
Kanak support on the east coast of the Grande Terre would have assured the 
FLNKS a majority in the East Region, the West Region was destined to be 
dominated by loyalist parties. Territorially large non-indigenous rural centres 
such as Dumbea and Bourail, which were also loyalist electoral strongholds, 
were to be found there. While during the regional elections of 24 April 1988, 
mainly Kanak abstentions in the East totalled 75.86% of eligible voters, in the 
West they amounted to 46.31%.282 The electoral favouritism of the Chirac 
Government extended to organising the first elections under the new statute to 
coincide with the date of the first round of the presidential elections. This 
decision was made in response to lobbying by the RPCR, which feared a decline 
in its electoral support should the regional elections be held in the wake of 
presidential elections lost by Chirac.283 
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The final months of the Chirac Government involved increasing 
FLNKS-initiated violence which became as troublesome to Pons as it had been 
to Pisani.284 Pons had inspired considerable enmity from Kanak:s with his 
disregard for their interests in preparing the self-determination referendum, the 
Pons Law and the Regional Autonomy Statute. The FLNKS was powerless to 
influence the course of government legislation due to the Front's marginal 
electoral base in French national politics. It enjoyed only minority representation 
in New Caledonia, and no longer had parliamentary representation as a result of 
its decision to boycott the legislative elections in 1986. UC confidence in the 
French Government had diminished considerably since 1981, when the party 
had hoped the Mauroy Government would facilitate independence by September 
1982. Pidjot concluded that his parliamentary presence had been a waste of time. 
Of the reform proposals for New Caledonia he had tabled in the National 
Assembly since the 1960s all had been disregarded by a succession of 
governments.285 Just as working within the French parliamentary system had 
not produced lasting results satisfactory to the FLNKS, largely pacific protest 
and participation by FLNKS leaders in the territorial administration since 1986 
had been ineffectual in furthering the FLNKS agenda. The reduction of regional 
funding in 1986, the annulment of regional budgets for 1987, the creation of 
funds to assist Europeans to re-establish themselves in rural areas, the 
replacement of the Land Office with the ADRAF, the French military escalation 
in tribal areas, lower emphasis on Melanesian identity in cultural policy, and the 
organisation of a self-determination referendum that Kanab could not win, had 
not instilled the FLNKS with a conciliatory disposition. Kanak disillusionment 
with the rule of French law was aggravated by a Noumea court's acquittal, on 
29 October 1987, of charges against the Hienghene ambushers.286 
Rather than quelling Kanak activism and removing the question of 
independence from territorial politics once and for all, the reforms of the Chirac 
Government ended up exacerbating existing political tensions in New Caledonia. 
On 12 March 1988 at a meeting at St Louis, north of Noumea, the FLNKS 
executive decided to swing back to militancy to break out of its stalemate.287 As 
it had in late 1984, the FLNKS resolved to foment disorder in an attempt to 
force a reconsideration of government policy in Paris. In spite of the fact that 
Mitterrand's first term in office had not led to the fulfilment of Kanak demands 
for independence, either with Socialist or liberal-conservative governments in 
power, Tjibaou held out the prospect that the re-election of Mitterrand and the 
return of a Socialist Government would permit a reconsideration of the question 
of self-detennination.288 This stance differed radically from the repudiation of 
the Socialists announced by the FLNKS charter in 1984. There were indications 
that Mitterrand was sympathetic, although he had not gone so far as to concede 
to the FLNKS demand for a restricted self-determination vote. He had however 
denounced the reforms of the Chirac Government as unnecessarily divisive and 
looked forward to the possibility of a reconciliation with the FLNKS.289 
Not all of Tjibaou's hopes were pinned on the Socialists. In the 
meantime, the FLNKS adopted a more active response to the Chirac 
Government, assuming that violence would prompt change where peaceful 
protest had not. The member party of the FLNKS which advocated a more 
militant line was the UC. Other FLNKS members questioned the 
appropriateness of an active boycott. Doubts existed over whether the struggle 
committees were equal to the task, and it was feared that militant action might 
provoke a violent reaction from French loyalists and the forces of law and 
order,29o as had been the case with the Hienghene ambush in December 1984, 
and the shootings of Machoro and Nonnaro in January 1985. As had occurred in 
1985 when the FLNKS abandoned militancy to cooperate under the 
PisanilFabius Interim Statute, in early 1988 Tjibaou employed the UC's majority 
following in the Front to push a new line. He apocalyptically presented the 
boycott as the last ditch chance for the Kanak people, claiming it entailed: 
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[ .•• J fa resistance ~ I'entreprise d'tlimination du peuple kanak. La mobilisation 
sera musclre pour Caire &:hec aUJ( tlections et ~ la mise en place du statut Pons. 
[ ••• J Le gouvernement sera Ie seul responsable de tous les dtrapages qui vont 
veniT. ~a ne va pas ~tre tendre. n y aura peut-!tre encore du sang.291 
Blaming the Chirac Government for placing the FLNKS in a position where 
violence seemed the only choice was self-exculpation of the sort used by 
terrorist groups: we are absolved of responsibility for our actions because our 
adversary is evil. It was an exaggeration to state that government reforms 
constituted an attempt to eliminate the Kanak people. While Pons did not 
recognise the existence of a Kanak people, and the effects of his reforms were 
not beneficial to Kanak interests, Tjibaou gave a false impression. Had the 
FLNKS chosen to do so, under the Regional Autonomy Statute it could have 
received political representation in the Territorial Congress even though its 
influence at regional level had been diminished. 
FLNKS struggle committees were mobilised, as they had been in 
November 1984, to actively disrupt the territory, particularly the elections on 24 
April 1988. On the Grande Terre, sporadic confrontations occurred in March, 
April and May between armed Kanaks and gendarmes. On 24 April, Kanak 
activism partially disrupted the elections but, as in November 1984, did not 
prove capable of preventing them. Scattered roadblocks and pickets forced the 
closure of 31 of the 139 polling stations in New Caledonia.292 Violence on the 
Grande Terre peaked on 2 May when a naval gunboat off the coast from Pouebo 
intervened to disperse around 30 Kanak activists with heavy machine gun 
fire. 293 
It was on Ouvea that Kanak militants gained the lasting attention of 
Paris. In the Loyalty Islands the FLNKS boycott fell short of expectations. 
Militants on Ouvea, Lifou and Mare were originally intended to go into action 
simultaneously but in the event only the Ouvea struggle committee mobilised.294 
A raid on the gendarmerie at Fayaoue two days before the elections on 24 April 
led to the killing of four gendarmes and the abduction of the surviving 
personnel. 295 The operation was carried out by the Ouvea struggle committee of 
the FLNKS, a polyglot formation comprised of members from the DC, FULK 
and Palika.296 The leaders of the struggle committee were Chanel Kapoeri, a 
UC Territorial Councillor, and Alphonse Dianou, the head of the UC youth 
section.297 Dianou normally resided in Noumea, but had shifted back to Ouvea 
for the operation. Initially, there was some uncertainty as to whether the FLNKS 
executive had condoned the operation. This question was clarified by an 
FLNKS political bureau communique issued on 24 April: 
ce qui s'est passt ~ Ouvta n'est pas nne action isoJte de quelques extrtmistes ou 
de terroristes incontrolts. II s'agit bien au contraire d'une action unitaire 
s'inscrivant dans Ie cadre de la mise en &:hec du statut Pons d&:idte par Ie VIle 
Congres du FLNKS a Tibarama.298 
The day before, three members of the FLNKS executive, Tjibaou, Yeiwene 
Yeiwene and Leopold Joredie, had called on Chirac to withdraw French troops 
from Ouvea, annul the territorial elections, and to open discussions on a new 
self-determination referendum more amenable to the FLNKS. Only then would 
the hostages be released.299 . 
The captives were split into two groups by the members of the Ouvea 
struggle committee. The gendarmes in one of these two groups were later 
released. The fate of the others was to become the central issue of a hostage 
incident which ended on 4 May when French army, marine and gendarme 
detachments stormed a grotto in the north of Ouvea where 23 captives were still 
being held. In total, 25 men, including 19 Kanak activists, died as a result of the 
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raid on the Fayaoue gendarmerie and the assault on the cave.3OO All of the 
captives held at the time of the assault were released through the efforts of the 
French military.30t 
The conjunction of the storming with the presidential elections led to a 
new round of polemicising in Paris. It did not pass unremarked that the assault 
had taken place four days before the second round of the presidential elections, 
which pitted Chirac against Mitterrand. The Chirac Government hailed the 
storming as a heroic feat in defence of the honour of France, and praised the 
military units involved for restoring the rule of law in New Caledonia.302 RPR 
leaders blamed Mitterrand for the assault at Fayaoue, claiming that Kanak 
activists had been encouraged by his criticisms of government administration of 
New Caledonia, and had hoped for presidential leniency in response to their 
guerilla tactics should he be re-elected.303 The French Left in turn attacked the 
assault on the grotto for being excessively violent, and claimed Chirac had 
ordered the assault as a ploy to gain the votes of members of the extreme-right in 
the presidential election. 
In many respects, the operation was too violent, although the same 
criticism could be made of the occupation of the Fayaoue gendarmerie by the 
Ouvea struggle committee. Like the killings of the four gendarmes by Kanaks at 
Fayaoue, the deaths of four Kanak captives (Wenceslas Lavelloi, Waina 
Amossa, Alphonse Dianou and Samuel Wamo) while in the custody of the 
French military304 were morally reprehensible. That the number of deaths in 
each instance amounted to four suggests that fa foi du talion had been in 
operation. -E.ons and Chirac had wanted a rapid resolution of the hostage 
situation by armed intervention, although their pressure on the military was 
initially met with opposition, notably from Captain Legorjus, commander of the 
GIGN.305 Legorjus, who acted as negotiator with the hostage takers, was 
reluctant to become involved in any rushed plan which might inadvertently cause 
the deaths of hostages. Faced with failing negotiations with the FLNKS 
executive in Noumea, he later concluded that an assault was the only way of 
saving the lives of the hostages. 
The theory that the assau1t was a vote-catching ploy neglected certain 
considerations. It was not Chirac who had planned the Fayaoue assault to 
coincide with the presidential elections, or the sequence of events which led·to 
the hostage stand-off. Chirac did not have the unquestioning obedience of 
military leaders, notably Legorjus. Partial responsibility for the events that led to 
the coincidence of the assault on the grotto and the electoral period lies with the 
FLNKS, whose militant tactics were intended to pressure Paris at this sensitive 
time. The FLNKS also shared some culpability with the Chirac Government for 
the failure of negotiations which might have resulted in the hostages' release. In 
addition, leftist critics tended to neglect the fact that Mitterrand, Chirac's 
opponent in the presidential elections, gave his assent to the assault as head of 
the French armed forces. Without presidential approval the operation could not 
have taken place. It is contestable that Mitterrand would have approved the 
operation had he thought it might have hindered his re-election. Although 
Legorjus speculated that Mitterrand wanted the hostage situation resolved one 
way or another before the conclusion of the elections and his probable re-
election so that blame could reflect on Chirac,306 it was most likely that the 
safety of the hostages overrode electoral considerations.307 Finally, if the assault 
was an electorally motivated attempt by Chirac to garner votes, it failed. 
Mitterrand was re-elected by a comfortable margin, although it should be noted 
that in New Caledonia, the vote was overwhelmingly pro-Chirac. (Tables 13, 
14) As had been the case in 1981, the New Caledonian electorate was at odds 
with the national majority vote for Mitterrand. 
By 1988 Pons appeared incapable of inspiring the peace and dialogue 
which he had hoped for in 1986. He had established the rule of democratic 
Republican law in New Caledonia, and had implemented his vision of the 
Table 13. French Presidential Elections, 1988. 
National Results 2 
First Round: 24 April 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Mitterrand (PS) 
Chirac (RPR) 
Barre 
Le Pen (FN) 
Lajoinie (PC) 
Others 
38,128,507 
31,027,972 
81.38% 
30,406,038 
Votes 
10,367,220 
6,063,514 
5,031,849 
4,375,894 
2,055,995 
2,511,566 
Second Round: 8 May 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Mitterrand 
Chirac 
38,168,869 
32,085,080 
84.06% 
30,923,249 
Votes 
16,704,279 
14,218,270 
% of votes cast 
33.41 
19.54 
16.22 
14.10 
6.47 
8.09 
% of votes cast 
52.06 
44.31 
Source: A. Cole & P. Campbell: French Electoral Systems 
and Elections since 1789 p.151. 
2 Not including French votes cast in foreign countries. 
Table 14. French Presidential Elections, 1988. 
New Caledonian Results 
First Round: 24 April 
Registered voters 88,223 
Votes cast 51,426 
Turnout 58.29% 
Valid votes 50,922 
Candidate Votes 
Chirac (RPR) 38,025 
Le Pen (FN) 6,308 
Barre 3,115 
Mitterrand (PS) 2,536 
Lajoinie (PC) 169 
Others 769 
Second Round: 8 May 
Registered voters 88,094 
Votes cast 54,346 
Turnout 61.69% 
VaJid votes 53,891 
Candidate Votes 
Chirac 48,660 
Mitterrand 5,231 
% of votes cast 
73.94 
12.27 
6.06 
4.93 
0.33 
1.50 
% of votes cast 
89.54 
9.63 
Source: Le Monde 26 avril 1988, 10 mai 1988. 
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territory's future, but did so at the expense of alienating the FLNKS to a greater 
extent than the Socialists had, which led to a toll in human lives as Kanaks 
vented their discontent. The self-determination referendum, while reafftrming 
that the majority of voters in New Caledonia wished to stay French, aggravated 
rifts with Kanak nationalists rather than cementing over them. Moreover, the 
time of the Chirac Government in power was not long enough to ascertain 
whether their new territorial statute would have functioned as intended. Rather 
than solving New Caledonian problems, the interlude of liberal-conservative 
administration had served to aggravate them. It is a measure of the narrow 
perspectives of his Gaullist predecessors that, in spite of the RPR fulfIlment of 
its reform schedule, in June 1988 Prime Minister Rocard was to ftnd himself 
confronted with a territory more in need of urgent government intervention and 
mediation than in 1986. 
Michel Rocard and the Matignon Accords 
Accusations of who was to blame for the Ouvea incident continued into 
June 1988. The incoming Socialist administration condemned the deaths in 
custody of Lavelloi, Amossa, Dianou and Wamo, and instigated an inquiry 
which conftrmed their maltreatment.308 Meanwhile, New Caledonian leaders 
were in a state of shock. The realisation that worsening violent confrontation 
could develop into civil war produced a moderation of attitudes in the executives 
of the FLNKS and the RPCR. 
The FLNKS reassessed the utility of maintaining its active boycott. The 
balance sheet of its actions was a death toll that was likely to continue to rise 
should violent protest continue, without any prospect of forcing the issue of 
independence. The boycott had fallen short of expectations. The New 
Caledonian elections of April and May 1988 had not been called off as a result of 
disruption caused by Kanak activism. The Front had not managed to achieve a 
full mobilisation of its struggle committees. On the Grande Terre, as on Mare 
and Lifou, most committees displayed an unwillingness to push confrontation 
with the French State to the extent that their counterparts on Ouvea had. Struggle 
committees were constrained by their ill-preparedness for extended 
campaigning, and by concern for the consequences of French loyalist or military 
reprisals against Melanesian settlements in their areas. The military build-up in 
New Caledonia undertaken by the Chirac Government had a dissuasive effect on 
Kanak militants, although not in all cases, as a partial mobilisation was 
achieved. The FLNKS was confronted with the superior military strength of 
French forces in New Caledonia. Against its poorly armed, partially mobilised 
militants, who were no more than several hundred in number, by 1 May there 
existed a combined total of 12,000 men under arms deployed in New Caledonia: 
the equivalent of one man for every twelve civilians in the territory. 309 The 
Ouvea incident demonstrated that although the harassment tactics of the FLNKS 
could inconvenience the Chirac Government by gaining extensive media 
coverage in Paris at the height of the presidential elections, if it came to armed 
confrontation, the French military had superior ftrepower. 
In an abrupt change of position, Lafleur also sought reconciliation. The 
RPCR turned away from a belligerent response to the FLNKS. Following the 
admission by the FLNKS that the Fayaoue operation was its responsibility, the 
RPCR had unsuccessfully called on Chirac to outlaw the FLNKS as a terrorist 
organisation.310 Before the elections Henri Morini, the head of the RPCR 
security force, and his subordinates, had travelled into rural areas to mobilise 
bush militias in defence of farms and settlements. On 23 April, near Canala, a 
truck Morini was travelling in was hit by gunftre from Kanak activists. He was 
wounded and had to be hospitalised.311 An informal network of bush militias 
coordinated by the RPCR was kept on alert during the FLNKS boycott and into 
May, in case Kanaks should decide to bum and pillage the rural homes of 
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French loyalists, as they had during the first election boycott in 1984. Mter the 
re-election of Mitterrand, a sudden moderation of attitudes ensued in the RPCR 
executive. Contemplating the five years of Socialist administration that lay 
ahead, Lafleur realised it was in the best interests of his party not to persevere 
with its past belligerence to Socialist authority if he wished to promote in Paris 
reforms for the socio-economic development of the South. Continued 
antagonism toward the FLNKS would achieve neither peace nor economic 
prosperity for New Caledonia, but would instead lead to further destruction of 
life and property. The RPCR decided following the assault on the grotto in 
Ouvea, after having described the FLNKS as a group of lawless terrorists that 
should be outlawed, to negotiate with the coalition in the hope of a return to 
peace. Discussions with FLNKS leaders were deemed preferable to their 
continued alienation.312 
By early June 1988 Lafleur and Tjibaou were displaying an openness to 
a negotiated solution in New Caledonia which had not existed since before the 
Nainville les Roches negotiations.3 13 A dialogue mission sent by Rocard to 
New Caledonia on 18 May facilitated a reconciliation. The mission had been 
assigned the task of re-establishing political dialogue in the territory, a daunting 
task after years of deepening divisions. At the time of Rocard's appointment as 
Prime Minister on 12 May 1988, the future of New Caledonia was the most 
pressing issue that confronted him)14 Once again, the contrast with New 
Caledonia's portfolio status in 1981 was striking. 
Olivier Stirn, the new Minister to the DOM-TOM, announced on 18 May 
that the Pons Statute would be annulled.315 Rocard had previously called into 
question the validity of Pons's policies for New Caledonia. In April 1987, he 
had written prophetically that the self-determination referendum would not 
diminish New Caledonian ethnic divisions and would lead to bloodshed.316 In 
the same year he had also criticised the shortcomings of governments which 
tried to resolve problems in the DOM-TOM by recourse to statutes and 
dispensing aid. 317 He stressed instead the concept of signing development 
contracts between the State and regions in the DOM-TOM on the basis of 
consensual dialogue to stimulate local autonomy. As Prime Minister, Rocard 
called into question the use of formally democratic logic which discounted 
Kanak identity. He criticised Pons's tendency to disregard the FLNKS because 
of its lack of an electoral majority.318 Once again, a change in philosophy had 
occurred in Paris. Unlike the intellectual renovations which accompanied 
reforms under Fabius and Pons, those brought about by Rocard were to take 
firmer root in New Caledonia. Just seven weeks after the Regional Autonomy 
Statute had been implemented, the achievements of Pons in New Caledonia 
seemed hollow. 
The dialogue mission led to the arrangement of tripartite discussions 
between Kanak nationalists (from the FLNKS and LKS), the RPCR, and 
Rocard at the Hotel Matignon in Paris from 23 June.319 On 26 June the 
Matignon negotiations produced a document establishing a territorial entente 
cordia Ie signed by all participants.320 The bulk of the Matignon Accord was 
reaffirmed with minor modifications after further negotiations in Paris from 17 
to 20 August 1988.321 This second statement is referred to as the Oudinot 
Accord. For the purposes of this work it is grouped with the first agreement 
under the collective title 'the Matignon Accords'. 
On 29 June the first part of the Matignon Accord was implemented with 
the transfer of New Caledonia's executive powers to the High 
Commissioner.322 Following precedent established by the PisanilFabius Interim 
Statute and by many decades of colonial administration, the Matignon Accord 
centralised power around the High Commissioner. The Executive Council was 
stripped of powers accorded to it by the Regional Autonomy Statute. This was a 
preliminary step to a one-year period of direct rule by the High Commissioner 
while new territorial administrative structures were installed. New Caledonia 
Table 15. French Legislative Elections, 1988. 
National Results 
5, 12 June 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
37,945,582 
24,944,792 
65.74% 
24,432,095 Valid votes 
Party 
PS 
RPR 
UIF 
PC 
IN 
Others 
Votes 
9,176,708 
4,687,047 
4,519,459 
2,765,761 
2,359,228 
923,892 
% of votes cast 
36.79 
18.79 
18.12 
11.09 
9.46 
3.70 
Sea ts 
276 
128 
130 
27 
1 
1 3 
Source: Cole & Campbell: French Electoral Systems and 
Elections since 1789 p.162. 
Table 16. French Legislative Elections, 1988. 
New Caledonian Results 
5 June 
First constituency (Noumea, Loyalty Islands) 
Registered voters 45,216 
Votes cast 24,257 
Turnout 53.65% 
VaHd votes 23,623 
Candidate Votes % of votes cast 
Lafleur (RPCR) 19,681 81.14 
Georges (FN) 3,248 13.39 
Cheval l 694 2.86 
Second constituency (rest of the Grande Terre) 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Nenou (RPCR) 
Fayard (FN) 
43,007 
17,468 
40.62% 
17,081 
Votes 
14,720 
2,361 
% of votes cast 
84.27 
13.52 
Sources: Les Nouvelles Catedoniennes 6 juin 1988; Le 
Monde 7 juin 1988. 
I Jean Cheval· was an independent candidate, advocating departmentalisation 
for New Caledonia. 
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would regain its administrative powers on 14 July 1989, after the election of a 
new Territorial Council. As in the past, executive control of the implementation 
of this raft of reforms would be exercised from Paris. 
New elections would be held so that the FLNKS and LKS could regain 
territorial representation. As a result of the FLNKS and LKS boycott of the 
regional elections on 24 April 1988, loyalist parties had monopolised the 
Territorial Congress to the near exclusion of Kanak representation. Of the 48 
seats established by the Regional Autonomy Statute, all except two went to 
loyalist parties.323 It was accepted by the parties to the Matignon Accords that 
the recasting of New Caledonia's future could not take place while Kanak 
nationalists remained excluded from political representation. Although the 
Territorial Councillors elected in April 1988 thereby had their legitimacy called 
into question, no doubts were cast on the New Caledonian results of the 
boycotted legislative elections in June 1988. (Table 16) Lafleur and Maurice 
Nenou, standing for re-election as RPR Deputies, were re-elected unopposed by 
FLNKS challengers.324 The Government considered it necessary to revise 
territorial representation, but challenging the results of national elections was 
never seriously contemplated. This position was held in spite of the fact that the 
FLNKS objected to new electoral boundaries drawn up under Pons for 
legislative elections in New Caledonia. Noumea had been combined with the 
Loyalty Islands for one constituency, while the remainder of the Grande Terre 
comprised the other constituency. The effect was to practically guarantee the 
RPCR majority representation over the Loyalties, an area where majority 
electoral support was traditionally for the DC, as the numerical strength of the 
loyalist vote in Noumea far outweighed the number of Kahak voters in the 
Loyalties. Lafleur and Nenou were re-elected in the legislative elections of 
March 1993, each with an absolute majority of votes cast in his constituency. 
(Table 22) Legislative elections were not controlled by the territorial statute. 
Their boycott by the FLNKS stemmed from its policy dating back to 1986, 
which held that their national representation was ineffectual, regardless of 
boundaries. The FLNKS ended up discarding its past objections to the electoral 
boundaries of the two constituencies when it presented two candidates for the 
legislative elections of March 1993. 
Amid majority indifference in metropolitan France, national acceptance 
of the Matignon Accords was put to the test in a referendum on 6 November 
1988. (Table 17) A national turnout of 36.92% of eligible voters constituted the 
lowest response to a French referendum since 1958.325 As the majority of those 
who voted, 70.47%, expressed approval for the Matignon Accords. they 
became law.326 A national referendum was used to affirm the Accords because 
of the greater democratic legitimacy attached to a direct consultation with the 
entire French electorate. Not insignificantly, this decision also precluded 
extended debate which might have led to complications and delays had the 
Matignon Accords been tabled as a bill before Parliament. The Rocard 
Government received only a relative majority in the National Assembly from the 
legislative elections of June 1988, (Table 15) which left it vulnerable to 
opposition filibustering. The referendum's air of legitimacy was undermined by 
a poor turnout. The 70.47% who voted for the Matignon Accords represented 
only 26.02% of French electors. 
In New Caledonia the turnout was 63.24%. (Table 17) Although 
52.37% of votes cast were for the adoption of the Matignon Accords, in certain 
communes opposition to them was high. Majorities in six of the 13 communes 
to be included in the South Province under the new statute voted against the 
accords. In Noumea, the heartland of RPCR electoral support, 56.0% of voters 
cast 'no' votes, as did 73.46% in Farino, 54.67% in Dumbea, 51.78% in 
BouraiJ, 50.53% in Mont Dore, and 47.67% in La Foa.327 These figures were 
signs of a combination of loyalist voter distrust of RPCR dialogue with the 
FLNKS and a Socialist Government, and the influence of the FN and RPR 
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representatives in Paris who opposed the referendum. It was speculated at the 
time that the RPCR might be on the verge of a mass desertion of electoral 
support to the extreme right for its signature of the Matignon Accords but this 
prediction did not eventuate in the provincial elections of June 1988. (Table 18) 
While for the RPCR results in these communes were unsettling, in November 
1988 majority approval of the Matignon Accords was expressed in the remainder 
of New Caledonian communes. 
Designed to re-establish civil order and pennit decentralised economic, 
social and cultural refonn, the Matignon Accords established a ten year 
development plan, at the end of which a territorial self-determination referendum 
would take place. In accepting a ten-year moratorium on self-determination the 
FLNKS assented in 1988 to a condition which its predecessor, the FI, had 
found reprehensible when it was made by Dijoud in February 1979.328 The 
terms of this future referendum differed in some important respects from those 
of the 1987 vote. Those eligible to vote in 1998 would include only inhabitants 
resident in the territory since 1988, and New Caledonians who had come of 
voting age since then.329 These conditions represented a compromise solution. 
They excluded more non-indigenous voters than either Fabius or Chirac had 
been prepared to, while failing to fulfil any previous FLNKS conditions for 
organising a self-determination referendum with restricted voter eligibility. The 
FLNKS had considerably moderated its past positions on self-determination in 
the pursuit of consensual dialogue with the French State. The RPCR too showed 
moderation in accepting these new eligibility conditions. Previously the three-
month residency qualification adopted by the Chirac Government for 
participation in the self-determination vote of 1987 had marked the limit of the 
concessions the RPCR was prepared to accept. 
New regional boundaries also reflected the consensual approach of the 
Matignon Accords. Under article 6, the four regions of the Regional Autonomy 
Statute were replaced by three provinces. (See Map 5) Whereas the Regional 
Autonomy Statute had divided most of the Grande Terre longitudinally, ending 
with a transverse cutting separating the three communes of the South from those 
of the East and West, the Matignon Accords employed a transverse division, 
roughly across the centre of the Grande Terre. This new delineation combined 
the predominantly European settlements of the west coast with the Melanesian 
ones of the east coast in the north of the Grande Terre. Under the Regional 
Autonomy Statute, the loyalist voters on the west coast had retained their 
administrative and political identity in the West Region as non-Kanaks fonned 
an electoral majority there. Under the new division the FLNKS would be likely 
to gain majority control of the North Province because of the greater numbers of 
Kanak voters living on the east coast. On the other hand, the RPCR would be 
given majority control over a greater area than either the Regional Autonomy 
Statute or the PisanilFabius Interim Statute had offered, including Bourail, the 
most populous settlement outside Noumea, where the loyalist vote was strong, 
and the mining centre of Thio.330 This new structure was intended to create an 
electoral balance somewhere between those established by the two preceding 
statutes, which had in tum permitted FLNKS majority control over three of four 
regions, and two of four regions. 
This balance was confirmed by the results of the first provincial elections 
held under the Matignon Accords on 11 June 1989. (Table 18) Votes for the 
FLNKS gave that party majority control over the North and Loyalty provinces, 
while the RPCR held a majority in the South. The elections repeated established 
electoral patterns in reaffirming the electoral strength of French loyalism in the 
South, and of Kanak nationalism in the northern half of the Grande Terre and in 
the Loyalty Islands. Loyalist parties continued to hold a majority of seats in the 
Territorial Congress, with 32 of the 54 seats set up under the new statutory 
arrangements. LKS and the FLNKS held one and 19 seats respectively. A new 
force, the Wallisian UO, won the remaining two seats, drawing on Wallisian 
Table 17: French Referendum on the Matignon 
Accords 
1988 
National Results: 6 November 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
For the Accords 
Against the Accords 
New Caledonian Results 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
For the Accords 
Against the Accords 
38,039,735 
14,043,134 
36.92% 
9,896,298 
2,474,743 
88,401 
55,908 
63.24% 
29,284 
22,065 
Sources: Official results cited in Le Monde 8 novembre 
1988, 10 novembre 1988. 
Table 18: New Caledonian Provincial Elections 
1989 
Territorial Results: t 1 June 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
91,259 
63,256 
69.31 % 
62,506 Valid votes 
Party Votes % 
RPCR 27,789 
Fl..NKS 17,878 
FN 4,219 
(D 3,213 
ill 2,424 
LKS 1,441 
Others 5,542 
Regional Results 
North 
Registered voters 21,537 
Votes cast 14,939 
Turnout 69.36% 
Valid votes 14,783 
Party 
RPCR 4,041 
Fl..NKS 9,371 
FN 344 
(D 361 
ill 
LKS 
Others 666 
of votes 
43.93 
28.26 
6.67 
5.08 
3.83 
2.28 
8.76 
South 
57,278 
39,790 
69.47% 
39,214 
20,856 
4,595 
3,875 
2,745 
2,424 
4,719 
cast Seats 
27 
19 
3 
2 
2 
1 
0 
Loyalty 
12,444 
8,527 
68.53% 
8,509 
2,892 
3,912 
107 
1,441 
157 
Source: Les Nouvelles CaUdoniennes 12 juin 1989. 
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support in the South. As they had under past statutes, Kanak representatives 
remained a minority in the Territorial Congress. After a decade of Kanak 
participation in territorial elections, the percentage of the vote accorded to Kanak 
parties had declined slightly. In the territorial elections of July 1979, the FI had 
gained 34.13% of votes cast.331 In 1989, the FLNKS and the LKS gained a 
combined total of 30.54% of votes cast. (Table 18) Obtaining the electoral 
majority needed to win independence constitutionally was still a distant prospect 
for Kanak leaders. 
The Councillors elected in the provincial elections assumed their 
functions in July 1989. Having scrapped the Regional Autonomy Statute, the 
Matignon Accords created new institutions whose salient powers did not 
however differ greatly from the bodies they replaced. (Table 19) Paris retained 
its extensive control over the territory and boosted the status of its representative 
in Noum~a. As he had done under Fabius, the High Commissioner reassumed 
executive control over New Caledonia. Under article 65 the High Commissioner 
was charged with representing and directing the territorial administration. The 
State generally maintained the powers it enjoyed under the Regional Autonomy 
Statute. Article 6 of the Regional Autonomy Statute and article 8 of the Matignon 
Accords, which outlined the powers of the State, were nearly identical. One 
exception was that under the new statute the State retained control over external 
relations, with the concession that the territory could negotiate foreign 
investment of up to 6MFF without prior approval. On the other hand, the High 
Commissioner was attributed command over the guiding principles of land 
reform, a response to the insider trading for territorial officials which the 
ADRAF had indulged in under the Chirac Government. The High 
Commissioner gained some control over primary education, excluding the areas 
of culture and language. Apart from these and other minor differences, article 6 
would not have looked out of place in the text of the Regional Autonomy 
Statute. The Matignon Accords maintained continuity with preceding statutes in 
safeguarding the powers of the French State in New Caledonia. None the less 
greater leeway was given to initiatives at territorial or provincial level than under 
the preceding statute. For example article 88 allowed provincial or territorial 
leaders to propose negotiations with foreign governments in the Pacific region. 
This adjustment represented an innovation in terms of local autonomy, although 
New Caledonian leaders desirous of developing their relations overseas would 
remain dependent on state expertise in foreign affairs. 
The specific responsibilities of the provinces conformed to most of the 
orientations of the Regional Autonomy Statute. Provincial representatives 
received more control over their own budgets than the previous regions had, and 
were reattributed powers over land reform which had been lost by the regions, 
but otherwise responsibilities at this level remained much the same as before. 
The major innovation was to be found in the implementation under articles 84 to 
87 of annual state-provincial development contracts of the sort envisaged by 
Rocard in 1987. These enabled the establishment of direct links between Paris 
and the two FLNKS-controIIed provinces, bypassing the RPCR-dominated 
Territorial Congress in the process. From 1990 to 1992 inclusive, 50.7% of 
contract funds were attributed to the North Province, and 18.3% went to the 
Loyalty Islands Province. The remainder, 31 %, was allocated to the South 
Province.332 Article 87, which instituted an investment fund for economic and 
social development, was not without precedent, but this aid was in practice to be 
distributed more freely in the North and in the Loyalty Islands than Pons's 
special development fund had been. 
Neither were the Economic and Social Committee and the Consultative 
Custom Committee without precedent. Their advisory capacities to the State and 
to the territory were described in articles 59 and 60. Article 79 followed 
precedents dating back to 1985 in providing indemnities to New Caledonians 
whose property or health had been damaged or destroyed in political 
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confrontation. A measure which would not have been contemplated under Pons 
was the amnesty under article 80 to those who had committed crimes relating to 
civil disorder before 20 August 1988. This article however specifically excluded 
those guilty of murders. The limitation was imposed at the insistence of the 
Constitutional Council, which had rejected an FLNKS proposal in the 
negotiations of July 1988 of an amnesty for murder.333 This limitation was 
lifted in January 1990, when the Rocard Government promulgated a law 
extending the amnesty to those responsible for murder.334 Such leniency would 
have been unthinkable under Pons, as would have been the lessening of tensions 
needed for such legislation to be approved in Noumea and in Paris. 
Rocard hoped to gain, and indeed achieved, a return to civil order in 
New Caledonia by granting or restoring to Kanak nationalists various 
concessions proscribed under Pons. Of particular importance was support 
offered by Rocard for provincial development.335 Article 85 of the Matignon 
Accords established the target of improving living conditions in rural areas by 
encouraging economic, educational and cultural activity there. Communications 
and public works would be expanded. Emphasis would be placed on offering 
educational facilities which would broaden opportunities for professional 
training. In proposing this, the Matignon Accords offered Kanaks the chance of 
building a stronger economic base in the provinces, and professional training, an 
area where Melanesians generally lagged behind the European population.336 
This initiative cut two ways. It reinforced the FLNKS policy of furthering 
regional development as the basis for independence. And should Kanaks fail to 
gain independence in 1998, they would still enjoy greater economic power 
within a French New Caledonia than they had prior to 1988. Either way, such 
moves Mnavoidably rendered Kanak development dependent on Parisianftnlll1ce 
and expertise. 
Article 85 strengthened state support for Melanesian cultural promotion, 
although within a multicultural context, an orientation which harked back to the 
Dijoud Plan. This represented another of the compromise positions in the 
Matignon Accords: cultural policy which sat between the pluralism established in 
cultural policy under Pons, and the exclusive concentration on Melanesian 
culture by the Socialists between 1981 and 1986. Article 93 of the Matignon 
Accords embodied renewed government support for Melanesian culture by 
setting up the Agency for the Development of Kanak Culture. 
Land reform, a topic of particular contention under Pons, was tidied up. 
Article 94 of the Matignon Accords retained the ADRAF, but its RPCR 
administrators had already been replaced by November 1988 and were the 
subject of an inquiry by the Ministry of Finance in 1988 and 1989. Fast track 
land deals conducted by the agency just prior to the advent of the Rocard 
Government were revoked, not without complaints from the RPCR. The official 
investigation was reassuring to the FLNKS, which was confident of tribal land 
claims receiving greater attention from the new administrators of ADRAF.337 
FINKS leaders signed the Matignon Accord in June 1988 to re-establish 
dialogue and regain access to territorial institutions after the failure of their 
militant option. Tjibaou abandoned militancy in the hope that dialogue would 
serve as the basis for progress toward independence and gaining more 
acceptable conditions for the FLNKS than the Regional Autonomy Statute had 
offered. To a limited extent the FLNKS got a better deal from the new provincial 
structure. FLNKS-dominated areas had more autonomy than under the 
preceding statute, and the development facilities at regional level offered under 
Rocard were more generous than those offered by Pons. It should be noted 
however that the State retained control over provincial budgets and natural 
resources. The provinces had limited capacity to raise their own funds, being 
restricted to levying tariffs on certain activities. Jheautonomy that the Matignon 
Accords offered existed within narrowly defined limits that in no way 
jeopardised state control over New Caledonia. 
Map 5. Provinces Established by the Matignon Accords 
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Concessions made by the French State in the fields of provincial 
development, Melanesian culture and land reform, were counterbalanced by the 
concessions of the FLNKS. As has been mentioned, the acceptance of the voter 
eligibility criteria for the self-determination referendum in 1998 marked an 
abandonment of its various past positions on this issue. Tjibaou and the FLNKS 
delegation took this deal as the best they could get, in the hope that Melanesian 
population growth, the exclusion from the referendum of transients and new 
arrivals, the spread of popular support for independence, and the possible 
emigration to metropolitan France of French loyalists. would tip the balance in 
1998. 
This optimism was not shared by some other members of the FLNKS, 
who were reluctant to assent to the concessions made by their representatives in 
Paris. The UC called for a revision of the initial Matignon Accord at a meeting 
hosted by the Nde tribe on 14 July 1988.338 Yann Celene Uregei, the leader of 
the FULK, vehemently opposed the Matignon Accord, and called for Tjibaou's 
resignation at the FLNKS congress at Thio on 16 July 1988.339 At the FLNKS 
congress at Gossanah, on Ouvea, on 23 and 24 July 1988, Tjibaou found 
himself subjected to criticism for having conceded too much in terms of the self-
determination referendum, and for not having pushed hard enough in other 
respects.340 The Gossanah congress rejected the referendum conditions.341 It 
decided that ten years was too long a period to wait for the self-determination 
referendum, which should be held instead before the next legislative elections. 
Although the prospect was constitutionally improbable, the congress claimed 
that should the Socialists lose power in the legislative elections in March 1993, 
the referendum could be abandoned by a liberaI.:.conservative government. The 
congress contested the voter eligibility criteria of the Matignon Accord, 
proposing a vote limited to inhabitants with parents born in New Caledonia. The 
congress also called for a redefinition of regional boundaries which would 
enable the FLNKS to gain elected majorities over three of four regions, called 
for the State to surrender control of natural resources to the provinces, and 
demanded an amnesty on Kanak:s imprisoned or wanted by the law for political 
actions from 1984 to 1988. 
FLNKS dissatisfaction with the Matignon Accord was the reason for the 
second round of negotiations between its signatories in Paris in August 1988. 
Only one major concession was made to the FLNKS: the granting of an amnesty 
on politically-motivated crimes, with the exception of murder. Neither the RPCR 
nor the Rocard Government were prepared to meet other demands from the 
Front. The FLNKS delegation did not have a great deal of room for manreuvre 
when faced with opposition from these quarters. Had the Front broken off 
discussions it would have been left at an impasse. A return to violent militancy 
would have been fruitless as a means of pushing for independence. A peaceful 
boycott would have achieved little for Kanak interests either. In both scenarios, 
the FLNKS would have given the impression of being recalcitrantly obstinate in 
the face of unprecedented overtures of good will from the RPCR and the 
Socialist Government in Paris. The FLNKS delegation therefore relented. The 
signature of the Oudinot Accord was represented by its signatories as a triumph 
for consensus,342 and by Tjibaou as a stepping stone to independence,343 but 
resentment persisted within the ranks of the FLNKS over Tjibaou's failure to 
negotiate greater concessions. Kanak dissent would become evident upon the 
assassination of Tjibaou in May 1989 and the estrangement of two founding 
formations from the Front. 
Kanak Loyalty Islanders have been most visible in the articulation of 
Kanak opposition to the Matignon Accords. Their different geographical and 
cultural situation from Kanaks on the Grande Terre has had an influence in their 
feeling of becoming distanced from the FLNKS, led mainly by Grande Terre 
mainlanders. In the Loyalties, widespread European settlement did not take 
place. In the absence of a large French presence, local tribes have retained land 
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ownership in the islands, along with a stronger sense of tribal identity. Having 
retained the integrity of their lands and their tribal identity, Kanak Loyalty 
Islanders tend to be less prone to compromise with France than Kanak 
mainlanders. 
The assassinations of Tjibaou and Yeiwene, the FLNKS Vice-President, 
on 4 May 1989 were an ugly expression of the divisions between the FLNKS 
executive, and party activists on Ouvea.344 These Ouveans already felt that 
during the Ouvea hostage incident, the FLNKS executive on the Grande Terre 
had not displayed sufficient support for local militants. The signature by 
FLNKS leaders of the Matignon Accords reinforced disenchantment on 
Ouvea.345 Djubelly Wea, the man who murdered Tjibaou and Yeiwene, believed 
like other members of the Ouvea struggle committee that the FLNKS executive 
had sold out to the French. Wea claimed that in accepting what were seen to be 
the Matignon Accords' unfavourable tenns, the executive had been duped by the 
Rocard Government and had effectively renounced the goal of Kanak 
independence.346 Wea paid for that belief with his life, when killed by Tjibaou's 
bodyguards. 
Doubt in the ranks of the FLNKS about the Matignon Accords was not 
confined to Ouvea. Following the deaths of Tjibaou and Yeiwene, the FULK 
dissociated itself from the FLNKS. Yann Celene Uregei, the leader of the 
FULK, had been notable for his lack of condemnation of their murders. and 
unconfinned rumours spread that the party was in some way responsible.347 
Uregei's opposition to the Matignon Accords was already well known. His 
party, alone among the members of the FLNKS, had refused to approve the 
Matignon Accords,348 and had boycotted the provincial elections in June 
1989.349 That year the UC called for the departure of the FULK from the 
FLNKS due to the fonner's hostility to the Accords. The FULK declined to 
leave the FLNKS then, arguing that its adherence to the FLNKS charter was not 
dependent on its absence from the Matignon Accords.35o Before the FLNKS 
congress at St Louis from 20 to 21 January 1990, FULK leaders were infonned 
that they would not be welcome, and party members who turned up were barred 
from entry.35i The rift between the FULK and the FLNKS was fonnalised in 
January 1992, when the fonner dissolved itself to fonn a new party in broad 
opposition to the Matignon Accords and the FLNKS's signature to it.352 
Congres Populaire held its first conference on Lifou, the home ground of the 
FULK, on 24 September 1992.353 The gathering, attended by 300 to 400 
Kanaks. including a delegation of around 50 people from Ouvea, asserted the 
importance of transcending party political differences, as well as preserving 
tribal traditions from erosion by European values. 
FULK had always been a minority party in the FLNKS, with only a few 
hundred party members,354 although its opposition to the Matignon Accords has 
not been isolated. The independent LKS, with its following centred on Mare, 
has found itself taking a similar position. On 11 April 1991, its leader Nidoish 
Naisseline, announced the withdrawal of LKS from the Matignon Accords.355 
He claimed that Socialist Governments were eroding custom authority through 
their policies and that the Matignon Accords were leading Kanaks away from 
independence. As can be seen from past election results LKS, like Congres 
Populaire. enjoyed the adherence of a minority of Kanak voters, but the 
positions of these movements are locally important for the political balance in the 
Loyalty Islands Province, where the FLNKS held four of seven seats. 
The USTKE, the trade union whose representatives adhered to the 
Matignon Accords as members of the FLNKS, has also distanced itself from 
political participation in them. In July 1989, the USTKE voted to withdraw from 
the FLNKS to concentrate on its primary concern, syndicalism.356 As the 
President ofUSTKE, Louis Kotra Uregei, is Yann Celene Uregei's nephew, the 
union had been regarded with suspicion by the UC after the assassination of 
Tjibaou and Yeiwene. At the funeral service for Tjibaou and Yeiwene in 
Table 20: New Caledonia's Population by Ethnic 
Group 
Group 
Total Population 
Melanesians 
Europeans 
Wallisians 
Indonesians 
Tahitians 
Vietnamese 
Ni-Vanuatu 
Other Asians 
Others 
1989 
Number 
164,173 
73,598 
55,085 
14,186 
5,191 
4,750 
2,461 
1,683 
642 
6,577 
% of Population 
100 
44.8 
33.6 
8.6 
3.2 
2.9 
1.5 
1.0 
0.4 
4.0 
Source: INSEE: Images de la population de la NouveUe-
Caledonie: principaux resultats du recensement 1989 p.21. 
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Noumea in May 1989, an USTKE delegation was turned away by UC members 
for this reason.357 Although the USTKE has not disavowed its participation in 
the Matignon process, it has expressed reservations over the agreement. Louis 
Uregei has stated that the USTKE still supports certain measures in the 
Matignon Accords, even if not their overall implementation.3S8 
In spite of this minority Kanak dissent over adherence to the Matignon 
Accords, the FLNKS has continued supporting them.359 The disenchantment 
expressed by the leaders of FULK, a minor party with three or four hundred 
members, LKS, a party with only one seat in the Territorial Congress, and the 
qualified reservations of a trade union, did not count as opposition which 
threatened FLNKS participation in the Accords. Its partnership with the State 
and the RPCR has persisted in the face of this marginal dissent. 
Dissent over adherence to the Matignon Accords has also circulated in 
the ranks of the RPCR. Lafleur, like Tjibaou, had the task of convincing his 
rank and file of the need to adopt the Matignon Accord in July 1988. He had less 
trouble in this respect than Tjibaou. On 23 July 1988, at its congress at Mont 
Dore, the RPCR unanimously approved the orientations of the Matignon 
Accord.360 The national referendum on the Matignon Accords in November 
1988 proved that not all of New Caledonian loyalist voters were as positive 
about the agreement as the RPCR leadership.361 Their negative votes and 
abstentions were respectively a response to FN rejection of the Accords, and to 
RPR disapproval of ratifying them by a national referendum. The FN, alone 
among French parliamentary parties,362 denounced the Matignon Accords for 
their promotion of decentralisation and for supposedly placing New Caledonian 
links with the Republic at risk in 1998.363 As was the case with Kanak dissent 
on the fringes of the FLNKS over adherence to the Accords, this extreme right 
challenge to RPCR adherence to the agreement failed to develop into a threat to 
its electoral hegemony in New Caledonia. 
RPCR assent to the Matignon Accords was given because they were not 
fundamentally threatening to loyalist interests. Therlevelopmentperiod the 
..agreement established worked to the economic advantage of the South as well as 
to the North and the Loyalty Provinces, and fulfill~P~policy of encouraging 
economic growth.364 As the provincial elections demonstrated in 1989, the new 
provincial structure permitted the reafftrmation of the electoral dominance of the 
RPCR in the South, and did not threaten its territorial electoral majority. As for 
the self-determination referendum, the RPCR was confident that, under the 
conditions of the Matignon Accords, French loyalism would be triumphant in 
1998.365 
Not only was the RPCR confident that the Matignon Accords posed no 
menace to ties with France, .RPCR leaders also felt that the ten year development 
period would lead to a softening and eventual abandonment of support for 
ind~~!ldencer Having experienced the benevolence of state funding for regional 
Qe'yel()Ptllent, it was argued, Kanaks would realise it was in their best interests 
10 .. remain French rather than to accept the uncertainties of independence. The 
_veracity of this thesis had been neither conclusively confirmed nor disproved by 
!he early 1990s. On 27 April 1991, Lafleur suggested hopefully that the 
negotiation of a consensual solution to the differences the RPCR had with the 
FLNKS might lead to the abandonment of the self-determination referendum.366 
The FLNKS, then holding a congress at La Foa, did not respond to Lafleur's 
comments. At its La Foa congress and at its Touho congress from 29 to 31 
August 1992, the FLNKS determined that obtaining independence through 
participation in the Matignon Accords remained its fundamental goal.367 
The RPR was at odds with the RPCR at the time of the referendum on 
the Matignon Accords. RPR leaders doubted the capacity of the Rocard 
Government to establish lasting peaceful dialogue between Kanaks and loyalists, 
and the suspicion persisted from the time of the Lemoine Statute that the 
Socialists might be attempting to lead New Caledonia into independence. The 
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willingness of Lafleur to cooperate with the FLNKS and the Socialists left him 
in disagreement with Chirac. While in July 1988 the RPR had at frrst expressed 
tentative approval of the reconciliation initiated under Rocard, 368 and Chirac had 
deigned to meet Tjibaou in October 1988,369 Gaullists later concluded that the 
referendum was a trap. The RPR advised its followers to abstain from voting in 
the referendum of November 1988.370 To vote against the Matignon Accords 
would have appeared a negative, disruptive reaction, but to vote for them would 
have implied a renunciation of past RPR policy conduct in New Caledonia,371 
thirac preferred the Matignon Accords to be approved by Parliament rather than 
by referendum, so that the RPR and other parties could influence their contents, 
and so that the final law could be more easily overridden by future 
legislation,372 In October 1988 the RPR expressed a lack of confidence in the 
capacity of the Rocard Government to oversee the Accords impartially, an odd 
position from a party whose representatives had been less than impartial in 
government from 1986 to 1988. The RPR was in addition hostile to the voter 
eligibility criteria for the self-determination referendum in 1998, asserting that 
the conditions used for the self-determination vote of 1987 had been adequate. 
Alain Jupp~, the RPR Secretary-General, stated that the Matignon Accords 
'WOuld be open to revision should his party return to government. 373 
Jupp~'s comment remained applicable during the period of Socialist 
gov~rnment until March 1993. The RPR remained dissatisfied with the structure 
of the Accords. Jup¢ maintained into 1993 the RPR position that the legislation 
needed adjusting.374 However in June 1991, showing signs of some restraint, 
Jupp~ had promised Burck, the UC President since 1989, that the RPR would 
not call the Matignon Accords into question if his party came to power in March 
1993,375 The New Caledonian High Commissioner, Alain Christnacht, felt in 
1992 that the RPR would not repeat the mistakes it made in New Caledonia 
between 1986 and 1988. He stated in November 1992 that the RPR should 
proceed more carefully in its second period of cohabitation. He supported this 
claim by pointing out that, unlike its time in opposition from 1981 to 1986, from 
1988 to 1992 the party had engaged in constructive dialogue with Kanak 
leaders.376 This theory was put to the test under Prime Minister Edouard 
Balladur, whose appointment in April 1993 marked the beginning of a second 
period of cohabitation, one which should last until 1995. The observation by the 
FLNKS in July 1988 that the arrival of another RPR-Ied administration could 
lead to a revision or abandonment of the Matignon Accords showed no signs of 
being fulfilled from March 1993. In the first few months there was no 
announcement of changes comparable to those made by Pons upon his 
appointment as Minister to the DOM-TOM in March 1986. The legislative 
elections of March 1993 (Table 21) gave the RPRlUDF coalition the largest 
parliamentary majority of any French political group since the 1830s. Dominique 
Perben, the new Minister to the DOM-TOM, indicated in June 1993 that socio-
economic change, rather than statute reform, was his preliminary concern. 
Perben's message to the Territorial Congress during his first official visit to 
Noum~a in June 1993 consisted of images of governmental calm and the 
exercise of impartial administrative continuity)77 
Doubts expressed by Jupp~ in 1988 concerning the capacity of the 
Socialists to manage the Matignon Accords impartially had not been justified by 
March 1993. The legislation lasted through five years of Socialist 
administration, a longevity which territorial reforms from Dijoud through to 
Pons failed to achieve. In May 1991 Mitterrand affIrmed to Paul N~aoutyine, the 
FLNKS President, that he would act as the ultimate guarantor of the fulfilment 
of the Matignon Accords.378 This comment was offered as reassurance 
following the resignation of Rocard as Prime Minister earlier that month. The 
two Prime Ministers who followed Rocard, Edith Cresson and Pierre 
B~r~govoy, both stated support for the Matignon Accords.379 Mitterrand's 
fulfilment of his constitutional duties toward the Matignon Accords, reaffrrmed 
Table 21. French Legislative Elections, 1993. 
National Results 
First Round: 21 March 
Registered voters 38,881,564 
Votes cast 26,796,142 
Turnout 68.92% 
Valid votes 25,378,158 
Party Votes % of votes Sea ts 
cas t 
RPRlUDF 10,074,796 37.60 80 
PS 4,874,978 18.19 0 
FN 3,152,543 11. 76 0 
PC 2,331,399 8.70 0 
Others 4,944,442 18.45 0 
Second Round: 28 March 
Registered voters 33,714,568 
Votes cast 22,775,879 
Turnout 67.55% 
Valid votes 20,616,533 
Party Votes % of votes Sea ts 
cast 
RPRlUDF 11,347,846 49.82 371 
PS 6,459,723 28.36 67 
FN 1,168,160 5,13 0 
PC 951,213 4.18 24 
Others 625,946 2.75 34 
Source: A. Chaussebourg & T. Ferenczi (eds.): Elections 
legislatives de mars 1993 pp.63, 77. 
Table 22. French Legislative Elections, 1993. 
New Caledonian Results 
21 March 
First constituency (Noumea, Loyalty Islands) 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
48,047 
27,715 
57.68% 
26,732 
Candidate 
Lafleur (RPCR) 
Ukeiwe 1 
Votes 
14,240 
4,288 
3,829 
1,519 
2,856 
% of votes cast 
51.38 
Wamytan (FLNKS) 
, Georges (FN) 
Others 
15.47 
13.82 
5.48 
10.30 
Second constituency (rest of the Grande Terre) 
Registered voters 46,592 
Votes cast 26,696 
Turnout 57.30% 
Valid votes 25,888 
Candidate Votes % of votes cast 
Nenou (RPCR) 14,015 52.50 
Joredie (FLNKS) 7,716 28.90 
Guil1emard2 2,269 8.50 
Others 1,888 7.07 
Source: Le Monde 23 mars 1993. 
1 Ukeiwe stood as an independent, right-wing candidate. 
2 Justin Guillemard stood as an independent, right-wing candidate. 
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in February 1993,380 should last until the end of his second septennate in 1995. 
Presidential support for the legislation beyond 1995 is less certain. 
Just as government backing in Paris of the Matignon Accords may not 
endure unlill998, so 100 in New Caledonia attitudes may change. Whether or 
not the Malignon Accords last until 1998 may depend to a great extent on 
whether the FLNKS believes itself capable of winning independence by popular 
vote. Should this appear improbable, then Kanak nationalists could return to 
their boycott tactics of past years. Rocard stated in July 1988 that Kanak 
nationalists had a good probability of gaining independence in ten years' time. 
By his estimation then, Melanesians would comprise over 50% of the electoral 
body by 1998.381 Another official estimate differed from that of Rocard. A 
confidential DOM-TOM Ministry report in 1988 estimated that if no metropolitan 
French left New Caledonia between 1988 and 1998, Melanesians would 
represent 44.5% of the electorate in the referendum. 382 The report added 
optimistically that if 16,000 eligible m~tro voters left New Caledonia between 
1988 and 1998, then Melanesians would enjoy the backing of 53% of the 
electorate. This scenario is improbable. The departure of just under 10% of the 
total New Caledonian population in 1989 (Table 20) before 1998 would 
represent a drastic demographic shift. These ethnically based statistics are far 
from conclusive in indicating future support for local sovereignty. Moreover not 
al1 Melanesian votes in 1998 wiJI be for independence. In 1985, around 20% of 
Melanesian votes went to loyalist parties.383 The FLNKS employed this 
statistical assumption, and estimated in July 1988 that Kanak nationalism would 
gain the support of 36% of voters in 1998.384 Although plausible, this total of 
36% was slightly higher than the level of combined support for Kanak 
nationalist parties in past territorial elections. 
Disregarding speculative projections, and considering the evidence of 
past elections alone, it is clear that Kanak nationalism has not had and does not 
enjoy the following of an absolute majority of the New Caledonian electorate. 
The results of the territorial elections unmarred by FLNKS boycotts, those of 
1979, 1985 and of 1989 (Tables 8, 18) confirm this assessment, as do the first 
legislative elections which the FLNKS contested in March 1993. (Table 22) In 
March 1993, the two Kanak candidates between them gained 20.23% of votes 
cast in the two constituencies. Whether or not Kanak nationalists lodge sufficient 
votes to gain independence in 1998 will depend in part on how many of them 
participate in the ballot, how many of them attain voting age between 1988 and 
1998, and on whether Kanak nationalists can gamer enough non-Melanesian 
votes to tip the balance.385 On the strength of the existing electoral balance, it 
appears French loyalism will be reaffmned in the 1998 self-determination vote. 
Kanak Development: Towards Integration or Independence? 
Apart from disillusionment with the shortcomings of militant activism, 
the FLNKS signed the Matignon Accords because they presented avenues for 
Kanak development. Since the time of cooperation with the Pisani/Fabius 
Interim Statute in 1985 members of the FLNKS executive had been aware of the 
handicaps of attempting to found a sovereign nation-state with a largely rural. 
tribal support base in a territory where non-Melanesian immigrants dominated 
the cash economy. Under the Matignon Accords the strategy of the FLNKS was 
to employ state development funding to improve the socio-economic standing of 
the North and the Loyalties. Such activity would, the theory went, endow 
Kanaks with the infrastructure upon which to found the Republic of Kanaky.386 
The inevitable drawback is the inherently dependent position in which it places 
the FLNKS with regard to the French State. 
The level of Melanesian dependence on non-Melanesian expertise was 
apparent with the construction near Noum~a of the Jean-Marie Tjibaou Cultural 
Centre, which began in 1993. This monumental piece of architecture, 
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incorporating Melanesian design features and European engineering techniques, 
was funded with 320MFF from the French presidential budget, and was 
designed by an Italian architect, Renzo Piano.387 The project is symbolic of the 
extent to which the affinnation of Melanesian identity under the Matignon 
Accords is reliant on the French State. 
The dependence of the FLNKS on state funding for development is 
reflective of a wider territorial economic dependence that has persisted into the 
1990s. It can be observed that New Caledonian dependence on mainland France 
has yet to substantially diminish. The coverage of import payments by exports 
fell slightly from 53.4% in 1990 (Table 6) to 52% in 1991.388 Given its mineral 
wealth, estimated to include between 20 and 40% of global nickel resources,389 
chrome, copper, cobalt and manganese,390 as well as its largely unexplored 
maritime resources, New Caledonia has great economic potential. The territory 
has the capacity to increase its financial self-sufficiency, but this expansion may 
ultimately be restricted by its small population base, its comparative isolation 
from major markets, and the level of development capital available. Criticism of 
New Caledonian dependence on state aid persists, particularly from 
commentators opposed to the islands' continued status as a French territory.391 
It is true that the level of aid per capita in New Caledonia is among the highest in 
the insular South Pacific.392 But compared to the rest of the DOM-TOM, the 
New Caledonian level of economic self-sufficiency is high. Thanks to the 
presence of its mining industry, and despite its drawbacks, New Caledonia is 
financially the most self-reliant part of the DOM-TOM.393 New Caledonian 
economic difficulties are far from being as pronounced as those of Reunion, 
with unemployment affecting 40% of its workforce in 1992,394 and exports in 
real tenns which covered 8.8% of the value of imports in 1990.395 Although by 
metropolitan French standards, New Caledonia was not particularly self-reliant, 
compared to the rest of the DOM-TOM it had attained an enviable level of self-
sufficiency and economic growth. 
Using New Caledonian GDP in 1974 as a base value of 100%, annual 
territorial production increased from 93% in 1981 to 146% in 1988.396 But the 
economic structure of the territory has not been fundamentally altered. The 
dominant role in the territorial economy of mining and the tertiary sector has 
been largely unaffected by French government policy since 1981. The financial 
contributions of nickel mining and civil service salaries will continue to playa 
detennining role in local economic well-being until long after the Matignon 
Accords come to an end. Metallurgy and mining comprised 23.07% of territorial 
GDP in 1988, a climb from its level of 15.93% in 1980, reflecting a general 
climb in international nickel prices since the late 1970s.397 The plethora of 
legislation implemented in New Caledonia, and the introduction of the Matignon 
Accords, have encouraged the continued presence of a proportionately large 
number of state and territorial civil servants. Administration accounted for 
22.51 % of GDP in 1980, and increased slightly to 23.99% of GDP by 1988.398 
The proportionally marginal status of agricultural production remained a constant 
during the 1980s, in spite of various government attempts to revive local 
agricultural production. In 1980, agricultural production totalled 2.99% ofGDP; 
this figure had declined to 1.59% of GDP by 1988.399 State development efforts 
in the 1980s to encourage commercial agricultural production by Melanesians 
did not result in a surge in activity. Coffee cultivation, the domain of Melanesian 
tribes, accounted for approximately 2% of total territorial agricultural production 
in 1990.400 Most tribal agriculture consisted of subsistence cultivation, 
concerning which statistics were not recorded. In 1990, 78% of commercial 
agricultural production in the territory came from the South Province, 21 % from 
the North, and 0.5% from the Loyalties.401 These proportions reflected the 
financial importance of meat and vegetable production, fields of largely 
European and Asian activity along the west coast of the Grande Terre. 
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While sector growth predicted in tourism by the Eighth Plan for the 
DOM-TOM did occur, progress has been erratic. After a marked decline in the 
mid-1980s, the total number of visitors to New Caledonia in 1990 was 8.6% 
higher than ten years before. (Table 9) Total visitors fell from 85,213 in 1990 to 
80,930 in 1991.402 This trend continued into 1992, the result of high 
accommodation and living expenses in New Caledonia, accentuated by a decline 
in the values of the Australian and New Zealand dollars compared with the 
French Pacific Franc.403 In spite of this downturn, tourism should continue to 
expand as Japanese arrivals increased during the 1980s.404 The yen has been 
more stable than the Australian and New Zealand dollars, and as Japanese 
tourists tend to have higher incomes than their Australian and New Zealand 
counterparts, local prices are not perceived by Japanese as being so high. 
Fisheries, the other area of great potential mentioned by the Eighth Plan, 
expanded too, although not as far as had been expected, and in a direction with 
unencouraging implications for local enterprise. Two local European attempts at 
developing industrial-based fishing companies collapsed in the mid-1980s 
following inadequate catches.405 Three Melanesian companies which established 
small-scale commercial operations in the early 1980s also collapsed.406 Coastal 
fishing by locals is predominantly for New Caledonian consumption. Most 
commercial European fishermen are based in Noumea and supply the local 
market, while the majority of Melanesian fisherman do so on an artisanal basis, 
serving tribal needs.407 Deep sea fishing is the domain of foreign trawlers which 
pay fishing levies to the territory. This practice began in territorial waters in 
February 1978. By 1991, 52 Japanese vessels were authorised to fish in the 
New Caledonian EEZ. In exchange for a maximum annual combined catch of 
2,225t, they paid 36MF CFP.408 In March 1991, the first Franco-US fishing 
accord was concluded, allowing 14 American ships to fish simultaneously, at a 
total cost of 18MF CFP in access rights, and a license payment of 750,OOOF 
CFP per vessel.409 While providing returns, these arrangements are indicative 
of the limits of local fishing enterprise. In the field of aquaCUlture, specifically 
prawn production, local initiatives have fared better. Aquaculture in New 
Caledonia progressed beyond the experimental stage, and by the 1990s had 
become an area of increasing export activity.410 As with tourism, the expansion 
of commercial activity in New Caledonian waters should continue, but will be 
slow due to the small scale of local operations. _ 
Although informed assessment of the end result of the Matignon Accords 
will retain elements of speculation until after 1998, some analysis of their 
development achievements to date can none the less be made. The extent to 
which the consensual solution offered by the Matignon Accords meets the 
sometimes conflicting demands of indigenous Melanesians is a major issue. 
Dijoud's recognition of Melanesian concerns in fonnulating policy, considered 
innovative in the late 1970s, has since been recognised as an essential element 
for productive change under the Malignon Accords. Under the Socialists from 
1981 to 1986, recognition of Kanak specificity was introduced into government 
policy, only to be discarded under Chirac, then reintroduced by Rocard. Political 
divisions in Paris and in Noumea stalled the implementation of durable 
Giscardian, Socialist and Gaullist administrative reforms. Attention below is 
devoted to considering socio-economic reform achievements under the Matignon 
Accords and their consequences for Melanesian and Kanak: identity, before 
postulating where these efforts might lead. 
Tensions accompanying the Malignon Accords hinge on the extent to 
which development is to be accompanied by Melanesian integration into the 
economic, social and cultural values of New Caledonia's immigrant population. 
The difficulty resides in ascertaining .exacdy what Melanesian values are. The 
New Caledonian population of over 73,000 Melanesians in 1989 (Table 20) 
were not the homogeneous Kanak people they have been portrayed as being by 
Kanak nationalists and their supporters.411 The status of the FLNKS as the 
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privileged mouthpiece of Kanak interests under the Matignon Accords tends to 
act detrimentally to the interests of those Melanesians who do not share the goals 
of the Front. Divisions between Kanaks under the Matignon Acc-ords, 
mentioned in the preceding section and detailed further below, highlight the 
pluralisti~ Qalllre of the indigenous population. Such divisions have been 
skimmed over in the only academic work published by 1993 on the implications 
of the Matignon Accords for indigenous Melanesian development. Published in 
1993, Isabelle Leblic's Les Kanak/ace au deveioppement. La voie etroite makes 
a cardinal analytic error in assuming that the word 'Kanak' is synonymous with 
Melanesian'. Although her training as an ethnologist, and her extensive field 
work in New Caledonia from 1983 might have led her to conclude otherwise, 
her work habitually makes reference to "la societe kanak", as a single entity, 
when no such homogeneity exists. The linguistic and tribal divisions among 
Melanesians in New Caledonia contradict such an assumption, as do political 
divisiQns among Kanaks, and the existence of loyalist Melanesians who do not 
consider themselves to be Kanak. 
Furthermore, Leblic tacitly considers the FLNKS to be the sole arbiter of 
the future of the Kanak people. After lengthy description of traditional 
Melanesian values, she turns to the indigenous response to development issues, 
although she does so solely through the policies of the FI and the FLNKS.412 
This approach is selective, and discounts minority currents of Melanesian 
opposition to the FLNKS. The recognition under the Matignon Accords of the 
FLNKS as a privileged partner in ongoing development in New Caledonia has 
been seen by some custom authorities as posing a threat to their established 
privileges in the tribal milieu. Kanak party authority, while sometimes 
coinciding with custom authority, as in the case of Naisseline, who is both a 
high chief on Mare and the leader of LKS, represents an inherent challenge to 
the authority of tribal chiefs. Kanak nationalism assumes a subordination of the 
tribe, the central unit in traditional Melanesian society, to the greater interests of 
a Kanak Republic. As Burck, the DC President, pointed out at a DC meeting at 
Naketyon 23 January 1993: "L'independance, ce n'est pas Ie regime des castes 
feodales et des royaumes hereditaires".413 Irc:mjcally, this subordination_of 
parochial interests to national unity f()lloWS a French Republican model, not a 
Melanesian one. 
The development priorities of the FLNKS under the Matignon Accords 
have at times clashed with custom authority. A notable case occurred on Lifou. 
Early in 1991 the FLNKS Mayor of Lifou, Cono Hamu, leased land from a clan 
for port construction at We. Another clan contested ownership of the land and 
embarked on a campaign against Hamu with the support of two of Lifou's three 
great chiefs. Roadblocks went up, and houses were burnt down. Hamu was 
declared persona non grata on Wetr and LOessi tribal domains and he was 
hospitalised in 1991 after being assaulted.414 The dispute flared again at the end 
of November 1992, when Wetr and U>essi chiefs occupied the We town hall in 
protest at ongoing port construction.415 In January 1993 Richard Kaloi, the 
FLNKS President of the Loyalty Islands, referred to the incident obliquely in 
calling for an end to local divisions and squabbling. His response, in line with 
FLNKS adherence to the Matignon Accords, was an appeal for unity and 
dialogue.416 Disunity showed no immediate evidence of dissipating. The 
following month Hamu resigned from his post in the face of tribal opposition 
and attempted to reassert his authority through re-election. A municipal by-
election, which had the distinction of being the first in New Caledonia to be 
contested by a custom candidate, Macate Wenewa, allowed Hamu to re-establish 
his electoral legitimacy, although without silencing his critics.417 
Kaloi holds that Kanak development lies through the mixing of custom 
and European modernity,418 but as the Lifou dispute demonstrated, this is not 
necessarily a comfortable mix. M~l~esian custom chiefs justifiably see FLNKS 
cooperation with the French State under the Matignon Accords as furthering 
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Mehm<::sian integration into French society. Under the Matignon Accords, the 
FLNKS has reaccepted the principles of French electoral democracy which it 
once rejected.419 Along with its re-entry into French democratic mechanisms, 
FLNKS acceptance of the Matignon Accords involved an acceptance of French 
state development methods and funding. These administrative orientations have 
led the North and the Loyalty Provinces to promote capitalism and 
entrepreneurial activities. If Kanaks are to conform to European economic 
models, which the North and the Loyalties have accepted to some extent, they 
have a great deal of catching up ahead before approaching the level of economic 
development in the South Province. The South has numerous advantages in 
possessing Noumea, the only large town, and largest port, as well as Tontouta 
international airport, the Doniambo nickel smelter, the Yate hydroelectric dam, 
and the largest pool of skilled labour. 
However some effort has been exerted to close the gap. Kanak 
integration into the European economy has led to provincial investments in 
enterprises once the domain of European owners. The state-assisted purchase by 
the North Province in April 1990, of the SMSP, Jacques Lafleur's mining 
company at Ouaco, is the most prominent symbol of this trend. The SMSP 
purchase, criticised in some quarters as being a very profitable deal for Lafleur 
and possibly a bad investment for the North Province,420 marked the entry of 
major Kanak investment in mining. This entry was made by means of a 
company established under the public authority of the North Province. At 
Canala, a local private initiative by Kanaks led to the reopening of a nickel mine 
and to the establishment of the Kanak Mining Company. Employing 60 
Melanesians, this company began exporting nickel to Japan in 1993.421 The 
importance of mining in the territory has prompted Kanak leaders to participate 
in a market where the potential for profit can be great, as can the potential for 
commercial failure, depending on international commodity prices. 
Kanak commercial interests have also spread into tourism. Fourteen 
hotels with a total of 197 rooms have been established in the North Province 
under the Matignon Accords, including a branch of Club Med at Hienghene, 
which opened in 1992.422 Club Med set up on Ouvea too, one of 11 hotel 
projects begun in the Loyalty Islands in an attempt to increase the provincial 
share of New Caledonian tourism profits.423 But Noumea has kept its majority 
share of the tourist market in New Caledonia due to its existing large network of 
accommodation, and to 665 additional rooms planned for the construction of the 
Doh Sheraton Hotel and the Pointe Mangin Hote1.424 The North Province, 
realising that Noumea is the most profitable area of New Caledonian tourism, 
purchased in November 1992 a majority interest in the Noumean Casino Royale, 
the Hotel Ibis and the Surf Novotel. Surf Novotel was the largest hotel in New 
Caledonia at the time of its construction in 1987, and the Casino Royale was 
likewise a prestigious investment. 425 
Large-scale Kanak investment in mining and high-prestige tourism 
operations followed well-established patterns of French commercial initiative. 
Micro-scale investment at tribal level has no such precedent and is more 
problematic.426 Whether the implementation of the Matignon Accords can effect 
positive change at tribal level to the satisfaction of traditional values is uncertain. 
Rural Melanesians now have better access to roads, schools, hospitals, 
electricity and running water thanks to public works projects fmanced under the 
Accords, although questions surround the future status of these people. The 
major issue is the extent to which the tribal milieu should become westernised in 
order to confonn to French development models. 
A lack of employment opportunities persists, with a 36% unemployment 
rate in the Loyalty Islands in 1989, and a 21 % rate in the North.421 This 
situation was presented by the New Caledonian High Commission as a pressing 
challenge which needed to be addressed.428 However whether Melanesians 
living in tribes really count as unemployed depends on one's cultural values. 
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Those not in full-time paid employment contribute to tribal subsistence 
economies. Is it preferable that these societies should be further eroded by 
Western values of individual achievement, private ownership and profit? 
Conversely, should New Caledonia's tribal population experience a materially 
impoverished existence while the local urbanised population enjoys a modem, 
consumer lifestyle? These questions are not merely rhetorical, but pose issues 
with which all New Caledonian Melanesians, Kanak or not, must grapple. 
Judged either by custom values or by European economic values, 
unemployment mayor may not be a problem. Traditionally, members of 
Melanesian tribes have lived outside the cash economy, on subsistence 
agriculture, mixed with some paid seasonal employment at most. Tribal reliance 
on paid employment has been increasing since the 1940s, a trend which has 
shown no sign of abating under the Matignon Accords. As European economic 
values spread in the tribal milieu, with their emphasis on personal achievement, 
ownership and profit, as opposed to the communal orientation of the tribe, the 
authority of traditional structures has been undermined. Traditional Melanesian 
economic values, centred on tribal subsistence and collective ownership, with 
barter as the basis for exchange, have been correctly gauged by the FLNKS as 
not offering a strong financial basis on which to build Kanak independence. By 
promoting increased Melanesian integration into the New Caledonian cash 
economy, the FLNKS has contributed to weakening custom authority. 
Land issues are symptomatic of differing cultural perceptions between 
Kanak administrators and tribal elders, as has been seen in the case of the 
dispute at We, on Lifou. As well there exist between Kanak tribal elders and the 
French State differing perceptions of land reform. The Matignon Accords have 
increased Melanesian land ownership. Land distribution since 1988 has been 
beneficial to individual Melanesians, and has benefited tribal landowners to a 
greater extent. Between 1989 and 1991, land redistributed to Melanesian tribes 
amounted to 48,417.8ha, while individual Melanesians received 38,833.9ha. 
Redistribution to non-indigenous inhabitants included 9,986.9ha to Europeans, 
993.2ha to Wallisians, and 279.4ha to communes.429 None the less, 
dissatisfaction persists in this controversial area. Paul Neaoutyine, the FLNKS 
President, has berated the ADRAF for perceived slowness in redistributing 
land,430 although there are reasons for this in many instances. Inter-tribal 
disputes over land ownership have been described by Bruno Arbouet, an 
ADRAF director, as an intractable problem.431 ArOOuet declared that the state 
approach to land reform, which viewed land as an agricultural commodity, 
remained out of tune with the tribal perception of land as a source of prestige, 
which mere ownership rendered valuable.432 The French State prefers that 
private and public land be ceded to Melanesians for cash cropping. This view is 
at odds with the tribal perception of land as a source of clan prestige regardless 
of that land's state of cultivation. Herein lies a major barrier to the spread of 
commercial agriculture and the lessening of territorial dependence on imported 
food. The FLNKS ambiguously straddles the two positions. While its member 
parties have habitually characterised the restitution of alienated land to 
Melanesian clans as paramount,433 the Front's pursuit of Kanak economic 
development through the adoption of European commercial values implies that 
restituted land should not be allowed to lie fallow but should be cultivated for 
cash cropping. 
The wave of construction undertaken in the North and the Loyalties since 
1989 - roads, schools, hospitals, hotels, telecommunications, electrification, 
port facilities - has encouraged improved integration with, and also increased 
reliance on, the South Province. The shortage of trained locals capable of 
contributing in these areas has caused these two provinces to become more 
reliant on metropolitan French and Noumean expertise. Neaoutyine has 
commented ruefully on how the bulk of rural construction work is completed by 
Noumean firms, as nearly all the available contractors are based there.434 The 
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development funds paid to these ftnns are transferred to the South rather than 
circulating in the rural economy. 
The lack of skilled labour in the North and the Loyalties stems from the 
low success rate of indigenous Melanesians in the French education system. 
Disproportionately few Melanesians attain levels of higher education compared 
to other ethnic groups in New Caledonia. By 1989, a mere 0.5% of indigenous 
Melanesians had obtained tertiary level education, compared with 10.8% of the 
local European population, which in itself constitutes a very low figure by 
metropolitan French standards.435 At that time, indigenous Melanesians 
represented almost 45% of the New Caledonian population, while Europeans 
represented just under 34%. (Table 20) The Matignon Accords aim to counteract 
this inequality through increased funding for all levels of education, and by 
offering Kanaks greater access to higher education. FLNKS leaders are well 
aware of this problem and have allocated large portions of their provincial 
budgets to education.436 A major project set up by the Accords is the 400 
managers programme, designed to pennit young New Caledonians to receive 
professional training in metropolitan France. From 1989 to 1991, 75.4% of the 
young people on this programme were Melanesian.437 By 1998, a total of 400 
young people will have been trained under the scheme, but this will mark only 
. the ftrst major step toward integrating Melanesians into management positions. 
In 1992, Melanesians were under-represented in the upper echelons of the 
territorial and state public service. There were ftve Melanesians out of 62 
functionaries in the A or highest salary category, 12 out of 125 in category B, 
and 30 out of 244 in category C.438 The FLNKS has backed the scheme for 
helping to create the management skills Kanaks will need to further their 
autonomy. The Melanesians among the 400 managers, who are intended to play 
a prominent part in territorial development, are being taught French values, skills 
and techniques. It is uncertain how successful or how willing will they be to 
integrate tribal values into their (!areers. 
Young Melanesians are being inculcated with French values through the 
state education system, after unilateral attempts by the FLNKS at fonnal 
education have foundered. From February 1985 the FLNKS reacted against the 
French socialisation of Melanesian youth by setting up independent Kanak 
Popular Schools. This was to be a territorial network which would teach 
traditional culture, thus allowing Kanak youth a greater understanding of its 
heritage. For lack of funds and trained personnel, the schools declined in 
number to just ftve by 1992,439 leaving most Kanak children reliant on the 
French education system. 
Within that system, recognition of Melanesian culture has been belated 
and marginal. Four of New Caledonia's 27 Melanesian languages were offered 
as subjects for the baccalaur~at in 1992, although there was a shortage of 
professional teachers fluent enough to teach and examine these languages.440 
The Matignon Accords have pennitted the Provinces to assume some control of 
primary education, allowing the North and the Loyalties to promote the use of 
local languages in primary school curricula, but from secondary level French 
remains the main language of instruction. In _edu~ati()n. as_in admjnistradon, 
law~ .. _m.eJlicine and other fields of professional endeavour, Kanak social 
adyancement . under the Matignon Accords lies through the acceptance and 
mastetyof European systems. 
In spite of the assertion by Emmanuelli in 1982 that the French 
Republican ideal ofjntegration belonged to another era,441 the cQo.c.ept has 
sho~tLQI)~xpected resilience in becoming an integral part.of the Matignon 
Ac~grd~t~eveJopment programme. Although Socialist Ministers would have 
been reluctant to admit the point, vocational training efforts since 1988 harked 
back to another era in teaching young Melanesians French administrative, 
technical and commercial values far removed from those of their tribal societies. 
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The language of instruction for the 400 managers is, of course, French. 
The role of Melanesian languages will undoubtedly remain marginal outside the 
tribal milieu in years to come, as it has always been. Within the French national 
education system as a whole, Melanesians will always playa marginal role, due 
to their lack of numbers. Although efforts are being made to alter national 
curricula in the territory to account for tribal languages, particularly at primary 
level, most of the education of young Kanaks will not be much removed from 
that of their counterparts in metropolitan France. Studying in what is effectively 
a foreign educational !o;etting has been an historical disadvantage for Melanesians 
that has yet to be turned around. 
Over two centuries of contact with Europeans have caused lasting 
modifications to traditional Melanesian society in New Caledonia. The European 
presence forcibly made the tribal milieu aware of broader horizons. The spread 
of the French language and the acceptance of Christianity there represented two 
major cultural changes which took place at the same time as Melanesian 
economic marginalisation caused by French expropriation of tribal domains. The 
French presence served to broaden the cultural awareness of Melanesians. The 
introduction of French language coupled with Christianity in the tribal milieu 
from the nineteenth century assisted the greater consciousness of territorial 
Melanesian identity. These two European elements provided the starting point 
for Kanak nationalism by providing a means of intertribal communication and 
common philosophical ground. Paradoxically, French Republicanism also 
played an important role in providing other philosophical elements and political 
tools basic to Kanak nationalism. 
In spite of inaccurate and politically motivated conservative French 
claims that Kanak nationalism was the product of FLNKS contacts with, 
variously, Anglo-Saxon Protestant, Soviet, Cuban, Vietnamese, North Korean 
or Libyan activists, the influences of French nationalism and the French Left 
have had far greater bearing. The majority of indigenous Melanesians ftrst learnt 
the concepts of 'nation' and 'patrie' in French schools, not from the writings of 
Marx, Mao, Lenin or Castro.442 The ftrst New Caledonian political group which 
promoted Kanak identity, the Foulards Rouges, was the creation in 1969 of the 
ftrst young Kanaks to receive tertiary education in metropolitan France. While 
there, they assimilated the philosophical currents of the French Left in the 
1960s, notably its preoccupation with Third World liberation movements, and 
applied them to their own context.443 The extent to which French political 
culture has penetrated Kanak nationalist parties is fundamental but tends to be 
overlooked. The FLNKS reflects the French political milieu in which it exists in 
having a president, with an executive and all the other structural paraphenalia of 
European political parties. Congres Populaire was formed in reaction to this 
orientation, although it is questionable whether it can transcend the entrenched 
use of various European political practices by Kanaks. 
The confrontation for primacy in New Caledonia between two distinct 
identities, those of French nationalism and of nascent Kanak nationalism, has 
been an unequal contest. French nationalism has retained its ascendancy in the 
territory, and will continue to do so in the near future thanks to the lasting and 
dominant implantation of French Republican institutions. The preponderant 
influence of the French State in territorial administration, law, education and 
language, the strength of state ftnance, as well as European dominance over the 
New Caledonian cash economy, have long left Melanesians marginalised in their 
own homelands. This situation was not fundamentally challenged by the 
Matignon Accords. The inevitable paradox of the Accords is that while one of 
their targets is to improve the social, political and economic participation of the 
Melanesian minority in the implanted French society in New Caledonia, this 
participation is largely, perhaps inevitably, determined and limited by French 
criteria. As critics in the LKS and the FULK have pointed out, by cooperating 
with the French State, the FLNKS has surrendered control over its claim to 
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independence. As has been demonstrated however. at no point since its 
foundation had the Front been in a position to attain Kanak: sovereignty 
unilaterally. 
Mitterrand has at no time conceded the FLNKS proposition that Kanak 
identity has moral primacy in New Caledonia. In any case, by signing the 
Matignon Accords. the Front has to a degree abandoned this claim by 
cooperating with the RPCR. Mitterrand reaffirmed in his election platform of 
1988 the position that the French Republic stood as the ultimate arbiter of the 
destiny of New Caledonia and that Republican law served in the best interests of 
Kanaks: 
Mais je De crois pas que I'ant~riorite historique des Canaques sur celte terre 
suffise a fonder Ie droil. [".J Le droit bafou~ des Canaques ne sera relev6, 
restaure que par la paix interieure et Ie garant de eette paix et de ces droits De 
peut etre que Ia Republique fran~se. n D'est pas d'autre arbitre. Je D'monee pas 
Ilt un principe. je constate un fait et ce fait commande Ie salut de tous.444 
These observations hint at the ultimate limitation of the Socialists since 1981; 
like more conservative French political parties, while in government they were 
bound to uphold Republican law. Reforms implemented by Socialist 
Governments since 1981 have been intended to improve the lot of Kanaks, but 
constitutional considerations preclude acting against the sovereignty of the Fifth 
Republic over the islands by promoting Kanak: nationalism, let alone by 
engineering the secession of New Caledonia from France. Under such 
conditions. the prevailing bias in New Caledonia cannot avoid being in favour of 
French priorities. however sympathetic Socialist representatives such as Pisani 
and Rocard might have been to Kanaks. 
As the FLNKS itself stated in a petition to the UN in 1991: "the 
Matignon Accords do not open a clear path to independence and three years after 
the signing of the agreement what can be seen are only small signs of the things 
that would enable viable economic, social and cultural conditions for a viable 
independence".44S The potential remains for the FLNKS to protest violently 
against the territorial status quo should Kanaks not receive satisfaction from 
future governments in Paris. Such protest, as in the past, would ultimately be an 
unproductive method of gaining sovereignty in the absence of majority territorial 
backing for independence. Conversely a majority vote against independence in 
the self-determination referendum scheduled for 1998 may lead Kanak leaders to 
accept further development funding from the French State. This cooperation 
might either be the prelude to a patient wait by Kanak politicians for a 
conjunction of political, electoral and demographic conditions likely to allow a 
successful push for independence, or might mark the beginning of a definitive 
Melanesian cultural, political and economic integration into the Fifth Republic. 
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Table 23. Wallis and Futuna. Basic Information 
Land Area: 
Maritime Zone: 
Population (1990): 
A verage Population 
Density (1990): 
Currency: 
GDP (1983): 
Average GDP 
per capita (1983): 
Principal Economic 
Activities: 
Administrative Status: 
Political Representation: 
Source: ITSEE: TEe 1991. 
255km2. 
300,000km2. 
13,705. 
54 inhabitants per km2. 
FCFP. 
20MFCFP. 
1,569F CFP. 
Subsistence agriculture. 
French Overseas Territory. 
One SenatOT in the French 
Senate. One Deputy in the 
French National Assembly. 
Map 6. Wallis and Futuna 
• Village 
MUA Faipule District 
.' 
• Village 
ALO Kingdom 
,. 
~ 
. 
•• 
ALOFI 
Source: A. Ali & R. Crocombe (eds.): Politics in Polynesia 
p.3; Aldrich & ConneJl: France's Overseas Frontier p.49. 
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3. Wallis and Futuna 
M. Ie Ministre, nous sommes Ie plus petit et Ie plus lointain 
territoire fran~ais d'outre-mer. Ne nous oubliez pasl 
Kamilo Gala, Deputy for Wallis and Futuna, addressing 
Le Pensec in the National Assembly, 8 November 1989.1 
The Neglected Isles? 
Wallisian feelings of neglect and abandonment were well en~apsulated in 
the plea made by Gata to the Minister to the DOM-TOM in 1989. However the 
charge of state neglect of this TOM was difficult to substantiate and there was 
some reason to suggest that the comment made by Gata represented attention-
catching dec1amation of the variety employed in debate over New Caledonia. 
Not so much forgotten as considered peripheral, Wallis and Futuna has always 
been of marginal concern to Paris. With its tiny surface area, no significant 
exports, and fewer residents than some Parisian boulevards, (Table 23) the 
territory was understandably far from representing a pressing administrative 
concern. 
State expenditure on the territory has been comparatively low, although 
this is a reflection of the low population level in the islands, and the 
correspondingly modest scale of administrative services required there. 
Government spending in Wallis and Futuna amounted to just under 0.68% of 
total state expenditure in the DOM-TOM in 1987.2 By way of comparison, New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia were allocated respectively 13.12% and 
16.37% of state DOM-TOM spending that year.3 In general such higher funding 
levels were due to the larger scale and populations of the rest of the DOM-TOM, 
although not in all cases. The French Antarctic, (Map 1) where the population 
consisted of 150 to 200 transient scientists,4 received 0.97% of state DOM-TOM 
expenditure in 1987.5 Saint Pierre and Miquelon, with several thousand fewer 
inhabitants than Wallis and Futuna,6 obtained 1.05%.7 These higher levels of 
spending reflected the more intensive capital costs involved in maintaining 
French scientific programmes in the Antarctic, and in subsidising the deep sea 
fishing fleet at St Pierre and Miquelon. Funding for Wallis and Futuna 
constituted a proverbial drop in the fiscal bucket compared to spending in the 
other inhabited DOM-TOM. 
As a result of the smallness and economic insignificance of Wallis and 
Futuna, the administration of the islands was inevitably of less concern to Paris 
than the other two Pacific TOM. While the three components of the French 
Pacific had the same constitutional status, the lower standing of Wallis and 
Futuna was reflected in the rank of the chief administrator there. Unlike New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia, each of which have a High Commissioner as 
proconsul, Wallis and Futuna is overseen by a Superior Administrator. Residing 
in Mata Utu, the territorial capital, the Superior Administrator is subordinate to 
the High Commissioner of New Caledonia, stationed in Noumea over 2,lOOkm 
south-west.8 The presence of a functionary subordinate to the High Commission 
in Noumea has been regarded as unsatisfactory by Wallisian leaders. In 
December 1986, custom chiefs proposed that the status of Wallis and Futuna be 
upgraded by the appointment of a High Commissioner to each of the islands' 
three kingdoms.9 (See Map 6) These grandiose aspirations were not heeded by 
Paris, which continues to hold the status of the three kingdoms in the territory in 
lower administrative esteem than their inhabitants would prefer. This gap 
between local feelings of self-importance and French administrative practice has 
been a major contributing factor to the Wallisian impression of being neglected 
by Paris. 
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As might be expected when viewed from Paris. Wallis and Futuna has 
had a minimal profile in state planning and national political debate. When they 
mentioned Wallis and Futuna at all. the Eighth and Ninth Plans for the DOM-
TOM. from 1981 to 1988, made only passing mention of the territory. 
sometimes alongside more detailed discussion of New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia. to Scant attention has been paid to Mata Utu in Parliament. The 
Journal OjJiciel contains hundreds of pages of debate and legislation concerning 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia in the period under examination, but very 
little discussion of Wallis and Futuna. The debate by the National Assembly on 
the DOM-TOM in June 1980 offered no more than brief reference to the 
territory. and that was largely thanks to the intervention of Benjamin Brial. then 
the RPR Deputy for Wallis and Futuna. who berated Dijoud for the alleged 
parsimoniousness of state funding to the islands. I I This incident reflected a 
general trend in the treatment of Wallis and Futuna in the National Assembly. 
Parliamentary considemtion of the TOM tends to amount to no more than a few 
minutes' mention of its financial situation in annual DOM-TOM budget debates. 
with an accompanying intervention from the Wallisian Deputy to complain about 
the tardiness and supposed inadequacy of state assistance.12 This treatment 
should not be considered inappropriate. Few metropolitan French small towns 
with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants receive such attention at this level, and it 
could be argued by government officials in Paris that the amount of attention 
paid to Wallis and Futuna is in fact disproportionately high. 
When the French Government devoted attention to its Pacific territories, 
Noumea and Papeete understandably received priority attention ahead of Mata 
Utu. In the 1980s New Caledonian civil disorder and the complicated balancing 
act involved in satisfying the conflicting demands of its different political groups 
assumed greater importance than the development needs of placid Wallis and 
Futuna. Similarly, the strategic role of French Polynesia as the base for the 
French nuclear testing programme far outweighed what intangible benefits 
Wallis and Futuna's adherence to the Republic might provide. While various 
French commentators have asserted the importance of New Caledonia to France 
due to its mineml deposits, and French Polynesia's significance because of its 
nuclear role, few have offered convincing arguments of a similar nature for 
Wallis and Futuna. I3 In 1985 Messmer described the territory as having 
strategic value because its position in the central Pacific was becoming more 
important with the passing of time.t4 The strategic potential of Wallis and 
Futuna was as unfulfilled as that of the Chatham Islands. Any stmtegic resource 
worth Wallis and Futuna might enjoy was not distinguishably different from that 
of any other small island in the South Pacific with a largely unexploited and 
unexplored EEZ. Were Wallis and Futuna considered to be ofincreasing military 
stmtegic value by Paris. a military presence to guard it was the least that might 
be expected, yet no significant force had been based in Wallis and Futuna since 
US troops were stationed there during World War 11.15 
Ministerial level visits to Wallis and Futuna during the 1980s offered no 
hint that the islands were soon to undergo transformation into a new hub for 
French geostrategy. Few metropolitan French parliamentarians could lay claim 
to having visited Wallis and Futuna, indeed few had any need to do so. Each 
government representative for the DOM-TOM tended to make at least one trip to 
the islands during his term in office. Such excursions were usually part of a 
broader itinerary. Emmanuelli passed through on 12 August 1981 as part of his 
introductory tour of the Pacific TOM.16 Lemoine visited in December 1983 after 
consultations with New Caledonian leaders.l7 Pons spent greater time in the 
islands than his predecessors, having travelled there in May 1986 before being 
appointed Minister to the DOM-TOM, as well as having paid visits in September 
and December 1986, in December 1987. and in March 1988.18 As a result, he 
was comparatively well acquainted with Wallis and Futuna. Only one French 
President, of the Fifth or of any other Republic, has visited Wallis: Giscard 
Table 24. Wallis and Futuna's Population 
by Ethnic Group 
1983 
Group 
Total Population 
Wal1isians 
Futunans 
Migrant French 
Foreigners 
1983, 1990 
Number 
12,408 
7,780 
4,322 
295 
I 1 
% of Population 
100 
62.70 
34.83 
2.38 
0.09 
Source: INSEE: Territoire des fles Wallis et Futuna. 
Resultats du recensement de fa population 15 /evrier 1983 
p.31. 
1990 
Group 
Total Population 
Wallisians 
Futunans 
Migrant French 
Foreigners 
Number 
13,705 
8,540 
4,708 
444 
1 3 
% of Population 
100 
62.31 
34.35 
3.24 
0.1 
Source: INSEE: Images de la population de Wallis et Futuna. 
Principaux resultats du recensement 1990 p.19. 
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d'Estaing passed through on 24 July 1979.19 His stop was tacked on to the end 
of a tour of French Polynesia. The itineraries of Chimc and Rocard, the two 
French Prime Ministers who visited the tenitory in the 1980s. followed a similar 
pattern. The first prime ministerial visit by Chirac to Wallis, for two days in 
September 1986, was made in between tours of New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia.20 Chirac's time in the territory was rare in that it included what Le 
Monde described as a "saut de pouce" to Futuna for a few hours.2t The arrival 
of Rocard in Mata Utu on 24 August 1989 was a one day stop on a tour that 
encompassed Australia, New Caledonia, Fiji and French Polynesia.22 With the 
exception of Pons. none of these metropolitan French politicians could claim any 
intimate first-hand acquaintance with Wallis and Futuna on the basis of their 
brief stays. Considering the breadth and scale of their other ministerial 
responsibilities, this state of affairs was entirely appropriate. Again. by way of 
comparison, there existed in metropolitan France hundreds of villages the same 
size as Mata Utu which could not claim to have received this number of high-
level official visits since 1979. While lobbying for improved communal funding 
their Mayors might also claim, not disinterestedly, to be neglected. As is the case 
with the plea made by Gata, such arguments should not be taken at face value. 
Long Distance Dependency 
Lying 20,OOOkm and twelve time zones away from Paris, Wallis and 
Futuna is further from the capital than either New Caledonia or French 
Polynesia.23 The remoteness of the territory from Paris is compounded by its 
physical isolation from its South Pacific neighbours. Of the Pacific TOM, the 
comments made by the Eighth Plan on the need to reduce isolation applied to 
Wallis and Futuna to the greatest degree, as the islands were not as well served 
by external air and sea links. Two weekly Boeing 737 return flights link Wallis 
with Fiji, New Caledonia and French Polynesia.24 Until 1990, territorial 
shipping consisted of a 1.620t cargo vessel, the Moana Ill, owned by the 
Wallisian Navigation Company. which made annually ten or eleven return 
voyages to Wallis and Futuna from Noumea.25 Maritime activity in the territory 
was diversified in 1991 when Translink Pacific Shipping, a New Zealand-based 
company, opened a route between Wallis and Fiji. In addition to 12 return 
voyages made by the Moana III in 1991, three Translink vessels made 14 return 
voyages to Wallis that year.26 These air and sea routes are important for the 
territory, although they involve small-scale and infrequent activity by 
comparison with those of New Caledonia or French Polynesia. For example, 
around 21 weekly international flights landed at Faaa airport on Tahiti during 
1991. and 2,100 port calls were made at Papeete that year.27 Once again though, 
all things are relative. The population of French Polynesia is over ten times 
greater than that of Wallis and Futuna. The larger tourist trade in French 
Polynesia. the greater westernisation of the territorial population (and the 
consequently greater reliance on imported goods), and the operations of the 
nuclear testing programme were contributing factors to this higher level of 
traffic. 
Of the two main islands, Wallis enjoys better communications with the 
outside world. leaving Futuna disadvantaged within the wider territorial 
isolation. The higher population level of Wallis (Table 24),28 and the longer 
history of a French presence there, have resulted in various advantages over 
Futuna. Wallis enjoys the prestige and benefits of the territorial capital, with its 
resident Superior Administrator, public servants, and the Catholic Archbishop. 
Wallis experienced modemisations such as the introduction of sealed roads, 
running water and electricity, before Futuna. Its cash economy is also larger 
than that of Futuna. Futuna has a domestic airport which reduces, but fails to 
eliminate, its isolation. Over 200km lie between the island and Wallis. a gap 
bridged by four weekly return flights. The aircraft which services this route, a 
112 
Twin Otter capable of transporting 15 passengers, does so thanks to the 
benevolence of the State. The plane itself was donated to the territory by the 
Chirac Government in 1986,29 and its financially unviable route is kept open 
with state subsidies.30 From Paris Futuna, along with the Marquesa Islands, 
and inland Guyane, rates as one of the most inaccessible permanently inhabited 
parts of the DOM-TOM. 
Wallis and Futuna holds the dual distinction of being France's most 
distant and dependent possession. The economic limitations of the islands 
presented a small albeit recalcitrant challenge to the Eighth Plan's general goal of 
diversifying economic activity in the DOM-TOM. Of all the DOM-TOM, it was 
in Wallis and Futuna that the indicators of economic dependence on metropolitan 
France painted by the plan were most marked. And of the inhabitants in the 
DOM-TOM, Wallis and Futuna's population faced the greatest developmental 
obstacles with the smallest means. In spite of the growth of tertiary sector 
economic activity, during the decades since becoming a TOM in 1961, Wallis 
and Futuna retained its reliance on traditional subsistence agriculture, 
supplemented with some lagoon fishing. Possibilities for the expansion of the 
traditional economy were limited by geographical constraints. Only around a 
quarter of the territorial land area was suited to agriculture.31 Population growth 
in Wallis and Futuna in the second half of the twentieth century had created 
unprecedented pressure on natural resources. The resultant diminished chances 
of Jiving comfortably and gaining social advancement within the tribal milieu 
through the inheritance of land, along with the attraction of paid employment in 
New Caledonia and in the New Hebrides, led to widespread emigration from the 
1950s to the late 1970s.32 By 1983, more Wallisians were living in New 
Caledonia than in WaJ1is and Futuna.33 For those who remained in tribal 
society, economic life was largely cashless, being centred on barter. In 1982, 
approximately 79% of the working popUlation in the territory were essentially 
unwaged and engaged in subsistence agriculture. The lifestyle of the remaining 
21 % differed markedly, consisting mainly of salaried workers in public 
service.34 
Local commerce was, and continues to be, of a limited nature. In 1982 
licensed businesses in the territory numbered 120. In Mata Utu, cash trade 
revolved around two small supermarkets, a hardware store with the territory's 
sole petrol station, two car dealerships, a garage, two butchers' and two clothes 
stores.35 Mata Utu also possessed the only bank in Wallis and Futuna, a branch 
of the Indosuez Bank which opened in 1977.36 These businesses were mainly 
owned by Europeans.37 Immigrants to Wallis and Futuna were concentrated in 
non-agricultural employment. In 1983 296 non-indigenous inhabitants were 
resident in the territory, of whom around 200 were French Europeans.38 Of the 
total immigrant population, which included unemployed dependents, 43.91 % 
(130) were employed in non-agricultural work.39 A far lower level of 
indigenous participation in paid employment existed. A total of 991 local 
Polynesians were in paid positions in 1983; 7.99% of the indigenous 
population.4o 
The presence of salaried public service employees alongside unwaged 
subsistence agriculturalists was a source of profound economic inequality which 
official statistics tended to mask. In 1983 average GDP per capita for Wallis and 
Futuna amounted to 1,569F CFP. (Table 23) By Western standards, and by the 
standards of the other Pacific TOM, this amount was low. (Tables 1, 33) 
However this figure, to an even greater extent than GDP per capita figures for 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia, was a classic misuse of the arithmetic 
mean. As in the other Pacific TOM, because of the large gap in income between 
those who essentially earned little or no money and those inhabitants who had 
jobs, average per capita income statistics are rendered nonsensical. Wallisians 
living outside the cash economy and local public service employees marked the 
two extreme poles in this inequitable distribution of wealth. In 1982 an estimated 
Table 25. Wallis and Futuna's Exports and Imports 1983-1991 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Exports(MF CFP) 0.15 2.8 0.21 _1 0.32 2.75 12.28 35.28 5.6 
Imports(MF CFP) 951 1,302 1,219 No comprehensive data collected from 1986 
Coverage 
Rate (%) 0.016 0.22 0.017 It " 
Sources: IEOM: Rapport dtactivite 1988. Wallis-et-Futuna pp.22, 23, Rapport d'activite 1990 Wallis-et-
Futuna p.32, Rapport annuel 1991. Wallis-et-Futuna pp.34, 35. 
1 Production disrupted by Cyclone Raja. 
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520 public servants working in Wallis and Futuna enjoyed a relatively affluent 
lifestyle on double pay in a personal income tax-free environment.41 
For the territory the post-World War II era entaileded a period of 
expansion for the tertiary sector in the absence of substantial secondary sector 
economic activities.42 The narrowness of territorial development was such that 
certain basic economic assumptions inherent in the Eighth Plan could not be 
applied there. The goal in the Eighth Plan of expanding light industry in the 
DOM-TOM represented an irrelevancy to the islands. Wallis and Futuna 
possessed inadequate resources and population to sustain modern 
manufacturing. Were light industry to be established in the territory, it would of 
necessity have to be export-orientated for want of a sizeable local market, but no 
promising potential foreign markets existed in any case. 
Manufacturing in Wallis and Futuna largely consisted of artisanal 
activities and construction work. What little export activity existed consisted of 
international sales of stamps, troehus shells, some handicrafts, fruit, and 
vegetables. (Table 25) Troehus shells, the only product exported in sufficient 
volume to merit the compilation of official export statistics. were sold to tlinket 
manufacturers in Italy. Most handicrafts, fruit, and vegetables were sold 
piecemeal in Noumea.43 Trochus or top shell exports increased substantially in 
the 1980s: the annual tonnage shipped rose from 1.5t in 1983 to 88.2t in 
1990.44 During this period the value of trochus exports climbed rapidly, from 
O.lSMF CFP in 1983, to 3S.28MF CFP in 1990.45 Production was erratic 
however. It was disrupted in 1986 due to cyclone damage, and in 1991 the 
amount exported dropped to 17t because of cyclone Ofa.46 The future of trochus 
exports, like that of the subsistence economy, is conditioned by resource limits. 
Any attempt to expand harvesting beyond existing levels threatens resource 
sustainabili ty. 41 
Economic disequilibrium in Wallis and Futuna was the consequence of a 
growing dependence on imports, mainly food, fuel, construction materials and 
consumer goOO8.48 By the 1980s this trend had led to a profound external trade 
imbalance. (Table 25) There was probably a link between this progression and 
the increasing numbers of the population in paid employment, who could afford 
consumer goods beyond the means of most of the population. However, this 
assumption is difficult to substantiate as detailed statistics are lacking concerning 
the precise nature of imported items. Rising import levels were also caused by 
the general expansion of public works and the periodic need for construction 
materials in bulk after cyclone damage. Imports have continued increasing in 
tonnage and value since the early 19808. In 1983, the territory imported 10,324t 
of goods, worth 950MF CFP.49 By 1990 imports amounted to around 17,000t, 
a gain on the 1989 level of 14,ooOt due to the burst of reconstruction activity 
after cyclone Ofa hit Wallis and Futuna in February 1990.50 In 1991, imports 
fell to 15,SOOt.51 There are no figures available on the value of imports since 
1986, as they have not been compiled since then. In 1985 however, the 8,905t 
imported were worth 1,219MF CFP.S2 Historically imports have arrived via 
Noumea. In 1990, 12,ooot travelled this route.53 The diversification of shipping 
since 1990 has led to the arrival of imports via a greater number of entrepots. In 
1991 4,335t arrived via Noumea, S,764t via New Zealand. 4,763t via Suva. and 
638t via Vanuatu. 54 . 
The economic possibilities that expanded tourism offered the French 
Pacific, as mentioned in the Eighth Plan, did not stretch to encompassing Wallis 
and Futuna. Far from major air and shipping routes, rendered inaccessible by 
the limited number of connecting international flights, lacking in hotel 
accommodation and tourist attractions, and largely unheard of by the outside 
world, the territory was not a promising base for tourism. Mata Utu offered only 
25 hotel rooms in the mid-1980s, while Futuna had no hotel.55 Attracting 
tourists to the islands was problematic. Wallis and Futuna's lack of an 
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international reputation as remarkable as that of French Polynesia, and its 
deficiency in facilities, posed considerable barriers to growth of tourism. 
Although not as large a proposition as the resolution of New Caledonian 
troubles, the stimulation of durable economic development in Wallis and Futuna 
presented an intractable problem in the 1980s. Overcoming the narrow 
population and resource base in Wallis and Futuna, as well as its physical 
isolation, to implement the economic modernisation and regional integration 
optimistically proposed by the Eighth Plan represented an impossible challenge 
to Paris. 
The Political Landscape 
The election of Mitterrand in 1981 was an event that jarred on the 
political sensibilities of the local conservative Polynesian electorate. For the 
flowering of the Socialist rose, few less propitious places existed than Wallis 
and Futuna. The PS and other political parties of the French Left had no 
representatives in the Territorial Assembly, and few sympathisers among the 
indigenous population. In the last vestige of the French Republic to retain 
kingdoms, where Giscardians were regarded as dangerous radicals, where 85% 
of the population was church-going,56 there was no room for Mitterrandian 
Socialism. Political life centred on attempts by the growing Giscardian camp to 
wrest power from local Gaullists, who had dominated territorial politics since 
the early 1960s. Giscard d'Estaing's following increased during the 1970s 
thanks to the advent of young liberals discontented with the Gaullist hegemony 
over territorial representation.57 Local voters heavily supported Giscard 
d'Estaing in both rounds of the presidential elections in 1981. (Table 26) In the 
first round, he obtained a healthy majority of 60.08% of votes cast, followed by 
an impressive 97.37% in the second round. As well as reflecting the activism of 
local Giscardians, this mass support was partially due to Wallisian recognition 
of the incumbent's broader national support than Chirac. The unprecedented 
amount of interest the President had shown in Wallis and Futuna by actually 
visiting it was an additional source of popularity that should not be 
underestimated. 
To an extent greater still than in New Caledonia, the political aspirations 
of local voters in 1981 were hostile to the PS, and out of tune with metropolitan 
French support for a Socialist future. Mitterrand gained a derisory 26 votes in 
Wallis and Futuna in the first round of the presidential elections, 0.54% of votes 
cast. In the second round, that total grew to a still insubstantial 113 votes, just 
2.30% of votes cast. The bulk of Mitterrand's second round total probably 
consisted mainly of protest votes lodged by disenchanted supporters of the 
RPR. By the time of the legislative elections in June, some locals had shown 
enough interest in a Socialist future to organise a local PS candidate, M. Ata, 
although the response to his candidature from the territorial electorate was low. 
He received 175 votes, 3.34% of votes cast. (Table 27) The second round of the 
elections was to be a runoff between the local Gaullist and Giscardian 
candidates, a competition won by Brial. Ata participated in the territorial 
elections of 21 March 1982, thus holding the distinction of being the first PS 
candidate to stand for election to the assembly. The response of local voters was 
not enthusiastic. He gained only 144 votes, 2.83% of valid votes.58 
Not only were Wallis and Futuna's voting patterns discordant with those 
of metropolitan France in 1981, so too was its social structure. The territory 
stood as a bizarre anachronism in the context of Socialist plans for social 
renovation. Traditional Polynesian social structures, modified by the cultural 
penetration of Catholicism in the nineteenth century, formed a deeply engrained 
prevailing conservatism that had survived largely because of the isolation of 
WaJJis and Futuna from the rest of the world. Wallis and Futuna was unique in 
being the only part of France where social systems akin to feudalism persisted. 
Table 26. French Presidential Elections1 1981. 
Wallis and Futunan Results 
First Round: 26 April 
Registered voters 6,506 
Votes cast 4,845 
Turnout 74.47% 
Valid votes 4,834 
Candidate Votes % of votes cast 
Giscard d'Estaing 
(UOF) 2,911 60.08 
Chirac (RPR) 1,868 38.56 
Mitterrand (PS) 26 0.54 
Marchais (PC) 6 0.12 
Others 23 0.47 
Second Round: 10 May 
Registered voters 6,515 
Votes cast 4,905 
Turnout 75.29% 
Valid votes 4,889 
Candidate Votes % of votes cast 
Giscard d'Estaing 4,776 97.37 
Mitterrand 113 2.30 
Sources: Le Monde 28 avril 1981, 12 mai 1981. 
Table 27. French Legislative Elections, 1981. 
Wallis and Futunan Results 
First Round: 21 June 
Eligible voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Brial (RPR) 
Falelavaki (UDF) 
Hoatau 1 
Ata (PS) 
MuliJoto2 
Second Round: 28 June 
Eligible voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Brial (RPR) 
Falelavaki (UDF) 
6,559 
5, 103 
77.80% 
5,083 
Votes 
2,393 
1,892 
456 
175 
167 
6,555 
5,144 
78.47% 
5,128 
Votes 
2,642 
2,486 
Source: Le Monde 30 juin 1981. 
1 An independent left candidate. 
2 An independent right candidate. 
% of votes cast 
46.89 
37.08 
8.94 
3.43 
3.27 
% of votes cast 
51.36 
48.33 
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The three kings in the territory sat at the head of monarchies which had retained 
their cultural and political integrity since 1842, when Wallis infonnally became a 
French protectorate at the instigation of Lavelua Soane Patita, the king of Wallis 
at that time.59 Although some Church canons, such as the proscription of 
contraception,6O were being abandoned by locals, the population remained more 
devoutly Catholic than the inhabitants of metropolitan France. Church and 
custom authority operated powerful brakes on change in Wallis and Futuna. By 
1981. their powers had been but partially eroded by cultural and political forces 
from France. 
The French State had however been a major impetus for change in Wallis 
and Futuna. particularly since the islands had lost their protectorate status under 
the Fifth Republic and became a TOM on 29 July 1961, on the promulgation of 
the territorial statute. On 27 December 1959, 94% of votes cast in a territorial 
self-detennination referendum had backed integration into the Fifth Republic.61 
Locals decided that continued association with France offered the islands a more 
secure future than the uncertainties independence would have implied. Under the 
protectorate, the Church had held greater authority in the islands than the State. 
Owing to their greater understanding of, and longer exposure to, local 
Polynesian culture, Marist priests had built up a privileged relationship with the 
three kings which gave them more authority than the succession of French 
Residents who served short-term postings to Mata Utu.62 This relationship was 
not overtly threatened by the new statute. Both religious and royal authority 
were recognised by Paris in the territorial statute of 1961. The integrity of 
traditional society was assured by articles 3 and 5, which guaranteed the respect 
of local customs and religion, as was the case elsewhere in the Fifth RepUblic. 
In the same manner as in New Caledonia. where Melanesian law was 
recognised, the exercise of Wallisian custom law was permitted provided it was 
not in violation of the French civil code, which locals were given the option of 
living under should they so choose. The Church received informal recognition 
of its prerogatives in the 1960s and 1970s through the non-application of French 
divorce and abortion laws.63 Under article 10 the three kings sat ex officio on 
the Territorial Council, alongside the Superior Administrator and three local 
political appointees. These three appointees, who did not necessarily have to be 
Territorial Councillors, were chosen from the local population by the Superior 
Administrator with the approval of the Territorial Assembly. 
The statute of 1961 nevertheless accorded administrative primacy to the 
State.64 Under article 9, the Superior Administrator became the head of the 
territory, and governed Futuna via his delegate there. Article 7 indicated that the 
State held authority over territorial defence, law and order, external 
communications, education, the treasury, customs, state administration, fmances 
and public health. The statute also tacitly offered potential for the erosion of 
church and custom through the democratisation of the territory. The 
establishment under article 11 of a Territorial Assembly with 20 members 
permitted the election of commoners to positions of local responsibility, and 
assured a fixed level of representation for Futuna by attributing its inhabitants 
seven seats. The full potential of democratisation under the statute was realised 
only from the 1980s. In the 1960s and 1970s. conservatives with strong links to 
the monarchs and the Church dominated the Territorial Assembly and the 
parliamentary representation of Wallis and Futuna. Local Gaullists, the majority 
of whom were Wallisians rather than Futunans, held or shared majority control 
of the Territorial Assembly from 1964 to 1992. A Wallisian. Benjamin Brial, the 
RPR Deputy for Wallis and Futuna. exemplified the continuity of conservative 
leadership for most of this period. In close association with custom authority,65 
he held the post of Deputy for Wallis and Futuna from 1967 to 1988. In this 
respect the situation differed from New Caledonian politics in the 1950s and 
1960s. There the majority of indigenous voters, with the support of various 
Melanesian chiefs. followed the reformist UC. 
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The role of civil administration, whether state or territorial, slowly grew 
from the early 1960s, but did so in consultation with traditional powerholders. 
The limits of state power when it ignored local sentiment became apparent after 
an incident in November 1974. Jean de Agostini, then the Superior 
Administrator, was forcibly expelled from the territory at the hands of an angry 
crowd.66 The source of the crowd's anger was a rise in local prices which they 
considered excessive. The half-a-dozen gendarmes present in the territory were 
unable to intervene effectively. 
This embarrassing incident was not one which state representatives in 
Mata Utu wished to see repeated. When in October 1986, some of the advisors 
to the Wallisian king started campaigning for the eviction of Georges Jaymes, 
then Secretary-General to Wallis and Futuna, the reaction was vigorous. 
Although civil disorder had amounted to no more than some anonymous 
threatening telephone calls to Jaymes and a brick tossed through the window of 
an administrative office,67 on 29 October Jacques Le Henaff, then Superior 
Administrator, declared a state of emergency. In doing so, Le Henaff employed 
powers outlined under article 8 of the 1961 statute.68 The five gendarmes in the 
territory were reinforced by a platoon of motorised gendarmes flown in from 
Noumea. After 26 uneventful hours the state of emergency was lifted. At the 
source of the incident was not the hand of the FLNKS, as Le Figaro wildly 
suggested,69 but instead a dispute between the authority of State and custom. Le 
Henaff announced that he would not tolerate the interference of custom authority 
in state affairs.1o Jaymes's unpopularity was caused by his decision to post 
eight of his subordinates back to metropolitan France before their contracts had 
expired. Among the eight were a Subdivision Head and the Head of Rural 
Economic Services, who were well-liked by local custom leaders.71 However 
ineptly, and in the face of custom leaders' assertions that they should have been 
consulted,72 the declaration of emergency pennitted the State to safeguard its 
prerogatives on Wallis. 
The risk to state authority of not making an immediate and vigorous 
response to a local challenge from custom authority was demonstrated in 1993. 
The starting point for what turned into violent confrontation was an earthquake 
on 12 March, which resulted in the deaths of three people.73 Some Futunans 
saw the natural disaster, the latest in a series which began with cyclone Raja in 
December 1986, as evidence of the Lord's wrath on an insufficiently devout 
population. Accordingly the Futunan kings of Sigave and Alo, Tuisigave and 
Tuiaigaifo, decided in May to appease God. They forbade fishing on Sundays, 
and urged their subjects to forsake business and leisure activities on that day in 
preference to prayer. Philippe Legrix, who had been appointed in March 1993 as 
the Superior Administrator,74 responded by indicating that the interdiction was a 
violation of Republican law and infringed civil liberties, in spite of claims by the 
two monarchs that they were acting within the bounds of the territorial statute. In 
June, Legrix suspended state funding to the two kings, and issued an ultimatum: 
unless the interdiction was lifted by 30 September, further state sanctions would 
be imposed. The deadline passed without any retraction from the two kings. On 
3 October, a power cut on Futuna was interpreted as Legrix's reprisal. Several 
locals beat up Jean Mauro, his representative on the island. The administrative 
office on Futuna and official cars were vandalised. The following day, 10 
gendarmes arrived from Noumea to make inquiries. Two men were arrested. 
The two kings lifted their interdiction on Sunday fishing the same day.75 The 
monarchs were unprepared to take their royal challenge to Republican authority 
any further and were perhaps unnerved by the extent to which the squabble had 
escalated into violence. 
The expulsion of de Agostini in 1974 has constituted the greatest 
challenge in Wallis and Futuna to the authority of the Fifth Republic to date. 
Compared to the New Caledonian troubles in the 1980s this incident, the state of 
emergency in October 1986, and the unrest seven years later, were minor 
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confrontations. Other activism by royal authorities in the 19808 was marginal 
enough for the representatives of Paris not to bother reacting to it. For example, 
in November 1983, the two Futunan kings demanded that Futuna receive TOM 
status.76 There was no future in this unrealistic proposal, which entailed an 
expression of feelings of Futunan neglect as well as of royal desires for higher 
status. Paris was as disinclined to follow this path as it was to adopt a Wallisian 
royal idea that each of the three kingdoms in the territory should receive their 
own High Commissioner.77 Even more flattering to local monarchs than the 
Futunan proposal, this vision was never contemplated seriously by state 
representatives. None of the kingdoms were important enough to justify the 
expense this unwarranted expansion of state bureaucracy would have involved. 
These local pretentions were wildly at variance with the regard in which Wallis 
and Futuna was held by its metropolitan French administrators. 
Developmental Continuity: from Dijoud to Pons 
In comparing the policies for Wallis and Futuna of the various French 
Governments since 1981, a degree of continuity greater than that of policy 
concerning New Caledonia is perceptible. Successive administrations 
implemented various development schemes in Wallis and Futuna without great 
controversy, undistracted by ideological differences of the sort evoked in Paris 
by ethnic problems and the question of self-determination in New Caledonia. As 
a result of prevailing local conservatism and the islands' economic dependence 
on France, the option of independence has not been a serious issue of debate in 
WaUis and Futuna. As Brial indicated to the National Assembly in July 1986: 
[ ..• J Ie territoire des iles Wallis et Futuna [,.oJ n'a jamais cesst de proover son 
attachement et sa fideUt~ A fa Ve R~publique, alin de pennettre d'am~liorer son 
oconomie, sa culture, son artisanat, et d'assurer l'avenir de sa jeonesse [ ... J.78 
The basic goals of the Eighth Plan, economic diversification, the 
improvement of living standards through modernised public facilities, and the 
promotion of economic growth via the reduction of territorial isolation. were not 
the source of protracted and vociferous debate as they were in the case of New 
Caledonia. Whether the Ministers overseeing the development of Wallis and 
Futuna in the 1980s were Giscardian, Socialist or Gaullist, they worked toward 
policy goals in a manner that did not entail the rushed legislation of a disruptive 
succession of revisionist statutes, as occurred in New Caledonia. 
Wallis and Futuna's developmental orientation had already been 
established by Dijoud by the time of the appointment of the Mauroy Government 
in 1981. Parallel to the New Caledonian Dijoud Plan, another Dijoud Plan had 
been implemented in Wallis and Futuna. Wallis and Futuna's version was 
adopted by the Territorial Assembly on 24 July 1979,79 five months after the 
adoption of its New Caledonian equivalent. The Plan was formulated after two 
decades without detailed territorial developmental planning under the Fifth 
Republic. Until the late 19708 the solution adopted in Paris to the pressure the 
islands'rapidly growing population was placing on local resources was to 
encourage emigration to New Caledonia and, to a lesser extent, to the New 
Hebrides. As a consequence of the economic downturn in New Caledonia from 
1974, and the uncertain future that approaching independence represented for 
immigrants in the New Hebrides, work opportunities for emigrating Wallisians 
declined. To counterbalance these declining opportunities, the Dijoud Plan 
concentrated on promoting local economic self-sufficiency; this proved to be an 
unrealistic option.80 The Plan covered a period of 20 years, of which detailed 
development projects were projected for the first ten years. The imple~entation 
of the Dijoud Plan was intended to enable Wallis and Futuna to become self-
sufficient in food by the tum of the century. Exports would increase as a result 
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of a state-finanaced diversification of crop production (copra, coffee and 
pepper). Fishing beyond artisanal level would be set up by providing state-
subsidised boats capable of deep sea operations.81 Increased funding was 
similarly proposed for the modernisation of communications and public 
services, the encouragement of arts and crafts for commercial sale, and for 
sporting and cultural activities in general.82 As with the Eighth Plan, Wallis and 
Futuna's Dijoud Plan neglected to consider the artificial nature of a projected 
territorial self-sufficiency dependent on state subsidies, technology and 
technicians emanating from Paris. The Dijoud Plan overestimated territorial 
productive capacity, as well as underestimating the resistance of local 
Polynesians to technological innovation, and the extreme difficulties territorial 
isolation posed in the creation of export markets for local produce. Regardless of 
these shortcomings, subsequent government development policy for the islands 
has continued to pursue the encouragement of territorial self-sufficiency,83 even 
though the illusory nature of these optimistic prescriptions was to become 
increasingly apparent in the years that followed. 
The first ministerial level visit by a Socialist to Wallis and Futuna in the 
1980s was that paid by Emmanuelli on 12 August 1981. Showing more reserve 
than during his frrst New Caledonian tour the week before his arrival at Mata 
Utu, Emmanuelli did not publicly express shock at social inequalities in Wallis 
and Futuna. Unlike the radical political change he declared desirable for New 
Caledonia, a gentler prescription was to be applied to Wallis and Futuna. 
"L'effort du gouvernement tendra it faire evoluer la societe [wallisienne] sans 
creer de traumatismes", Emmanuelli indicated.84 
Rather than a wave of social change of the sort implemented in New 
Caledonia, Emmanuelli limited government reform efforts in Wallis and Futuna 
to the improvement of territorial infrastructure (roads, port facilities, the health 
system, educational facilities) and to the diversification of the territorial 
economy.85 The notable initiative made in the TOM during Emmanuelli's term 
as Secretary of State to the DOM-TOM was the establishmentof an economic 
and social development fund in 1982.86 Cautious reform by Emmanuelli was a 
measured response to Wallisian society'S aversion to Socialist reformers, or 
indeed to anything to do with the Left. The improvement of territorial public 
works, continued under Lemoine, was an unspectacular policy, quite compatible 
with the Dijoud Plan, which was offered in order not to offend the conservative 
values of local leaders. 
Before 1985 it is difficult to discern any specifically Socialist ideological 
influence in the administration of Wallis and Futuna. For most of this period, 
Socialist Ministers devoted their attention to more immediate and demanding 
subjects than France's most distant TOM. The microscopic nature of problems 
in Wallis and Futuna compared with issues confronting France at national level 
precluded the expenditure of any great effort on what was considered a minor 
portfolio. The major achievement of the Socialists in government between 1981 
and 1986 was the signature of a state-territorial planning contract on 27 March 
1985, which offered confirmation of the staid nature of Socialist Government 
reform in Wallis and Futuna. This contract prioritised development work to be 
undertaken by state and territorial representatives by 1988. Three goals set for 
agricultural development included soil protection and improvement,' the 
expansion of irrigation, and increased afforestation. Undertakings for the 
improvement of the exploitation of fisheries included the construction of a boat-
building workshop on Futuna and the establishment of a training scheme for 
fishermen. Local artisans, whose wares consisted of carvings, tapa cloths and 
trinkets, were to take a step towards commercialisation by sending their wares to 
Noumea, to be marketed there by the New Caledonian Trades Council. Futuna 
was to receive a medical dispensary, electrification and further roading, while 
Wallis was to receive a maternity hospital, and improved port facilities. 
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Territorial secondary and technical teaching were to be expanded. 
Telecommunications facilities were programmed for upgrading,87 
By metropolitan French standards these were all extremely modest and 
easily achievable projects yet they represented important undertakings for the 
inhabitants of Wallis and Futuna. For instance, the lack of adequate roading and 
electrification on Futuna were serious barriers to the improvement of local living 
standards. When electrification was completed on Futuna in 1987, 16 years after 
its installation on Wallis, the island literally came out of the dark ages.88 
Futunan electrification might appear belated from a metropolitan French point of 
view. In general modem amenities have been late in arriving at Wallis and 
Futuna, as they have in rural New Caledonia and in the outer islands of French 
Polynesia. Local state radio broadcasting began in 1979, while state television 
broadcasting began in Wallis in 1986 and in Futuna in 1991.89 The absence of 
these amenities was not surprising given the numbers living in the territory. 
Nevertheless, Wallis and Futuna lacked some amenities that other South Pacific 
islands with smaller popUlations have enjoyed for years. In 1993, no local press 
existed, although at least one Wallisian language newspaper published in 
Noumea was in circulation, along with New Caledonian and metropolitan 
French newspapers and magazines. Niue. with a population of 2,500 in 1992. 
and Nauru with 9,300 inhabitants, are just two examples of micro-states with 
their own modest local newspapers. 
In spite of the uncontroversial nature of their administration of Wallis 
and Futuna from 1981 to 1986, Socialist Governments in this period managed to 
aggravate WaJIisian leaders. The source of rising Wallisian distrust of the 
Socialists during this period was the question of New Caledonian independence. 
In a reaction opposite to that of Kanaks, references to the possibility of New 
Caledonian self-determination by government representatives in 1984 and 1985 
were contemplated nervously by Wallisian leaders. Limited numbers of 
Wallisian emigrants resident in Vanuatu had already returned to Wallis and 
Futuna since 1980, due to declining employment opportunities there for 
immigrant workers.90 Wallisian authorities feared no less than the collapse of 
the economy of WaJIis and Futuna and the breakdown of its social systems from 
overpopUlation should the more than 12,000 Wallisians resident in New 
Caledonia be forced to leave by triumphant Kanak nationalism.91 
Although this was the worst possible scenario. Wallisian leaders bad" 
cause to be nervous about the concept of Kanak independence. Kanak enmity 
towards Wallisian immigrants was well known. Kanaks and Wallisians were 
divided by their different ethnic origins, the former Melanesian and the latter 
Polynesian, and by their different religious preferences, respectively Protestant 
and Catholic. They were divided by politics too. Wallisians in New Caledonia 
preferred French 10yaUsm to Kanak nationalism, fearing arbitrary eviction under 
a Republic of Kanaky. Wallisians were regarded by Kanaks as foreign 
interlopers brought into New Caledonia at the behest of the French. Wallisians 
were held partly to blame for depriving Kanaks of scarce jobs, and were 
resented for their tendency to support the RPCR.92 An incident on a European· 
owned farm near Ponerihouen in May 1985 offered an example of growing 
tensions between Kanaks and Wallisians. The FLNKS demanded that eight 
Wallisian farmhands, along with three Europeans and two Melanesians 
unsympathetic to Kanaks, be replaced by local unemployed Kanaks. Fearful of 
arson or other retribution, the landowner did as the FLNKS demanded and 
dismissed these employees.93 The use of unemployed Wallisians in the RPCR 
security force in 1985 aggravated tensions between Kanaks and Wallisians.94 In 
April 1985 a detachment of 35 Wallisians from this force. along with Henri 
Morini, their French Algerian leader, were held captive for 48 hours by Kanak 
activists on Mare.95 These were not isolated incidents. Kanaks and Wallisian 
RPCR supporters confronted each other atvarious demonstrations during 1985, 
and several Wallisians were threatened and alxlucted by Kanak activists.96 
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The response ofWa11isian politicians and custom authorities was to act in 
the defence of their compatriots' interests. Wallisian leaders, notably Brial and 
Papilio, opposed Socialist refonns for New Caledonia in 1985, and backed the 
counterproposals of the RPCR.97 Wallisian custom chiefs affmned their support 
for retaining New Caledonian adherence to the French Republic, stressed the 
right of Wallisians to live and work in New Caledonia without harassment, 
opposed repatriation to Wallis and Futuna, and backed the RPCR in its 
opposition to Socialist and FLNKS policies.98 In June 1985 Falakiko Gata, the 
President of the Territorial Assembly of Wallis and Futuna, pointed out to 
Mitterrand the disastrous effects that a massive repatriation ofWallisians living 
in New Caledonia would have should a Republic of Kanaky be established. He 
asked for additional funding to prepare for this eventuality. Mitterrand's 
response indicated that he thought this scenario was less imminent than Gata 
presumed.99 
In the campaign for the legislative elections of March 1986 opposition to 
New Caledonian independence was an important theme for Wallisians, whether 
inhabiting their home islands or New Caledonia. Lafleur visited Wallis and 
Futuna early in March 1986 to bolster Brial's campaign for re-election. Lafleur 
presented himself as the protector of Wallisian interests in New Caledonia, 
spoke of the dangers of Kanak independence for Wallisians, and stressed RPR 
and RPCR opposition to the break-up of the Republic.1oo Brial was re-elected 
on 23 March with 44.31 % of votes cast, a reaffinnation of Gaullist continuity in 
the territory. (Table 27) However the influence of the RPR should not be 
overestimated. Brial had gained 51.36% of votes cast in 1981. The other 
Wallisian candidates were likewise opposed to Kanak independence. None the 
less Wallisian leaders regarded the appointment of the Chirac Government in 
1986 with relief. Not only were Wallisian interests in New Caledonia less 
threatened with a Government in power which was openly hostile to Kanak 
independence, but the expectation existed among local RPR supporters that the 
Chirac Government would be more attentive to development issues in Wallis and 
Futuna. 
As was the case in New Caledonia, in Wallis and Futuna Pons enjoyed 
better relations with local conservatives than had Lemoine and Emmanuelli. But 
as was also the case with New Caledonia, between 1986 and 1988 the Chirac 
Government did not lessen economic dependence and social inequality in Wallis 
and Futuna. The completion of the state-territorial development contract in 1988 
reflected well on the Cbirac Government, even though it had commenced under 
Fabius. On 31 August 1986 the announcement by Chirac in Mata Utu of the 
establishment of an emergency plan for the socio-economic improvement of the 
territory was wannly received~ 101 A positive reception was offered although 
there was little that was original in the plan. Comments made by Chirac in Mata 
Utu on the need to reduce territorial isolation through the modernisation of 
external communications, the need to upgrade territorial infrastructure and to 
lessen economic dependence rehashed well-worn themes dating back at least to 
Dijoud. Included in the 29.51MFF worth of projects foreseen under the plan 
were some which had already been in the 1985 development contract, namely 
the improvement of education, airport and hospital facilities and Futunan 
electrification. 102 
An extraordinary aid intervention was undertaken by the Chirac 
Government after cyclone Raja hit Futuna on 26 and 27 December 1986. The 
cyclone resulted in one death, and destroyed crops and most of the buildings on 
the island.t03 By October 1987, 45.74MFF had been allotted by Paris to island 
reconstruction.t04 This effort pennitted Futuna's recovery from a disastrous 
blow to its economy and infrastructure. The funding for this cyclone relief was 
generous, being around 50% greater than the amount offered under the existing 
emergency plan for socio-economic growth. 
Table 28. Wallis and Futunan Territorial Elections 
1982-1992 
Territorial Results 
21 March 1982 
Party 
RPR 
lJ[F 
15 March 1987 
Party 
RPR 
UIF 
UPL 
22 March t 992 
Party 
Independents 
RPR 
Presidential Majority 
Sea ts 
1 2 
8 
Seats 
7 
7 
6 
Seats 
1 1 
6 
3 
Sources: Keesing's Contemporary Archives December ·1984 
p.33285, March 1988 p.35779; Le Monde 24 mars 1982; Les 
Nouvelles CaUdoniennes 16 mars 1987, 24 mars 1992. 
Table 29. French Legislative Elections, 1986. 
Wa1lis and Futunan Results 
First Round: 16 March 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Brial (RPR) 
Hoatau t 
TuP 
Maisueche3 
Second Round: 23 March 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Brial (RPR) 
Hoatau 
Tui 
7,852 
6,318 
80.46% 
6,304 
Votes 
2,570 
1,842 
1,669 
223 
7,835 
6,314 
80.59% 
6,302 
Votes 
2,798 
2,175 
1,329 
% of votes cast 
40.68 
29.16 
26.42 
3.53 
% of votes cast 
44.17 
34.45 
21.05 
Source: Le Monde 19 mars 1986, 25 mars 1986. 
t An independent left candidate. 
2 Although Basile Tui is a local UDP leader, he stood as an independent left 
candidate. 
3 An independent left candidate. 
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Although the local majority preferred cohabitation to the uncertainties of 
Socialist administration, they still voiced support for reform. During the twenty-
fifth anniversary celebrations of the 1961 statute, held in July 1986, a 
spokesman for the Territorial Assembly called for a revision of the statute which 
would give the local population greater autonomy. Territorial leaders wanted 
both the security of Republican ties, and greater administrative control over local 
affairs. In spite of majority calls for statute reform, the Chirac Government 
resisted change. lOS No great administrative renovation for Wallis and Futuna 
was either promised or undertaken by the Chirac Government. Pons announced 
during a visit to the territory in December 1986 that he was unwilling to overturn 
the existing statute, and informed local leaders that they should leave the 
Government to manage state affairs. 106 In the aftermath of the declaration of 
emergency in October, Pons wished to avoid giving the appearance of yielding 
to local pressure. 
The Impetus for Change 
If impetus for statute change and a greater local say over Wallis and 
Futuna's administration was successfully resisted by RPR leaders in 
government in Paris, RPR Territorial Councillors found themselves less able to 
resist popular demands for political change. From 1981 Wallisian Gaullists, led 
by Brial, experienced steps in an ongoing electoral decline caused by local 
opposition in which Futunans played a prominent part. In the territorial elections 
held on 21 March 1982, (fable 28) RPR Councillors won 12 seats, ahead of the 
UDF candidates and independents who won the remainder.to7 A bout of 
political manceuvring in November 1983 displayed the increased fluidity of local 
party distinctions: a UDF Councillor defected to the RPR group, followed by the 
counterdefection of three RPR Councillors to the UDF group.l08 Among the 
RPR defectors was Falakiko Gata, who was elected the new Territorial 
Assembly President. In April 1985 Gata, a Futunan discontented with the 
preponderance of Wa11isian Gaullists, set up UPL, which solicited largely 
Futunan support. The territorial elections in Wallis and Futuna on 15 March 
1987 (Table 28) resulted in a major reversal for the Wallisian Gaullists' long-
standing dominance in local political life, perhaps caused by public 
disappointment at their inability to effect statute reform. Only seven of the 20 
seats in the Territorial Assembly went to Gaullists. 109 UPL gained six seats in 
March 1987.110 The RPR stayed out of opposition in March 1987 by forming a 
pragmatic coalition administration with the UPL, and backed the election of 
Falakiko Gata as President. Basile Tui, the local head of the UDF, was defeated 
in the election. His party's seven Councillors formed the Opposition. 
Local GauIlist fortunes seemed to have recovered during the French 
elections from April to June 1988. If not at territorial level, then at least in 
national elections the RPR was still a redoubtable force. In the presidential 
elections, Chirac received 52.21 % of the Wallisian vote in the ftrst round, and 
73.19% in the second round. (Table 30) The UDF was sidelined. The liberal 
candidate, Raymond Barre, received 39.27% of votes there in the first round. In 
the results of that round, the lack of a substantial PS following was once again 
evident. Mitterrand, arguably better known to Wallisians than he had been in 
1981 thanks to his seven years in office, obtained but 7.21 % of the local vote. 
His support jumped in the second round, when he received 26.42% of votes, 
but as in 1981 this increase was probably the result of protest votes lodged by 
Wallisians who did not want to vote for an RPR candidate. Overall, as was the 
case in 1981, Wallis and Futuna's electors polled against the national trend, 
backing the loser in the presidential race. 
The re-election of Brial in the June legislative elections (Table 31) 
seemed to be indicative of the continued strength of the local RPR vote in 
national elections. Brial was re-elected on 12 June with 52.0% of the vote in the 
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second round. Kamilo Gata, a 30 year-old university-educated Futunan, and the 
brother of Falakiko Gata, was the opposition candidate in the second round. 
With the support of UDF voters and other opponents of Brial, Gata obtained 
47.66% of the vote. As in 1981, a PS candidate was presented, Joseph 
Maisueche, although his score was marginal. ll1 He obtained 3.93% of votes 
cast (246 votes) in the first round, which was inadequate to warrant participation 
in the second ballot. Brial, and the reputation of his party, experienced a major 
deb~cle following the lodging by Kamilo Gata of an appeal on the grounds of 
electoral irregularities. Gata's allegation that Brial's supporters had rigged the 
vote was upheld by the Constitutional Council. In a decision promulgated on 23 
November 1988, the body found that the poll had been tampered with. By 
lodging multiple votes under assumed names, Briars followers had taken 
advantage of the fact that around 30% of voters on local electoral rolls no longer 
resided in the territory)12 
In the rerun of the election which was held on 15 January 1989, Kamilo 
Gata defeated Brial, not only gaining 57.44% of valid votes, but doing so on a 
presidential majority platform. 113 Since June 1988, Gata had boldly declared his 
allegiance to the MRG, a minor French party electorally allied with the Socialist 
majority. This victory for Kamilo Gata was a sign of local disenchantment with 
Briat's electoral methods, as well as being indicative of a broader RPR electoral 
decline. The extent of local disenchantment with the RPR has been conftrmed in 
more recent national polls. In the territorial vote for the European parliamentary 
elections on 18 June 1989, 54.86% of votes went to the PS, while the national 
UDF/RPR coalition obtained 41.14%.114 The recent electoral success of Kamilo 
Gata contributed to this result, as did the difficulty of convincing rival Wallisian 
RPR and UDF supporters to vote for a joint ticket. Confirmation that the election 
of Kamilo Gata had not been a short-lived fluke came in the legislative elections 
of March 1993. (Table 32) In their second round on 28 March, standing again as 
an MRG candidate, Gata defeated Clovis Logologofolau, the RPR candidate. He 
did so by a comfortable margin, gaining 52.18% of votes cast. Logologofolau 
obtained 47.38% of votes cast, a conservative defeat in a national ballot where 
the RPRJUDF coalition swept the polls. (Table 21) 
Local Gaullists experienced similar setbacks in the territorial elections 
held on 22 March 1992. (Table 28) Although the RPR gained seats in 
comparison with the 1987 elections, it lost its place in the governing majority. It 
also lost the territorial presidency, which had been assumed by Logologofolau 
since 1987. Soane Uhila, the new Territorial Assembly President, was elected 
on 25 March 1992 with the backing of independent and presidential majority 
representatives. I IS Uhila was an independent candidate, employed as territorial 
secretary by the trade union Force Ouvriere. t16 By 1 September 1992, the date 
of the opening of the first sessions of the new administration, Uhila was leading 
a coalition of six presidential majority Councillors, and ftve independents, with 
the remaining nine RPR Councillors forming the Opposition.1t 7 The new 
administration constituted a novelty in including Territorial Councillors 
sympathetic to Mitterrand. In addition, not only was this the ftrst time that local 
RPR representatives had been in opposition since 1964, it was also the ftrst time 
the Territorial Assembly had included women, two having been elected in 
March. ll8 The signiftcance of this latter event should not be underestimated: 
traditional values in Wallis and Futuna have largely excluded women from 
leadership roles. Wallis and Futuna's territorial leadership in the early 1990s had 
become considerably less conservative than it was a decade before. 
Political change has likewise taken place in the Wallisian community in 
New Caledonia since the late 1980s. An expression of the political 
disillusionment of a minority of local Wallisians with the RPCR, the UO was 
formed in May 1989 to participate in the New Caledonian provincial elections. 
(Table 18) This was not the first time that Wallisians had acted on their 
discontent with the RPCR,1l9 but it was the first time that Wallisians were 
Table 30. French Presidential Elections, 1988. 
Wallis and Futunan Results 
First Round: 24 April 
Registered voters 8,316 
Votes cast 6,020 
Turnout 72.39% 
Valid votes 6,013 
Candidate Votes 
Chirac (RPR) 3,143 
Barre 2,364 
Mitterrand (PS) 434 
Le Pen (FN) 37 
Lajoinie (PC) 2 
Others 33 
Second Round: 8 May 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Chirac 
Mitterrand 
8,315 
6,412 
77.11 % 
6,387 
Votes 
4,693 
1,694 
% of votes cast 
52.21 
39.27 
7.21 
0.62 
0.03 
0.54 
% of votes cast 
73.19 
26.42 
Sources: Le Monde 26 avril 1988, 10 mai 1988. 
Table 31. French Legislative Elections 1988. 
Wallis and Futunan Results 
First Round: 5 June 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Brial (RPR) 
Gata l 
Tui (UDF) 
Maisueche2 
Second Round: 12 June 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Brial (RPR) 
Gata 
8,316 
6,259 
75.26% 
6,241 
Votes 
2,736 
2,235 
1,024 
246 
8,309 
6,475 
77.93% 
6,453 
Votes 
3,367 
3,086 
% of votes cast 
43.71 
35.71 
16.36 
3.93 
% of votes cast 
52.0 
47.66 
Source: Le Monde 7 juin 1988, 14 juin 1988. 
I A Barrist, independent candidate. 
2 Presidential majority IPS. 
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elected at territorial level on an independent party platfonn. The UO denounced 
the RPCR for failing to act in the best interests of WaIIisian immigrants, and 
declared that only through independent lobbying would they gain better political 
representation and the capacity to improve their socio-economic status. l20 This 
independent stance had certain limitations in that whether Wallisians stood 
independently or with the RPCR, their representation in the Territorial Assembly 
had always been minor, usually consisting of two Councillors. 
Wallisian leadership on home ground and in New Caledonia faced the 
second period of Socialist Government from April 1988 to March 1993 with a 
less conservative outlook than in 1981. Kamilo Gata typified a younger 
generation, more trave11ed, better educated and open to change, which was 
exerting greater influence on local politicallife)21 Since 1989, Wallisians at 
home and in New Caledonia have lobbied Paris for greater recognition of their 
interests. In January 1990 the UO sent a delegate to Paris to voice resentment at 
the lack of specific recognition by the Matignon Accords of the Wallisian 
community (New Caledonia's third largest ethnic group).122 UO lobbying did 
not produce any concrete commitment1from the Rocard Government, certainly 
not to the extent of expanding the Accords to include the Wallisian community as 
a separate partner, as the party optimistically proposed in January 1990. 
However Wallis and Futuna's leaders made some progress in lobbying Paris for 
a revision of poHcy concerning their territory. 
The first major expression of interest by the Rocard Government in 
Wallis and Futuna came with Rocard's arrival in Mata Utu on 24 August 1989. 
Rocard's visit to the territory was the first paid there by a Socialist Prime 
Minister. His speech at Mata Utu that day was cautious in tone, avoiding matters 
which might have offended the Wallisian royalty present. Rocard characterised 
the governmental position of respect for local customs and institutions as well as 
support for refonn as entailing "progres dans la coutume".123 However, like 
Pons, Rocard was unenthusiastic about revising the 1961 statute: 
Je crois en effet que les institutions du Territoire, qui datent de 1961, ont 
besoin d'etre modemis~es. Mais est-ce la prioril6? Le d6bat institutionnel est un 
d~bat qui divise. Je considere, moi, que la priorit6, c'est la formation, I'emploi, 
Ie progres &:onomique et social. 124 
In keeping with the cooperation theme of his Pacific tour, of which· Mata Utu 
was only one leg, Rocard stressed the importance of avoiding divisive debate 
between the State and local poJitical and custom representatives over redrafting 
the statute. He preferred instead to concentrate on ongoing development work. 
While advancing this message, he outlined the need to diminish Wallis and 
Futuna's isolation and its economic dependence: 
II faut que vous dependiez moins de la metropole, moins de la Nouvelle-
CalMonie, it raut davantage mettre en valeur vos ressources naturelles. [ ... ] La 
volonte du gouvernement est de tourner la page de l'isolement et de 
I'enclavement de votre territoire.l25 
Rocard's words could equally have been spoken by Pons or Chirac 
during their visits to Wallis and Futuna, or by visiting Ministers all the way back 
to Dijoud ten years before. His declaration followed in the well-established 
orientations of territorial development decided on in Paris. Through the 
commercial exploitation of local resources and the reduction of territorial 
isolation, Wallis and Futuna would become more self-reliant and the standard of 
living of its inhabitants would be improVed. The efforts undertaken during his 
period as Prime Minister were steady but unremarkable, involving the 
improvement of territorial telecommunications, the extension of the local 
television network to Futuna, and the continuation of agriculture and fisheries 
projects. 
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Although Rocard expressed his reservations over immediate statute 
reform, vague Wallisian demands for such reform did not dissipate, and his 
Government later undertook to discuss the matter. On 1 August 1990 Le Pensec, 
then Minister to the DOM-TOM, announced that the Government would hold 
round table discussions in Paris with territorial leaders on "Ie progres social, Ie 
developpement economique et la modernisation des institutions 
[territoriales]".126 Logologofolau and Kamilo Gata led a territorial delegation to 
Paris for meetings in June 1991. They presented a 27-page draft of a "plan 
directeur de developpement economique, social et culturel" to Le Pensec. The 
proposal was presented as having, and had, the support of all of Wallis and 
Futuna's political parties. 127 
The proposal, according to Le Monde, consisted of a list of the various 
improvements that the Territorial Assembly wished to see implemented: the 
construction of new roads and the sealing of old ones, the extension of running 
water to a greater number of houses, the installation of more telephone lines, the 
lengthening of local airport runways, the expansion of port facilities, job 
creation, further assistance to agriculture and fisheries, and the development of 
tourism. l28 Local politicians shared the developmental orientations advocated by 
Rocard and his predecessors, but were not satisfied with the pace of change. 
They wanted more material improvements, introduced more rapidly than those 
of preceding years. 
The accusation of territorial neglect by a distant, impersonal bureaucracy 
that Kamilo Gata had made in the National Assembly in November 1989 was 
reiterated by Logologofolau and his First Secretary, Mikaele Tauhavi1i: 
Nous avons t'impression d'etre 1es oub1i~s de la R~publique. Pourquoi n'avons-
nous pas les memes avantages que les autres territoires d'outre-mer7 Nous 
constatons que nous sommes moins bien trait~s que 1a Nouvelle-CalMonie et 
que la Po1yn~sie [fran~aiseJ [ ... J On ne nous donne pas 1es moyens publics de 
nous d~ve10pper malgre les multiples rapports officiels sur notre situation, et 
on nous empeche de crrer un d~ve10ppement avec Ie secteur priv~ [ ... J Nous 
avons l'impression que nous sommes sanctionn~s ~ cause de notre fideli~ ~ la 
France. Faut-it poser la question de notre appartenance ~ la France pour etre 
mieux consid~res7129 
The pair no doubt had the Kanak nationalist movement in mind when 
they posed this question. Their assertion that Paris responded more readily to 
disruption than to representations through normal administrative channels was 
an attempt to influence official opinion there and was overstated. The veiled 
threat that Wallis and Futuna might push for independence if disillusionment 
with Paris persisted was absurd. There had never been any great electoral 
support for independence in Wallis and Futuna. Territorial dependence on 
French munificence for the maintenance of local social services, and public 
works, as well as agricultural and fisheries projects, left its inhabitants ill-
disposed toward claiming sovereignty. It was ridiculous to state that territorial 
representatives were being sanctioned or were forgotten on the occasion of an 
official visit to Paris to discuss reform. The claim that Wallis and Futuna was 
less well-treated than the other two Pacific TOM was a questionable one. While 
Mata Utu might not enjoy all the modern conveniences of Papeete or Noumea, 
that circumstance was more a reflection of the different popUlation levels of the 
three centres than evidence of neglect. On the other hand, parts of the interior of 
the Grande Terre and the outer islands of French Polynesia were at the same 
level of development as Wallis and Futuna, or were even less well off. The 
assertion that the territory had not been given the means to develop itself was 
likewise open to scrutiny. Might not the marginal possibilities for the expansion 
of entrepreneurialism be the consequence of the extremely limited resources of 
the territory, and of local social conservatism, rather than the fault of Paris? 
Table 32. French Legislative Elections. 1993. 
Wallis and Futunan Results 
First Round: 21 March 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Gata t 
Logologofolau (RPR) 
Uhi1a2 
Second Round: 28 March 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Gata 
Logologofolau (RPR) 
Uhila3 
6,618 
5,794 
87.55% 
5,753 
Votes 
2,626 
2,175 
952 
6,611 
5,876 
88.88% 
5,850 
Votes 
3,066 
2,784 
o 
% of votes cast 
45.32 
37.54 
16.43 
% of votes cast 
52.18 
47.38 
o 
Source: Le Monde 23 mars 1993, 30 mars 1993. 
1 Presidential majority candidate. 
2 An independent candidate. 
3 Soane Uhila stood down in favour of LogoJogofolau, but was still registered 
for the ballot. 
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The infrastructural improvements advocated by the territorial delegation 
could not be considered particularly bold or innovative. They were in line with 
government public works efforts that continued into the 1990s. Le Pensec was 
slower to react to the idea of statute reform. In July 1992, he visited Wallis and 
Futuna and announced that he was open to further representations about the 
future status of the territory, which might involve an evolution to greater 
administrative autonomy.130 In March 1993 it was announced by the outgoing 
Socialist administration that Wallis and Futuna was to be granted internal 
autonomy, although precise details on the timetable for this step were not 
forthcoming}31 Wallis and Futuna, unlike the other two Pacific TOM, had been 
left untouched by the decentralisation policies advocated by French 
Governments from 1981.132 Whether similar renovations will be implemented 
in Wallis and Futuna and what their effects might be is one of the salient political 
questions facing local political leaders in the 1990s. 
No major renovation in government thinking concerning Wallis and 
Futuna's administration has taken place since the Dijoud Plan in 1979. Socialist 
and Gaullist development plans since Dijoud have largely followed its precedent. 
Wallisian demands for a revision of the 1961 statute failed to evoke a positive 
response from Paris until 1991. Although since 1988 Wallisian parliamentarians 
have been more vocal in denouncing asserted Parisian inflexibility and slowness 
in implementing change in Wallis and Futuna,133 Paris has not shown any haste 
over statute discussions. With the appointment of the Balladur Government in 
March 1993, the tentative consideration by Le Pen sec of statute reform may lose 
what impetus it had or be discarded. There has been no indication that the 
reluctance of metropolitan French RPR leaders to respond to Wallisian demands 
in this field has diminished. As Perben, the new Minister to the DOM-TOM, 
indicated, he considered socio-economic improvements rather than statute 
reform to be his priority. 134 
The 1990s: Persistent Dependence 
As in New Caledonia under the Matignon Accords, the State's intention 
of decreasing Wallis and Futuna's dependence through funding for various 
development schemes has paradoxically led to the consolidation of territorial 
reliance on metropolitian French assistance. Since 1981, administrative services 
in Wallis and Futuna have expanded in response to the increasing demands 
placed on them by the implementation of various aid plans. From 1986 to 1991, 
the number of people employed in the public sector grew from 761 to 1,026, 
although as a proportion of the growing numbers of those in paid employment 
these figures represent a marked drop from 82.27% to 62.26%.135 This growth 
in the public sector, as well as more rapid growth affecting people in the private 
sector, has tended to aggravate the inequalities already existing between the 
waged and unwaged working popUlation. Public and private sector employees 
enjoy a level of purchasing power far beyond that of subsistence farmers, 
enabling them to buy consumer goods and to experience a standard of living 
beyond the means of those in the tribal milieu. 
Rocard indicated his awareness of this situation during his visit to Mata 
Utu in August 1989. Reacting to claims made by local civil servants that their 
salaries should be raised, Rocard rejected this idea as it would lead to an increase 
in the disparities between the living standards of those in the public sector, the 
small private sector, and the mass of workers outside the cash economy.136 
Rocard mentioned· that job creation was the way to improving the lot of those not 
in paid employment, but this proposal stumbles on the narrow range of territorial 
economic activity. The number of inhabitants in paid employment increased in 
number from 1983 to 1990. In 1983 there were 1,121 people of 5,552 
inhabitants aged from 17 and a half to 65 years who worked outside of 
subsistence agriculture.137 Thus 20.20% of the working age population was in 
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paid employment. In 1990, out of territorial inhabitants 14 years and over, there 
were 1,406 people in paid employment of 7,080 people aged from 16 to 65.138 
This figure represented 19.86% of the working age population in paid 
employment 
Private sector employment opportunities increased in the 1980s, 
although such activity in Wallis and Futuna remained marginal by Western 
standards. In 1987, private sector employment represented 22.56% of the work 
force in paid employment, a percentage which rose to 37.74% by 1990,139 This 
private sector rise was a reflection of the increased work opportunities offered 
by public works projects, both as a part of ongoing state development initiatives, 
and as a result of reconstruction work undertaken after cyclone damage caused 
in December 1986 and in February 1990.140 The IEOM described these 
employment gains as fragile, because they comprised work on short-term 
projects stemming from disaster relief and government contracts,141 There 
existed no alternative fields in the private sector which might sustain similar 
growth. 
In spite of the increasing number of wage earners in Wallis and Futuna 
in the late 1980s, Indosuez did not apparently view the territorial economic 
situation with optimism. In November 1989, the sole local trading bank closed 
down for want of sufficient custom to justify its continued presence. Westpac 
Banking Corporation, which bought up Indosuez's South Pacific branches in 
1990, did not show any interest in reopening the branch. For two years, local 
savings had to be held by the territorial treasury while local political leaders 
lobbied the State to find a replacement. In 1991, the Wallis and Futuna Bank 
began trading. This was an operation jointly financed by the territorial 
administration, the National Bank of Paris, and the Caledonian Investment 
Bank,142 
Since 1981, government plans to stimulate economic diversification in 
Wallis and Futuna have not resulted in major advances. Apart from trochus 
shells, by the early 1990s local exports were insignificant, while heavy 
dependence on imports persisted. (Table 25) Manufacturing continued to be 
concentrated on construction and handicrafts in the absence of a viable base for 
modem light manufacturing.t43 In 1991, territorial agriculture was still centred 
on subsistence consumption. State efforts to stimulate production beyond this 
level had not been very successful. Local farmers, preferring established foods 
such as taros, yams, cassava and bananas, have resisted attempts to diversify 
crop production through the introduction of more exotic fruits and vegetables. 
Traditional land tenure, based on family plots of between O.25ha and O.5ha, has 
prevented commercially viable cash-cropping, and European innovations such as 
chemical fertilisers and modem farm machinery have been rejected by locals in 
favour of the continued use of traditional agricultural tools and techniques.l44 
While territorial politicians like Logologofolau have attempted to place blame on 
Paris for the feebleness of the private sector in Wallis and Futuna, it should be 
recognised that local unwillingness to abandon traditional forms of agriculture 
precludes the major expansion of commercial agriculture. 
Commercial fishing is similarly limited because of a reluctance to go 
beyond subsistence levels of production. Territorial fisheries exploitation in the 
early 1990s remained restricted to lagoons, despite plans to expand it. A state-
funded workshop allowed local fishermen to buy cheap boats, of which it had 
built around 500 by 1991. Although this activity had assisted lagoon fishing, 
commercial fishing was limited. The prospects of commercial deep sea fishing 
by locals looked unpromising, as they lacked the large vessels and the trained 
personnel necessary to bring in profitable catches. 145 Foreign trawlers retained 
their dominance over the exploitation of Wallis and Futuna's EEZ, although their 
presence at least provided license revenue for the territory. 
For want of facilities and international awareness of the territory, tourism 
has not been an area of major growth since 1981. In December 1991 four hotels 
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on Wallis offered 30 rooms in total. Futuna still had no hotel accommodation. 
The average occupancy rate that year was estimated at 15%. Around 90% of 
visitors were businessmen.146 Wallisian political leaders would like to see the 
number of hotel rooms in the territory expanded to 200,147 however this idea is 
a pipe dream considering the marginal level of local tourist activity. Cultural 
conservatism may also prevent any major future influx of tourism revenue. A 
proposal by Club Med to build a resort on Faiva Island, just off the coast of 
Wallis, would have offered a major boost to local tourism. However the king of 
Wallis vetoed the offer in 1987, fearing the deleterious moral effects the 
presence of scantily-clad, hedonistic European tourists would have on his 
subjects.148 Custom authorities may well block any future proposals for tourist 
resorts. 
Traditional society in Wallis and Futuna is far from having been eroded 
by French influences to the same extent that Melanesian cultures in New 
Caledonia have been. European immigration has remained limited, consisting 
mainly of metropolitan French civil servants who are posted to the territory for 
fixed periods. In 1990 97.67% of the 13,705 inhabitants in the territory were 
either Wallisian or Futunan. The remainder amounted to 457 immigrants, of 
whom just 13 were not French. 149 No alienation of land took place in Wallis 
and Futuna in the nineteenth century because of limited European settlement. 
The absence of a large, permanent non-indigenous population has allowed the 
three kingdoms to retain control of local resources. In the eyes of state 
functionaries and of liberal territorial politicians this royal resistance to change is 
negative, forming a barrier to the commercialisation of agriculture and fisheries, 
as well as to the growth of tourism. The three monarchs of the territory might 
counter with the argument that it was preferable that traditional society retained a 
level of control over its destiny which Tahitians, and the Melanesians of the 
Grande Terre of New Caledonia, no longer enjoyed. Social changes brought 
about by non-indigenous settlement in New Caledonia and French Polynesia 
since the nineteenth century had exercised a de stabilising influence on 
indigenous identity there. No such problem existed in Wallis and Futuna. Both 
had retained their cultural identities. The low level of mixing between Wallisians 
and Futunans should be noted too. In 1990, 69 Wallisians were resident in 
Futuna, and 105 Futunans in Wallis.t50 Although fonning a minority in the 
territory, Futunans have maintained their insular cultural identity. 
French culture in Wallis and Futuna continued to make inroads because 
of the gradual improvement of state educational facilities, although a significant 
proportion of the territorial population could still not speak French. In 1990, it 
was estimated that of the territorial population aged ten years and over 76.5% 
spoke French, 73.7% could read it, and 72.3% could write it.151 In New 
Caledonia in 1989, 97.1 % of indigenous Melanesians aged ten years or more 
could speak French, 92.6% could read it, and 92.9% could write it.152 In 
French Polynesia in 1988, 88.6% of full Polynesians aged ten years or more 
could speak French, 84.4% could read it and 82.7% could write it.l53 In 
metropolitan France in 1990, it was estimated by the INSEE that of the 
population aged 18 years and over, 9.1% could neither speak, read, write nor 
understand French well.154 The educational attainments of the indigenous 
population aged six years and over in 1990 were likewise low by metropolitan 
French standards, and in comparison with the other two Pacific TOM. Of 
Wallisians, 12.0% had not been to school, 65.1% had not progressed beyond 
primary level, 22.4% had attained secondary level and 0.5% had gained tertiary 
level education. The respective figures for Futunans were 19.9%,63.9% 16.0% 
and 0.3%.155 The ongoing improvement of educational facilities in the territory 
will improve educational levels and knowledge of French in years to come, 
although the lack of local tertiary and vocational training facilities hinders the 
growth in the number of those receiving higher education. Considering the small 
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population base, the State cannot justify the construction of local educational 
facilities beyond secondary level. 
In spite of the improvement of living standards in Wallis and Futuna 
throughout the 1980s as a result of state development funding, government 
programmes have yet to overcome what are viewed from Paris as basic local 
economic limitations. State organisation of improved communications, public 
services and development schemes was incapable of surmounting the islands' 
isolation, small population base, and meagre natural resources. The metropolitan 
French economic outlook, which equated development with the expansion of the 
cash economy, and the introduction of capitalist socio-economic values, was ill-
adapted to changing this situation. The reluctance of the three kingdoms to 
abandon their traditional values may have been viewed as backward from a 
European economic perspective. But as long as the French State continues 
subsidising the material demands of the local popUlation, and provided that large 
numbers continue to leave the territory, the existing economic balance should 
remain viable, however unsatisfying it might be for state planners. The 
maintenance of a Polynesian subsistence economy alongside an 'unproductive' 
cash economy dominated by services might be a more rational response to the 
constraints of the local natural and cultural environment than the state 
development model. 
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Table 33. French Polynesia. 
Basic Information 
Land Area: 
Maritime Zone: 
Population (1988): 
A verage Population 
Density (1988): 
Currency: 
GDP (1989): 
Average GDP 
per capita (1989): 
Principal Economic 
Activities: 
Administrative Status: 
Political Representation: 
3,26Skm2, 
5,030,OOOkm2, 
188,814. 
58 inhabitants per km2. 
FCFP. 
281,667MF CFP. 
1,463,20SF CFP. 
Servicing the nuclear testing 
programme, tourism, pearl 
farming. 
French Overseas Territory. 
One Senator in the French 
Senate. Two Deputies in the 
French National Assembly. 
Source: ITST AT: Tableaux Economiques de la Polynesie 
fran~aise. 
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4. French Polynesia 
[Les iles de] la Polynesie fran~aise, ce ne sont pas seulement les 
vahines, les cocotiers, les plages... La Polynesie, c'est aussi, 
malheureusement, Ie chomage, la hausse vertigineuse des prix, la 
delinquance juvenile, les problemes du logement [ ... J. 
Gaston Flosse, Deputy for East French Polynesia, addressing the 
National Assembly, June 1980.1 
Paradise's Problems 
The stereotype of Tahiti as a South Seas paradise, much cherished still in 
metropolitan France and elsewhere, stands as one of the greatest psychological 
barriers to understanding contemporary French Polynesia's socio-economic 
difficulties. The eighteenth century voyage to Tahiti by the French explorer 
Bougainville, and the related essays of his philosophical interpreters Rousseau 
and Diderot, have exercised a powerful influence on the French imagination. 
Their contemporaries' anachronistic notion of Tahiti as an idyllic tropical 
paradise, inhabited by free-spirited noble savages communing with nature, is 
one that persists two centuries later, as a perusal of any relevant tourist 
brochure, French or more generally Western, will illustrate. While in the early 
1980s few in metropolitan France had any great awareness either of New 
Caledonia or of French Polynesia,2 the minority who knew anything of French 
Polynesia were likely to have their knowledge based on the myth of a 
paradisiacal Tahiti and would have found it difficult to believe that there could be 
much trouble in that supposed paradise.3 As can be perceived from Flosse's 
observation above, the strength of this paradise myth was such that it had to be 
ritually debunked in France in the highest quarters.4 
Romantic myths surrounding French Polynesia persisted into the 1980s. 
Apart from sporadic and sometimes inaccurate press coverage, few readily 
accessible sources of information existed through which an interested 
metropolitan French citizen might gain insights into the contemporary situation 
of the territory. The bulk of French books relating to French Polynesia 
concerned anthropology, French exploration and colonisation in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, or the work of celebrated artistic residents like Paul 
Gauguin. Compared with the number of works published in the 1980s on New 
Caledonia's political evolution, little appeared on the situation of French 
Polynesia.S Although in October 1987 metropolitan French press accounts of a 
Papeete riot, looting, and the declaration of a state of emergency on Tahiti 
brought about the spread of the realisation in Paris that all was not well there, 
French Polynesian socio-economic problems were not subjected to the same 
level of public scrutiny and political debate in metropolitan France as the New 
Caledonian troubles were in the 1980s. 
An awareness of the issues facing French Polynesia necessarily existed 
in the offices of the Ministry of the DOM-TOM in the rue Oudinot and among 
the leadership of the major French political parties. As Minister of the DOM-
TOM, Bernard Pons was questioned in the National Assembly on the cause of 
the riot and looting in October 1987 and admitted that the incident was a 
symptom of increasing social problems.6 A labour dispute between the port 
authority and dockers had escalated out of control, presenting to the poorer 
Polynesian residents of Papeete the opportunity to ransack the central business 
district. In the 1970s, thanks to economic prosperity encouraged by the presence 
of the nuclear testing programme, there had been almost full employment for 
those living outside subsistence tribal economies, but this circumstance was 
short-lived. The unemployment rate among those considered to be past or 
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present members of the paid workforce was 3.8% in 1977. Population increase 
resulted in an increasing imbalance between the number of young locals entering 
the employment market and the number of jobs available. By 1983, the general 
unemployment rate was 11.2%. By 1988 11 ,430 people were jobless, the 
equivalent of 15% of the territorial workforce.1 Polynesians, who constituted 
the least qualified segment of the population, were the ethnic group worst 
affected by unemployment. In 1988 the Polynesian unemployment rate was 
10.5%, compared to 3.1% among local Europeans. Around 80% of the total 
number of unemployed were Polynesians aged from 15 to 34 years of age.8 
Earlier, in May 1987, Pons had reacted to the plight of the Tahitian poor by 
touring some of Papeete's "quartiers insalubres",9 although the reform 
prescriptions he proposed were inadequate to forestall the looting and 
destruction of the October riot. PS leaders, from Mitterrand down,lO had 
similarly shown an awareness of the social problems to be found in French 
PolyneSia without having introduced refonns capable of overcoming them. 
Since the arrival at Papeete in March 1962 of the advance guard of the 
testing programme,tl all aspects of territorial administration had been 
subordinated to the establishment and running of the CEP, which was 
instrumental in transforming the local economy. The advent of the CEP, 
accompanied by an influx of state capital, and increased employment 
opportunities for French Polynesians, resulted in an unprecedented level of 
territorial economic prosperity. But this event also aggravated social inequalities 
and economic imbalances in French Polynesia. Ongoing government support for 
nuclear deterrence has acted as a barrier to the resolution of the socia-economic 
problems stemming from the presence of the CEP. In the absence of any 
willingness to remove the CEP, ministers in Paris have been incapable of 
significantly diminishing the disparities created by its presence. 
In the 1980s there was no ideological debate concerning French 
Polynesia between the PS, the UDF and the RPR over the application or validity 
of concepts such as 'French colonialism' or 'indigenous liberation' as there was 
with New Caledonia. Partly this difference was due to the absence of a 
substantial local Polynesian nationalist party pushing for self-determination, 
although party political considerations in Paris should not be ignored. While 
actively exercIsing their acceptance of the maintenance and modernisation of the 
French nuclear deterrent. Socialist Governments in the 1980s felt disinclined to 
address the detrimental socio-economic consequences of the presence of the 
CEP, or decolonisation issues as they might concern French Polynesia. At 
variance with their willingness to proclaim the deleterious heritage of French 
colonialism in New Caledonia, they avoided applying such debate to French 
Polynesia. Socialist talk of self-determination issues outside the New 
Caledonian context might have encouraged Polynesian nationalist political 
agitation which could have posed a threat to the activities of the CEP. France had 
already been constrained to relocate its nuclear testing facilities from Reggane in 
the Sahara after Algeria became independent. 12 A repeat performance in French 
Polynesia would have been far from desirable. 
To understand the political issues which faced French Governments 
from 1981, it is necessary to examine the combination of developments, notably 
the defeat of indigenous nationalism in the 1950s, and the installation of the 
French nuclear testing programme, which determined the political landscape of 
the territory in the 1980s. The necessarily brief overview which occupies the rest 
of this section covers the islands' economic, social and political history from 
1945 to 1980 and offers a backdrop to the reform and development efforts of 
French Governments since 1981. 
Although with regard to the careers of their indigenous nationalist 
movements, the experiences of French Polynesia and New Caledonia differed, 
the histories of these two TOM since World War II do offer points of 
comparison. A number of parallels can be drawn in the institutional evolution of 
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the two territories from 1946 until the late 1970s, particularly in the fields of 
party politics and statute reform. From 1945 to 1981 both territories became 
more economically and administratively dependent on metropolitan France. 
In October 1946 French Polynesia, until then known as the 
Etablissements fran~ais de I'Oceanie, became a TOM at the same time as New 
Caledonia. The arrival of the VC on the New Caledonian political scene in the 
1950s was concurrent with the beginning of Tahitian party politics in the years 
immediately following World War II. Central to this latter development was 
Pouvanaa a Oopa, a charismatic demi who had fought for France in World War 
I, worked as a blacksmith in Papeete, and founded the first Tahitian political 
party.13 The year after his election as a Deputy in the National Assembly in 
1949, Pouvanaa founded the RDPT. Initially the RDPT was, like the UC in the 
19508, a reformist party which aimed to further local autonomy under the Fourth 
Republic. Unlike the VC, which worked to improve the lot of both indigenous 
and non-indigenous inhabitants, the RDPT specifically promoted the interests of 
the indigenous population. The RDPT received some encouragement on 22 July 
1957, when after bureaucratic delays, the 'loi-cadre Defferre' was applied to the 
territory, a year after its application in the other TOM. The law created a 
Government Council elected by members of the Territorial Assembly, although 
the French Governor presided over the body and had power of veto over its 
decisions. Of more lasting significance was the reform which five days later 
gave the territory a new name: "Polynesie fran~aise".t4 
Far from all of the French Polynesians were content to stay French. By 
1958 the more radical members of the RDPT, including Pouvanaa, had become 
dissatisfied with the the Defferre law because under it the Governor retained 
executive control of the territory, and because the Government Council was 
deemed too restricted in its powers. Pouvanaa and his followers abandoned the 
notion of promoting reform within the French Republic and advocated the 
foundation of an independent Tahitian Republic. The RDPT split over the 
question of sovereignty. Certain RDPT members who opposed independence 
sided with the UTD-UNR, the local conservative coalition formed in 1958, and 
campaigned for a 'yes' vote in the September 1958 referendum on adherence to 
the fledgling French Republic. French Polynesia was the only part of the French 
Pacific which gave the option of independence substantial, if minority, backing. 
Whereas in New Caledonia in September 1958, and in Wallis and Futuna in 
December 1959, 2% and 6% of valid votes respectively were for independence, 
in French Polynesia, the pro-independence total amounted to 36%.15 The 
French Polynesian pro-independence vote of September 1958 constituted a 
percentile level of support slightly greater, for example, than the combined 
percentage of the vote obtained by Kanak parties in the New Caledonian regional 
elections of September 1985. (Table 8) 
The advent of the Fifth Republic posed setbacks for the RDPT, as it did 
for the DC. Neither party fared well in the face of hostile Gaullist governments 
in Paris. De Gaulle was far less sympathetic to the RDPT than he was to the 
more moderate UC. The nationalist movement founded by Pouvanaa declined 
following his controversial conviction on circumstancial evidence on 28 October 
1959, supposedly for inciting insurrection.l6 His sentence of eight years in 
prison in metropolitan France and 15 years banishment from French Polynesia 
decapitated the RDPT and left its members divided over whether to persist in 
advocating sovereignty or to moderate the party line. Pouvanaa was released 
from prison in February 1966 and was not permitted to return to French 
Polynesia until de Gaulle had lifted his expulsion order in November 1968 .. The 
parallel between Pouvanaa's falling foul of the law and the experience of 
Maurice Lenormand, the leader of the DC, was striking. In 1963 Lenormand 
had his civil rights removed for five years and he received a suspended sentence 
of one year's imprisonment for alleged involvement in a bombing of the VC's 
headquarters in April 1958.17 As in the case of Pouvanaa, what possible motive 
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Lenonnand could have had for committing the act of which he was presumed to 
be guilty remains puzzling. Was it mere coincidence that these two opponents to 
Gaullist rule in the French Pacific found themselves convicted on dubious 
evidence? Whether or not his imprisonment was just, the removal of Pouvanaa 
from the political scene after the loss of the 1958 referendum marked a major 
setback for Polynesian nationalism. Although the RDPT and its successors 
subsequently demanded further self-detennination votes for French Polynesia, 
none were forthcoming owing to the electoral decline of the nationalist vote. 
As in New Caledonia, the 1960s and early 1970s entailed an expansion 
of state control in French Polynesia and an accompanying diminution of the 
powers of the territorial administration, although the precise fonns this reduction 
assumed in French Polynesia differed from the New Caledonian context. 
Territorial revenue for French Polynesia, drawn mainly from import tariffs and 
company taxes in the absence of any personal income tax, dropped in the first 
years of the Fifth Republic. This trend occurred because of both a decline in 
local agricultural production, and the exhaustion in 1966 of a major export 
earner, phosphate from Makatea Island.18 Faced with declining revenues and 
finding itself with inadequate funds to run its own services, the territory was 
constrained to cede to the French State control of its post and 
telecommunications in 1960, followed by secondary education and vocational 
training in 1963, and sections of its health service in 1968.19 The refonn of 
French Polynesian communal administration in 1971 and 1972 reduced further 
territorial authority and revenues. The five communes in French Polynesia were 
expanded to a territory-wide network of 45 communes, administered according 
to metropolitan French law. The territory found itself in the position of having to 
pass 25% of its revenue to the communes, and lost some of its previous 
administrative influence over the scattered outer islands. Previously, territorial 
representatives had exercised influence over the creation of new communes. The 
establishment and administration of this new network fell under state contro1.20 
French Polynesia found itself host to the CEP from July 1963, when 
Governor Aim6 Grlmald authorised its presence in the territory by decree.21 In 
February 1964, Grimald gained the assent of the territorial Permanent 
Commission to pass control of the atolls of Moruroa and Fangataufa to the CEP 
for its nuclear tests.22 This consultation did not necessarily imply majority 
Polynesian support for use of the atolls, the Penn anent Commission being a 
group of five Territorial Councillors who represented the Territorial Assembly 
between sessions.23 Oddly, although autonomists held three of the seats on the 
Commission, there was a majority vote in support of ceding control of the atolls. 
Resignation to what was considered inevitable, and the hope of compensatory 
funding for the territory tipped the balance.24 
The economic effects of the installation of the CEP were felt rapidly. By 
1964, CEP expenditure in French Polynesia was four times the size of the 
territorial budget.25 Total French military activity in the islands had amounted to 
5% of GDP in 1961, before the arrival of the CEP. By 1966, CEP and related 
military activities accounted for 76% of the greatly expanded French Polynesian 
ODP.26 1966 represented the peak of this trend. From that year, although the 
total expenditure of the CEP and the military steadily rose, as a percentage of 
GDP it declined. This percentile faU reflected lower military expenditure after the 
construction of the facilities necessary for the test programme, and growth in the 
tertiary. sector of the French Polynesian economy. In 1971, the figure 
represented 33% of GDP. By 1980, it had declined further, to 21 %.27 
French Polynesia's already declining agricultural production diminished 
further 'a~ the presence of the CEP created job opportunities for local 
Polynesians in the secondary and tertiary sectors. Commercial copra 
production, the main territorial export after phosphate until 1966, fell from more 
than 25,000t in 1964 to 7,500t by 1968.28 Here the installation of the CEP was 
not the sole factor in the decline: the falling number of available workers for 
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harvesting coincided with falling market prices, not only for copra but also for 
vanilla. By 1980 in real tenns French Polynesian copra exports were worth 
half as much as their 1970 market value. Vanilla production fell from 28t in 
1970 to under 2t 12 years later, and its value declined from 47MF CFP to 13MF 
CFP.29 Overall, French Polynesian agricultural exports declined in tonnage 
from the early 1960s. In 1960, they amounted to 24,365t. By 1980 the total was 
11 ,91 Ot. 30 Production in some areas ceased altogether in this period. 
Commercial coffee production came to an end in 1964, as did that of coconut 
by-products. Some diversification of agricultural exports occurred, although it 
was not of great importance. Fresh fruit exports, for which no details were listed 
before 1973, fell from 149t that year to 93t in 1980.31 
Aquaculture constituted a growth sector for the French Polynesian 
economy from the 1970s, but was of far less importance than revenue received 
as a result of the CEP's presence. In the 1960s, the future of aquaculture did not 
look promising. At that time mother-of-pearl had been the only important export 
derived from territorial waters, and its production was also affected by the same 
factors that lay behind the decline in agricultural production.32 Shell exports 
collapsed from 645t in 1960 to 9t by 1981.33 This decline was compensated for 
by the rapid expansion in pearl exports. In 1972, when the first record of 
significant exports was made, pearls accounted for 1.56kg. By 1981 total pearl 
exports were 86.53kg.34 Pearls represented the only export success of the 
period. Otherwise by 1981 local commercial exploitation of territorial maritime 
resources was minimal. As in the other Pacific TOM, local fishing operations 
were small-scale and devoted to local consumption, while deep sea fishing was 
the domain of foreign trawlers operating on fishing licenses from the Territorial 
Government. 
The demographic effect of the installation of the CEP was to draw 
workers and their families to Papeete. Dockers were required to handle cargo 
shipped to Moruroa via Papeete, and civilian staff were needed to build, clean 
and maintain new facilities for CEP employees. The town and adjacent centres 
(Pirae, Faaa, Arue and Maina) experienced rapid population growth while most 
islands in the territory experienced a decline in working popUlation. Greater 
Papeete had 36,514 inhabitants in 1962.35 Fifteen years later, this population 
had exceeded 78,000.36 By 1977 residents in this urban conglomeration 
represented 83% of the popUlation of Tahiti, and 57% of the total French 
Polynesian population}7 Other arrivals, personnel for the test programme and 
its various support services, came from further afield than the outer islands. As 
in New Caledonia during its nickel boom, European immigration also occurred 
during the French Polynesian period of economic expansion. In 1962 there were 
around 2,500 Europeans working on Tahiti. By 1971, there were around 
7,500.38 Immigration from the 1960s did not tilt the ethnic balance in French 
Polynesia to the extent that it did in New Caledonia. Although defining ethnic 
origin in French Polynesia was more problematic than in New Caledonia due to 
the high degree of interethnic mixing in the fonner, official figures listed full 
Polynesians as representing 65.63% of the territory's population in 1977. 
Among others, full Europeans accounted for 11.14%, and full Asians for 5.36% 
The remainer were demis of mixed ethnic origins.39 
Although the indigenous population of French Polynesia had not lost its 
demographic preponderance as New Caledonian Melanesians had, Polynesians 
had became socially and economically marginalised. The decline of the rural 
economy had eroded the value of traditional skills. Urban living on Tahiti gave 
rise to a cash-based consumer lifestyle which was novel to the bulk of the 
indigenous population. Moreover the Polynesian ability to succeed in this 
consumer society was lower than that of other ethnic groups. Polynesians 
looking for work in Papeete found their career options restricted by their limited 
French education and, frequently, by their lack of fluency in French.40 
Management positions in the secondary and tertiary sectors tended to be the 
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domain of metropolitan French, Asians or demis, with Asians notable for their 
success in business.41 In 1988, these groups were disproportionately highly 
represented in management posts in the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
Europeans were the principal income earners for around 20% of the total number 
of households that year. However this 20% comprised 72.9% of households 
depending on income from people employed in liberal professions, 42.6% from 
those in middle management positions, and 27.3% of incomes from 
businesspeople and company directors. Conversely, while full Polynesians were 
the principal income earners for 58% of the number of households in the 
territory, they represented 81.7% of households depending on agriculture as the 
main source of income, 36.5% in the field of artisanry, and only 10% of 
households for which employment in liberal or management posts offered the 
main source of income.42 
While average GDP per capita rose from 7,684FF in 1960 to 51,370FF 
in 1980,43 there was no evidence to suggest that the benefits of economic 
prosperity were more evenly spread among French Polynesians than they had 
been prior to the arrival of the CEP. In 1981 workers on the minimum wage 
received ten times less than upper management civil servants, while agricultural 
workers and fishermen received 15 times less.44 Polynesians who had relocated 
to greater Papeete were not as likely as demis or people of non-indigenous 
origins to enjoy the economic prosperity that the CEP induced in the secondary 
and tertiary sectors. Those who found work tended to be manual labourers on 
comparatively low pay, while Polynesian unemployed were forced to live a 
humble existence in shanty towns on the outskirts of Papeete, a town in the 
centre of which real estate prices came to exceed those of the Champs Elysees.45 
The lives of these urban Polynesians were far removed from the tropical 
Rousseauist idyll that their ancestors supposedly enjoyed. Those who remained 
in the outer islands faced an economic downturn which forced agricultural 
activity back to subsistence levels. This return to nature would not necessarily 
have been as spiritually uplifting for a struggling Polynesian agriculturalist as it 
might have been for an adept of Rousseau. 
From 1962 to 1980, the primary sector workforce dropped from 46% of 
paid labour to 15%. The secondary sector dropped from 19% to 16%, while the 
tertiary sector rose from 35% to 67%.46 Within this workforce employees of the 
State and local government held important albeit minority status. In 1977, out of 
a working population of 42,868, 29,266 were in private sector employment, 
while 13,537 (31.57%) were in the public sector.47 This distribution was 
different from the work sector balance in Wallis and Futuna, a sign of the 
importance of local commerce, and of the existence of a level of light industry 
and manufacturing which were absent in Mata Utu. 
Tourism was far more developed in French Polynesia than in Wallis and 
Futuna by the early 1980s. The opening of an international airport at Faaa in 
October 196048 had broken down territorial isolation and enabled easier access 
for tourists, who had previously arrived by boat. Just before the CEP engulfed 
the territorial economy, tourism had expanded to become the largest economic 
sector by income in French Polynesia by 1964.49 Tourist arrivals increased from 
around 700 in 1957 to nearly 30,000 by 1968, and 84,615 by 1974.50 The 
territory's trump card was its global reputation as a South Seas paradise, but 
tourism was not without its difficulties. A stay in paradise was expensive. 
Travellers were discouraged by astronomical prices in Tahiti,51 the consequence 
of a society largely dependent on imported goods, and of its distance from 
affluent northern hemisphere countries. These factors posed psychological and 
economic barriers even in the age of jet travel. 
Although the Eighth Plan for the DOM-TOM had presented high official 
hopes for tourism development at the end of the 1970s, a gap between 
expectation and reality had already developed by that stage. The Sixth Plan for 
the DOM-TOM (1971-1975) enthusiastically projected that by 1975, tourism 
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growth would be such that 7,000 hotel rooms would be available, workers in 
the tourist sector would number over 7,000, and 240,000 tourist arrivals would 
take place annually.52 In 1975 these targets were far from attainment: hotel 
rooms numbered a little over 2,000, there were fewer than 2,000 people 
working in the tourism 'industry', and tourist arrivals that year numbered 
88,959.53 Although not living up to the excessive optimism of the Planning 
Commission in the 1970s, tourism was an expanding area of the territorial 
economy, and the Eighth Plan continued to view it optimistically. 
For the islands the 1960s and 1970s involved years of growing financial 
as well as administrative dependence on metropolitan France. With the anival of 
the CEP came an influx of several thousand metropolitan French scientists, 
military and general support personnel who expected the same consumer 
lifestyle as they were used to in Europe. The number of small businesses in 
Papeete expanded rapidly to soak up the disposable incomes of CEP employees, 
and those of the locals privileged to be a part of the new economic prosperity. 
From 1963 to 1965, the number of retail outlets in Papeete rose from 359 to 
559.54 Consumer goods were imported in far greater numbers than had been the 
case at the beginning of the 1960s. The value of imported mechanical and 
elecnical goods alone increased from 437MF CFP in 1960 to 9,098MF CFP by 
1968.55 Imported foods rose from 445MF CFP in value in 1960 to 2,381MF 
CFP in 1968.56 
These imports, along with all the construction materials imported for 
CEP facilities and new housing in the territory, helped finance the territorial 
administration. Even before the arrival of the CEP, in the absence of personal 
income tax, import tariffs had been the main revenue earner for the territorial 
administration. In 1979 Flosse pithily and accurately characterised the relation 
between increased imports and the territorial government's fiscal health: "Ici, 
plus on importe et mieux on se porte."57 Although the availability of imported 
goods stifled local production, raised retail prices and contributed to generally 
increased living costs, tariffs on those products represented a funding lifeline 
that territorial politicians were reluctant to sever for want of any other politically 
acceptable means of raising territorial revenue. As in New Caledonia, personal 
income tax was the bere noire of local salary earners, and had been traditionally 
despised by them as an infringement of personal liberty. Any territorial 
administration which dared impose it faced tumultuous opposition from business 
interests. A proposal made by Pouvanaa in 1957 to introduce a graduated 
income tax scheme was one of the developments which brought about the 
mobilisation of a conservative front against him in the last months of the Fourth 
Republic.58 
French Polynesia was far from self-sufficient before the arrival of the 
CEP; it has become more dependent since then. In particular the' ongoing decline 
of local agriculture left its mark. In 1960, the territory imported 37.0% of its 
food requirements. Twenty years later, it was importing 51.5% of its food.59 
Increased food demands, along with those for consumer goods and construction 
materials, caused the coverage rate of imports by exports to slide dramatically 
from 83.0% in 1960 to 24.0% in 1980.60 The greater part of French Polynesian 
external trade stayed with France. In 1980, 47.6% of territorial imports 
originated from France, which received 69.6% of French Polynesian exports.61 
Assuming it was possible, the trade integration with the Pacific region stressed 
by the Eighth Plan stood at best as a distant prospect. Products from Australia, 
New Zealand and Japan accounted for 11.9% of territorial imports in 1980, 
while products from various other countries in the region were included in the 
4.8% of imports categorised as coming from "other countries".62 
Although the foundation of the CEP brought about an influx' of 
metropolitan French funds and encouraged prosperity, it brought with it various 
troubles. In the late 1970s, French Polynesia displayed all the traits of 
dependence outlined in the Eighth Plan for the DOM -TOM: declining territorial 
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self-sufficiency in food, an absence of productive diversity in agriculture and 
light industry, an external trade balance tilted towards a high level of French 
imports and exports, and low levels of trade with nations in the Pacific basin. 
This was the situation as Giscard d'Estaing had inherited it in 1974, and it was 
unchanged when Mitterrand assumed the presidency in 1981. 
The nascent local nationalist movement in French Polynesia saw the 
prospects of independence recede under the Fifth Republic. The islands' 
economic fortunes became more tightly linked with France through the 
continued presence of the French military and their nuclear programme. Local 
Polynesian autonomists remained hostile to the nuclear presence in their 
territory, but they realised that should the CEP ever cut back or halt its testing 
activities, the effects could be detrimental to French Polynesia's economic well-
being. The increased French presence had a politically stifling effect on the local 
independence movement both because the territorial economy had become 
increasingly dependent on the State and because the CEP had created an era of 
financial prosperity for French Polynesia. The message that continued ties with 
France were beneficial for local Polynesians was easier to promote as a result. 
Consequently, electoral support for independence faded by the early 1970s, 
when an autonomist coalition government lost power to a coalition of Gaullists 
and independents.63 
Campaigning by the RDPT for autonomy had been cut short by de 
Gaulle's dissolution of the party. The Journal Officiel of 6 November 1963 
carried a decree of the Council of Ministers, signed by de Gaulle, and Prime 
Minister Georges Pompidou among others, which banned the party as a threat to 
law and order.64 Thus de Gaulle and his colleagues outlawed a movement which 
they considered contrary to the national interest. Faced with vehement state 
opposition from the French President down and a decline in electoral support, 
the nationalist movement moderated its claims. In the late 196Os, programmes 
for statute reform aiming to give Ftench Polynesia greater internal autonomy 
within the French Republic became the new focus for Pouvanaa's followers. 
The successor party to the RDPT, Here Ai'a (Beloved Land), founded in 
February 1965 by John Teariki, and Francis Sanford's E'a Api (New Way), 
founded the same year, retreated from Pouvanaa's pro-independence platform of 
the late 1950s.65 In advocating autonomist policies during their period of 
coalition rule over the Territorial Government from 1967 to 1972, these two 
parties returned to the position of the RDPT in the early 1950s. 
The modest goal of internal autonomy was more acceptable to the French 
Polynesian electorate than independence had been. Teariki and Sanford attracted 
broad support from voters who accepted internal autonomy as a path towards 
diminishing Parisian dirigisme in the territory. French Governments under the 
presidencies of de Gaulle and Pompidou were unresponsive to autonomist 
claims. After the election of Giscard d'Estaing in 1974, Paris recognised that 
statute reform was desirable and began discussions with Teariki and Sanford. 
Negotiations under Giscard d'Estaing were hesitant and protracted. Sanford and 
Teariki only made real headway in negotiations after their coalition, the Front 
Uni pour l'Autonomie Interne, gained a majority in the territorial elections of 
May 1977. A new statute proposed in 1976 by Olivier Stirn, then Secretary of 
State to the DOM-TOM, was criticised by autonomists for giving back too few 
of the administrative powers which had been lost by the territory under the Fifth 
Republic. Sanford threatened Stirn with the return of an independence 
movement should autonomist hopes be disappointed. In exchange for Here Ai'a 
and E'a Api's support for the UDF, the statute was renegotiated and a new 
version was promUlgated in July 1977.66 
The new statute replaced the French Governor with a High 
Commissioner. As was the case in New Caledonia, the High Commissioner 
held the presidency of the Territorial Government, with a locally elected Vice-
President effectively presiding over matters of territorial jurisdiction. Territorial 
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powers under the statute differed from those under the Defferre law. The 
territory was to exercise competence over any domain not specifically listed as 
being that of the State. Although far from undermining the administrative status 
quo, the adoption of the statute was heralded as a great victory by Sanford and 
Teariki. Giscard d'Estaing and the UDF viewed the reform as the enlightened 
fulfilment by Paris of Polynesian demands for internal autonomy. It was 
envisaged that the new statute, combined with the introduction of development 
contracts between the State and the territory designed to strengthen the economy 
and alleviate social disparities, would eventually compensate for the shock 
caused by the CEP.67 
As in New Caledonia, the results of the 1981 elections cut short 
Giscardian reform orientations for French Polynesia. In assuming that the 
course of territorial reform had been settled for French Polynesia, Giscardians 
had not counted on the volatility and fluid nature of political life in Papeete. The 
issue of internal autonomy was far from resolved and from 1980 was adopted 
with zeal from an unexpected quarter. 
Territorial Politics: From Giscard to Mitterrand 
Up to this point examination of French Polynesian politics has been 
limited to a generalised description of two opposing political camps in the post-
war period, those of autonomists and conservatives. This necessary 
simplification has been adopted to avoid becoming sidetracked by the 
complexities of French Polynesian political alliances from the 1950s to 1970s. 
However to understand the outwardly puzzling, ever-shifting maze of alliances 
both within Papeete, and between Papeete and Paris, as well as the influence 
they had on the implementation of French policy in the territory in the period 
under examination, closer analysis will be offered of the French Polynesian 
political scene from 1980. 
The presentation of biographical information concerning the key leaders 
introduced so far is a reflection of the importance of personality politics in 
French Polynesia. From Pouvanaa to Flosse, the territory's political dir~ction 
has been heavi1y influenced by a small number of vigorous figures. French 
Polynesian political parties tend to be little more than the embodiment of the 
mana of a single man.68 Ideological considerations have been subservient to 
short-term pragmatism as the small group of political personalities with a 
territorial reputation shifted allegiances in their ongoing struggle for the 
dominance of }X>litical institutions. Consequently French Polynesian }X>liticallife 
was inherently unstable, with a plethora of short-lived parties combining into 
coalitions which rose and fell from election to election. Because of these shifting 
alliances, politics in French Polynesia have been aptly described as reminiscent 
of the French Fourth Republic.69 
There are numerous examples from the 1950s of French Polynesian 
leaders who have made at least one political volte-face, but the one that best 
serves as an introduction to the 1980s is the self-transformation Flosse made in 
the late 1970s. At the time of the territorial elections in 1977, as the leader of 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira and the major local conservative figure, he ran a campaign 
which was light in detailed policy, not going beyond generalised support for 
social reforms, links with France and the strengthening of the economy.70 Faced 
with the arrival of an autonomist majority in the elections, and the Front Uni's 
coup in gaining statutory reform from Paris, Flosse decided to outflank Sanford 
and Teariki and take over their policy platform. As neither Flosse nor his party 
were closely tied to the UDF, he could afford to go a step further than the Front 
Uni. He accused the Front Uni of having conceded too easily to Paris, and 
proclaimed that the statute of 1977 failed to go far enough in granting greater 
autonomy to French Polynesia. By 1980, he had become a· "super-
autonomist",71 calling for Paris to create a Territorial Government with its own 
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Ministers, able to negotiate with foreign powers, and with greater control over 
local resources.72 On 7 March -1980, he tabled a private member's bill in the 
National Assembly designed to bring about the necessary statute modifications. 
Like legislative initiatives formulated by Pidjot as Deputy for New Caledonia, 
the bill did not gain the backing of a majority in the National Assembly. Dijoud 
did not take Flosse's bill seriously and on 11 May described it as premature.?3 
Regardless of this lack of interest in Paris, Flosse's position was perfectly in 
accord with RPR policy stressing some form of decentralisation in the DOM-
TOM as the best means towards strengthening their ties with metropolitan 
France.74 Coincidentally, and a consideration that would not have seemed 
greatly important in 1980, Flosse's "super-autonomist" outlook was not far 
removed from the decentralisation and "autogestion" orientations of the PS. This 
coincidence was to determine the shape of relations between Papeete and Paris 
from 1981. Whereas the defeat of the UDF and RPR by the PS in the elections 
that year was regarded by the RPCR as a disaster for conservative interests in 
New Caledonia, in French Polynesia the advent of the Socialists held more 
ambiguous implications. The "super-autonomist" stance of Flosse was to lead 
him into a series of statute negotiations with Emmanuelli and Lemoine that 
durably changed the territorial administrative structure. 
In their 1981 electoral campaigns in French Polynesia the major 
metropolitan French parties and their local advocates reiterated the political 
positions expounded in the National Assembly debate on the DOM-TOM in June 
1980. But a dimension was added to the exposition of these positions by 
campaigners in French Polynesia, who projected metropolitan French policies 
through the distorting prism of their own parochial concerns. 
The marriage of convenience between the UDF and the Front Uni was 
perhaps the oddest combination in 1981; it demonstrated that Flosse was not the 
only French Polynesian leader capable of switching platform. The UDF, with its 
French Republican origins, and the Front Uni, with its roots in Polynesian 
nationalism, had converged from drastically different ideological starting points. 
In the. past, autonomist parties had aligned themselves with parties of the French 
Left rather than with the Centre-Right, in the belief that Socialists would be more 
sympathetic to Polynesian interests. In the presidential elections of 1965, Teariki 
had campaigned for Mitterrand against de Gaulle. Nine years later, Teariki and 
Sanford had both advocated voting for Mitterrand rather than for Giscard 
d'Estaing, unconvinced that a former Finance Minister of de Gaulle would be 
any different from his predecessors as President.75 Although autonomist 
campaigning in May 1974 enabled Mitterrand to gain 51.04% of votes cast in 
French Polynesia in the second round of the presidential elections,76 by 1981 
the Front Uni preferred Giscard d'Estaing. Whereas in 1974, the French 
Polynesian Comite de soutien a Giscard d'Estaing had been the creation of a 
small coalition of independent centrist Territorial Councillors, by 1981 they 
found themselves rivals of the very autonomists who had campaigned against 
them on the Comite de soutien a Fran~ois Mitterrand seven years before. As 
evidence of the fractious nature of French Polynesian party politics, by April 
1981 there were four rival Giscardian support committees, each vying to spread 
the good word.77 Prior to the elections in 1981 the leaders of the Front Uni 
misread political developments in Paris, acting on the assumption that Mitterrand 
would lose at national level as he had before.?8 Their good relations with 
Giscardian Ministers in Paris should not be ignored either. Having gained 
various reform concessions from Paris since 1977, the Front Uni campaigned 
for Giscard, optimistic that his re-election would enable the introduction of 
further benevolent legislation which would increase autonomist prestige.79 
On the topic of statute reform, Teariki stated early in April 1981 that 
Giscard d'Estaing had promised a revision of the 1977 statute should he be re-
elected. When questioned in Paris days later concerning this reported promise, 
Giscard d'Estaing was vague on details, although he indicated that the statute "a 
Table 34. French Presidential Elections, 1981.· 
French Polynesian Results 
First Round: 26 April 
Registered voters 78,496 
Votes cast 52,018 
Turnout 66.27% 
Valid votes 51,036 
Candidate Votes % of votes cast 
Giscard d'Estaing 
(UDF) 26,241 50A5 
Chirac (RPR) 18,323 35.22 
Mitterrand (PS) 4,249 8.17 
Marchais (PC) 273 0.52 
Others 1,950 3.75 
Second Round: 10 May 
Regist~red voters 78,519 
Votes cast 49,831 
Turnout 63.46% 
VaJid votes 48,771 
Candidate Votes % of votes cast 
Giscard d'Estaing 37,414 75.08 
Mitterrand 11,357 22.79 
Sources: Le Monde 28 avril 1981, 12 mai 1981. 
Table 35. French Legislative Elections, 1981. 
French Polynesian Results 
First Round: 21 June 
First constituency (West Polynesia) 
Registered voters 52,681 
Votes cast 29,989 
Turnout 56.93% 
Valid votes 29,710 
Candidate Votes % 
J uventin (UDF) 8,361 
Leontieff (RPR) 7,480 
Vernaudon (Ea Api) 4,814 
Atger (fa Mana) 4,354 
Others 4,701 
Second constituency (East Polynesia) 
Registered voters 26,154 
Votes cast 15,241 
. Turnout 58.27% 
Valid votes 15,05 8 
Candidate Votes % 
Flosse (RPR) 8,528 
Drollet (fa Mana) 2,575 
Portier (UDF) 1,529 
Others 2,426 
Second Round: 5 July 
First constituency 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
(West Polynesia) 
52,660 
30,546 
58.01 % 
29,953 
of votes 
27.88 
24.94 
16.05 
14.52 
15.68 
of votes 
55.95 
16.90 
10.03 
15.92 
cast 
cast 
Candidate 
Juventin (UDF) 
Leontieff (RPR) 
Votes 
15,415 
14,538 
% of votes cast 
50.46 
47.59 
Sources: Le Monde 24 juin 1981, 7 juillet 1981. 
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toujours ete en faveur d'une plus grande autonomie [ ... ] C'est un 
commencement et non un aboutissement "80 In the same interview, the President 
confidently stated that the territory had made great progress with socio-economic 
reforms since 1974 through its development contracts for agriculture, 
aquaculture and industry, the extension of social welfare coverage, the 
improvement of the education of French Polynesians, and assistance in the 
creation of a territorial culture office. Elsewhere he offered to the French 
Polynesian electorate optimistic observations on the territory's future under a 
second Giscardian septennate: 
Je constate que les progr~s se sonl acc616r6s dans lous les domaines ou nous 
[les gouvemements fran~ais et territorial) avons engag6 ensemble de grandes 
actions pour I'avenir de votre Territoire. [ ... J Aujourd'hui it nous reste comme 
partout beaucoup de travail a faire. [ ... J Mais nous pouvons construire I'avenir 
de la Polyn6sie. Un avenir de bonheur et de paix, suivant nos propres 
traditions, a condition de disposer de la continuit6 dans l'action et de la 
s&;urit6.81 
Absent from the rare interviews and statements given in 1981 by Giscard 
d'Estaing on French Polynesia were the detailed, technocratic analyses for 
which he was renowned. Instead, he traded on vague banalities such as those in 
the quote above, their underlying message being to keep him in power as better 
was yet to come. 
The urgency of this message intensified after Mitterrand's national 
showing in the fust round of the presidential elections: he came second behind 
Giscard d'Estaing, in contrast to his third placing in the French Polynesian poll. 
(Tables 2, 34) In an attempt to harness the largely anti-communist sentiment of 
the territory's predominantly Christian population, attempts were made to invoke 
the Red peril which paralleled those of the RPCR in New Caledonia. This was 
by no means a new ploy; similar scaremongering had been indulged in during 
the presidential elections of 1974.82 After the ftrSt round, one of the Giscardian 
support committees asked rhetorically "G. Marchais peut-il etre Ministre des 
DOM/fOM1" Predicting that a Socialist Government would be hostage to the 
whims of a minority PC holding the balance of power in the National Assembly, 
French Polynesian voters were asked by the Comite de soutien a Ia candidature 
de Valery Giscard d'Estaing: 
Que ferait donc pour Ia France pour I'outre-mer en g6n6ra1, pour la Polynesie 
Fran~aise en particulier un gouvemement frap¢ de paralysie par la volonte du 
parti communiste? Rien de bon, assurement. Et si les communistes participent 
au gouvernement, pour nous ce sera Ie pire.[ ... ] Imaginez que Ie Ministre 
charge de I'outre-mer soit communiste. Quelle politique menerait-il pour la 
Polynesie franl;aise? Que peut-on attendre de lui face a notre peuple qui est 
profondement religieux? De eela, nous ne voulons pas.83 
Such speculation probably influenced local voting patterns. Fear of 
communism, as well as hope for further Giscardian reforms, may well have 
contributed to convincing 75.08% of the French Polynesian electorate to vote for 
Giscard d'Estaing in .the second round of the presidential elections. (Table 34) 
The groundless nature of fears concerning the influence of the PC on the PS has 
already been discussed in chapter 2. The PC played no role in French 
Polynesian politics at the time of the 1981 elections, and had never had any 
significant presence in the islands. Marchais received 0.52% of votes cast in 
French Polynesia during the ftrSt round of the presidential elections, a level of 
support indicative of the lack of French Polynesian interest in his party platform. 
Nor, more significantly, did the PS have a direct presence in French 
Polynesia at the beginning of the 1980s. A PS/Front Uni alliance could have had 
major bearing on territorial politics, but the autonomists had sided with Giscard 
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d'Estaing. Instead, opposing the RPR, which had close associations with 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira, and the UDF, to which a motley collection of independent 
and Front Uni committees had adhered themselves, the PS had as its mouthpiece 
the Maohi nationalist party la Mana Te Nunaa (Power to the People). Founded 
in 1976, la Mana differed from the bulk of French Polynesian parties in having a 
fairly fixed agenda, and less emphasis on personality politics.84 Led by a group 
of young Polynesians who had received tertiary educations in France, and who 
had absorbed the organisational methods and philosophies of the French Left, la 
Mana led a revival of Polynesian nationalism from the late 1970s, calling for the 
territory's secession from the Fifth Republic. Yet it was a fledgling party which 
had yet to gain as wide a level of support in French Polynesia as Kanak 
nationalist parties did from the 1970s. Like the PI in New Caledonia, in 1981 la 
Mana campaigned for Mitterrand and the PS in the hope that a Socialist 
Government would bring abOut radical local change and the recognition of its 
nationalist agenda.85 Some distinction must be made between PS statements and 
those made by French Polynesian followers of the Socialists. Although la Mana 
was a socialist party in the broader sense of the term, it was not a component of 
the PS, and it provided its own gloss on PS policy, presenting it to fit Maohi 
nationalist criteria. 
la Mana, like the Front Uni, and even Flosse,86 professed to be opposed 
to nuclear testing, but it fudged the issue of Mitterrand's backing for the 
retention of French nuclear defence and, by implication, nuclear testing in 
French Polynesia. An la Mana party communique on 29 April 1981 declared that 
a vote for Giscard d'Estaing was a vote for the continuation of nuclear testing,87 
while neglecting to mention Mitterrand's pro-nuclear stance.88 That the 
Mitterrandian policy of ongoing support for French deterrence was no different 
from that of Giscard d'Estaing and Chirac would have contradicted la Mana's 
electofaI slogan: "Avec F. Mitterrand, changer la vie".89 
Consistent with its youthful leadership, la Mana presented itself as the 
representative of French Polynesian youth, and stressed that Giscardian reforms 
in the territory were far from having overcome the social disadvantages and 
poverty of young urban and rural Polynesians.90 la Mana accused Giscardian 
liberalism of failing to get to the heart of territorial social inequality, and 
promoted Mitterrand as a President who would install "une autonomie 
economique" and "un veritable gouvernement interne", as well as who would 
"lutter contre les privileges" .91 Mitterrand was portrayed as a potential Socialist 
saviour for the territory, an image which would prove hard to live up to in the 
decade which followed. 
In this respect, la Mana did not vary from the line that Mitterrand himself 
offered: the image of ambitious, far-reaching, egalitarian reform for French 
Polynesia. Mitterrand stated that improving the lot of local youth was a priority, 
along with the reduction of social inequalities and the encouragement of local 
production to lessen territorial economic dependence.92 In a message to French 
Polynesians issued at the time of his election the new President indicated that 
things were going to change: 
. Les Polyn~siens, tout particulierement, savent qu'il faut mettre fin au 
centralisme excessif et ~touffant du pouvoir giscardien. [ ... J Il faut faire cesser 
la bureaucratie galopante et envahissante qui empeche la Polyn~sie de 
d~velopper son &:onomie et de mettre en place un v~ritable pouvoir 
autonome.[ ... ] It est insupportable que la r~forme de 1977, au lieu de donner 
aux Polyn~siens les moyens de prendre en charge Ie devenir de leur «fenua» 
[peuple], ait abouti ~ faire du Conseil de Gouvemement un perp~tuel 
qoomandeur de subsides par Ie tranchement des Conventions.93 
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These orientations were more reminiscent of the author of Le Coup d'etat 
permanent in the mid 1960s rather than the President of the early 1990s. He 
would have as hard a time living up to his own words as to those of Ia Mana. 
Although Mitterrand indicated that things were going to change in the 
islands, that change did not extend to talk of self-determination as it did in New 
Caledonia. In Papeete, Maohi sovereignty was not a major campaign issue 
during the elections of 1981. The message promoted by most local parties was 
that the political path for the territory lay in the promotion of greater 
administrative autonomy within the Fifth Republic. It was nevenheless evoked 
on occasion, mainly by Ia Mana. On the question of French Polynesian 
independence, in 1981 Mitterrand was as circumspectly observant of 
constitutional considerations as he was in New Caledonia's case: 
Le parti sociaHste reconnait solennellement Ie droit des populations de choisir 
librement les institutions politiques qui leur paraissent les plus adapt6es aux 
solutions locales. Ce droit It I'exercice de l'autod6termination qui d6coule du 
droit a la difUrence et du principe du respect des sp&ificitl!s de chaque 
population est inscrit depuis 1946 dans Ie pr6ambule de la constitution. Le 
parti socialiste a toujours reclam6 l'application de ces droits fondamentaux des 
populations d'outre-mer. et it a. par avance, proclame! sa volonte! de respecter 
leur vreu.94 
This statement tied in with Mitterrand's position on New Caledonian 
independence at that time: if a majority of the electorate in the territory desired 
independence, then it would be given. In French Polynesia, such a scenario 
represented a distant and unpopular prospect in 1981. Ia Mana supporters were 
few within the territory. In the territorial elections of 1977, the party received 
3.63% of votes cast, inadequate to gain any seats in the Territorial Assembly.95 
This marginal following for Maohi sovereignty precluded any likelihood that 
Mitterrand would have to weigh his position on French Polynesian 
independence as carefully as he had to with New Caledonia in the 19808. 
On the eve of his election in 1981 Mitterrand offered clear observations 
concerning the issue of French Polynesian statute reform: 
Si les Polyn~!lienR estiment qu'U faut ameliorer, modifier Ie statut actuel, je 
m'engage A Ie faire en 6troite concertation avec tous les partis, avec tons les 
elus. 
D'ores et d6j~, j'afftrme que I'autonomie interne delle passe par 1a fibre 
disposition des res sources du Territoire et par la suppression des pouvoirs 
exorbitants du Haut Commissaire. II faut que les Conseillers de Gouvemement 
aient la pleine responsabilire de la gestion du Territoire, sous 13 responsabilite 
d'un des leurs Ubrement choisi. 
Ainsi peut s'ouvrir une ere de relations confiantes entre la France et la 
Polyn~sie. un d6veloppement harmonieux, une plus grande justice sociale, une 
veritable responsabilite de gestion.96 . 
These prescriptions were exactly what Flosse had advocated. 
The PS was dissatisfied with its lack of representation in Papeete and 
made an attempt to establish its own presence in local politics at the time of the 
presidential elections. Following the accession to power of the Mauroy 
Government, the Socialists made efforts to establish a branch in French 
Polynesia. Like its New Caledonian and Wallisian counterparts, the PSP was to 
have an inglorious career. The main force behind the PSP was Paul Koury, a 
Guadaloupean dentist of Lebanese origin living in Papeete. He had settled there 
in 1976 after marrying one of Flosse's daughters. whom he claimed he had 
subsequently divorced on the grounds of "incompatibilite politique".97 At the 
time of the election of Mitterrand, Guy Penne, one of the new President's 
advisors, asked Koury to enter French Polynesian politics for the PS. Although 
founded on 10 May 1981, remarkably it was only after Emmanuelli's frrst visit 
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to Papeete in August that the PSP assumed anything other than a paper 
existence.98 Echoing PS plans of broader social renovation at national level, the 
PSP hovered on the margin of territorial political life into the mid-1980s and 
then faded away. No PSP candidates were elected to the Territorial Assembly in 
the territorial ejections of 23 May 1982, (Table 36) as the party only gained 
2.11 % of valid votes.99 Equally disappointing to the PS was the marginal score 
obtained by Koury four months later in the East Polynesia by-election. Polling 
last, he received 433 votes, 0.27% of votes cast)OO The PSP did not 
consolidate a territorial network capable of rivalling those of established local 
parties, and continued experiencing mediocre electoral results. The participation 
of the PSP in the territorial and legislative elections of March 1986, (Tables 39, 
40) marked its last significant foray into electoral politics. French Polynesian 
voters had showed no haste to desert established local political parties to follow 
the Socialist vision. That Koury was an outsider worked against him. Unlike the 
prominent local politicians of the day he had neither Polynesian ancestry nor a 
local heritage, considerations which were important elements in gaining the 
confidence of indigenous voters. 
The RPR had already consolidated its presence in French Polynesia via 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira. The RPR message for French Polynesia during the 1981 
elections was more effectively presented than that of either the PS or the UDF. 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira greeted Pons and organised large rallies for him during his 
tour of the territory early in April.IOt No major PS or UDF representative visited 
the islands for the campaigns from April to June. Flosse acted as Chirac's 
mouthpiece in Papeete. Flosse professed scepticism over the likelihood of 
Giscard d'Estaing revising the statute in the case of his re-election, and took the 
opportunity to reiterate his "super-autonomist" stance. He stressed that allowing 
the territory greater autonomy did not entail severing links with France: "Pour 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira I'autonomie interne, ce n'est pas l'independance mais la 
decentralisation au sein de Ia Republique Fran~aisetl.t02 Chirac was in 
agreement with this sentiment. In April 1981 he declared to La D~peche de 
Tahiti: 
Et de m!me faeon que je suis partisan d'une plus grande dtconcentration et d'one 
plus grande decentralisation au profit des Regions et des departements 
m6tropolitains, je suis de la m!me fa~on favorable l I'autonomie locale 
lorsqu'elle concerne la Polynesie Fmn~aise.{ ... ] Certains, je Ie sais, craignent 
que l'autonomie interne soit l'anti-chambre de l'independance. Je tiens lies 
rassurer car rna conviction est que c'est au contraire par I'instauration d'une 
veritable autonomic locale, garantie de vos franchises. de vos traditions et de 
votre culture, que pourra !tre definitivement exorcisela tentation dangereuse de 
l'ind6pendance.103 
Chi rae could lay passing claim to having assisted decentralisation during 
his period as Prime Minister from 1974 to 1976, when preliminary work had 
been done on the statute of 1977. French Polynesia would have to await 
Chimc's appointment as Prime Minister in March 1986 to see the extent to which 
he would apply these views, by which time they had been overtaken by statute 
reform under preceding Socialist Governments. His views here contrasted 
sharply with his later opposition to the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute, which he 
declared was the antichamber to New Caledonian independence. His attitude 
differed because within the New Caledonian context, greater territorial autonomy 
offered indigenous nationalists the opportunity to work towards independence, a 
consideration of little applicability to French Polynesia. 
Chirac's view concerning territorial economic policy did not differ from 
those of the PS or the UDF in broadly following the orientations of the Eighth 
Plan for the DOM-TOM. Local productivity should be stimulated in order to 
reduce territorial dependence on imports. Emphasis was placed on the 
exploitation of maritime resources and the expansion of tourism. 104 Both Chirac 
Table 36. French Polynesian Territorial Elections 
1982 
Territorial Results: 23 May 
Registered voters 85,033 
Votes cast 60,470 
Turnout 71.11% 
Valid votes 60,182 
Party Votes % of votes cast Seats 
Tahoeraa 17,787 29.41 1 3 
Here Ai'a 9,451 15.63 6 
Ai'a Api 6,829 11.29 3 
Ia Mana 6,522 10.79 3 
E'a Api 3,773 6.24 1 
Others 16,108 26.64 4 
Sources: Le Monde 26 mai 1982; Henningham: France and 
the South Pacific p.142. 
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and Tahoeraa Huiraatira had no opposition to the continuation of the 
development contracts instituted under Giscard d'Estaing.1OS Chirac foresaw no 
reduction of the activities of the CEP in the event of his election, considering the 
nuclear strike force to be France's best means of protecting its independence.106 
While Plosse did not go to the extent of la Mana in claiming to speak: for 
disadvantaged Polynesian youth, he did on occasion decry local social problems 
such as unemployment and propose the extension of social welfare 
assistance.107 Taboeraa Huiraatira did not venture so far as to support Ia Mana's 
proposals for the introduction of personal income tax. It was not opposed to the 
reform of company taxes and other levies imposed by the territory, but regarded 
the introduction of personal income tax as justified only as a measure of last 
resort, and not as a very desirable one.1 08 Flosse had convinced the 
conservative electorate to follow his recently adopted internal autonomy 
platform, although until 1993 there was no indication that his party was ready to 
take up la Mana's advocacy of personal income tax. 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira and the RPR's emphasis on the remedy to social 
problems such as the wealth gap and unemployment formed the major difference 
with Mitterrand's general policy for French Polynesia. Concerning the 
continuation of nuclear testing, and an increase in local autonomy, both 
Mitterrand and Chirac were essentially in agreement. With regard to 
development issues, both expressed negative comments on the limitations of 
Giscardian reforms to date and offered more and better change, although each in 
his own way. Political rhetoric from the two presidential candidates' local 
spokesmen tended to conceal these policy convergences 
After Mitterrand's victory in the second round of the presidential 
elections Tahoeraa Huiraatira reacted with alarm, warning French Polynesian 
voters of dire consequences. A party declaration issued just after the results were 
announced predicted that Mitterrand would be dependent on the PC to fonn a 
left-wing coalition government, and urged a strong tum-out for the RPR in the 
coming legislative elections, as only Chirac would be capable of keeping this 
"coalition socialo-communiste" in check.109 This call to the polling barricades 
evoked a limited response during the legislative elections in the islands. (Table 
35) In the first round Plosse was re-elected RPR Deputy with 55.95% of votes 
cast in East Polynesia. The RPR candidate in West Polynesia, Alexandre 
L60ntieff,110 lost a second round run-off with Jean Juventin, the UDF 
candidate. lll A large segment of the French Polynesian electorate was still 
prepared to back a UDF candidate in spite of Giscard d'Estaing's defeat in the 
presidential elections. Tahoeraa Huiraatira later discarded any fighting talk after 
the party had consolidated its territorial representation to the point where it could 
comfortably negotiate the reforms it had hoped to implement with Chirac as 
President. < 
Towards Internal Autonomy 
Considering the unstable nature of French Polynesian politics, it is 
sutprising that the evolution of the tenitorial statute in the 19808 and early 1990s 
was not accompanied by the series of legislative revisions which New Caledonia 
underwent. Instead in September 1984, at the conclusion of orderly negotiations 
marked only by civilised expressions of differences of opinion, the National 
Assembly unanimously approved a new territorial statute for French Polynesia. 
This statute survived into the 1990s, outlasting the New Caledonian Lemoine 
Statute, the PisanilFabius Interim Statute and the Regional Autonomy Statute. 
Explanation is offered below of why this should have happened when numerous 
factors were predisposed against the consensual introduction of a new 
administrative structure for French Polynesia. Comparison is made between 
New Caledonian statute legislation and that of French Polynesia from the 19808 
to ascertain the degree to which decentralisation measures implemented by Paris 
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in the two TOM differed. The practical consequences of French Polynesian 
statute reform are examined, namely the nature and extent of the decentralisation 
it introduced. Reactions of the major metropolitan French parties to 
governmental relations with French Polynesia are analysed. Prominent was the 
moderate dissension between representatives of the Left and Right compared to 
their pronouncements on New Caledonia. 
Following the Socialist victories in the 1981 elections, the 
representatives of the Front Uni found themselves in political disarray. Once 
again, they had supported the losing candidate in the presidential elections. By 
the time of Emmanuelli's visit to Papeete in August 1981, Sanford and Teariki 
were attempting to ingratiate themselves with the Secretary of State. Sanford 
stated to Emmanuelli "Je sais que la concertation fonde votre action, que la vraie 
decentralisation politique, administrative, economique est en fin 13.; en un mot. 
que les comportements colonialistes sont revolus. "112 Sanford's assessment, 
insinuating that all which had gone before did not spell true decentralisation, 
involved a belated disavowal of his earlier promotion of Giscardian reforms. His 
words were at odds with a declaration he had made three months before 
following the election of Mitterrand: "Avec Giscard d'Estaing, beaucoup de 
progres ont ete accomplis sur Ie plan economique. Maintenant, certains dossiers 
ayant trait au developpement economique risquent d'etre remis en question.tlll3 
Sanford and Teariki advocated in August that the Mauroy Government should 
implement further decentralisation measures in the territory, but that advocacy 
sat uneasily with the versatile nature of their party allegiance. Flosse used the 
Front's setbacks to his benefit by pushing to extremes his 'more radical than 
thou' image. By December 1981, he was calling for an immediate suspension of 
nuclear testing and an inquiry into its safety.114 This theatrical stance from the 
RPR Deputy was quite incompatible with traditional Gau1list backing for nuclear 
testing. t 15 Nothing came of the proposal, although it did allow Flosse to 
upstage the Front Uni on its political ground. 
Emmanuelli confronted local reform demands by announcing that he was 
not unopposed to statute modifications. however he considered social and 
economic change to be of greater importance. As in New Caledonia, he had 
gained the impression that addressing social inequalities was a more pressing 
consideration.116 Unlike New Caledonia however, some early contemplation 
was also to be devoted to statute reform. The Council of Ministers announced 
after Emmanuelli's return to Paris that a state-territorial working committee 
would be appointed to examine the statute as well as development planning.117 
In August 1981 the Front Uni was best placed to negotiate with Paris, 
holding majority control over the Territorial Government, but this situation was 
not to last. On 23 May 1982, the Front Uni experienced major setbacks in 
territorial elections which brought about the end of its coalition administration. 
(Table 36) In a campaign involving 398 candidates contesting 30 seats, the 
cohesion of the Front Uni was marred by defections, dissent, and divisions 
between its various components.118 After five years in government, the member 
parties of the Front had not managed to consolidate a collective identity to the 
point of enabling them to stand on a joint platform. Wishing to retain their 
respective identities, the Front's three major formations. Here Ai'a, Eta Api and 
the Mouvement Social-Democrate,119 ran separate campaigns. lust before the 
May elections Emile Vernaudon, an E'a Api Councillor. resigned from the Front 
Uni Government to form Ai'a Api (New Land). Sensing an oncoming change in 
the fortunes of the Front Uni, various figures in Here Ai'a decided to stand as 
independents.120 Tahoeraa Huiraatira did not face such organisational problems. 
It criticised the disunity and allegedly poor administration of the Front Uni while 
promoting its campaign slogan: tlMieux gerer la Polynesietl ,121 Tahoeraa 
received enough votes through the proportional ballot to take 13 of the 30 seats 
in the Territorial Assembly, an increase of three compared with its representation 
since 1977. The member parties of the Front Uni lost considerable ground: Here 
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Ai'a held its six seats, E'a Api was reduced from six seats to one, and the 
Mouvement Social-Democrate failed to gain any.I22 Ia Mana and Juventin's Ai'a 
Api each received three seats.l23 
The new balance of power left Plosse in a commanding situation, 
holding command of a unified block, while all opposition was fragmented. He 
took advantage of divisions among his opponents to form a coalition 
government with Juventin after the May elections. It was a union which lasted 
only 110 days before collapsing under the force of personality differences.l24 In 
a remarkable but by no means unprecedented volte-face, in September 1982 
Plosse then formed a new coalition with Here Ai'a. Plosse and Teariki were as 
unlikely a couple as Plosse and Vernaudon, although they negotiated ajoint 
policy platform, the terms of which were sufficiently loose to avoid immediate 
political differences.125 The joint aim of promoting political stability while 
confronting various socio-economic problems was the sort of stance political 
groupings of almost any ideological leaning could assertt to. This coalition 
cemented enough stability for the territory to enter into statute negotiations with 
Paris. 
Plosse had to resign as Deputy for East Polynesia in August 1982. His 
tenure of the posts of Deputy and of Vice-President of the Territorial 
Government was deemed incompatible by the state judiciary. Tutaha Salmon, a 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira Territorial Councillor, and Plosse's proxy for the seat, was 
elected to the post in a by-election held on 29 August 1982.126 While a reduction 
of his personal responsibilities, the loss of the seat allowed Plosse to devote 
more time to statute reform. 
As with parallel reform in New Caledonia, some consultations 
concerning the French Polynesian statute had been made under Emmanuelli. 
however the bulk of the preparatory work was to be completed under Lemoine 
from March 1983. Thanks to the coalition's majority, and. the absence of 
vehement opposition to statute reform in Papeete, Lemoine was not obliged to 
arrange round table negotiations a 16 Nainville les Roches for French Polynesian 
representatives. It became apparent at an early stage that the Mauroy 
Government was largely prepared to fulfil proposals presented by Plosse for 
greater territorial self-government. 
On 30 June 1983 Plosse met MauToy at the Hotel Matignon. Mauroy 
assured Plosse that he was willing to legislate a statute which would give French 
Polynesia a Territorial Government with greater responsibilities, and which 
would extend to permitting it to represent France at international fora. 127 
Negotiations between Lemoine and Flosse had begun on 14 April 1983, aimed 
at finalising the details of a new form of territorial administration which would 
establish a Territorial President elected by the Territorial Assembly, and who 
would lead the Territorial Government rather than the High Commissioner. It 
was envisaged that the High Commissioner would retain a supervisory role, 
assuring the legality of local administrative decisions. l28 Lemoine confrrmed 
these orientations with an official announcement in early September 1983, by 
which time a draft statute proposal had already been forwarded to the French 
Polynesian Territorial Assembly.129 The draft, prepared in August 1983, 
reiterated Lemoine's earlier general publicised description of the competences of 
the Territorial President, the Territorial Assembly and the High Commissioner. 
The bill proposed that French Polynesia should receive increased control over 
the French Polynesian EEZ, be allowed to negotiate foreign investment to a 
value of 55MFF, and to regain control over the first cycle of secondary 
education. Paris would engage in closer consultation with the territory over 
international fishing agreements in its EEZ, international air and sea links, and 
immigration. 130 . 
This draft met with some criticism in Papeete. Plosse and opposition 
representatives characterised it as deficient, claiming it did not devolve enough 
power to the territory. At an assembly s~ssjpn on 21 September 1983, the draft 
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was rejected. Plosse voiced the objections of the Territorial Assembly to the 
Constitutional Law Commission in Paris on 6 October.131 He asserted that the 
draft did not go far enough in devolving state powers. Plosse obtained an 
audience with Mitterrand on 19 October 1983 to voice French Polynesian 
dissatisfaction, but the proposal was tabled as a bill before the National 
Assembly on 7 December with only minor modifications.132 The French 
Government was constitutionally obliged to consult with territorial 
representatives, in the same manner as required under the existing New 
Caledonian statute. The Territorial Assembly had no power of veto over 
legislation emanating from Paris. Any objections raised in Papeete could 
therefore be disregarded by the Mauroy Government. Plosse called a special 
session of the Territorial Assembly on 12 April 1984 to debate what should be 
done. Here Ai'a Councillors abstained from voting because Juventin, the party's 
new leader, had announced there was little recourse at territorial level and it 
would be better for French Polynesian parliamentary representatives to voice 
local dissatisfaction in Paris. Of the 27 Councillors present, 17 voted for a 
motion presented by Tahoeraa Huiraatira which called for a rewrite of the statute 
bill.133 
Dissatisfaction expressed in debate in Papeete found no great echo in 
Paris during parliamentary consideration and promulgation of the bill from May 
to September 1984. The Senate, dominated by the UDF and RPR, adopted the 
bill on 17 July. Doing its best to dampen any future claims that the bill might 
serve as a fIrst step towards independence, the Senate renamed it the "projet de 
loi tendant a doter Ie territoire de la Polynesie de l'autonomie interne dans Ie 
cadre de la Republique".t34 This cumbersome title was rejected by the National 
Assembly. Upon the completion of the fIrst reading in the National Assembly on 
10 May, the bill was passed with 485 votes for and one against. 135 At its final 
reading in the National Assembly on 31 July, the bill became law with the 
unanimous approval of the 481 Deputies voting. 136 The legislative progress of 
the statute was not impeded by opposition recourse to the Constitutional 
Council, as the DOM decentralisation bill had been in November 1982, and as 
the PisanilFabius Interim Statute for New Caledonia was to be in August 1985. 
Nor was the statute to be abandoned by the Fabius Government in the face of 
rising, violent opposition in the territory, and coordinated opposition attacks in 
Paris. as occurred with the New Caledonian Lemoine Statute. 
The tone of the National Assembly debates over the bill was superfIcially 
curious when viewed alongside the parliamentary ruction which accompanied 
the Lemoine statute bill for New Caledonia. The jeering, abuse, tirades and 
interjections characteristic of debates on New Caledonia in 1984 and 1985 were 
absent from statute reform debates on French Polynesia. The contrast between 
the two was greatest in the debates of the National Assembly on 31 July 1984, 
when the final reading of the Lemoine Statute for New Caledonia took place just 
before that of the French Polynesian statute.137 Whereas the political future of 
New Caledonia had become a ball kicked around an ideological football field, 
proposals for French Polynesia were treated in a calm, orderly manner. Various 
party speakers voiced reservations about the legislation for French Polynesia, 
though none of them were prepared to push their reservations to the extent that 
they had over New Caledonia. In the absence of accompanying talk of self-
determination, the granting of greater administrative powers to the French 
Polynesian Territorial Government was not considered controversial. As no 
substantial minority backing for secession existed in French Polynesia, the PS 
and the PC had no grounds for raising the issue of self-determination, while the 
UDF and the RPR could profess no great objections to reform on the grounds 
that the Socialists were threatening the unity of the Republic by hastily leading 
the territory to independence. 
Juventin and Salmon took the opportunity the National Assembly 
debates provided to voice their qualified criticisms of the statute bill. Their 
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reservations diminished as the bill passed through its three readings, partly 
because some of their requests for modifications were met, and partly because it 
became apparent to the two Deputies that so little animosity to the legislation 
existed among their metropolitan French colleagues that entrenched opposition to 
it was pointless. Prior to the first reading of the bill, some minor competences 
had been added to the list of territorial responsibilities.138 At the IlfSt reading, 
the Government accepted Juventin's proposal that a state-territorial coordinating 
committee should be set up to supervise the implementation of the statute.139 It 
also accepted his proposal that the Territorial President should be obliged to 
submit his list of Ministers to the Territorial Assembly for approval, and that the 
statute should be characterised as open to future evolution so that territorial 
powers might subsequently be increased. Juventin was dissatisfied that the 
territory would not receive control of the French Polynesian EEZ, even though 
the territory did not have the means to maintain such control.140 Lemoine had 
deemed it necessary to cede the territory competence over the exploitation of 
maritime resources, but not the full control of the EEZ. He argued that such 
control could not be permitted for legal reasons. International law only 
recognised the control of the French Republic over territorial waters. Therefore 
the State would have to retain its responsibilities in this domain.141 Overall 
though, Juventin had had enough of his requests met to enable him to vote for 
the statute bi1J on 3) JuJy. 
Salmon declared at the first reading that numerous points remained to be 
addressed, notably the granting of territorial control over the issue of visas to 
foreigners staying more than three months in French Polynesia, and the 
extension of the international standing of the territory by allowing it to negotiate 
regional accords which it deemed relevant to its interests.142 By the third reading 
of the bill, Salmon indicated that he would vote for it, although he remained 
disappointed that the territory had not been granted greater economic powers, 
and that the Territorial Government would not have greater autonomy from the 
Territorial Assembly. In this latter respect he differed from Juventin. He also 
expressed opposition to articles 10 and 12 of the bill, which limited the number 
of posts the members of the Territorial Government could hold simultaneously. 
There was speculation this could be applied detrimentally to Plosse. Plosse, the 
most likely candidate for Territorial President under the new law, had been 
elected on 17 June 1984 to the European Parliament on the UDF-RPR list. 143 
Some controversy had been provoked by this article, with the RPR asserting it 
was a Socialist attempt to limit Plosse's political career. His five-year term of 
office in Strasbourg might be endangered by these articles if he decided to run 
for the presidency. At the bill's first reading, PS and PC Deputies held off an 
RPR and UDF attempt to loosen this restriction, with 317 votes against 112.144 
For Juventin and the UDF this concern constituted a dubious point which had 
needlessly distracted debate and should be left to the Constitutional Council to 
resolve. 145 The Constitutional Council ruled in September that the two posts 
were not incompatible, allowing Plosse to be Territorial President and a 
European parliamentarian.146 In any event, this matter did not prevent global 
RPR acceptance of the statute bill. 
On behalf of the RPR, Jacques Toubon expressed approval of the bill, 
stating that it conformed with his party's aims for decentralisation within the 
Republic.147 He described RPR support as "un «oui, mais»", in that the party 
was opposed to the possible implications of article 10 for Plosse, and because 
the Mauroy Government had failed to grant greater territorial control over the· 
French Polynesian EEZ. Toubon asserted that the Government had not gone as 
far as the RPR would have gone in decentralising, a claim which was to be put 
to the test during Chirac's administration. 
The UDF also offered a "oui, mais" in its assessment of the bill. Pascal 
Clement, speaking for the party, said it supported the bill "mais peut-etre avec 
des arrieres-pensees, ou avec des craintes".148 Echoing arguments applied to 
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Socialist refonns to New Caledonia, he claimed the bill might follow the 
precedent of the 10i-cadre Defferre' of 1956 in bringing French Polynesia closer 
to independence: 
J'ai bien entendu dire. et re¢ter. que ce statut ne constituait pas une etape vers 
I'independance. Je souhaiterais volontiers Ie eroire. mais je erains que les 
memes mecanismes institutionnels ne produisent les memes effets.149 
In fact, the Defferre law had not led French Polynesia to independence, and by 
the early 1990s, this fear expressed about the new statute remained unfulfilled. 
Robert Le FoIl, a PS Deputy, replied with the observation that the Opposition 
occasionally tried to make believe that the Socialists were abandoning French 
Polynesia, but this did not correspond with reality )50 It was difficult to believe 
that the Mauroy Government might be attempting to steer French Polynesia into 
independence when it had negotiated the statute bill with a territorial delegation 
led by Flosse, a fonner RPR Deputy, an RPR European parliamentarian and the 
leader of Tahoeraa Huiraatira. This attempt by Clement to cast doubts on 
Socialist motives failed, although similar attempts applied to the New 
Caledonian portfolio would prove more successful in raising a coordinated 
liberal-conservative reaction in defence of the unity of the Republic. It should be 
noted that the RPR avoided such arguments in its commentaries on the French 
Polynesian statute bill, probably conscious of the charges of hypocrisy it would 
be exposing itself to should it seek to challenge Socialist motives. Had the RPR 
claimed that the new statute might lead French Polynesia to independence, PS 
Deputies would have been able to inquire why the party had allowed Flosse, the 
RPR stalwart in Papeete, to negotiate with the Mauroy Government in the first 
place. The dialogue between Socialist Governments and Tahoeraa Huiraatira had 
no equivalent in New Caledonia. There the RPCR stood in opposition to 
Socialist statute refonn because it involved a self-detennination vote. 
Moderation was likewise a characteristic of the PC reaction to the bill. 
Jacques Brunhes summed up the Communist position at the first reading of the 
bill: 
Le groupe communiste 8 eltamine ce projet a partir de positions de principe qui 
sont connues de chacun: tout ce qui peut ameliorer la vie des poputationsde 
Polynesie. etendre les Iibertes et accroitre l'autonomie de ce territoire a notre 
soutien. C'est la raison pour laqueUe nous voterons ce texte.151 
Anti-colonial rhetoric and the championing of indigenous nationalism were not 
major features of the Communist attitude, either to the bill or to French 
Polynesia in general. Maohi independence did not receive the same support that 
Kanak nationalism did when the PC criticised the Lemoine Statute for not 
guaranteeing Kanak self-determination.152 The Communist double standard 
stemmed from the marginal nature of the Maohi nationalist movement, and the 
fact that its most important exponent, Ia Mana, sympathised with the PS rather 
than with the PC. The moderation of the PC served to keep the debates on the 
bill relatively calm. Had it proclaimed itself the mouthpiece of Maohi 
nationalism, this stance might have raised tempers on the UDF and RPR 
benches to the level evident in debates over New Caledonia. 
Internal Autonomy: Framework and Implementation 
Reference by Clement to the statute bill as a possible portent of 
independence was given in response to the opening speech of Michel Suchod, a 
reporter for the Constitutional Law Commission. Introducing the bill to the 
National Assembly on 9 May 1984, he had placed the legislation within the 
context of Socialist decentralisation under the Fourth Republic, and more 
recently under the Fifth Republic: 
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Le texte qui vous est soumis prend en compte les deux principes 
d'autonomie interne et de d~entralisation. 
En proposant un regime d'autonomie interne dans lequelles affaires du 
territoire sont administrres librement par les ~lus territoriaux, Ie Gouvernement 
rappelle son attachement tt la libre d~tennination des peuples, principe que fit 
pr~vaJoir un autre gouvernement socialiste avec la loi cadre du 23 juin 1956. 
[ ••• J 
En effet. ce projet emprunte au principe de ]a docentraJisation. Le 
Gouvernement entend appliquer en Polyn~ie fran~aise des regles identiques II 
celles dont MnMicient les Mpartements m~tropo1itains depuis "entrre en 
vigueur de la loi du 2 mars 1982.153 
Any analogy made between the administrative structure of French Polynesia 
under the new statute and that of a metropolitan French Department was a loose 
one. The office of High Commissioner was peculiar to the TOM, although a 
rough comparison could have been made with the status of the President of the 
General Council. French Polynesian bodies such as the Government Council 
and the Territorial Assembly had equivalents in metropolitan Departments in the 
form of General Councils, although the latter did not have as great a degree of 
administrative autonomy. 
With regard to the departmental reforms of 1982, these did not apply to 
the TOM. Similarly, communal electoral reform undertaken by Defferre in 1982 
had not affected French Polynesian communes. While proportional 
representation was installed that year for New Caledonian municipal elections, in 
French Polynesia the old first-past-the-post system was retained. The 
introduction, with the Territorial Assembly's approval, of proportional 
representation to communes with more than 10,000 inhabitants was 
contemplated,] 54 but did not happen.1ss The main reason for this lack of change 
was an unwillingness to radically alter communal. regulations which had only 
been extended to most of the territory at the beginning ot the 1970s. In French 
Polynesia it was the High Commissioner who authorised the application of 
communal legislation. 156 . 
Suchod's mention of departmental reform in the French Polynesian 
context presented territorial statute reform as part of a broader Socialist plan for 
national local government reform and decentralisation. In doing so, he glossed 
over administrative differences between the TOM and metropolitan French 
Departments. The description offered by Lemoine of the statute was similarly 
misleading: 
Ce nouveau statut marque une rupture avec les statuts procMents en allant 
jusqu'au bout de la logique constitutionnelle de «l'organisation particuliere» des 
territoires d'outre-mer. en dotant la Polyn~sie fran~aise de l'autonomie interne. 
Cette autonomie interne constitue la reconnaissance par la R~publique 
de Ia ¢ificire de la Polynesie fran~aise.157 
While it is true that the statute bill offered greater recognition of French 
Polynesian specificity, it is doubtful that it represented either a break with 
preceding statutes or the end-point of territorial administrative particularism. 
(Tables 37, 38) The main territorial administrative bodies - the High 
Commission, the Territorial Government, and the Territorial Assembly - were 
rejigged rather than replaced. The Permanent Commission of the Territorial 
Assembly was increased from 7 members, to a complement ranging from 9 to 
13 members. The territorial Economic and Social Advisory Committee was 
maintained. An Administrative Tribunal was set up to monitor the legality of 
territorial legislation. The new statute was a reworking of the one which 
preceded it, not a new beginning. Nor was the statute necessarily the end of the 
line for French Polynesian autonomy, as subsequent statute reform has 
demonstrated. 
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The final text of the law, referred to as the Internal Autonomy Statute, 
was promulgated in September 1984.158 The phrase "autonomie interne", 
prominent in the first article of the statute, was used to define the administrative 
standing of the territory: 
Le territoire de Ia Polyn6sie fran~aise constirue, confonntnlent am articles 72 
et 74 de la Constirution, un territoire d'outre-mer dote de l'autonomie interne 
dans Ie cadre de la Republique et dont rorganisation particuliere et evolutive est 
d6finie par Ia pr6sente loi.159 
Symbolic of its new standing was the granting to the territory under article 1 of 
an official flag and hymn. These symbols were far from entailing an abdication 
of French sovereignty. Under article 1 it was additionally outlined that the High 
Commissioner would hold his traditional authority over the defence of law and 
order, the respect of French law, and state administration. He was to act as the 
state watchdog over the legality of the actions of the territorial administration. 
The list in article 3 of state domains over which the High Commissioner 
held authority was still extensive. Overall, he retained most of the 
responsibilities outlined in the statute of 1977. with the addition of more specific 
details in some instances. As under the statute of 1977, he exercised authority 
over territorial foreign relations, immigration, external communications, finance, 
defence, strategic resources, the maintenance of law and order, state 
administration, civil law, labour law. communal administration, the second cycle 
of secondary education and state higher educational facilities. His control over 
the importation of all arms and munitions was a new detail. Previously, his 
authority had been limited to military arms. State control over local land, air and 
sea resources was increased. Article 3 of the Internal Autonomy Statute, while 
going into more precise detail, confirmed the orientations of article 62 of the 
statute of 1977 and added a further feature.1 6o With the permission of the State 
the territory would be able to exploit local maritime resources. However existing 
prerogatives of the territory such as its ability to negotiate fishing accords in its 
EEZ with foreign powers were not challenged. 161 
More change was apparent in the High Commissioner's relations with 
territorial representatives, although he retained considerable authority. Under 
article 91, the High Commissioner could declare a state of emergency in French 
Polynesia. Article 92 outlined the High Commissioner's powers over the 
Territorial Government. He could suspend and defer any decision by the 
Territorial Assembly or Government to the Administrative Tribunal for 
examination should he deem it contrary to French law. The Administrative 
Tribunal was the body which decided the legality of any contested decision. This 
marked a reduction of the High Commissioner's tutelage over territorial 
representatives and a degree of alignment with metropolitan French practice. 
Previously, the High Commissioner had been empowered to annul any decision 
of the Territorial Assembly or Territorial Council by decree.162 The relationship 
between the Territorial Government and the Administrative Tribunal could be 
compared to that between the Government and the Constitutional Council in 
Paris. Under the Internal Autonomy Statute the State retained substantial 
command over any Territorial Assembly which it felt had gone out of control. 
Articles 71 Md 1i allowed the Hiah Commissioner to assume command of the 
territorial budget if the Territorial Assembly could not balance its boots. UDder 
article 81 t the Council of Ministers in Paris could dissolve the Territorial 
Assembly by decree "lorsque Ie fonctionnement des institutions territoriales se 
revele impossible". The assessment that it was impossible to govern could be 
made either unilaterally in Paris after hearing the advice of the President of the 
Territorial Assembly and the President of the Territorial Government, or it could 
be made in reaction to a demand from the Territorial Government. Paris could 
thus rein in the Territorial Assembly should its actions be deemed out of order. 
Table 37. French Polynesia's Statute of 1977 
GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE (MINISTERE DE LA FRANCE D'OUTRE·MER) 
ANNUtATION DES DELIRERA-
NOMME DE\1.,\NDF. ,\N"Il'I.ATlON I)E~ vr.iVfS"""""'~OOI unON 1 L DE 
, ,nON ,D .,,', 1\ A MANDE DU 
E/EVOQIIE TIONS. DlSSOl.llION PAR DECRET. CONSEILDE GO~ERNEMENT PAR DEcRET. 
-1I1\UT.O)MMISS;\RIATJ' rem I' (ONSEIL DE :---l, ASSEMBLER 
CHEF DU TERRITOIRE pri"ider .. I GOUVERNEMENT! TERRITORIALE 
• Represente rEM 
• Dirige les services et etablissemenls 
publics de 
• Chef dll Territoire : dirige les services 
et etablissements puhlics territonaux 
• Assure In preparation du budget dont 
eSll'ordonnnleur 
• Veille 11 la Icgalite des netes des auton-
tes territoriales ... tutelle a . 
• Rend executoires les actes du Conseil 
de gouvemement et les deliberations de 
I'Asscmblce territoriale et de la commi~· 
sion permanente 
• Pem demander I'annulation par deeret 
en Conseild'elat, des deliberations de 
rA.T. ou du ConseH de gouvemement. 
• Preside en theone par Ie haut-commis~aire 
, • pratique des institutions: 
Le haut-commissaire n'y siege plus. c'est 
proje!' de .. 
deliberations 
Ie ,ecre!aire general qui Ie represente I election 
pour les arfaj~s de I"Etat. .. 
• Le vice-president preside et gere avec 
les 6 conseillers elus par IAT.. les 
nffaircs du Terriloire entrant dans In 
competence du Conseil (competence 
d'attribution). lis determinent raction des 
services publics et lerriloriaux. 
• Pas d'altribUlions individuelles 
• Peut demander la dissolution de I'A.T. 
=::i::'=--. par deere! en Conseildes ministres. 
DEMANDE 2eme LEnURE ET ANNULATlON 
DES DF-UHF-RATIONS PAR DECRET 
motion de 
~ {'cr •. , ...... 
demande 
... ,lisrolU!ion 
Source: P.-Y. Toullelan & B. Gille: Le mariage franco-tahitien p.l23. 
Composition, formation et fonctionne-
ment identiques a la periode precedente 
• L'Assemblee a une compcJence de i 
droit commun par rapport 11 rEtat et au 
Conseilde gouvernement qui ont des 
competences Iimitativement enumerees 
• Vote Ie budget et delibere sur les 
affaires du Territoire relevant de sa com-
petence 
• ContrOie Ie Conseil de gouvemement 
• Motion de censure 11 la majorite abso-
lue (auparavant, It la majorite des 3/5) 
1 COMMISSION PERMANRNTE 
Donne son avis sur les projets de 
caraclere economique, social et 
culturel qui lui sont soumis par Ie 
Conseilde gouvemement ou par ('A.T. 
Table 38. French Polynesia's Internal Autonomy Statute, 1984, 1990 
GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE l'v1INISTERE DE LA FRANCE D'OUTRE-MER) 
:-10M ME 
lOT REVOQt'E 
HAUT·COMI\tlSSAIRE 
• Represenle rEla! dOni il dili-
ge Ie'!; services et etablisse-
In legnlite des aCles 
emanant des aUlOriles territo-
riales en les deferant au tribu-
nal administratif (Melle 11 pos-
teriori) 
• assiste aux <;eances des 
Conscils d'archipel (1990) 
, • competence de rEtat limitati-
I vement enumerees ... (.C. omme en 11)77). , 
GOUVERNEMENT f)U 
TERRITOIRE 
(Conseil des ministres) 
• president du gouvernement .. cle 
de voute" de I'executif local (nile 
accru en 1m)· €Iu par lAT. par-
mi ses membres • choisit les 
ministres dont un est vice-president 
(6a 10 en !9R4.6a 12en 1990) 
• chef de r Administration Icrritoriale 
• peut demander une 2eme lecture 
d'une deliberation de I' AT. 
• representation de I'Etat dans Ie 
Pacifique' role accru en 1990 
motion de 
""""II .,;eTu>ut~ 
DlssoumON PAR DECREI' 
f:N rnN~EIL DES MINISl"RES 
+ 
ASSEMBLEE 
TERRITORIALE 
• 1986: 41 conseillers 
• competence de droit commun : 
regie les affaires du Territoire qui 
ne sont pas reservees au gouver· 
nemen! local ou 11 I'Elal 
gouvernement 
Ie president 
du gouvemment de ses fooctions . 
ce qui enrraine In demission du 
gouvemement 
• creation de commissions d'en-
: competences limitativment cnu. quetes et de controle 
merees • ministres o11t des attrihu. " • deliberations executoires de 
• attributions collegiales du Conseil 
lions individuelles • aetes du gou- " plein droit: contnlle de legalite 
vernement executoires de plein " par Ie tribunal adminsitrntif. 
droit (controle de legalite 11 poste- / I 
. .) I I ! 
: administralif l non . " " I 
, I I • 
, .. I I , 
L---------------------------t---------------./ // 
control. 
---..... de legante 
Tribunal adminsitratif / 
I 
• Veille ilIa legalite des actes des I~ _____ ..... 
autoritcs territoriales. 
commission perma 
·9 ill3 membres 
• deliberations ex~cutoires de 
plein droit contrtiie par Ie tribunal 
administratif. 
Source: Toullelan & Gille: Le mar/age Jranco-tahitien p.147. 
Comit~ economique et 
social, Conseil economique 
et social et culturel (1990) 
• Doone son avis comme auparavant 
• 1990 : duree du mandaI des 
conseillers : 4 ans. 
Le C.E.S.C. realise desormais sa 
propre initiative des etudes sur leg 
I~ entrant dans sa competence. 
Cbambre territoriale 
descomptes 
• 1984 : tutelle budgetaire du terri· 
toire par la cour des comptes 
• 1990 : tutelle devolue ~ 18 
Chambre territoriale des comptes. 
Conseil d'arcbipel (1990) 
• I Conseil dans chaque archipel 
• membres : elus de ees arehipels. 
conseillers lerritoriaux et maires 
• emet des avis sur les plans de 
developpement et la desserte des 
archipels. 
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Within these limits, territorial representatives experienced increased 
powers under the Internal Autonomy Statute. Article 21 of the 1977 statute had 
allowed the Territorial Government Council authority over territorial domains, 
the purchase of real estate for territorial administration purposes, the acceptance 
of gifts to the territory, public works, tariffs, private airports, territorial 
administration, local statistics, price control, preparation of import programmes 
within the budget constraints set by the State, local commerce, the application of 
labour law, the teaching of local languages, and the codification of territorial 
regulations)63 The Territorial Government, the body which replaced the 
Government Council, had greater powers than its predecessor. Unlike the 
Government Council, it was not presided over by the High Commissioner, who 
was now represented by a Territorial Vice-President elected by the Territorial 
Assembly. Instead, at the head of the Territorial Government was a President 
elected by the Territorial Assembly. The Territorial Government could have six 
to ten Ministers, as outlined in article 5, who were chosen by the Territorial 
President. 1M This Government exercised authority over territorial taxation, 
public health, transport, professional codes, insurance regulations, public 
market codes, the control of weights and measures and the repression of fraud, 
price control, urban planning, veterinary services, territorial administrative 
personnel, the issuing of statistics, territorial administration buildings, internal 
road, air and sea Jinks, electric power production, abbatoirs, ports and airports, 
weather forecasting, post and telecommunications, sport and culture, labour law 
and some professional training. 
Some of these attributions marked the return of powers lost under the 
Fifth Republic, namely the restoration of post and telecommunications to 
territorial control, and of the first cycle of secondary teaching. The Internal 
Autonomy Statute foresaw that the second cycle of secondary teaching would be 
returned to territorial tutelage in 1989 at the territory's demand. This actually 
occurred on 1 January 1988, in response to a private member's bill tabled in late 
1987 by Edouard Fritch, who was then the RPR Deputy for East Polynesia.16S 
State-territorial contracts were continued under the Internal Autonomy 
Statute. Articles 69 and 70 of the statute of 1977 had established the possibility 
of deve10pment contracts in the fields of technical and financial aid.166 This 
arrangement was confirmed by articles 103 and 104 of the 1984 statute. The 
Internal Autonomy Statute did not differ greatly from its predecessor in this 
regard. 
Compared with either the 1977 statute, or with the New Caledonian 
statutes of the t 9808, the Internal Autonomy Statute went further in recognising 
the existence of indigenous cultural identity. Article 90 stated: "La langue 
tahitienne est une matiere enseignee dans Ie cadre de 11l0raire normal des eccles 
maternelle et primaire",167 In the early 1990s, most indigenous languages of 
New Caledonia had yet to receive such status. The same article allowed the 
substitution by the territory of Tahitian with other Polynesian languages in the 
curricula of certain schools, in recognition of the cultural identities of 
archipelagoes such as the Marquesas, where Tahitian was not widely spoken. In 
practice, the teaching of Tahitian and other indigenous languages had been 
permitted in French Polynesian schools since 1980. Prior to this, French was 
the only language allowed, and pupils had been punished for speaking their 
native tongues in class)68 Local culture had been financed by the territory since 
the 1970s, when the Tahitian museum and a Polynesian Cultural Centre were 
founded.1 69 Tahitian had been recognised by the Territorial Assembly as an 
official language in November 1980,170 and it had become the main language 
used in the chamber from 1982. The three Ia Mana Councillors elected that year 
insisted on speaking Tahitian instead of French, much to the consternation of 
journalists and some assembly secretaries who did not know the language. This 
precedent was followed by representatives of Here Ai'a and most of the other 
Territorial Councillors who, being demis, were bilingual,l11 Due to the numbers 
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of the Tahitian population, Tahitian has become the dominant indigenous 
language in French Polynesia. It has penetrated public life to a far greater extent 
than any of the Melanesian languages in New Caledonia,I72 although it has not 
resisted the incursion of French as well as Wallisian and Futunan. Tahitian 
preeminence among local languages was resented by Polynesians from the outer 
islands. Marquesan Territorial Councillors have, on occasion, caused 
bewilderment among their Tahitian colleagues by addressing the Territorial 
Assembly in Marquesan, in an assertion of their identity in the face of both 
Tahitian and French cultural hegemony. 113 
Flosse feted the Internal Autonomy Statute as a substantial, if not total, 
fulfilment of his specifications for local rule. Its promulgation brought him 
considerable acclaim. and assisted his election on 14 September 1984 as the first 
Territorial President of French Polynesia under the new administrative 
framework. I74 Flosse's achievement eroded the following of Here Ai'a and left 
the party in some disarray. luventin's leadership of the Here Ai'a was 
. questioned in the light of Flosse's predominance over territorial politics. 
Tinomana Ebb, a Territorial Councillor and a party stalwart, left it in September 
1984 to form Te Aratia 0 Te Nunaa.t75 Te Aratia however did not manage to 
challenge Here Ai'a and has remained a minor party with Ebb as its sole 
territorial representative. The autonomists had been soundly outmanreuvred by 
Flosse as a result of his conclusion of the statute negotiations. He had 
implemented autonomist policies under Mitterrand to a greater extent than they 
had managed under Giscard d'Estaing. The former members of the Front Uni 
found themselves suffering from an image problem. No longer could they 
distinguish themselves from Tahoeraa Huiraatira by calling themselves 
'autonomists'. They were left politically discredited, divided, and consequently 
faced diminishing electoral support. The Maohi nationalist fringe was likewise 
challenged by Plosse's achievement. The need for independence from France 
was questioned by Plosse and his followers. who pointed out that the Internal 
Autonomy Statute addressed demands for self-rule, and held the advantage of 
being open to further modifications should the territory so choose. 
Flosse instituted an annual territorial holiday to commemorate the signing 
of the Internal Autonomy Statute. This symbol of success was abandoned under 
the administration of Alexandre Uontieff from 1987 to 1991. At the first 
anniversary celebrations at the end of June 1985, in front of a crowd that 
included Penne and Messmer, who represented respectively Mitterrand and the 
RPR, Flosse freely paid tribute to the Socialist Government and to the Territorial 
Government for their part in the negotiations. In particular he praised 
Mitterrand's wisdom in transcending party divisions and impartially overseeing 
the statute negotiations.176 He placed the French Polynesian Internal Autonomy 
Statute in the traditions of the French Republic, describing the spirit of 
legislation of both the Fourth and Fifth Republics as offering to the TOM "des 
institutions nouvelles fondees sur l'ideal commun de liberte, d'egalite et de 
fraternite et con¥ues en vue de leur evolution democratique".l77 This rosy 
account avoided any mention of de Gaulle's opposition to local nationalists, or 
of local opposition to joining the Fifth Republic, but did go so far as to pay 
hommage to Pouvanaa, Teariki and Sanford for their furtherance of Polynesian 
identity through support for the 1977 statute. These comments preceded the 
observation that the previous statute had not gone far enough in granting self-
rule. This observation could be regarded as out of place coming from a man who 
had organised opposition to the pro-independence vote in 1958, supported the 
arrival of the CEP, and who had criticised the trio in question for their 
autonomist stances before borrowing their political platform. 
On the subject of the implementation of the Internal Autonomy Statute, 
Flosse mentioned the rapidity and efficiency with which new territorial 
institutions had been set up, and pointed out that although grey areas remained 
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and further reform would be needed, the legislation was adaptable to change 
without jeopardising the status of French Polynesia as a TOM: 
Ce pacte est bien entendu perfectible mais it convient tout d'abord d'en 
faire l'ex¢rience et de d~finir. en eoncertation avec l'Etat,les diffieulres et les 
obscwit~ auxquel1es it conviendra de rem&lier. [ ... ] C'est dans ce sens que nons 
consid&ons qu'it est evotutif. [ ... 1 Ie ne me cache pas que certains, parmi les 
potyn~ens [fran~ais], envisagent ce mot evolutif dans un sens tout different du 
n6tre. [ ... J It y a eeux, de plus en plus rares, qui nostalgiques d'une p6riode 
coloniale revolue, pensent encore qu'it n'y a point de salut en dehors de la 
depanementalisation. [ ... J II ya aussi eeux qui. par inconscience on par ealent 
personnel, nous poussent ~ reclamer une indq,endance qui De peut que nous 
condnire au chaos et a fa misere. [ ... 1 Nons rejetons ces deux extremes mais 
cela ne veut pas dire que nous sommes partisans de l'immobilisme.178 
Flosse used his speech at the celebrations to establish the orientations of 
his administration's political programme. Now that the new territorial 
administrative structure had been established, work could proceed on social 
reform "en faveurdes plus demunis", accords could be arbitrated between 
employers and unions, and investment could be made in the exploitation of . 
natural resources.179 
At this time, New Caledonia was still embroiled in controversy over self-
determination, to the neglect of socio-economic reform. While Fabius and Pisani 
were confronted with troubles in New Caledonia, Lemoine was able to 
supervise the implementation of the Autonomy Statute. He did so for the first 18 
months following its promulgation in September 1984, through until the 
Socialist defeat in the legislative elections of March 1986. 
While New Caledonian political factions were at loggerheads with Paris 
in the first months of 1985, relations between the French Polynesian 
Government and Paris were exceedingly amenable, considering the different 
political pedigrees of their respective representatives. Far from bringing wrack 
and ruin at the hands of the PC, as had been suggested by some local 
Giscardians in 1980, Socialist rule had proved administratively fruitful. The 
period of conservative dominance in Papeete. which coincided with PS 
dominance in Paris produced a high level of accord and cooperation rather than 
the dissent and discord which might have been expected. The marginal status of 
the Maohi nationalists in French Polynesia, the weight of territorial dependence 
on funds from Paris, and Socialist preparedness to meet most of the demands of 
the Tahoeraa Huiraatira, lay at the source of this political marriage of 
convenience. . 
After the State-Territorial Coordinating Committee established by the 
Internal Autonomy Statute held its fIrst meeting in Paris during the ftrst week of 
December 1985, Lemoine presented a positive balance sheet of the fIrst fourteen 
months of the new administrative arrangements, asserting that they had met local 
demands and responded to Socialist policy of recognising local conditions in the 
DOM-TOM: 
II me semble que I'autonomie interne repond en ce moment A une n~ssire, a 
un besoin qui s'etait exprime en Poiynesie fran~ise. Ie crois que Ie propre de 
l'outre~mer est d'avoir ses s¢Cificites et done it faut savoir adapter les 
conditions statutaires aces situations.I80 
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The Limits of Autonomy 
Despite prevailing good will between Papeete and Paris from September 
1984 to March 1986, this period did not pass without some controversy. The 
form of autonomy which the Internal Autonomy Statute created had its limits. 
The sovereignty boundaries which could not be crossed involved French 
Polynesian external relations with the other Pacific TOM, with the South Pacific 
region and, later, with Europe. In his enthusiasm to exercise greater powers on 
behalf of the territory, and driven by partisan political opportunism, in 1985 
Flosse collided with the ftrst of the barriers which these limits imposed. 
Flosse aroused the ire of Pisani on 13 February 1985 when he arrived in 
Noumea to sign an "alliance des Territoires fran¥ais du Paciftque".181 Acting as 
Presidents of the Territorial Governments of New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia, Ukeiwe and Flosse cosigned a document which had been approved 
by the Territorial Assemblies of both TOM.182 Consisting of 12 articles, the 
Interterritorial Alliance was a tool for expressing the united conservative 
opposition of the territorial administrations of the three Pacific TOM to the 
concept of New Caledonian independence. (Appendix 5) The document stressed 
the necessity of preserving the Republican values and democratic traditions of 
France at a time when these were "mis en peril, dans cette partie du Pacifique, 
par des tentatives d'hegemonie faites sous couvert d'ideologies". Negative, 
veiled reference to the dangers of Kanak nationalism was contrasted with the 
necessity for "Ie respect de la Constitution", "la defense du monde libre dans 
cette partie du monde", and the maintenance of "l'integrite du territoire national". 
The Alliance stressed pan-TOM unity "etablie sur la base d'un ideal commun de 
liberte, d'egalite et de fraternite et sur la solidarite des peuples qui les composent [ ••• J pour assurer la prosperite economique, Ie progres social et Ie 
developpement culturel de leurs habitants". The rest of the text established a 
conference of Territorial Presidents which would be held four times a year, with 
a Secretariat as well as a Permanent Interterritorial Commission comprised of 
two Territorial Counci11ors or Ministers from each territory. This structure was 
to be financed from territorial budgets. At the time of the signature of the 
Alliance, Wallis and Futuna was not a party to the document, though provision 
was included for it to join. From 6 to 14 February 1985 an RPCR delegation to 
Mata Utu lobbied the Territorial Assembly and custom representatives there to 
back the Alliance. The delegation claimed to have Wallis and Futuna's "oui de 
principe", with Brial expressing "Ie soutien total" of the local branch of the 
RPR.183 
The Interterritorial Alliance constituted Flosse's expression of solidarity 
with the RPCR, and opposition to Kanak nationalism. While Flosse had 
embraced internal autonomy for French Polynesia, he shunned the concept of 
independence in association which was proposed by Pisani for New Caledonia 
in January 1985. At the time of the signature of the Interterritorial Alliance, 
Flosse advocated that in the absence of a sympathetic government in Paris, it 
was up to the representatives of the Pacific TOM to unite and display their 
attachment to France, their rejection of any possible balkanisation of the French 
Pacific, and their need for unity in the face of presumed foreign threats. 184 In 
backing the RPCR, Flosse used his status as the highest French Polynesian 
political representative to act as the protector of French Polynesian immigrants in 
New Caledonia.185 Among the inhabitants of Thio, the mining settlement 
occupied by the FLNKS in late 1984, were around 700 Polynesians, including 
Wallisians and Tahitians. 186 
In March 1985, the alliance partners began consideration of a common 
market for the French Pacific, which would involve the establishment of a free 
trade zone. 187 This proposition was cut short by Socialist opposition to the 
Interterritorial Alliance. Pisani was unimpressed with the pact. He declared it 
both illegal and unconstitutional and began legal proceedings against it at the 
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time of its signature.188 He contended that Flosse and Ukeiwe had exceeded 
their authority and were infringing domains which were the concern of the 
French State. He had grounds for asserting this. Article 3 of the Interterritorial 
Alliance, which envisaged that alliance members would establish direct contacts 
with foreign South Pacific territories, was a direct challenge to state authority 
over foreign affairs. Plosse and Ukeiwe responded by publicly denouncing the 
Pisani Plan, and by claiming that as a Socialist appointee Pisani was unfit to 
represent France because he lacked impartiality.189 Neither Plosse nor Ukeiwe 
were particularly notable for their objectivity over this matter themselves, and it 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Interterritorial Alliance was a product 
of the sort of partisan attitudes for which they berated Pisani. 
On 9 April 1985, the New Caledonian Adminstrative Tribunal annulled 
the Interterritorial Alliance, judging that Ukeiwe had exceeded the constitutional 
powers of the Territorial President as outlined under the Lemoine Statute.190 
Specifically, relations with foreign powers lay beyond the competences outlined 
in the statutory regulations. Flosse and Ukeiwe circumvented this annulment by 
signing another alliance in Papeete on 29 June 1985. The new text was exactly 
the same as the one which had preceded it, except that it dropped all mention of 
territorial powers of negotiation with foreign states.t 91 By this stage the 
achievement of the Interterritorial Alliance was more rhetorical than anything 
else. Since June 1985, nothing much has come of the Alliance. When the 
presumed imminence of plans for New Caledonian independence in association 
with France receded, so too did Flosse and Ukeiwe's front against it 
In August 1985, Plosse was to have another of his initiatives as 
Territorial President rebuffed. He attended a South Pacific Forum meeting on 
Rarotonga in the Cook Islands with the aim of obtaining observer status for 
French Polynesia. With the sponsorship of the Cook Islands. Flosse argued 
with Forum members that French Polynesia should receive observer status so . 
that it might be "a la fois la voix de la France et celie de Ja PoJynesie Fran~aise au 
sein du Forum du Pacifique Sud")92 He indicated that the status of French 
Polynesia was now comparable to that of the Cook Islands, which had full 
member status in the Forum in spite of not being a fully independent State. 
French Polynesia was able to attend South Pacific Commission meetings; by 
logical extension it should be able to attend Forum meetings as well. The 
response of the South Pacific Forum was that French Polynesian autonomy was 
not as far evolved as that of the Cook Islands. Flosse was still, in essence, a 
French representative, not a Polynesian one. As such he would be denied 
observer status, as the Forum was a political organisation for South Pacific 
nations rather than for local representatives of a European power.l93 
The European connection French Polynesia enjoyed through France 
came to impinge on the sphere of territorial administration under the Internal 
Autonomy Statute during the late 1980s. Since the birth of the EEC in 1957, 
French Polynesia and the other Pacific TOM had been considered community 
members, falling within the Treaty of Rome's category of Overseas Country or 
Territory.194 French membership of the European Community had resulted in 
certain advantages for territorial trade. Products could be exported to Europe free 
of customs duty due to the islands' status as a European Overseas Territory, 
while European imports were still subjected to territorial import tariffs, provided 
that no discrimination was exercised over products originating from different 
Community members.195 Moreover, French Polynesian copra. exports 
benefited from European Community subsidies.196 As European citizens, 
French Polynesians have since 1959 enjoyed the right of free circulation Within 
the EEC. while reciprocal arrangements did not apply to French Polynesia.197 
The territory has also been eligible for European development funding. 198 
Under EEC legislation, French Polynesia and the other Pacific TOM were 
considered to be little extensions of Europe in the South Pacific, while the fragile 
nature of their economies and the smallness of their populations were shielded 
160 
by these and other protective measures. The extent to which European status 
applied to French Polynesia in other respects was to prompt considerable debate 
in the territory in the years preceding European Union in 1993. 
Speculation centred on whether internal autonomy might be threatened 
by EC representatives in Brussels and Strasbourg. Although Flosse and 
Ukeiwet99 have been European parliamentarians, none of the Pacific TOM have 
permanent direct representation in the European Parliament or in other Ee 
bodies. Generally metropolitan French representatives are considered to speak 
on the behalf of the Pacific TOM in EC discussion"s, and are obliged to consult 
territorial leaders over legislation that is of direct concern to them.2OO As is the 
case with French legislation, Paris can choose to ignore the opinions of 
territorial leaders, whose role is limited to an advisory capacity. This 
arrangement has been unsatisfactory on those occasions when the French 
Polynesian Territorial Government has differed with Paris on certain aspects of 
Ee legislation. Not only may its opinion be ignored by France, but also the 
territory has no direct recourse to the EC. A similar situation, of course, applies 
to metropolitan Departments, which are less privileged than French Polynesia in 
that their leaders are not able to impose tariffs to protect the local economy. For 
example, the entry of Spain and Portugal into the EEC affected the wine 
producers of southern France, as cheaper Portuguese and Spanish wines were 
able to enter the French market without hindrance. 
Of the various measures envisaged for European Union in 1993, those 
enabling the lifting of border controls and visa restrictions for European citizens 
seeking to live and work in other member countries aroused the greatest disquiet 
in French Polynesia. Visions of hordes of sun-seeking Europeans hoping to live 
and work on the territory's renowned tropical islands existed in the minds of 
certain territorial leaders. Local politicians speculated that such an influx would 
deprive French Polynesians of job opportunities, as the labour market would be 
flooded by well-educated outsiders. The spectre of European firms moving in to 
buy up large portions of the local economy was also raised.20t Paris has tended 
to dismiss or ignore such concerns as groundless, and has not always shown 
great concern in calming them. 
The first major open expression of French Polynesian discontent with 
French handling of European integration came in 1989. In May of that year, the 
Territorial Assembly received the text of an EC bill which would permit 
European doctors and veterinarians to establish themselves freely anywhere in 
the Ee. On the grounds that European immigrants might put such local 
professionals out of work, the Territorial Assembly unanimously opposed the 
bill in a deliberation on 26 May, only to discover that the bill had already been 
approved by France.202 
The Territorial Government united with opposition parties and called on 
voters in the territory to protest by boycotting the European parliamentary 
elections in June 1989. On polling day, 18 June, only 10.76% of the local 
electorate voted. 203 This turnout showed the effects of a greater electoral boycott 
than any the FLNKS had organised in New Caledonia. Even compared with the 
traditionally poor French Polynesian participation rates in European elections, 
this was a low turnout. In the European elections of June 1979, 56.66% of 
registered voters had cast votes.204 In June 1984, 58.48% of registered voters 
had participated.205 It was speculated that most of the minority who voted in 
June 1989 consisted of metropolitan French living in French Polynesia.206 
In the National Assembly Alexandre Uontieff, at that time Deputy for 
West Polynesia, called on the Rocard Government to permit French Polynesia to 
negotiate directly with the EC in defence of its interests: 
II convient [ ... J d'6viter que les institutions territoriales ne soient 
progressivement depouil16es de leurs com¢tences au profit des instances 
europrennes [ ... J Mais d'autre part, les 6lus polyn6siens estiment que les 
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directives euro¢ennes, prises sans consultation pr~able des responsables du 
territoire, pourraienl compromettre gravement I'equilibre OConomique et social 
local.207 
Brice Lalonde, the Secretary of State to Environmental Affairs, replied 
on behalf of Le Pensec, promising that the Government would endeavour to take 
French Polynesia into account in future EC negotiations, and would continue 
consulting the territory, although he made no response to Leontieffs demand for 
direct EC representation. Not surprisingly, French Polynesian autonomy did not 
stretch to the extent of permitting independent representation to the EC. 
The question of. European Immigration and investment in French 
Polynesia became more pressing as European Union approached. Article 8(a) of 
the Maastricht Treaty permitted European citizens to circulate and settle freely in 
the EC without immigration controls,2OS while barriers to foreign investment 
were also lifted. Senator Millaud expressed general support for European Union 
with reservations in these fields. He pointed out that although under article 3 of 
the Internal Autonomy Statute the High Commissioner controlled immigration, 
and under article 31 had to consult the Territorial Government on immigration 
permits, this arrangement might be overridden by the Maastricht Treaty. 
European citizens refused residence in French Polynesia could contest this veto 
by invoking EC arbitration on the grounds of discrimination contrary to articles 
8D and 138D of the Treaty.209 Article 3 of the Maastricht Treaty, which 
envisaged fixing joint European policy on agriculture, fisheries and tourism, 
represented another contentious point for Millaud.210 He expressed the 
reservation that the territorial economy might end up being adversely affected by 
ill-considered decisions made in Strasbourg and Brussels.211 
In 1989, Leontieff was highly critical of European integration,212 
although oddly he did not doubt its economic and social benefits for French 
Polynesia. He differed from Plosse, who had serious doubts about the 
implications for the territory, and who called for French Polynesian voters to 
abstain from the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in September 
1992.213 Leontieff advocated a vote for European Union, arguing that the 
greater export opportunities it offered outweighed possible immigration 
problems. Vernaudon and Millaud, the other two French Polynesian 
parliamentary representatives at the time. broadly agreed with Leontieff. but of 
the three, Leontieff was the most vigorous in his support.214 
Addressing MiJ1aud's reservations, Leontieff pointed to article 232 of the 
Treaty and claimed that its provisions for the control of European immigration to 
Overseas Territories would prevent a European invasion of French Polynesia. 
Leontieff also supported the Treaty because it recognised the autonomy of the 
Pacific TOM. Although article 227 declared that in the case of policy divergence 
between the EC and an Overseas Country or Territory, the European Council 
would have the final say, a declaration appended to the Treaty allowed a contrary 
resolution. Where differences were marked, a member country and its Overseas 
Territory could act in the interests of the territory and override the European 
Council.215 Such a measure could be applied to European immigration and 
investment in French Polynesia, as well as to the application of economic policy. 
In the Ught of this declaration, it appears that France should be able to block 
European immigration and investment which it deems harmful to French 
Polynesian interests, and to veto any European economic policy ill-adapted to it 
or the other Pacific TOM. 
Debate in Papeete over the implications of European integration for the 
Internal Autonomy Statute brought into contention the durability of the 
legislation, and the possibility that it might be overruled unilaterally by forces 
beyond the control of the Territorial Government. With the aim of strengthening 
their autonomy French Polynesian representatives have, since 1984, lobbied 
Paris for various modifications to the Statute. 
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During cohabitation from 1986 to ·1988, this lobbying did not make any 
notable progress. While the Chirac Government made vigorous efforts to 
overturn Socialist legislation for New Caledonia implemented between 1981 and 
1986, the same administration was reluctant to tinker with the Internal 
Autonomy Statute. It had no mandate or inclination to revise legislation which 
had been unanimously approved by the National Assembly, and feted by RPR 
representatives in the French Polynesian Government. Moreover although the 
Statute was conceived of as open to further change, it had only been in operation 
for 18 months at the time of Chirac's accession to government. Insufficient time 
had passed for justifiable major revisions to be implemented. To attempt 
legislative revisions in French Polynesia as were undertaken in New Caledonia 
would have been unnecessary and pointless. Pons announced during a visit to 
Papeete in May 1986 that he saw no need to enlarge French Polynesian 
autonomy, and warned that going further in that direction might provide 
inadvertent encouragement to local nationalists. He declared to the Territorial 
Assembly in May 1986: 
Vous MnMiciez [d'un] statut de large autonomie, qui correspond, j'en suis 
persuad6, aux vreux de I'immense majorit6 des Polyn6siens. Nous ne devons 
donc certainement pac; bouleverser vos institutions nouvel1es. EUes 6tabHssent 
un 6quiIibre qui, globalement. parait satisfaisanL216 
As with the earlier round of statute negotiations from 1982, the 
necessary precondition to further statute renovation was a change in government 
in both Paris and Papeete. The appointment of Rocard as Prime Minister in May 
1988 marked the beginning of a new era for French Polynesia as it did for New 
Caledonia. The Rocard Government was corifronted with major changes in the 
French Polynesian political landscape since the Socialists had left government in 
March 1986. (Tables 39, 40) 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira was no longer preeminent in local politics, having 
been displaced in a bout of infighting that took place in 1987. The leader of this 
dissent was Alexandre Leontieff, who was then Minister for the Economy, 
Tourism and the Sea. Discontented with territorial social and economic policies, 
which had become discredited by the social disharmony evident in the Papeete 
riot of October 1987, Leontieff decided to break away from the Territorial 
Government. 217 On 1 December 1987, along with Georges Kelly, the 
Agriculture Minister, and Huguette Hong Kiou, Social Affairs Minister, he 
resigned from the Government.218 At this time, Flosse was in Paris, fulfilling 
his duties as Secretary of State to the South Pacific, an appointment he had 
received from Chi rae in March 1986. He had resigned from the post of 
Territorial President on 9 February 1987, because of the pressure of his 
ministerial duties, and had been replaced three days later by his associate 
Jacques Teuira.219 Since February, Flosse had been constrained to devote less 
attention to territorial politics because of his series of ministerial visits around the 
Pacific. Flosse returned to Papeete on 3 December to find Tahoeraa Huiraatlra 
and the Territorial Government in a state of disarray. Faced with a motion of 
censure from 28 of the 41 members of the Territorial Assembly, including 14 
majority Councillors, on 7 December Teuira resigned from the territorial 
presidency.220 
He was replaced by Alexandre Leontieff two days later.221 That month 
Uontieff formed a new party, Te Tiarama (The Torch), from the Tahoeraa 
Huiraatira members who had sided with him. He consolidated his power 
through the support of autonomist and Maohi nationalist representatives. In all, 
his new majority encompassed representatives from ten different parties. Their 
unity was cemented as much by their common dislike of Flosse as by their 
hopes for Leontieffs vision of a territorial "plan de relance". It was Uontieff 
who was to be instrumental in the renegotiation of the Internal Autonomy 
Table 39. French Legislative Elections, 1986. 
French Polynesian Results 
16 March 
Registered voters 
Valid votes 
103,489 
74,359 
Party Votes % 
Tahoeraa 30,580 
Amuitabira I 14,252 
la Mana 6,680 
Here Atia 13,048 
Tavini 4,739 
Te Ea No Maobi 4,231 
PSP 829 
of valid votes 
41.12 
19.17 
8.98 
17.55 
6.37 
5.69 
1.11 
Seats 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Gaston Flosse and Alexandre Leontieff were elected. 
Source: Official results, Haut-Commissariat de la 
Republique en Polynesie fran~aise (pbotocopies). 
1 Amuitabira No Polynesia. A sbort-lived coalition including Ebb, 
Vernaudon, Braun-Ortega and tbeir followers. 
Table 40. French Polynesian Territorial Elections 
1986 
Territorial Results: 16 March 
Registered voters 103,667 
VaHd votes 74,492 
Party Votes % of valid votes Seats 
Tahoeraa 29,881 40.11 22 
Amuitahira 12,495 16.77 5 
Here Aita 10,369 13.92 5 
la Mana 6,134 8.23 3 
Tavini 4,770 6.4 2 
PSP 374 0.50 0 
Others 10,469 14.05 4 
Sources: Official results, Haut-Commissariat de la 
Republique en Polynesie fran~aise (photocopies); 
Henningham: France in the South Pacific p.151. 
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Statute, although at the time of his election, this prospect was considered a less 
pressing matter than various development plans.222 
Widespread backing for Leontieff during the first months of his 
administration was apparent when he stood for re-election as Deputy for West 
Polynesia in the legislative elections of June 1988. (fable 42) In March 1986, he 
had been elected to the seat on an RPR ticket, at the same time as Flosse had 
won the East Polynesian seat for the party. (Table 39) By June 1988, 
Leontieffs political alignment was perplexing. He was described by Le Monde 
in its electoral results as standing on an "RPRJPS" platform,223 while not really 
belonging to either camp. It was true that he had campaigned for Chime in the 
presidential elections,224 in which Mitterrand had gained an absolute majority of 
the vote in French Polynesia. (Table 41) However Uontieff was not a member 
of Chirac's inner circle as Plosse was, and had not been on good terms with the 
Prime Minister after having won the territorial presidency.225 Neither had 
Leontieff joined the PS, although he and his ally Vernaudon had Socialist 
backing in 1988 because of their challenge to Flosse's authority and their 
consequent nuisance value to Chirac. Spelling a major reverse for the Tahoeraa 
Huiraatira-RPR axis, Uontieff was re-elected in June 1988, while Flosse lost 
his seat to Vernaudon, an independent presidential majority candidate.226 By the 
time of his unsuccessful attempt at re-election in the legislative elections of 
March 1993, (Table 48) Uontieff had shifted allegiance to the UDF. This move 
finalised his break with the RPR or, more to the point, with Flosse, its 
preeminent spokesman in French Polynesia.227 Evident in the career of 
Uontieff is the extent to which personality politics rather than political ideology 
played a detennining role. Metropolitan French political categories such as 'Left' 
and 'Right' are inadequate for defining the fickle shifts of loyalties and party 
allegiances in Papeete. 
Thanks to the majority support of a governing coalition which even 
included Ia Mana representatives, and in spite of his past associations with the 
RPR, in mid-1988 Uontieff found himself comfortably placed to negotiate with 
the Rocard Government. Uontieff wished, as Plosse had, to see the powers of 
the territory extended beyond the confines of the Internal Autonomy Statute. 
This goal was well in keeping with the open-ended nature of the terms of the 
Statute, and Paris was receptive to certain revisions of its text. Discussions on 
redrafting the legislation took place between territorial representatives and Le 
Pen sec in Paris in July 1989. Le Pen sec visited Papeete that month to announce 
that a "modernisation" of the Internal Autonomy Statute would be carried out in 
the months to follow.228 Rocard confirmed this undertaking during his own 
visit to French Polynesia from 24 to 27 August 1989. He pronounced himself 
prepared to adopt new measures, namely "clarifier les rapports entre Ie 
Gouvernement territorial et l'assemblee, [ ... J developper Ie champ de 
competences du Territoire, notamment pour les relations economiques 
regionales, [ ... J apporter des garanties supplementaires de rigueur dans la 
gestion des affaires pubUques avec la creation d'une Chambre territoriale des 
comptes, [ ... J developper les structures de concertation dans les archipels".229 
The aim of such reform was presented by Rocard and Le Pensec as fine-tuning 
rather than as a major overhaul, as they both observed that the Internal 
Autonomy Statute had largely functioned satisfactorily during its fmt five years. 
The modifications to the legislation were codified with the promulgation 
of Law no.90-612 in July 1990.230 The changes had received the unanimous 
approval of the Senate on 17 April 1990,231 and had been adopted by a majority 
of the National Assembly with PS and UDF backing. The RPR and the UDC232 
opposed the revision of the Internal Autonomy Statute on the basis that increased 
territorial autonomy was unnecessary. The PC abstained. The Communists were 
not opposed to the principle of increasing territorial responsibilities, but did not 
agree with the revisions proposed.233 This law was consistent with the 
proposals that Rocard had outlined eleven months before and enhanced the 
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Internal Autonomy Statute. Many of the changes to the Statute were cosmetic, 
consisting of clarifications of passages which had been found ambiguous. For 
example, article 3, subsection 5 of the 1984 legislation stipula,ting state control 
over foreign commerce, with the exception of territorial control over the setting 
of the annual import programme and the level of territorial imports under articles 
25(9) and 26(1) was compressed into a single clause.234 The other changes 
concerning state authority were similarly minor. Article 3, subsection 13, tidied 
up the outline of the State's role in the functioning of the justice system, for 
which it assumed the administrative costs, with some minor exceptions. A 
section in article 3, which dealt with the territorial EEZ, defined the procedure by 
which the territory would be conceded the exploration and exploitation rights to 
natural resources, without in any way threatening state sovereignty in this 
domain.235 
Globally though, the territory benefited from various concessionary 
measures implemented by Law no.90-612. Under article 5, the number of 
Ministers in the Territorial Government was increased from a range of six to ten 
to six to 12, a change which both lightened the workload of individual 
Ministers, and enlarged the ministerial payroll. Article 28 permitted the 
Territorial Government to authorise all direct foreign (non-French) investments 
in French Polynesia, whereas previously it had not been competent if such 
investment exceeded 80MFF in value. This was a potentially important change. 
An addition to article 31 served to address local concerns about immigration 
control by instituting a State-Territorial Consultative Immigration Committee. 
The Territorial President enjoyed enhanced status. Under article 37, the 
requirement to submit the presidential list of Ministers to the Territorial 
Assembly for approval was abrogated.236 The President was allowed greater 
powers of representation to international fora. Proposals could be made by the 
President to the State for the opening of negotiations with Pacific nations in any 
field relevant to French Polynesia. Under article 39, the President was 
additionally guaranteed representation at such negotiations, and could be 
designated to represent the French Republic either in Pacific international 
organisations, or in the United Nations. 
The Territorial Assembly, although deprived of its power of veto over 
the composition of Territorial Governments, retained its capacity to call a no 
confidence vote, and under article 52 his was given financial autonomy from the 
Government by being allowed to set its own budget, with the Territorial 
Assembly President assuming charge of its accounts. The Economic and Social 
Committee was renamed the Economic, Social and Cultural Council in a revision 
of articles 82 to 89, a modification indicative of a wider advisory role to the 
Territorial Assembly than it had held previously. 
A major addition to the territorial administration outlined by Law no.90-
612 was the creation, under article 89 his, of Archipelago Councils. One of 
these was envisaged each for the Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands, the 
Austral Islands, the Tuamotu and Gambier Islands, and the Marquesa Islands. 
(Map 7) Comprised of a mix of local body and territorial representatives, these 
bodies were to be consulted by the Territorial President over territorial 
development plans that might touch upon them. Their advisory role extended to 
social and cultural as well as economic affairs. The Archipelago Councils 
addressed long-standing complaints, particularly from the distant Marquesas, 
that the interests of the Society Islands tended to be over-represented at territorial 
level due to their demographic weight. 237 Unfortunately for the outer islands, 
these administrative entities have been neglected by the Territorial Government 
since the return by Flosse to the office of Territorial President in April 1991.238 
They may yet receive more attention and encouragement under future Territorial 
Governments. 
Addressing to some extent an issue which had not received any great 
attention in the original text of the Internal Autonomy Statute, article 90 his of 
Table 41. French Presidential Elections, 1988. 
French Polynesian Results 
First Round: 24 April 
Registered voters 107,984 
Votes cast 60,585 
Turnout 56.11 % 
Valid votes 59,381 
Candidate Votes 
Mitterrand (PS) 26,05 I 
Chirac (RPR) 23,700 
Barre 5,992 
Le Pen (FN) 1,728 
Lajoinie (PC) 512 
Others 1,398 
Second Round: 8 May 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Mitterrand 
Chirac 
98,714 
58,013 
58.77% 
57,112 
Votes 
31,021 
26,091 
% of votes cast 
43.0 
39.12 
9.89 
2.85 
0.85 
2.31 
% of votes cast 
53.47 
44.97 
Sources: Official results, Haut-Commissariat de la 
Republique en PoJynesie fran~aise (photocopies); Le Monde 
10 mai 1988. 
Table 42. French Legislative Elections, 1988. 
French Polynesian Results 
First Round: 12 June 
First constituency 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
(West Polynesia) 
64,075 
32,776 
51.15% 
32,354 
Candidate 
Leontieff (RPR/PS) 
Fritch (RPR) 
Temaru (Tavini) 
Revault 1 
Votes 
13,225 
7,960 
4,587 
2,171 
2,067 
2,344 
% of votes cast 
40.35 
Graffe (UDF) 
Others 
24.29 
13.99 
6.62 
6.31 
7.15 
Second constituency 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
(East Polynesia) 
43,856 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Vernaudon 2 
Flosse (RPR) 
Salmon3 
24,725 
56.38% 
24,245 
Votes 
11,817 
11,416 
1,012 
1 Independent, presidential majority candidate. 
2 Independent,presidential majority candidate. 
3 Pro-independence candidate. 
% of votes cast 
47.79 
46.17 
4.09 
Second Round: 26 June 
First constituency (West Polynesia) 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
L~ontieff (RPR/PS) 
Fritch (RPR) 
Second constituency 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Vernaudon 
Flosse (RPR) 
64,080 
30,871 
48.18% 
30,018 
Votes % of votes cast 
19,331 62.62 
10,687 34.62 
(East Polynesia) 
43,826 
27,894 
63.65% 
27,467 
Votes 
13,931 
13,536 
% of votes cast 
49.94 
48.53 
Sources: Official results, Haut-Commissariat de la 
Republique en Polynesie fran9aise (photocopies); Le Monde 
14 juin 1988. 
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Law no.90-612 set up a "college d'experts" to advise the Territorial Assembly 
on land reform, a measure designed to improve official adjudication of 
ownership disputes. In 1993 this college remained a paper entity, as no effort 
had been made to set it up in spite of ongoing land disputes.239 The Territorial 
Government has shown inertia over land reform issues, both because of their 
complexity, and because it has been distracted by a range of other socio-
economic questions, and political infighting since 1984. Land issues persisted 
regardless. Ignoring them did not constitute a responsible administrative 
approach, either to the interests of potential commercial investors in the territory, 
or to those of indigenous landowners. As Bernard Poirine has pointed out, in 
the absence of any long-term policy on the difficult relationship between 
commercial investment and indigenous land rights, the Territorial Government 
has condemned itself to repetitive, circular arguing each time a new development 
project encounters opposition from indigenous land owners.240 
French Polynesian land refonn has not become the explosive issue that it 
has in New Caledonia, although it has been subject to the clash of traditional and 
European values. The primacy of individual over collective ownership has been 
challenged since the late 1980s by local nationalists and tribal leaders. Individual 
landholding had come to dominate the urban areas of the Society Islands, where 
tribal lands had been appropriated by the State. The legality of many of these 
appropriations has been attacked by those Polynesians who had lost their land, 
but French and territorial law continued to favour individual ownership.241 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira leaders argued that traditional land tenure was unproductive, 
archaic, and represented a hindrance to territorial development.242 As with the 
RPCR in New Caledonia, the party would have preferred to dismantle tribal 
holdings to aHow the establishment of commercially viable freehold farms. 
Such options were restricted by the fact that traditional collective 
subsistence tenure remained dominant outside the urban parts of the Society 
Islands where European economic values were most strongly established.243 
Plans prepared by Territorial Government for tourist and aquaculture 
investments have on occasion run into opposition from local landowners even 
within the Society Islands. The monarchist Pomare Party has been particularly 
active in this field since the 1980s, organising locals to protest against territorial 
development projects with land occupations reminiscent of those conducted by 
the PI and FLNKS.244 To what extent an eqUilibrium might be established 
between the conflicting interests of the Territorial Government and tribal leaders 
over land issues was still to be resolved in the early 1990s. In 1989, around 
2,000 cases of land litigation were presented, about one third of the court cases 
which took place in the territory that year.245 Population growth concurrent with 
attempts at local development by the Territorial Government are likely to result in 
continuing tensions in this area in years to come. FI and FLNKS agitation 
forced the French Government to pay greater attention to New Caledonian land 
reform, and the creation of bodies such as ADRAF. No equivalent body exists 
in French Polynesia, although the need for one is evident, as is the need for 
greater legal recognition of tribal land ownership if French Polynesia is to avoid 
the confrontations New Caledonia experienced over land reform. Before such an 
organisation can be established, the Territorial Government will need to abandon 
its past apathy over land refonn. 
Law no.90-612 did not represent the conclusion of the possibilities of 
the Internal Autonomy Statute. French Polynesian representatives will continue 
to lobby Paris for increased powers in years to come but, in the absence of 
majority voter support for self-determination, the French State is not likely to 
allow autonomy to develop into independence in the near future. Paris still 
maintains its capacity to abrogate some or all of the Internal Autonomy Statute, 
in spite of measures by Alexandre Leontieff to lessen the facility with which a 
French Government might do this unilaterally. In 1992 he tabled an amendment 
in Parliament to rewrite article 74 of the French Constitution as part of a bill 
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designed to adapt the Constitution to reflect the implications of European Union. 
This amendment accorded the administrative statutes of the TOM "loi organique" 
status, meaning that they could only be revised through the vote of an absolute 
majority in Parliament.246 It was adopted into the French Constitution in June 
1992.247 An afftrmation of the statutory status quo for the French Paciftc, this 
legislation nevertheless did not exclude the prospect of further reform. Although 
since March 1993 the Balladur Government has enjoyed the backing of an 
absolute majority in the National Assembly, there was no indication that it was 
contemplating statute reform in the ftrst few months after its appointment. As 
was the case with the Chirac Government in 1986, national issues such as rising 
unemployment were of greater immediate concern in Paris than French 
Polynesian statute reform. 
Socio-Economic Policy 1981 to 1991 
While the various French Governments appointed since Mitterrand's 
election to the presidency in 1981 have managed to resolve French Polynesian 
administrative demands by ceding a degree of autonomy, the responses of Paris 
to social and economic issues have neither broken territorial financial 
dependence on metropolitan France, nor reduced social inequalities, nor 
stimulated economic recovery, three prospects deemed desirable by territorial 
leaders, French Governments and state planners since the 1970s. 
Whether or not dependence was necessarily bad for French Polynesia, or 
whether a major reduction of it was possible, might validly be asked. The 
implantation of the CEP produced a period of unprecedented economic 
prosperity for part of the local population. For the majority of the inhabitants, 
mainly the Polynesians, who were not major beneftciaries of this economic 
prosperity, the effects were not so positive. The implantation of the CEP 
brought with it a high inflation rate and raised costs of living. Indigenous 
migration to Papeete deprived the agricultural sector of personnel, depopulated 
the outer islands, and resulted in the creation of a suburban underclass which 
hoped to gain a share in the prosperity but was poorly integrated for want of 
skills. 
As seen from Paris, perhaps the greatest disadvantage of the economic 
prosperity which came with the arrival of the CEP was the manner in which it 
raised the level of local affluence without resulting in increased territorial 
economic self-reliance. French Polynesians became accustomed to living a 
modem consumer lifestyle which, if unaided by state spending and subsidies, 
the local economy could not have sustained. Succeeding Governments in Paris 
claimed to wish to see the lessening of territorial reliance on mainland France 
through the revival of local agriculture and the encouragement of investment in 
tourism and light industry. This was an unrealistic hope so long as the most 
personally profttable areas of employment in French Polynesia remained in the 
'unproductive' sectors of the state and territorial administration. It was difftcult 
to redeploy the workforce into areas which the State desired to see expanded. 
Those locals who were in well-paid, secure jobs in the state and territorial public 
services were unlikely to wish to go into business or take up agriculture. 
Dependence on imported foodstuffs and consumer items had developed in the 
1980sto the point that a return to the less dependent times of the 1950s would 
be politically untenable. The introduction of import quotas would have caused a 
huge drop in territorial revenue, the collapse of a business sector reliant on 
imports, and would have resulted in widespread unemployment. Considering 
the population increase in French Polynesia since the 1960s, and the limited 
local resources, the territory is unlikely ever to be largely ftnancially self-
sufficient,' any more than any.ofthe sovereign island states of the South Paciftc 
are. Political independence for places such as Vanuatu and the Cook Islands has 
not been accompanied by great progress towards economic independence. Their 
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governments remain reliant on foreign aid and development loans for their 
financial equilibrium, just as French Polynesia depends on aid, subsidies and 
loans from Paris. However unbridgeable the gap between expectation and reality 
might be, if judged by the criteria of state and territorial officialdom, lack of 
great progress in these three fields has been a major shortcoming in French 
policy in the territory during Mitterrand's period as President 
The absence of a nationalist movement as disruptive as the FLNKS 
allowed Paris to concentrate on promoting territorial economic expansion to an 
extent not possible in New Caledonia for much of the 1980s. Yet at the end of 
that decade prospects for New Caledonian development under the Matignon 
Accords appeared sounder than the socio-economic situation of French 
Polynesia.248 In spite of a plethora of government development programmes, 
over a decade since 1a Mana's promises, proffered in 1981, of radical and 
egalitarian Socialist social and economic reconstruction for French Polynesia 
directed from Paris, no such changes have occurred. Ten years after 
Mitterrand's election in 1981, one French Polynesian journalist was led to 
conclude: "La decennie Mitterrand, pour la Polynesie, cfest quelques timides 
changements mais surtout la continuite ... ".249 
Like statute reform generally in the Pacific TOM, the direction of French 
Polynesian socio-economic policy was conditioned by criteria determined in 
Paris. As is discussed below, territorial leaders have been deficient in 
formulating original approaches to local developmental issues since attaining 
internal autonomy in 1984. Although PS, as well as UDF and RPR leaders, 
have periodically proclaimed the need for economic diversification, the reduction 
of dependence on metropolitan France, and the promotion of social equality, no 
fundamental change in the territorial economy and society has been effected by 
these parties in government, nor was it likely to occur, so long as the French 
Polynesian economy remained dependent on the CEP. Increased territorial 
economic dependence and growing social inequality were among the attendant 
effects of the CEP's presence, as has been explained earlier. It was no 
coincidence that these features persisted until April 1992 alongside the French 
Government's resolve to continue nuclear testing operations. 
SociaJist Ministers, having chosen to maintain the nuclear-based 
economy in French Polynesia established by their Gaullist and Giscardian 
predecessors, likewise chose to emulate their approach to local social and 
economic development. This approach entai1ed planning orientated towards the 
encouragement of the diversification of local production and the growth of a 
more export-orientated economy, while maintaining the CEP and its 
accompanying state of economic dependence. Not surprisingly, the CEP's 
presence has continued to outweigh measures promoting territorial self-
sufficiency. The CEP and its accompanying support services represented, along 
with the state funding they brought into the islands, the most important feature 
of territorial economic life throughout the 1980s. In 1988, CEP and military 
expenditure in French Polynesia was equivalent to 57.0% of the territorial 
budget and was, of course, supplementary to it.250 Defence spending overall 
accounted for 55.0% of state expenditure in French Polynesia that year, the 
equivalent of 18.7% of territorial GDP.251 
Since 1981 the establishment of French Polynesian internal 
administrative autonomy has not been accompanied by economic independence 
from France. While the French Polynesian cash economy was more substantial 
than that of Wallis and Futuna, it had yet to meet the level of New Caledonian 
self-sufficiency which, it should be observed, was itself relatively low by the 
standards of developed nations. (Tables 6, 25) In the early 1990s, the illusory 
goal of French Polynesian territorial self-sufficiency represented only a slightly 
less distant prospect than it did in the early 1980s. There had been no export-led 
economic recovery in the territory of the sort considered desirable by the Eighth 
Plan and its successors, and French Polynesia remained dependent on imported 
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goods. From 1983 to 1991, the coverage rate of imports by exports did grow 
from 6.5% to 14.0%. This trend represented only the beginning of a serious 
diminution of dependence. (Table 43) From 1977 to 1989 exports contributed a 
low average contribution of 0.9% to annual territorial growth in GDP.252 Import 
substitution, another orientation deemed desirable by the Eighth Plan to reduce 
local demands on expensive imported goods, likewise proved to be of marginal 
importance. From 1977 to 1989 import substitution contributed an average of 
0.7% to the total growth of GDP per annum.253 Trade dependence on 
metropolitan France persisted. The largest supplier of imports in 1991 was 
metropolitan France. Of all imports that year, French goods represented the 
greatest single proportion, at 48.24% of the total value.254 
In the absence of any Socialist willingness to abandon nuclear testing, 
there was to be no major challenge to the shape of a territorial society dependent 
on the CEP and state administrative funds for its existence. The priorities in 
social and economic changes begun in French Polynesia under Giscard 
d'Estaing were to retain their validity and formed the basis for continued 
development work in the 1980s. Socialist policy for the territory failed to differ 
with the orientations of Giscardian reformism to the extent that occurred in New 
Caledonia. Without a large Polynesian nationalist movement, there was to be no 
Socialist championing of Maohi identity to the degree that there was of Kanak 
identity, and no national debate on Maohi rights. Without an aggravating spur to 
their social consciences like the FLNKS, Socialist Ministers were not prompted 
to formulate original solutions to socio-economic questions in French Polynesia 
to the extent that they attempted them in New Caledonia. The recognition of 
Melanesian cultural identity and land rights under the Nainville les Roches 
declaration, the PisanilFabius Interim Statute, and the Matignon Accords, went 
far beyond state recognition of the indigenous population of French Polynesia. 
Prevalent in the implementation of socio-economic reform in French Polynesia 
by Socialist Governments was the dearth of leftist ideological thinking apparent 
in their handling of development issues in Wallis and Futuna. 
The major axes of economic development in the Eighth Plan (1981 to 
1985) - financial and technical assistance for professional training, public works 
construction, tourism projects, the expansion of aquacultural and agricultural 
production, as well as manufacturing - continued into the 1990s on the courses 
that had been determined over a decade earlier. The groundwork for many areas 
of developmental research had been laid in the 1970s. Aquaculture research, 
begun in the islands by the Pacific Oceanological Centre in 1973, was 
continued;255 as were renewable sea and solar energy projects started in 1978 
by the French Atomic Energy Commission.256 These schemes began producing 
tangible results in the 1980s. 
The establishment of Archipelago Councils in 1990 marked the extension 
of decentralisation measures begun in the early 1970s, when a territory-wide 
network of communes had been founded, and greater territorial funding had 
been channeled into local government. Development boards established in the 
1970s, such as the Intercommunal Equalisation Fund in 1971,251 and the 
Management and Development Fund of the Islands of French Polynesia in 
1979,258 respectively offered funding for communal administration and island 
development. Such measures to shore up the outer islands against depopulation, 
underdevelopment and economic decline by establishing viable cash economies 
were to be continued in the 1980s and early 1990s. Infrastructure renovation in 
the form of improved inter-island transport and communications was another 
aspect of decentralisation measures which were extremely important in a territory 
with a land and marine surface area equivalent to that of Europe, upon which 
were scattered small island populations living hundreds or thousands of 
kilometres apart. 
The aim of such reforms has been to promote local development to 
counteract the concentration of population and economic activity on Tahiti. The 
Table 43. French Polynesia's Exports and Imports 1983-1991 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Exports(MF CFP) 4,800 5,084 6,564 5,112 9,095 8,112 10,309 11,011 13,131 
Imports(MF CFP) 74,200 85,662 88,940 92,667 90,587 87,487 91,664 91,927 93,829 
Coverage 
Rate (%) 6.5 5.9 7.4 5.5 10.0 9.3 11.2 12.0 14.0 
Sources: Bernard Lalanne: "Le prix des DOM-TOM" in L'Expansion 8-21 mars 1985 p.80; IEOM: Exercice 1988 
Rapport d'activite. Polynesie fran~aise p.147, Rapport annuel 1990. Polynesie fran~aise p.168, Rapport 
annuel 1991. Polynesie fran~aise p.97. 
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drawback of these changes has been the expansion of local government 
bureaucracy on to islands, many of which had not experienced its permanent 
presence before. Miniature equivalents of what happened on Tahiti were 
established. A fortunate minority received employment in the new local 
government services, receiving a level of income that previously would not have 
been possible. Thus were created a privileged social group and income 
disparities which had not existed earlier. Rather than necessarily creating new 
work in the primary sector, the increase of bureaucracy in the islands expanded 
the tertiary sector, and imposed a greater financial burden on the Territorial 
Government. 
Social reform in the territory was to present the governments of the 
1980s with their greatest challenge. How to improve the living standards of 
slum dwellers who had already migrated to Tahiti in search of employment 
opportunities not offered in the outer isles was a difficult proposition. The 
Eighth Plan offered the nostrums of improving the education of such indigenous 
inhabitants to increase their chances of employment. and the provision of further 
public health and housing, alongside its vague mention of encouraging the 
greater participation of DOM-TOM inhabitants in administrative decisions 
affecting them. The Internal Autonomy Statute responded to this last 
consideration, but Territorial Governments since 1984 were to find themselves 
hard put to provide improved social services. 
There remained the issue of the gap between public and private sector 
wages. Although in the end personal income tax was not introduced by Dijoud, 
it appeared likely that the Mauroy Government would adopt the idea in order to 
bring about wealth redistribution by providing territorial funding through taxes 
for social welfare measures. The replacement of import levies with personal 
taxation might also lower consumer prices on imported goods. 
Such areas were the principal concerns and axes of development at the 
beginning of the 1980s. The rest of this section will examine how development 
theories expounded in Paris, and adopted by Territorial Governments since 
1984, failed to produce radically improved living standards and economic self-
sufficiency in French Polynesia. The seriousness of this problem was 
compounded by a worsening series of territorial budget overruns from the late 
1980s caused by the profligate spending of the Territorial Government and 
worsened by the reduction in the activities of the CEP. 
During his visit to French Polynesia in August 1981. as Secretary of 
State to the DOM-TOM Emmanue1li addressed the themes of greater territorial 
self-reliance through the growth of a productive economy. and the reduction of 
social inequalities. Like Pons six years later, he toured the slums on the outskirts 
of greater Papeete. Afterwards Emmanuelli proclaimed the need to redistribute 
local wealth through the introduction of personal income tax and greater social 
welfare funding: 
II Caudra restreindre certains privileges et s'attaquer aux in~galit~s les plus 
criantes, faire dispamitre les zones de misere, changer enfin la nature profonde 
de ce systeme 6conomique qui repose beaucoup trop sur une soci6t6 de 
marchands et restaurer ensemble one soci~ de producteurs.259 
Emmanuelli caUed for fiscal reform which would redistribute income to the 
benefit of the poor, and for land reform which would reduce land speculation 
and lower the inflated real estate prices on Tahiti and elsewhere. 
By the end of his period as Secretary of State to the DOM-TOM in March 
1983, Emmanuelli had not achieved these ambitious goals. French Polynesia 
remained dependent on imports, although the value of its exports did rise from 
2,800MF CFP in 1979260 to 4,800MF CFP by 1983. (Table 43) This increase 
was largely a reflection of private investment in pearl production and the rising 
value of this commodity on the international market at the time, movements for 
which the State could not plausibly claim credit. During the same period, 
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territorial imports rose in value from 54,800MF CFP261 to 74,200MF CFP. 
(Table 43) The coverage rate of exports by imports rose slightly, from 5.1 % to 
6.5%. 
Emmanuelli's period of administration over the DOM-TOM from 1981 to 
1983 was too short to allow him to improve the situation of the poor. The 
dropout rates of Polynesians in schools remained far higher than those of other 
ethnic groups, and the French education system, run by the State and the 
territory, had yet to fully respond to indigenous educational needs. It was not 
until the Internal Autonomy Statute was promulgated in September 1984 that the 
State recognised the place of indigenous languages in education. Social reform 
had yet to radically improve the lot of slum dwellers by the early 1980s. In 1982 
there were an estimated 22,000 people, around 13% of the population in French 
Polynesia, either in substandard housing or none at all. This was around the 
same figure as 13 years before.262 
The wealth gap between public servants and those unemployed or in the 
private sector remained. In 1982 state salaries were around 25% higher than 
private sector ones.263 The lowering of public sector salaries through the 
reduction of the various benefits accorded to state servants working in French 
Polynesia, as well as the introduction of a progressive income tax system which 
would in theory generally lower high incomes, appeared imminent following 
Emmanuelli's policy announcements in August 1981. But in the early 1980s this 
did not occur as it did in New Caledonia. One reason for this reluctance was 
that Emmanuelli and his successors probably feared adverse local reaction. 
Flosse and Tahoeraa Huiraatira's opposition to tax reform was well known. In 
any case, after the establishment of greater territorial powers under the Internal 
Autonomy Statute, the State devolved initiative to such policy initiatives to the 
Territorial Government. 
Although private sector wage levels were increased by raising minimum 
wages in the 1980s, Socialist Governments did not reduce state employee 
remuneration to the level of that of the private sector. While the Territorial 
Government abstained from taking this initiative for its employees too, it should 
be recognised that the remuneration of territorial public servants was fixed 
following the rates offered to their state counterparts. Having established salary 
parameters, it behove Paris to take the initiative and begin to reduce them. 
Reluctance to cut the higher wages state servants in the TOM received was partly 
caused by unwillingness to raise the ire of state sector unions. They and the 
Territorial Government would have attacked such a move as centralised, 
authoritarian direction, and would have promoted opposition and controversy 
which might have damaged state-territorial relations. In the absence of 
significant support for the PS in French Polynesia during the early 1980s, 
Socialist Governments acted cautiously. 
In 1989, the average monthly wage in agriculture, forestry and fishery 
work was 115,379F CFP, compared with 175,358F CFP for administration.264 
In this respect, egalitarian Socialist sentiments were not to be put into practice 
from 1981. They have at times been reiterated in more recent years, but sans 
lendemain. During his visit to French Polynesia from 15 to 18 May 1990, 
Mitterrand offered lofty sentiments echoing those of Emmanuelli nine years 
before: 
Enfin, rien ne sera construit sans l'hannonie sociaie, laquelle repose, it faut s'en 
convaincre,·sur une repartition equilibrre des fruits de Ia croissance, une juste 
. distribution des chances, une plus grande egalite. [ ... J La recherche d'une plus 
grande equite oblige II s'interroger sur les moyens de reduire les inegalites 
inMrentes aux structures economiques et sociales. [ ... J Voyez Ie probleme tres 
difficile de la fiscaHte. Le systeme fiscal polynesien fonde presque 
exclusivement sur la consommation ne peut guere repondre lll'obligation d'une 
plus juste repartition des richesses. II faudra bien un jour, aux conditions que 
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vous [Ie territoire] d~finissez et en l'adaptant ault rooli~ locales. introduire une 
fiscalit6 sur les revenus.265 
That Socialist leaders not taken the opportunity in the 1980s to bring about these 
social changes, through the introduction of personal income tax before the 
promulgation of the Internal Autonomy Statute, and by lowering the salaries of 
state employees, passed unobserved in the presidential speech. 
In the absence of other sources of income, the Territorial Government 
continued to impose tariffs on imported goods. and the cost of living 
consequently remained high. The private sector continued to be disadvantaged in 
the remuneration it could offer, and was therefore less attractive to locals, who 
preferred to work for the State or the territory in administrative posts. The 
agricultural workforce declined as a percentage of the population in paid 
employment, while the tertiary and secondary sectors increased slightly. In 
1980, 5% of paid workers were engaged in the primary sector, compared with 
21 % in the secondary sector, and 74% in the tertiary sector. By 1990, the 
balance had gone to 3%, 22% and 75% respectively.266 This balance had largely 
been determined before 1981, and was not to any great extent affected by 
refonns since that year. 
Socio-economic policy under Lemoine from 1983 to 1986 progressed 
along the lines of a1ready-established plans. Due to the preoccupation that statute 
negotiations represented for the State and the territory,267 social reform took a 
back seat during this period. One major social reform however was a housing 
scheme created in 1983 under a new organisation, the Territorial Reconstruction 
Agency. This effort was made only after cyclone damage had rendered 
imperative a new public housing plan.268 From 1983 to 1986, around 2,000 
destroyed houses were rebuilt, and around 6,000 damaged ones were repaired 
using funds from this agency, at a cost of approximately 7,OOOMF CFP.269 
Another project in 1983 aimed to restart the commerdal production of vanilla, to 
the point that 130ha of vanilla trees would eventually be under cultivation, 
enabling the harvesting of 150t of vanilla by 1990. The project was funded to a < 
level of 33% by EC development funds, 24% by the Territory, and 43% by 
vanma producers.210 As is discussed below, actual production fell far short of 
these expectations. . 
The extension of social welfare. housing plans. training and re-
employment schemes, as well as the promotion of investment in tourism; 
manufacturing, aquaculture and agriculture, were priorities con finned by Chime 
and Flosse for the period of cohabitation from March 1986. In Papeete on 26 
September 1985 Chirac accused Socialist refonns of not having been forceful 
enough to halt territorial social and economic stagnation.271 To some extent, this 
was true. There had been no export-led recovery from 1981 to 1986. The 
coverage rate of imports by exports had only risen slightly from 5.1% in 1979 
to 5.5% by 1986. (Table 43) Ia Mana's and Mitterrand's declared hopes in 1981 
of bringing about fundamental changes in the territory's social and economic 
structure remained unfulfilled five years later. For example, the unemployment 
rate had increased from 11.2% in 1983 to 15.0% in 1988.272 Job creation could 
not keep pace with the number of school Ie avers entering the labour market, 
resulting in rising youth unemployment.273 The RPR none the less excessively 
belittled the role of Socialist Governments in supporting territorial development, 
heaping praise on Flosse and his colleagues while neglecting to mention that 
their greater control over territorial development was the result of the creation of 
the Internal Autonomy Statute, and underestimating the importance of state 
development funding and expertise in the fields of agriculture and 
aquaculture.274 
The Chirac Government displayed a restrained approach <to French 
Polynesian development which differed from its reaction to New CaIedonia. It 
did not dissolve various agencies established since 1981 as it did in New 
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Caledonia, perhaps because there were fewer to dissolve, but also because their 
role was not as politicised as those of the Land Office and the various bodies 
promoting Kanak culture. There was to be no bickering over development 
funding comparable to that which took place between the three regions 
administered by the FLNKS and Paris. 
In Flosse, Chimc had a party representative who not only dominated the 
Territorial Government, but who also agreed with his socio-economic policies. 
Notably absent from this platform was the proposed introduction of personal 
income tax, or the reduction of public sector salaries in line with those of the 
private sector. On 15 April 1986 Flosse announced the reform policies of his 
Territorial Government under cohabitation, which were in fact no different from 
those of the Eighth Plan. Paradoxically in a territory so dependent on state 
funding and with little modem heritage of vigorous entrepreneurialism, Flosse 
stressed the importance of private enterprise, with the qualification that "Ie 
liberalisme doit etre tempere par un certain interventionnisme justifie par l'interet 
general. "275 He thus declared that the Territorial Government would continue its 
reliance on state funding, and in tum would retain its willingness to fund the 
social welfare system, and future local development projects. Flosse announced 
his intention of expanding territorial energy sources, work which had in any 
case been progressing since the 1970s. His declaration that the territory would 
become more self-sufficient in food harked back to the Eighth Plan, as did his 
comments that agricultural exports would be increased, fisheries exploitation 
would expand, small business would be encouraged, and tourism would be 
promoted. That such policies needed to be reitemted showed how little progress 
had been made since the Eighth Plan had been drawn up. Nor was the source of 
revenue for this work original: Flosse stated he would approach Paris for more 
development funding. 
Apparent in the orientations for territorial development offered by Flosse 
was an absence of original thinking. While the Territorial Government had 
attained a degree of administrative autonomy, it showed no signs of exercising 
any political autonomy in formulating new approaches to socio-economic 
development issues. No independent study of territorial development was 
undertaken while Flosse was President. Fundamental elements upon which the 
goal of increasing the weight of market capitalism in the territory hinged were 
left unconsidered. Balancing economic liberalism with interventionism would be 
no mean feat. If economic liberalism was the goal, what was the point of 
continuing to spend territorial revenue propping up a commercially unviable 
agricultural sector?276 If protectionism was the goal, why were local agricultural 
producers still open to competition from imported foodstuffs, including certain 
supposedly essential items (such as coffee) which were declared exempt from 
customs duties? The dependence of the Territorial Government on customs 
duties from imports was problematic in the context of striving for economic 
liberalism. If the Territorial Government actually did manage to establish a 
diversified, more self-reliant local economy, it would be cutting its own fiscal 
throat. The target of import substitution threatened territorial revenue. In the 
unlikely event that local food production was revived for example, a 
corresponding decline in food imports would deprive the territory of funding. 
The continued funding of social services would be rendered difficult if territorial 
revenue dropped greatly. The Territorial Government could resort to borrowing 
more money from the State although this activity would appear out of place in 
the context of a self-sufficiency drive. Another major issue to confront was how 
the territory was to bring about a redeployment of the skilled workforce from the 
public to the private sector. With the implementation of increased territorial self-
adiministration under the Internal Autonomy Statute, the tendency had been not 
to diminish the number of local bureaucrats but to increase it. There was little 
incentive for locals to show interest in the uncertainties of private enterprise 
when an expanding public service still offered better employment opportunities. 
Total 
Visi tors 
Table 44. Tourism in French Polynesia 1984-1991 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
101,595 122,086 161,238 142,820 135,387 139,705 132,361 
1991 
120,938 
Sources: IEOM: Exercice 1988. Rappon d'activite 1988. Poiynesie fran~aise p.108, Rappon annuel 1991. 
Poiynesie fran~aise p.37. 
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State planning until 1986 had not managed to master the complicated challenges 
to increased territorial self-sufficiency. There was little reason to think that a 
sudden change would be brought about by the Territorial Government if it 
employed the same reform orientations. 
Measures undertaken by the Territorial Government did not address 
deeper structural issues, but instead involved only minor organisational changes. 
From 1986 the reorganisation of territorial employment services was 
undertaken, including the introduction of new employment schemes, and the 
announcement of an intensification and diversification of professional training 
services.277 When faced with intractable social troubles in unemployment and 
housing, the Territorial Government passed on its responsibilities to Paris. In 
response to territorial calls for assistance, from December 1987. the State took 
charge of family allowances, formerly administered by the territory, budgeted 
for the annual construction of 250 state houses, and reimbursed the victims of 
the Papeete riot of October 1987.278 As a Deputy for French Polynesia, Fritch 
had complained to the National Assembly in October 1987 that the Territorial 
Government had inadequate state funding to meet its target of the construction of 
500 houses per year, a goal in itself unable to satisfy the needs of the local 
population.279 The Territorial Government was having trouble addressing the 
situation of the rural popUlation. Fritch in addition pointed out difficulties with 
the Social Protection Regime for the Rural Milieu. This social welfare scheme, 
established in February 1979 by the Territorial Assembly, was designed to 
support rural inhabitants with family benefits, sickness benefits, accident 
compens.ation and pensions, and was funded by both the State and the territory. 
The Territorial Government had been incapable of keeping the fund out of deficit 
from 1983, due to the rapid increase in the number of beneficiaries. Their total 
rose from 4,845 in 1982 to 8,234 in 1986. From 1983, the Territorial 
Government had been constrained to subsidise the fund with its budget sUlpIus 
and transfers of funds originally allocated to other portfolios. Fritch called for 
greater state funding, which was given to the territory .280 Communal funding 
was another area of contention, with Fritch calling for increased state 
participation in the Intercommunal Equalisation Fund.281 The 1988 budget for 
the DOM-TOM failed to meet Fritch's requests in this respect. There was a limit 
to the extent to which the State was prepared to act for the Territorial 
Government. 
Under cohabitation necessary work continued on the improvement of 
territorial infrastructure. The extension of electrification to the outer islands was 
an important aspect of this activity. By 1988,28 of the 75 inhabited islands in 
French Polynesia had electric power.282 The establishment of the Papeete 
campus of the French University of the South Pacific on 29 May 1987 was a 
high point in infrastructural development: the campus would offer French 
Polynesians unable. to afford tertiary education in metropolitan France the means 
to gain higher qualifications.283 Construction of the university branch began in 
1988. Plans for the establishment of a French university in the Pacific TOM 
dated back to the 1961,284 and preparatory discussions on the subject had been 
in progress under the Fabius Government. None the less the foundation of the 
university reflected well on the efforts of Plosse. 
Although such infrastructural work improved French Polynesia's 
situation during the period of cohabitation, French and Territorial Government 
policy expectations concerning economic growth were not met. Instead, the 
territorial economy declined in 1987, a trend which lasted beyond the end of 
cohabitation in 1988. Of particular concern was the decline in tourism. Arrivals 
fell from 161,238 in 1986 to 142,820 in 1987. By 1991 the annual total was 
down to 120,938. (fable 44) This trend was contrary to the growth in tourism 
experienced by other South Pacific destinations. From 1987 to 1990, Fiji 
enjoyed a 41% increase in the number of tourist arrivals. Numbers rose 50% in 
New Caledonia. and 139% in Vanuatu.28S There was universal agreement that 
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the high cost of living in French Polynesia was a deterrent to travellers. The 
Papeete riot of October 1987 also deterred clientele, as did the declining values 
of the US, Australian and New Zealand dollars compared to the French Pacific 
Franc in the early 1990s.286 
Agricultural reforms appeared handicapped by the inability of French 
development techniques to effect changes in the Polynesian tribal milieu. 
Agricultural exports such as copra diminished due to falling prices on the 
international market. 287 The encouragement of cash cropping stood as a major 
priority for territorial development but, as in Wallis and Futuna, it struck the 
barrier of traditional Polynesian agricultural techniques. State and territorial 
agricultural agents have experienced difficulty in convincing Maohi farmers to 
abandon traditional forms of land tenure and cultivation for modem, 
commercially viable farms, as was intended under the Eighth Plan.288 Maohi 
farmers were unenthusiastic to see the break-up of family orientated, subsistence 
polycultural farming by the incursion of large-scale monocultural cash 
cropping.289 This conservatism, combined with the comparatively small areas of 
agncultural land in French Polynesia (totalling 10.36% of the territory's land 
surface in 1987),290 and its physical dispersion over distances of thousands of 
kilometres limited the development of strong commercial agriculture.291 
Unfulfilled expectations of socio-economic change were an important 
motive for the cabinet revolt led by Alexandre Leontieff in December 1987. In 
1988 Uontieff led negotiations with the Rocard Government for a new bout of 
development arrangements under the Tenth Plan, from 1989 to 1993. The aims 
of the new state-territorial contract under the Tenth Plan had a distinct ring of 
familiarity about them when Maurice Porchon, government reporter for the 
Finance Commission, announced them to the National Assembly on 13 
November 1988: 
En Polynesie, Ie Gouvemement va signer un contrat de plan entre l'Etat et les 
cot1ectivites du territoire. Les orientations prioritaires sont les suivantes: 
developpement des infrastructures de communication; renforcement des moyens 
de formation et de recherche - cr~tion de cinq coll~ges et deux lycOOs; action en 
faveur des demandeurs d'emploi. des personnes l\gees et des handicapes; 
developpement de I'habitat social - Ie logement pose un probl~me absolument 
crucial dans I'ensemble des departements et territoires d'outre-mer; promotion 
des activites productives - en particulier developpement de la peche, 
amenagement d'un nouveau complexe - et touristiques. avec un renforcement de 
la desserte aerienne avec Ie Japon.292 
The new State-Territory Contract Plan was signed on 11 January 1989. 
It differed from those which preceded it only in emphasis, its content having 
been determined by previous plans. Its first priority was the improvement of 
territorial training and research facilities. The State was to provide 12,977MF 
CFP for higher education, of which 6,385MF CFP would be administered by 
the State, and 6,541MF CFP would be allocated to the territory. These funds 
would enable the construction of five colleges, two lycees and new university 
facilities, not mentioned in the quote above. Centres for professional, and 
apprentice training were to be opened, along with five units offering refresher 
courses which would enable easy entry to these centres.293 
The second priority was the expansion of territorial agriculture and 
fisheries. For this area 2,073MF CFP was set aside, including 1,036MF CFP to 
be administered by the State, and 855MF CFP by the territory. Fisheries would 
be boosted by the construction of a modern fishing base in the Marquesas, 
which would service a flotilla of 18 tuna boats. Here, the aim was to allow local 
fishermen to go beyond lagoon fishing to work on the high seas.294 On land, 
the project's aim was to create 300 commercial farms, extend the network of 
fruit and vegetable market gardening, and to encourage commerciallogging.295 
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The third priority of the Contract Plan was the improvement of the territorial air 
network and roading.296 
Somewhere further down the list the Contract Plan addressed ongoing 
housing problems. The Territorial Office for Public Housing had found itself 
unable to reduce the spread of substandard housing and the growth in the 
number of homeless in the late 1980s. The period of the Tenth Plan involved the 
establishment by the State and territory of a new partly-public company, Fare de 
France, which was assigned the task of constructing 1,000 houses from 1989 to 
1993.297 By the end of 1991, 360 houses had been built, although the 
programme was running behind schedule and it was uncertain whether its target 
would be met on time.298 In 1993 the period of the Tenth Plan was just coming 
to a conclusion. The goal of constructing 200 houses per year was far from 
having been attained, with,an average of 137 houses completed since 1989. The 
realisation of the Office's goals was hindered by funding shortfalls during a 
period of increasing financial problems for the territory.299 The plan which 
follows will necessarily have to cover some of the same ground as its 
predecessor. 
While state and territorial administrators have overseen the progressive 
improvement of social welfare measures, the modernisation of territorial 
infrastructure and services, and have continued providing subsidies and 
technical support for the recovery of local production in agriculture, fisheries 
and manufacturing, French Polynesia's economic situation did not radically 
change from 1981 to 1991. Territorial dependence on metropolitan France 
persisted in the fonn of imports and subsidies, as well as administrative and 
technical services. 
In 1981, Mitterrand had called for the dismantling of French Polynesia's 
"bureaucratie galopante".300 Eight years later it was still racing on, unimpeded. 
The number of state and territorial public servants in French Polynesia increased 
from 13,537 in 1977301 to 24,347 by 1989.302 This increase reflected the need 
for additional personnel to oversee development schemes implemented since the 
announcement of the Eighth Plan, and the increased number of territorial 
personnel required because of greater territorial administrative autonomy. 
Administrative costs consumed most of the revenue of the Territorial 
Government in 1990. That year the territorial budget (excluding state funds) 
amounted to 76,830MF CFP, of which 59,730MF CFP (77.74%) were 
allocated to administrative costs.303 Seven years after Mitterrand's election, the 
Territorial Government still fitted his description of it in 1981 as "un perpetuel 
quemandeur de subsides"304 from the State. The territory resorted to state 
funding to complement its own revenue. In 1988, the territorial budget 
amounted to 72,OOOMF CFP, which was supplemented by 103,750MF CFP 
contributed by Paris.305 French Polynesia's level of bureaucracy and its 
financial dependence on Paris had not been broken during Mitterrand's first 
septennate. 
It is unlikely that French Polynesia will break out of its dependence on 
imported goods and be able to revive local production given territorial reliance 
on tariffs from imported goods. In 1989, income from such tariffs contributed 
43.68% of territorial revenue, the largest single source of direct revenue, well 
ahead of company tax, which provided 11.1 %.306 Although imports dropped 
from 46.9% of territorial GDP in 1981 to 30.9% in 1989,307 the monetary value 
of these imports rose in real terms308 as well as in face value. (Table 43) The 
rising value of imported goods characteristic of the 1980s should continue in the 
1990s. In the short term, it is more profitable for the Territorial Government to 
experience an increase in imports rather than a reduction.309 
Public servants in French Polynesia did not dominate the cash economy 
to the extent that they did in Wallis and Futuna, and the economic influence of 
civil servants had yet to be overshadowed l>Y those in the primary and secondary 
sectors. Overall state and territorial admi'nistrative spending constituted 59% of 
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territorial GDP in 1980.310 The marginal decline of the primary and secondary 
employment sectors to the advantage of tertiary employment since 1981, which 
the Eighth Plan hoped to avoid, has been noted. In French Polynesia 
administrators remained greater contributors to the cash economy than workers 
in agriculture, aquaculture or manufacturing. This was an imbalance which the 
Eighth Plan had hoped to see overturned but which showed no sign of changing 
by the late 1980s. In 1988, public servants represented 35.58% of the territorial 
workforce in paid employment among whom state servants represented 11.33%, 
territorial employees 16.77%, and communal employees 7,47%.311 Those 
working in administration received 54.4% of salaries paid in French Polynesia 
in 1989.312 Administrators' salaries constituted 28.24% of territorial GDP that 
year.313 Those in agriculture, on the other hand, comprised 8.77% of the 
territorial workforce, artisanal workers 14.7%, indu~trial workers 9.46%, and 
fishermen 2.59%.314 These occupations fell within the "others" category given, 
which accounted for 9.8% of salaries paid in 1989.315 The average salary for 
those in state and territorial administration was much higher than the average 
payments offered to those in agriculture, fishing, manufacturing and handicrafts. 
In 1990. average monthly salaries for public servants ranged from 135,148F 
CFP for the lowest grade to 305,961F CFP for the highest grade.316 Industrial 
workers received average monthly salaries ranging from 89,500F CFP to 
92,l00F CFP.317 Civilian and military administrative expenditure in French 
Polynesia dropped during the 1980s, but remained considerable. It averaged 
around 28% of territorial GDP from 1981 to 1985, and around 25% from 1986 
to 1990.318 Overall, state expenditure fell from 40% of territorial GDP in 1981 
to 34% in 1989.319 While this trend amounted to a minor percentile drop of 
0.75% per annum, actual spending continued to rise. 
The historically declining commercial productivity of the agricultural 
sector has not abated since 1981. The Eighth Plan's goal of territorial self-
sufficiency in food32o was far from having been realised by the beginning of the 
1990s. In 1990, French Polynesia relied on imported foodstuffs to fulfil around 
80% of its requirements.321 Under these conditions French Polynesia appeared 
unlikely to become a significant food exporter to markets in the Pacific basin. In 
1989, food products accounted for 3.17% of the total value of French 
Polynesian exports.322 Major inroads had yet to be made by meat and vegetable 
exports on the Japanese and New Zealand markets, as the Eighth Plan had 
optimistically projected.323 In the early 1990s, Japan was more important as a 
market for French Polynesian pearls than for foodstuffs.324 Japan retained a 
protectionist stance towards its agriculture into the early 1990s, presenting 
various trade barriers to countries wishing to export foodstuffs there.325 Export 
marketing to New Zealand was still embryonic. The first French Polynesian 
trade delegation arrived in New Zealand only in November 1991, to promote 
beer, vanilla, pearls and fruits. 326 Inauspiciously the delegation's 100kg 
selection of fruit was unable to be displayed: it had been confiscated by New 
Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries inspectors for not having been 
fumigated to their satisfaction.327 The incapacity to meet Australian and New 
Zealand phyto-sanitary regulations has been a major barrier, not only to French 
Polynesian producers, but also to New Caledonian producers.328 
Government technical and financial assistance for French Polynesian 
agriculture has not encouraged the productive successes hoped for. Copra 
production in the 1980s did not come close to exceeding tonnage produced in the 
1970s; Total territorial production exported from 1969 to 1979 came to 
115,178t, while in the decade that followed the export total was 80,968t.329 
Owing to international market fluctuations, and to damage caused by cyclones in 
1983, annual exported copra production declined from 11,815t in 1980 to a 
low of 3,OlOt in 1984, climbed to 9,278t in 1988, plummeted once more to 
5,817t in' 1988, and climbed to 10,09Ot by 1991.330 Unsteady prices on the 
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international market have been offset by territorial subsidies for producers and 
price guarantees unchanged since 1986. Copra exports were hindered by 
problems such as ageing processing equipment and poor quality control, 
resulting in inferior product compared to other major producers such as 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea.331 Without subsidies. copra 
exports from French Polynesia would surely have collapsed. 
Fresh fruit production in French Polynesia has mainly climbed 
throughout the 1980s, although most of this output served local needs rather 
than being exported. In 1986 7,254t of fruit were produced for sale.332 of 
. which only 18t were exported.333 In 1989, commercial fruit production 
amounted to 8,97Ot,334 of which 189t were exported.335 Attempts at exporting 
fruit juice to mainland France were abandoned in 1991 due to high shipping 
costs, lack of market image and higher production costs than competing 
products on the metropolitan market.336 
The revival of vanilla production did not live up to expectations. The 
ambitious cultivation programme which began in .1983 resulted in production 
over the following seven years of just 21.8t of the 150t of prepared vanilla 
targeted by 1990.337 Vanilla exports were far from reaching the triple figure 
tonnages exported annually in the early 19608. In 1980 2t were exported, rising 
to 5t in 1983 when international prices rose, although exports had fallen sJightIy 
to 4t by 1989. The reason for the lack of commen;ial success was that EC and 
territorial funding did not meet planned levels, and international prices for vanilla 
feU in the late 1980s. State and territorial officials have. responded by 
formulating a follow-up programme which was projected to last until the late 
19908.338 
Coffee, a commodity which had not been exported in any great quantity 
since the 1960s, has likewise failed to fulfil the expectations placed on it by state 
and territorial development officials. Its decline found a close parallel in the 
decline of coffee exports from New Caledonia. An exporter in the early 1960s, 
French Polynesia imported coffee in bulk during the 1980s. In 1990, coffee 
imports amounted to 373t.339 Under the Tenth Plan, it was intended to have 
raised annual territorial production to the modest level of 15t of coffee by 
1993.340 All of this coffee was intended for the local market. By 1991, local 
production had reached 13t,341 Coffee producers have many years of work 
ahead before they might regain their former status of minor suppliers to the 
international market. 
Aquaculture expanded to a greater degree than.agrlculture in the 1980s. 
Export levels and profits in the pearl industry rose rapidly during the 19808. 
Exports climbed from 86.53kg in 1981342 to 833.46kg in 1991.343 In the early 
1990s pearl farming was the cornerstone for the economic activities of around 
thirty islands in French Polynesia, employing around 2,000 people,344 Pearls 
were the single largest export earner for the tenitory: in 1991, they accounted for 
around 33.7% by value of French Polynesian exports. (Table 43) Their value 
rose from 997.83MF CFP in 1986345 to 4,424.32MF CFP in 1991.346 The 
pearl industry stood as an un typical local commercial success story which owed 
a great deal to the perseverance and marketing skills of a small number of local 
entrepreneurs, and to the local abundance of sheltered lagoons with suitable 
micro-climates. 
Pearls were the only product from French Polynesia'S maritime zone to 
enjoy such commercial success. Slow progress has been made in expanding the 
territorial fishing industry beyond artisanal level, particularly with the deep sea 
fishing fleet being created under the Tenth Plan. The first two vessels of this 
fleet were in service in 1991, but deep sea fishing by local vessels has'yet to be 
developed to the point where it would be more profitable to the territory than 
revenue from fishing accords with Japan and Korea. Deep ·sea fishing, as 
elsewhere in the Pacific TOM, is still mainly the domain of foreign vessels 
because of the lack of suitable local vessels, a convenient market, storage 
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facilities, and qualified labour.347 Artisanal fishing in lagoons and in coastal 
zones was still important by 1991, with around 80% of fishing licenses 
authorised by the territory going to small fishing operations.348 
After pearl farming, tourism has been the other area of major economic 
growth during the 1980s, although it has not lived up to the expectations placed 
upon it in Paris and Papeete either. By the early 1990s the level of tourist-related 
activity in the territory had still not exceeded the Sixth Plan's projection for 1975 
of 7,000 hotel rooms for the territory, to beused by 240,000 tourists, who 
would enable the employment of 7,000 locals in tourism.349 Nor had it come 
close to Flosse's projection in April 1986 that by 1990 there would be 200,000 
annual tourist arrivals, enabling the employment of 8,000 people in tourism.350 
With tourist arrivals in French Polynesia totalling 120.938 in 1991, (Table 44) a 
territorial hotel capacity of 2,824 rooms,351 and with 5,200 people employed in 
tourism,352 a large gap between official expectation and reality becomes evident 
The highest annual number of visitors to the territory was 161,238, achieved in 
1986. (Table 44) Tourism constituted less than 5% of territorial GDP in 1991, 
but was nevertheless considered the most important productive sector of French 
Polynesia's economy}53 In spite of experiencing considerable albeit intermittent 
growth in the number of tourist arrivals during the 1980s, tourism is still 
vulnerable to international market trends. There was a substantial drop in the 
number of North American, European and Japanese tourists in 1990 and 1991 
which impacted negatively on French Polynesian tourism. Potential visitors 
from these countries decided to avoid overseas holidays at the time of the Gulf 
War for fear of being subjected to terrorist attacks.354 The total number of 
visitors to the islands dropped from 132,361 in 1990 to 120,938 in 1991. Both 
of these totals were lower than the 1989 total of 139,705 visitors. (Table 44) As 
already discussed, French Polynesia was also disadvantaged compared to other 
South Pacific destinations because of its high prices. 
Since the 1960s the territory had promoted the expansion of hotel 
accommodation in order to increase tourist revenue. From the late 1980s, some 
of the large developments planned encountered local opposition. A 250-room 
Sheraton hotel with a golf course was proposed for Moorea in 1988 by Japanese 
investors. This project encountered opposition from citizens' groups on the 
islands. In June 1991, Moorea residents blocked the proposal by voting against 
it in a local referendum.355 A self-contained 2,000-room tourist village planned 
for Bora Bora, with 2,000 rooms, was also delayed by locals who objected to 
its presence.356 Local objections to tourist projects were not as entrenched as in 
Wallis and Futuna, where custom authority has been able to openly veto resort 
proposals, but such residential opposition has slowed investment in what the 
territory and the State saw as a crucial sector for the islands' economic growth. 
As in the late 1970s, tourism held great income potential for French Polynesia, 
although investment in the territory in the early 1990s had yet to meet the 
expectations of two decades earlier. 
Indigenous opposition has been a factor in the long delay of the 
recommencement of phosphate production in French Polynesia. In the middle of 
the 1970s, a large deposit of phosphate was discovered on Mataiva Atoll.3s7 
Plans to exploit the deposit have been conditioned by market studies which 
judged the deposit unprofitable in the face of competition from Nauru. It was 
decided in the late 1970s that Australia and New Zealand constituted the only 
profitable markets for Mataiva phosphate. They would not be interested in 
purchasing it until cheaper supplies from Nauru were nearly exhausted, which 
should occur early in the twenty-first century,358 Successive Territorial 
Governments have inherited the portfolio, and have shelved phosphate 
exploitation for this reason, as well as because of legal problems over deciding 
who should receive royalties from mining. Local residents formed the Mataiva 
Phosphate Society in September 1991 to retain control over local resources.359 
Since then, the matter has been in the hands of the Territorial Government, 
Table 45. French Polynesia's Population by Ethnic 
Group, 1988 
Group Number % of Population 
Total Population 188 t 814 100 
Polynesians 125,532 66.5 
Polynesian Demis 30,790 16.3 
Europeans 19 t 797 10.5 
Mixed Race 
Europeans 1 2,700 1.4 
Asians 7,614 4.0 
Mixed Race Asians2 1,231 0.7 
Others 3 1,144 0.6 
Source: ITSTAT: TEP 91 p.29. 
1 Resulting from intermarriage other than with Polynesians. 
2 Resulting from intermarriage other than with Polynesians or Europeans. 
3 Foreigners, and those resulting from intermarriage between three or 
more ethnic groups. 
Table 46. French Polynesia's Population 
Distribution 1983, 1988 
1983 
Archipelago 
Total 
Windward Islands 
Leeward Islands 
Austral Islands 
Marquesa Islands 
TU,amotu-Gambiers 
1988 
A rchipel ago 
Total 
Windward Islands 
Leeward Islands 
Austral Islands 
Marquesa Islands 
Tuamotu-Gambiers 
Number 
166,753 
123,069 
19,060 
6,283 
6,548 
11,793 
Number 
188,814 
140,341 
22,232 
6,509 
7,358 
12,374 
% of Population 
100 
73.8 
11.4 
3.8 
3.9 
7.1 
% of Population 
100 
74.3 
11.8 
3.4 
3.9 
6.6 
Source: Fran~ois Sodter: "Le recensement general de la 
population de 1988 en Polynesie francaise" in Bulletin de 
ta societe des etudes oceaniennes no.246 tome 20 no.l1 
mars 1989 pp.58-61. 
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which has not been hasty in making a decision. What form phosphate 
exploitation will take, or whether it will be extracted at all, remains to be seen. 
The deposits on Mataiva were estimated as adequate to sustain annual production 
of 1 to 1.2Mt annually for 12 to 15 years, valued at around 54,OOOMF CFP.360 
Were phosphate mining to proceed on Mataiva, it would create around 300 jobs, 
and would provide an economic boom for an island with only 199 
inhabitants.361 As on Nauru. it might in addition destroy the environment to the 
extent of preventing future cultivation there. 
Government economic development efforts on the outer islands had 
failed to bring a major turn-around in their economic decline by the early 19908. 
Private investment in pearl farming has, as has been noted, provided 
employment opportunities on many islands without entailing the environmental 
destruction that phosphate mining would. These are happy exceptions. While 
state and territorial development agencies have provided millions of French 
Pacific Francs in development funding.362 they have not brought about the 
economic rebirth of the island economies in question. The Leeward Islands 
remained economically advantaged due to their better infrastructure. larger and 
more highly skilled workforce. and because of Tahiti's role as the territorial 
administrative centre. Most of the hotels in the territory were located in the 
Leeward Islands. mainly on Tahiti. Moorea. Huahine and Bora Bora.363 
Widespread return migration from Tahiti to the outer islands has not OCCWTed, in 
spite of funding to encourage this. The percentage of the territorial popUlation 
living in the Windward Islands rose marginally during the 1980s, from 73.8% 
of the territorial population in 1983 to 74.3% of the population in 1988. (Table 
46) The Leeward Islands' proportion of territorial population increased from 
11.4% in 1983 to 11.8% five years later. While the percentile figure for the 
Marquesas remained around 3.9%, the figures for the other outer islands 
declined slightly over the same period. That of the Austntl Islands declined from 
3.8% to 3.4%, and the Tuamotu-Gambiers fell from 7.1% to 6.6%. In the 
1980s demographic centralisation in French Polynesia had reached its plateau. 
Lying around 1,500km to the northwest of Papeete, the Marquesas were 
still comparatively isolated, although they were better served by external air and 
sea links than Futuna. Development work in the archipelago resulted in 
electrification. running water and telecommuncation facilities. but the local 
economy was still dominated by traditional agriculture. with the population 
alternating between subsistence agriculture and paid seasonal work.364 In 1993. 
the implications of the establishment of the deep sea fishing base two years 
before had yet to be fully felt. This activity should provide a boost to the local 
cash economy during the 199Os. 
The shape of infrastructural development on the outer islands has varied. 
as has the form of economic development there. The Tuamotu and Gambier 
Islands still had insufficient shipping links. both internally and with the rest of 
the territory, although local needs in electricity and running water had been 
met.365 Pearl harvesting and copra. production were the major primary activities 
on the islands.366 although the value of these was dwarfed by the size of state 
investment in nuclear testing facilities on Moruroa and Fangataufa. While the 
Austral Islands, with their temperate climate and rich soils, remained the biggest 
food producers in the territory. exports were hindered by the islands' distance 
from Tahiti, the largest territorial market, which lies between 500km and 
1.000km away. The growth of commercial production has been slowed by 
inadequate marketing as well as by the unwillingness of local farmers to 
abandon traditional systems of land tenure and cultivation.367 . 
The populations of the outer islands tended to experience high rates of 
what by European criteria was considered to be unemployment. owing to the 
limited penetration of the territorial cash economy. Unemployment statistics 
were incapable of summarising this situation. because they did not count those 
living outside the cash economy. who may have been employed in subsistence 
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farming, but who did not have steady cash incomes. In 1988, the Windward 
Islands had an unemployment rate of 9.8% of those in the paid workforce. The 
rate was 10.1% in the Leeward Islands, 12.2% in the Marquesas, and 17.9% in 
the Austral Islands. The Tuamotu and Gambier Islands were the exception to the 
rule, with only 4.7% of the paid workforce unemployed, thanks to the presence 
there of CEP facilities, and because of the extent of local pearl and copra 
operations.368 
French Polynesia's population remained handicapped by its low 
educational attainment levels. Attempts to improve the education of indigenous 
inhabitants during the 1980s, through the opening of new schools, training 
institutes and the university, brought about reductions in the low success rate of 
full Polynesians and Asians compared to Europeans in the education system. In 
1983, 19.5% of Polynesians aged 10 years and over had reached secondary 
level education, compared to 53.0% of Europeans and 39.0% of Asians.369 For 
the same age group, that year 0.5% of Polynesians had reached higher 
education, compared to 17.5% of Europeans and 4.0% of Asians.370 The 
Polynesian participation rate in secondary education had rapidly improved by the 
late 1980s, although they were still behind those of Europeans and Asians in 
French Polynesia. In 1988 40.7% of Polynesians aged 10 years and over had 
received secondary education. At tertiary level, the participation rate of 
Polynesians had dropped slightly to 0.4%.371 By way of comparison, 67.2% of 
local Europeans aged 10 years and over had received secondary level education, 
and 20.7% had experienced tertiary level education, although this last figure was 
high because of the presence of metropolitan French CEP technicians, military 
personnel and administrators.372 Of the territory's Asians aged 10 years and 
over, 52.3% had received secondary education, and 6.9% had reached tertiary 
level education, suggesting that Polynesians were not the only group which was 
educationally disadvantaged.373 Progress in achieving the Eighth Plan's goal of 
improving the educations of DOM-TOM inhabitants was noticeable but 
disparities between ethnic groups persisted.374 
While Polynesian participation in higher education was not as high as 
that of other ethnic groups in French Polynesia, Polynesian culture made inroads 
in state and territorial curricula. From 1990, the Papeete branch of the French 
University of the South Pacific offered a bachelor's level degree in Te reo 
Maohi. In Paris, it has been possible to study for a bachelor's level degree in 
Tahitian since 1992.375 In 1993, it was too early to speculate on the success of 
these courses. There existed a shortage both in qualified teachers and in qualified 
students for them.376 It can be said that these courses offered a recognition of 
Polynesian culture in the state higher education system which has been slower in 
arriving than that accorded to Basque, Breton, Occitan or Corsican language. 
Although slightly reduced, the socio-economic issues which confronted 
French Polynesia in 1981 were largely unchanged ten years later. Low territorial 
self-sufficiency, lack of productive diversity in agriculture and light industry, an 
external trade balance tilted heavily towards a high level of French imports, and 
the failure to produce an export-led economic recovery, were all elements 
considered to be developmental problems in Papeete and Paris which had been 
resolved neither by the State, nor by the Territorial Government. Nor were these 
obstacles likely to be eliminated when there existed no political will either in 
Papeete or in Paris to curb expenditure on an ever-expanding bureaucracy, to 
diminish territorial reliance on import tariffs and trade barriers so that the cost of 
living might be lowered and local investment might be encouraged, to lower the 
attractiveness of 'unproductive' administrative posts by cutting salaries and 
benefits to public servants, or to solve the conundrum of whether local 
commercial agriculture was to be fully protected or left to fade away. From the 
late 1'980s French Polynesia was to find its situation complicated by further 
difficulties, stemming from the increasing instability and profligate spending of 
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its Territorial Government, as well as from Paris's decision in April 1992 to 
suspend nuclear testing, the cornerstone of local economic activity. 
Crises in the 1990s 
Mitterrand's second septennate as President coincided with a trying 
period for French Polynesia. At the very time when political, social and 
economic tensions diminished in New Caledonia under the Matignon Accords, 
the situation in French Polynesia appeared to be worsening. Regardless of the 
outcome of demands from Papeete for greater self-administration through the 
legislation and implementation of the Internal Autonomy Statute, political 
problems persisted. 
Into the 1990s French Polynesian internal administration continued to be 
hampered by the instability of the territorial political class. Infighting among the 
personalities at the head of major local political formations resulted in serious 
disruptions for Territorial Governments. Mismanagement and allegations of 
corruption at the highest level brought widespread discredit to the leaders of the 
main political groups, as well as affecting the administration of the territory. On 
top of this, the suspension of the CEP's nuclear programme in April 1992 
brought about a decline in territorial revenue from the main contributor to the 
local economy, leaving territorial leaders with serious doubts about the financial 
viability of French Polynesia in the twenty-first century. 
This concluding section examines the series of political crises the 
territory has faced since late 1988, and assesses the effects they have had on 
local political life. That the Internal Autonomy Statute had not permitted greater 
local administrative stability was not necessarily because this legislation was 
faulty. Rather, the troubles confronting French Polynesia were the reflection of 
inherent drawbacks in the outlooks of leaders in Paris and Papeete. Having 
obtained internal autonomy, territorial leaders have shown precious little 
maturity or responsibility in exercising it. Excessive spending on faulty 
development plans that have left the territory burdened by rising debt has not 
offered the road to greater self-reliance. Nor does the countermeasure adopted to 
resolve this impasse - the solicitation of more funds from the State - seem likely 
to remedy the situation. For its part, Paris has not greatly helped to discourage 
territorial mismanagement. Both before and since the attainment of French 
Polynesian internal autonomy, Paris has been inept in curtailing what Mitterrand 
referred to in 1981 as galloping bureaucracy in the territory. The installation of 
the CEP contributed to the collapse of local agriculture and encouraged the 
growth of a service economy. The granting of internal autonomy had the effect 
of contributing to the expansion of bureaucracy at territorial level rather than of 
reducing it. Plans to wean French Polynesia from its dependence on 
metropolitan French funds, whether in the form of finance accrued from the 
presence of the CEP, or of imported metropolitan French consumer goods, have 
been of marginal success while the nuclear test programme remained in place, 
and territorial revenue depended largely on import tariffs. 
The incapacity of governments in Paris and in Papeete to live up to their 
pronouncements on the desirability of territorial self-sufficiency stemmed from 
the political dispositions accompanying territorial social and economic 
dependence on metropolitan France. Paris was not prepared, or indeed able, to 
effect a reduction of territorial reliance on metropolitan French funds so long as 
national defence policy required the presence of the CEP in French Polynesia. 
Papeete, on the other hand, was not prepared to inflict on itself the austerity 
measures necessary as a prelude to any real drive towards economic 
independence when it could have recourse to funding from a French State 
desirous of maintaining local socio-economic stability so that the CEP could 
function smoothly. Whether these dispositions are likely to be abandoned in the 
immediate future will depend on the projected role of the CEP in the French 
Polynesian economy. As has been the case since the arrival of the CEP in 1963, 
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the future of French Polynesia within the Fifth Republic into the twenty-first 
century will hinge on considerations of national defence. Whatever the course of 
events, the future socio-economic health of the territory will be mainly 
determined in Paris. Territorial leaders will find themselves, as they have since 
the beginning of the Fifth Republic, having to adapt as best they are able in the 
face of changing circumstances largely beyond their control. 
Various attempts by Territorial Governments to stimulate the local 
economy have, like those initiated in Paris, not managed to stimulate major 
advances towards a self-sufficient territorial economy. Hopes in December 1987 
that the technocratic abilities of Alexandre Uontieff would produce a turn-
around in the French Polynesian socio-economic situation through initiatives at 
territorial level turned out to be misplaced. The resolution by Uontieff of 
territorial demands through the negotiation of the statute amendments of July 
1990 was the high point of a reform programme which produced few new 
positive developments. Uontieffs ambitious territorial "plan de relance", issued 
in November 1987, calling for the reduction of French Polynesian economic 
dependence, the promotion of tourism, the decentralisation of the economy, the 
resolution of unemployment and the housing shortage,377 was not realised 
during his period in government. The plan ended up contributing to the discredit 
of the Leontieff Government by driving the territory further into debt. The 
funding necessary to achieve Leontieffs policy goals was sought, as invariably, 
from Paris. His administration determined the need for approximately 517MFF 
in funding to fund the recovery plan.378 The paradoxical orientation of seeking 
to promote territorial self-reliance by seeking additional finance from the State 
was a major symptom of the assistance mentality of French Polynesian leaders. 
From 1987 to 1991, Uontieff followed a well-trodden policy path, funding his 
"plan de relance" through external borrowing. 
The expectation in Papeete that moves towards self-reliance could be 
facilitated with financial assistance from Paris were not fulfilled. Rather than 
reducing territorial dependence, Leontieff overborrowed and overspent while 
trying to implement his ambitious reforms. Territorial borrowing rose from 
3,900MF CFP in 1986 to 6,875MF CFP by 1990, of which 3,417MF CFP 
represented the amount outstanding on interest payments for past loans.379 By 
1990, the Leontieff Government faced an accumulated debt of 47,198MF 
CFP,380 a figure equivalent to 81.65% of territorial revenue that year.381 In 
1991, an independent audit of territorial finances, covering the three years and 
four months of Leontieffs term as President, concluded that his administration 
had incurred a deficit of around 7,OOOMF CFP for 1991.382 In addition the 
report claimed that his administration had overspent on an excessively large 
bureaucracy that should have been reduced, and had indulged in questionable 
accounting practices.383 Under Uontieff moreover, the territory was spendthrift 
with public funds. For example, approximately 600MF CFP were spent on 
celebrations for the centenary of the commune of Papeete, which were attended 
by Mitterrand in May 1990.384 Uontieffs incapacity to live up to his goals did 
much to undermine his reputation as an efficient technocrat. 
Uontieff experienced difficulties in retaining confidence in his leadership 
well before it was possible to assess the financial ill-effects of his 
administration. A statutory crisis eventuated in 1989 as an indirect result of the 
defection of a member of the Leontieff Government, Enrique Braun-Ortega.385 
On 22 June 1988, Braun-Ortega resigned as Economy and Finance Minister. He 
had already distanced himself from Leontieff by campaigning unsuccessfully 
against him for the seat of East Polynesia earlier in the same month.386 At the 
time of his resignation, Braun-Ortega cited his reasons as being "personal"387 
but it became apparent in later months that he was motivated by disillusionment 
with Uontieffs reform plan, which he described as ill-conceived and vague.388 
In November 1988, Leontieff found himself faced with majority 
opposition to his territorial budget for 1989 after Braun-Ortega formed a six-
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member dissident faction called Ho tu Nui (the Centre Group) from Uontieffs 
majority in the Territorial Assembly.389 Antagonism towards Plosse shown by 
Braun-Ortega faded rapidly when Ho tu Nui allied itself with Tahoeraa 
Huiraatira in voting against the budget. The flexible approach that territorial 
leaders adopted to forming alliances was as vigorous and as irresponsible as 
ever. That Braun-Ortega might ally himself with Tahoeraa Huiraatira would have 
been unthinkable in 1987. After helping Uontieff to topple Tahoeraa Huiraatira 
from government in December 1987, by June 1988 Braun-Ortega had joined 
ranks with his old enemies. In a constitutionally dubious move on 17 
November, three of Leontieffs Ministers, Kelly, Hong-Kieu and Spitz, 
resigned to take up places in the Territorial Assembly, displacing proxies who 
had become hostile to the Government. Reinforced by the return of these three 
government representatives to the Territorial Assembly, Uontieff was able to 
push the budget through with majority support. Their task having been 
completed, the three former Ministers were then reappointed to the Government 
by Leontieff on 26 November. 390 
This tactical ploy led Braun-Ortega to lay a complaint before the 
Administrative Tribunal. On 21 March 1989 the body declared that the Uontieff 
Government was illegal. It annulled the appointments of five Ministers, 
including the three who had performed the shuffle in November 1988. The other 
two affected by the decision were Louis Savoie, who had replaced Braun-Ortega 
as Minister of Economy and Finance, and Fran~ois Nanai, who had become 
Minister for Transport, Urbanisation and Administration as a result of the 
portfolio reshuffle.391 Uontieffhad neglected to follow the procedure laid down 
in article 8 of the Internal Autonomy Statute, which required ministerial 
appointments to be ratified by a majority vote in the Territorial Assembly.392 
For the rest of March, French Polynesia was without a Government, as 
the five remaining members were not adequate under article 5 of the Internal 
Autonomy Statute to form a quorate cabinet.393 By 3 April, Leontieff had 
finalised another cabinet team which gained the approval of the Territorial 
Assembly. The final holders of the five vacant posts were Boris Uontieff 
(Economy and Finances), Jacques Drollet (Housing and Social Affairs), 
Raymond van Bastolaer (Urban Affairs and General Administration), and loane 
Temauri (Agriculture and Culture), with Alexandre Leontieff as Minister of 
Works, Employment, Professional Training, Tourism and Sports.394 
Just before the appointment of a new Government in April, the 
Territorial President appealed to the Council of State in Paris to overturn the 
decision to annul the previous administration. The Council and Jean Montpezat, 
the High Commissioner at the time, were not prepared to challenge what was a 
territorial matter.395 The Council of State did however despatch a review team to 
investigate complaints made by Leontieff.396 This investigation presaged a 
modification to the statute. Among the modifications to the Internal Autonomy 
Statute applied in July 1990, was article 101 his, which permitted the Territorial 
President and the Territorial Assembly President to demand directly the 
judgement of the Administrative Tribunal, whereas previously they had had to 
appeal its decisions through the Council of State.397 
The whole incident was of considerable inconvenience to Alexandre 
Leontieff. In the long term, Braun-Ortega's action against the Uontieff 
Government was more of nuisance value than constituting a serious challenge to 
his presidency. The action did however demonstrate the extent to which the 
Uontieff Government was prepared to stretch the rules to hold the opposition in 
check. It likewise demonstrated that the united opposition which Uontieff had 
managed to mobilise against Tahoeraa Huiraatira was fraying around the edges. 
On 14 February 1990, Vernaudon was excluded from the Uontieff Government 
for having negotiated with Plosse over a possible electoral coalition after the 
territorial elections scheduled for 1991.398 The dismissal reduced Leontieffs 
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majority in the Territorial Assembly to 21 out of 41 seats, a narrow margin 
which Flosse was to attempt to overturn with the assistance of Vernaudon. 
That Leontieffs suspicions concerning Vernaudon were well-founded 
was confinned three months later. On 9 April, Flosse and Vernaudon attempted 
to overturn the Uontieff Government with a no-confidence motion, majority 
support for which would have forced the Government's resignation. Their 
motion failed, with only fourteen Territorial Councillors lending their 
support.399 That day, debate in the Territorial Assembly became rOWdy. The 
session was suspended after Flosse and Vernaudon flooded the debating 
chamber with their supporters.4OO Mitterrand himself later intervened to calm 
differences between Uontieff and Vernaudon. Mter a meeting between the three 
at the Elysee on 31 May 1990, Vernaudon announced that a reconciliation had 
occurred.40t If so, it was not to last long. Vernaudon found himself unable to 
accept Leontieffs conditions for his return to government, and days later 
announced that his political divorce with Uontieffwas finaL402 
Adroit negotiations by Flosse at the time of the territorial elections of 17 
March 1991 (fable 47) pennitted his triumphant return, leading a new Territorial 
Government. Since the end of the Chirac Government in April 1988, Flosse had 
held no parliamentary post, either at national or at territorial level. His sole 
elected position was that of Mayor of Pirae. But his time had not been wasted. 
While he was on the sideHne of territorial politics, his leadership of Tahoeraa 
Huiraatira faced no serious internal challenges, and he organised the party for a 
return to power. By early 1991 the other major local parties, from Uontieffs Te 
Tiarama to the Maohi nationalist Ia Mana, were subject to public disillusionment 
over their failure to implement the fundamental socio-economic change that had 
been presented by them as indispensable. 
The territorial elections of March 1991 produced no absolute majority for 
anyone party, forcing the various major parties into the usual uneasy alliances. 
(Table 47) These alliances were however more extensive than those in past 
elections. For the first time in a territorial ballot, no independent candidates were 
elected. This outcome presented a major break: with past elections, when there 
had always been isolated figures elected to the Territorial Assembly on the basis 
of local followings.403 Tahoerra Huiraatira, with 18 seats, and despite its loss of 
four seats since 1986,404 was in a commanding position over Leontieff and 
Juventin, whose Union Polynesienne list gained 14 seats.405 To fonn a 
governing majority, Flosse had to rely on an alliance with Vernaudon's Ai'a 
Api, which had received five seats.406 Ia Mana was snubbed by its supporters 
for its participation in the Uontieff Government, which was perceived by many 
as marking an abandonment of its nationalist goals.401 It failed to regain any of 
its three seats. The Maohi nationalist party Tavini Huiraatira (Serving the 
People),408 benefited from disaffection with Ia Mana by winning over its 
supporters, thereby gaining four seats. These gains represented a doubling of 
Tavini Huiraatira's Territorial Councillors in comparison with its 1986 result. 
The party received 11.3% of votes cast in the elections of 1991, and more than 
5% in each of the two local constituencies, an unprecedented level of 
support.409 
The alignments of some parties in the elections differed radically from 
those they had held ten years before, while others had not changed. Flosse 
remained Chirac's man in Papeete. His election to the territorial presidency was 
hailed by Chirac as a victory both for Plosse and, by implication, for the 
RPR.410 News of Uontieffs defeat, on the other hand, was received with 
disappointment by Le Pensec in Paris, who cast doubts on the future political 
stability of the territory.411 The Rocard Government would have preferred the 
re-election of Leontieff to the appointment of Flosse. In this respect things had 
changed drastically since 1981, when Leontieff had been in the Gaullist camp. 
an irony noted by Drollet of Ia Mana, who had backed the PS in 1981.412 Here 
Table 47. French Polynesian Territorial Elections 
1991 
Territorial Results: 17 March 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
109,462 
85,775 
78.36% 
84,798 Valid votes 
Party Votes % 
Tahoeraa 26,639 
Union 
Polyn~siennel 19,737 
Ai'a Api 10,414 
TRvini 9,693 
Others 18,315 
Source: Le Monde 20 mars 1991. 
of votes 
31.06 
23.01 
12.14 
11.30 
21.35 
1 Coalition led by Juventin and Alexandre Uontieff. 
cast Seats 
1 8 
1 4 
5 
4 
0 
Table 48. French Legislative Elections, 1993. 
French Polynesian Results 
First Round: 21 March 
First constitutency 
Valid votes 
(West Polynesia) 
41,417 
Candidate 
Juventin (RPR) 
Temaru (Tavini) 
Leontieff (UDF) 
Raapotol 
Dehors2 
Votes 
13,870 
11,206 
7,786 
2,593 
2,568 
3,394 
% of valid votes 
33.49 
27.06 
18.80 
6.26 
6.20 
Others 8.18 
Second constitutency 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
(East Polynesia) 
46,141 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Flosse (RPR) 
Vernaudon 3 
Salmon4 
Others 
1 An independent right candidate. 
32,010 
69.37% 
31,477 
Votes 
15,787 
8,523 
4,654 
2,513 
2 Presidential majority candidate. 
3 Presidential majority candidate. 
4 Pro-independence candidate. 
% of votes cast 
49.32 
26.63 
14.54 
17.85 
Second Round: 28 March 
First constitutency 
Registered voters 
Votes cast 
Turnout 
Valid votes 
Candidate 
Juventin (RPR) 
Temaru (Tavini) 
(West Polynesia) 
64,296 
44,098 
68.59% 
43,025 
Votes 
23,996 
19,059 
% of votes cast 
54.42 
43.22 
Source: Le Monde 23 mars 1993; Chaussebourg & Ferenczi 
(eds.): Les elections legislatives de mars 1993 p.147. 
Table 49. CEP and Military Spending in French Polynesia 1981-1991 
Expenditures 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(MFCFP) 
Personnel wages 9,540 10,180 12,730 15,460 15,310 15,340 16,460 17,200 16,400 19,340 21,860 
Subcontracters1 4,560 5,450 10,560 10,690 11,000 11,450 11,480 13,680 13,210 15,000 12,830 
Import tariffs2 2,700 2,820 4,000 4,230 5,490 6,160 6,910 5,880 6,100 5,800 7,320 
Total 16,790 18,450 27,280 29,370 31,800 32,950 34,850 36,760 35,710 40,140 42,010 
Sources: Blanchet: A Survey of the Economy of French Polynesia p.38; IEOM: Rapport annuel 1991. Polynesie 
jranfaise p.183. 
1 Money paid to local fIrms for construction work and sundry other services. 
2 Duties on imported equipment paid to the Territorial Government 
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Ai'a and Ai'a Api, the two 'autonomist' parties (as much as the term meant 
anything since Plosse's negotiation of the Internal Autonomy Statute) had gone 
their separate ways after uniting behind Uontieff in December 1987. Here Ai'a, 
through its alignment with Leontieff, enjoyed the sympathy of the Rocard 
Government, in marked contrast with the backing of the party for the UDF in 
1981. After the territorial elections, Ai'a Api formed a coalition government with 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira, once more placing pragmatism ahead of any asserted 
ideological principles. 
The Left/Right divide which governs analysis of French parliamentary 
politics has not had great validity in the French Polynesian context since 1981. 
Apart from Flosse's ties with the RPR, in Papeete links with metropolitan 
French parties have tended to be transitory and motivated by short-term 
pragmatism. Fickle ties shown by territorial leaders were to contribute 
significantly to the chaotic local political situation that developed following the 
territorial elections of 1991. 
On 21 March 1991, Plosse and Vernaudon formed a coalition 
government. 413 Its installation was to be delayed by discontent in the 
Opposition. On 30 March 1991 Alexandre Leontieff, Juventin and Oscar 
Temaru414 announced a joint boycott by their parties of the Territorial Assembly 
session to protest against a coalition which they claimed did not deserve to be in 
power. The fact that Flosse and Vernaudon possessed a democratically elected 
majority was considered less important than the disruptive expression of 
opposition dissent. Lack of a quorum in the Territorial Assembly forced its 
closure until 4 April, when the Opposition relented somewhat, allowing Plosse 
to be appointed Territorial President, and Vernaudon to assume his functions as 
the Territorial Assembly President.415 
Resistance to Hosse, led by Juventin and Temaru, as well as by local 
unionists, intensified in June and July of 1991. On 21 June, the motorway from 
Papeete to Faaa international airport was cut by roadblocks. The barricades were 
the effort of two groups. Tavini Huiraatira militants responded to a call by 
Temnru to protest at the introduction of the French lottery and increased taxes on 
consumer items.416 The lottery was portrayed as an unwanted vice which would 
cause poor Polynesians to squander their meagre incomes, while the taxes on 
consumer items were opposed because they would likewise affect the incomes 
of the disadvantaged. In addition, members of the local drivers' union (truckers 
and taxi drivers) mobilised to demonstrate against the introduction of higher 
petrol taxes by Flosse. These people received the assistance of Juventin. He 
fomented discontent by setting up a "comite de lutte" to assist the protesters.417 
Plosse's contested taxes, forming an austerity package designed to gain 
enough revenue to repay around 40% of the 1991 territorial deficit, raised 
taxation on non-essential foodstuffs, beer, tobacco, fuel and electricity. The 
roadblocks were dismantled after Flosse conceded the lifting of the petrol tax 
five days·later.418 This measure did not resolve the dispute. The "comite de 
lutte" maintained its opposition to the rest of the reforms, calling for Plosse to 
introduce an income tax for high salary earners, rather than introducing taxes 
which would hit those on lower incomes as well.419 
After it became apparent that Plosse had no intention of doing this, more 
forceful rejection of his policies was expressed by the "comite de lutte". On 9 
July the two major territorial unions, the USATP and A Tia I Mua420 called for a 
general strike which was answered by dockers in Papeete, and at the CEP 
facilities on Moruroa and Hao Atolls.421 Further roadblocks were set up on 10 
July, across the highway to Paaa, and blocking the road to the wharf at Papeete. 
Whereas previously High Commissioner Montpezat had not intervened, perhaps 
believing that Flosse could sort the problem out, this time protest action 
concerned the CEP and the port of Papeete. This turn in events directly affected 
defence and external communications, areas of state competence under the 
Internal Autonomy Statute. Montpezat sent in gendarmes to clear roadblocks set 
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up with Papeete municipal vehicles by some of Juventin's employees.422 While 
dispersing approximately 500 to 1,000 people manning the roadblocks, and 
lifting vehicles out of the way with a crane, 37 gendarmes were injured.423 On 
11 July, Montpezat managed to negotiate a settlement between the Territorial 
Government and the protesters. Fulfilling his part of the agreement, Flosse lifted 
the new taxes, while for their part, the protesters called off their actions.424 
The incident was assumed to have shaken Flosse's resolve, for on 12 
July he announced he was stepping down from the presidency.425 He went into 
retreat, eventually returning to work on 19 July. By this time, the Cresson 
Government had calmed tempers by offering state subsidies to cover the part of 
the territorial deficit which Flosse had hoped to repay with the higher taxes.426 
Paris did not wish to see confrontation tum into a repeat of the riot of October 
1987. Flosse expressed bitterness over the protest actions, accusing Temaru, 
Leontieff and Juventin of attempting to destabilise his administration.427 In the 
light of events he had some cause for doing so. 
The incidents of June and July 1991 did not mark the end of trouble 
experienced by Flosse with unionists. From 2 December 1991 to 7 February 
1992, the territorial economy was crippled by a seamen's strike, organised by 
those working on interisland shipping in French Polynesia. The strike was 
reportedly the longest in French Polynesian history.428 It culminated in a 
blockade of the port of Papeete for four days from 3 February, when the striking 
seamen anchored and chained together about a dozen ships in the harbour, 
blocking access.429 The seamen called the action off after local shipping 
companies met most of the demands of the strikers, including higher pay, and a 
guarantee to cancel legal proceedings against them.430 As in the case of the 
dockers'. strike of 1987, the seamen's strike affected a vulnerable pan of the 
territorial economy, its trade. 
From late 1991 to early 1992, the seamen's strike was not the only major 
confrontation that Flosse faced. His alliance with Yernaudon, which had been 
intended to last for five years,431 lasted just 159 days.432 In September 1991, 
Flosse announced he would be increasing the size of the government majority by 
signing a pact with Here Ai'a. Acting in what he portrayed as the interests of 
increasing political harmony, Flosse dismissed two Ai'a Api cabinet members, 
replacing them with appointees from Here Ai'a. This broke the clause in the 
coalition agreement with Ai'a Api which guaranteed it a fixed number of 
Ministers. Vernaudon responded by announcing that his party was joining the 
Opposition.433 
Vernaudon declared his intention of keeping his post as President of the 
Territorial Assembly, which he had held since the the territorial elections of 
1991. He used his position to paralyse the Flosse Government. Vernaudon 
refused to convoke the Territorial Assembly so that the territorial budget for 
1992 might be adopted, a situation which lasted until April 1992. Under the 
Internal Autonomy Statute the High Commissioner was the sole person who 
could -convoke the Territorial Assembly other than its President, although 
Montpezat refused to become embroiled in the affair, leaving certain 
commentators to speculate that he was passively assisting the opponents of 
Flosse.434 The deadlock was broken by Montpezat's replacement as High 
Commissioner, Michel Jau. On 3 April 1992, after much toing and froing with 
the Administrative Tribunal over statutory considerations, an assembly majority 
of 25 Territorial Councillors convened outside the Territorial Assembly building 
to elect Juventin as the new Territorial Assembly President. Jau upheld the 
election, which insensed Vernaudon to the point that on 4 April he and his 
followers occupied the Territorial Assembly building and barricaded themselves 
in.435 
When the territorial budget was finally about to be adopted in July 1992, 
Jau exercised his prerogative as High Commissioner under article 77 of the 
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Internal Autonomy Statute and seized control of the budget.436 He then 
proceeded to cut around 1,000MF CFP from it, holding that the Flosse 
Government had overestimated likely territorial revenue in forthcoming 
months.437 Plosse had refused to reduce projected expenditure, declaring that 
such a cut would impinge on essential selVices. 
As if this catalogue of woes was not bad enough, the Plosse 
Government was adversely affected by Prime Minister Beregovoy's 
announcement in Paris on 8 April 1992 of a one-year suspension of nuclear 
testing in French Polynesia.438 The suspension represented Mitterrand's 
response to the declining chances of a global thenno-nuclear conflict following 
the end of the Cold War in 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991. The Russians had announced a suspension of their nuclear 
testing in October 1990, which President Yeltsin had renewed twelve months 
later.439 France had already reduced its annual number of tests in French 
Polynesia, partly due to budgetary considerations, and partly due to declining 
superpower tensions apparent from the late 1980s. During his visit to French 
Polynesia in August 1989, Rocard had announced that the annual number of 
nuclear tests conducted would be reduced from eight to six, effective as of 
1990.440 In spite of this announcement, CEP and related military expenditure in 
French Polynesia in the early 1990s maintained the steep climb it had 
experienced in the preceding decade. It rose from 16,790MF CFP in 1981, to 
35,710MF CFP in 1989, 40,140MF CFP in 1990, and 42,010MF CFP in 
1991. (Table 49) 
In August 1989 Rocard denied that the reduction in testing called into 
question the future of the CEP, and by implication that of French Polynesia. His 
announcement nevertheless prompted experts in Papeete to take stock of the 
consequences of a closure of the nuclear programme. ITST AT estimated in 1989 
that in the event of the withdrawal of the CEP, without state compensation 
territorial GDP would decrease by 23%, and 17% of the paid workforce would 
become unemployed.441 Even prior to the announcement of the test suspension 
in April 1992, territorial leaders had been thinking about the possibility that Paris 
might eventually phase out the CEP in response to changes in the global strategic 
balance, and to the necessities of tightening budgetary constraints on defence 
expenditure. Alexandre Leontieff expressed his hope that as declining testing 
operations resulted in reduced income for the Territorial Government, the State 
would feel obliged to compensate French Polynesia.442 By November 1991, as 
a Deputy for French Polynesia, Leontieff was stating publicly that in order to 
prepare the territory for any withdrawal of the CEP, Paris should negotiate a 
French Polynesian equivalent of the Matignon Accords, complete with 
development and administrative arrangements designed to lead the territory to a 
more self-reliant existence.443 This concept was reiterated by Temaru, 
Vernaudon and Boris Leontieff on 9 April 1992, immediately after the 
announcement of the test suspension. They issued a joint statement to the effect 
that Paris should al10w the "emancipation" of the territory by dissolving the 
Territorial Government and calling new elections, to be followed by the 
negotiation of "une plate-fonne commune sur les mesures institutionnelles, 
economiques et financieres qui conviennent desormais a la Polynesie".444 
Alexandre Leontieff responded by declaring himself resolutely opposed to 
French Polynesian independence, obselVing that the islands were not self-
sufficient enough to be viably independent,445 
There was little chance anyway that Plosse would allow himself to be 
turned out of office, and still less that he would push for independence. On 23 
April Hosse left Papeete for Paris to attend the first of a series of meetings with 
the Beregovoy Government on the matter of compensatory state funding for the 
Territorial Government,446 Some economic effects of the test suspension were 
noticeable as early as the first few months after its announcement in 1992. By 
June, the CEP had laid off around 100 civilian employees.447 The IEOM noted 
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in September, that from May to August 1992 territorial revenue had declined 
5,300MF CFP compared to revenue received between May and August 1991. 
The reason for this trend was a drop in imports and, consequently, in customs 
revenue.448 Overall, the IEOM attributed the economic downturn to the testing 
suspension. In July 1992, it was estimated, not disinterestedly, by Patrick 
Peauce1lier, Flosse's Finance Minister, that the territory that year would be 
deprived of 2,400MF CFP in revenue it would have received from the military 
had the suspension not occurred. The Beregovoy Government did not agree 
with this figure, offering instead 2,OOOMF CFP in short-term compensation 
through a loan to be repaid by December 1992.449 
On 14 May 1992, a territorial delegation led by Flosse signed a state-
territorial protocol in Paris with representatives of the Beregovoy Government. 
The protocol established a development plan called the Pact for Progress. The 
Pact fulfilled Leontieffs concept of a French Polynesian equivalent to the 
Matignon Accords, but was limited to socio-economic proposals and did not 
include any reference to a self-determination referendum. Territorial 
independence was not an issue, in spite of comments advocating self-
determination from the Maohi nationalist minority. Le Pen sec heralded the 
agreement as "un veritable pacte de progres economique, social et culturel".450 
The Territorial Government undertook to reform local taxation to permit a 
redistribution of wealth and to promote greater social equality, while the State 
gave its backing to the funding of the main reforms deemed important by the 
territory. Under the Pact for Progress, Flosse supervised the organisation of a 
series of workshops in Papeete in July 1992, during which community leaders 
identified key areas for reform, including the need to promote local production, 
the introduction of income tax and the diminution of import tariffs, the reduction 
of public servants' salaries, greater recognition of local identity in education, 
promotion of family planning in order to lower the birth rate, and land 
reform.4S1 To what extent these issues will really be addressed remains to be 
seen. Past territorial inertia on the promotion of wide-ranging socio-econornic 
reform does not invoke optimism. Participants at the workshops also took the 
opportunity to pillory territorial politicians, blaming them for much of the 
economic dependence, and administrative instability, of French Polynesia.452 
Yet it is upon these figures that the future of the territory rests. 
In January 1993, Flosse led another territorial delegation to Paris to 
present French Polynesian proposals to Le Pensec. After some disagreement 
over the amount of additional state funding French Polynesia should receive 
over the following ten years,453 Le Pensec committed the State to approximately 
115MFF in special territorial funding in 1993. On 28 January, an accord was 
signed guaranteeing this, as well as committing the State to intensified 
infrastructural work, social programmes and economic diversification.454 After 
negotiations with the Balludur Government in September 1993, this amount 
became the first instalment of a projected total of 3,41OMFF worth of funding 
for the territory from 1994 to 1998.455 Whether this accord will prove as 
disappointing as the Eighth Plan and those which followed it has yet to be 
demonstrated. The State will need to transcend the limitations of its past 
developmental assistance if it is to bring about fundamental change to the 
dependent state of the territory. This consideration has become more pressing in 
the 1990s, with the reduction of the activities of the CEP bringing to the 
forefront of debate French Polynesia'S level of reliance on funding generated by 
the nuclear presence. An awareness exists in Paris of these issues. Speaking to 
the National Assembly on 13 January 1994 as Minister to the DOM-TOM, 
Perbenoffered official recognition of such economic limitations: "Le 
developpement [en Polynesie fran~aise], en grande partie artificiel, s'est fait au 
detriment des activites economiques traditionnelles et a provoque de serieux 
desequilibres economiques et sociaux."456 
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In the short tenn at least. the representatives of the State and of the 
Territorial Government have come to a settlement over the territory's economic 
future. The response of Paris to declining territorial revenue has been to replace 
military financial support with civilian aid. This step is not. in itself. the path to a 
reduction in territorial dependence on state funds. As Poirine pointed out: "En 
effet, simplement rem placer la rente atomique par plus de rente administrative 
civile revient en fait a remplacer l'heroi'ne par La methadone chez un grand 
drogue."457 With or without the CEP, French Polynesia faces serious 
challenges in the later 1990s if it is to develop a higher degree of economic self-
reliance. In the absence of exploitable mineral resources as rich as those of New 
Caledonia it is unlikely that Papeete will ever become as self-sufficient as 
Noumea. Local agriculture might be developed to the point where it met a greater 
part of territorial needs, although its physical limitations are such that its capacity 
to become a major export earner are slight. The French Polynesian EEZ holds 
various possibilities for mineral and fisheries revenue. but its exploitation by 
1993 was still marginaL 
Most importantly of all, it should be asked whether French Polynesian 
political leaders have the will to lead the territory out of its dependence. For all 
their pronouncements advocating reduced dependence, they persisted in seeing 
economic salvation as residing in recourse to metropolitan French subsidies. 
Their reasoning was based on the assumption that just as Paris had provided for 
territorial financial needs in the past, it would carry on doing so in the future. 
whatever the fate of the CEP. Territorial leaders may very well be right. There 
was no indication in the early 1990s that Paris was becoming parsimonious. The 
amount of state finance required to stabilise the French Polynesian budget was 
minute by national standards, and was arguably worth expending to maintain a 
geostrategic base which had been useful to the Fifth RepUblic. However this 
assistance mentality gave the lie both to professed local aspirations to self-
government, and to claims by French Governments and state planners that Paris 
aimed to encourage local autonomy. For all the administrative renovations in the 
1980. the territory was more dependent on metropolitan France for its financial 
wellbeing in the early 1990s than it had been in the 1950s. 
The persistence of French Polynesian reliance on the State cast doubts on 
the economic substance of internal autonomy, just as the disruptive infighting 
and profligate spending of territorial political leaders called into question internal 
autonomy's administrative viability. Financial mismanagement and self-
interested, counterproductive manreuvring in Papeete since 1984 have eroded 
the perceived integrity and competence of territorial political leaders. Shortly 
before his return to Paris in February 1992, Montpezat expressed these doubts: 
Ce que les gens mettent en cause, c'est Ie fonctionnement de l'autonomie 
interne. [ ... J Aux elus de s'interroger, s'occupent-ils vraiment de la population? 
Il est preoccupant qu'it ne se passe pas une semaine sans que ron ait besoin de 
recourir r. l'arbitrage du haut-commissaire ou des tribunaux.458 
Participants at the development workshops of July 1992 showed similar 
disillusionment with territorial leaders. Flosse commented wrily that they must 
have employed every abusive epithet they could find in the dictionary.459 An 
opinion poll published on 25 November 1992 by the two daily newspapers in 
Papeete, La Depeche and Les Nouvelles, showed the extent of popular 
disaffection with local politicians. 70% of those polled indicated their belief that 
French Polynesian politicians were motivated solely by self-interest; 51 % 
claimed that internal autonomy had failed.460 
In January 1993, around 3,000 protesters in Papeete called for the 
resignations of Flosse and Juventin, and for a clean-up of local politicallife.461 
The protest was a response to corruption in territorial politics, corruption which 
had spread so blatantly that it had become public knowledge. Allegations of 
misuse of public office by public figures were nothing new in Papeete, although 
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since the signature of the Internal Autonomy Statute the degree of corruption 
appeared to have worsened. Various local politicians had turned to their personal 
advantage the greater independence of territorial institutions from Paris. 
The most prominent subject of allegations of corruption was Flosse. 
Unsubstantiated stories about his dealings were legion. A brief resume of two 
affairs concerning which some substance has been revealed is offered here. The 
affairs demonstrate that since 1984, on occasion Flosse has used his position as 
Territorial President in an unprofessional manner. 
In 1985 and 1986, what became known as the cement affair took place. 
In 1985 Flosse became well acquainted with the honorary South Korean consul 
in Papeete, Bernard Baudry, which led to an invitation for Flosse to visit Korea. 
During the visit, Baudry gave Flosse 28,000 free tee shirts, made in South 
Korea, with "Tahoeraa Huiraatira" printed on them. After his return, Flosse 
gave Baudry exclusive rights over the importation of cement. Braun-Ortega, 
who was then director of a company importing New Zealand cement, brought 
legal proceedings against the decree, claiming that Flosse was exercising 
favouritism out of self-interest. In 1986 the Administrative Tribunal found that 
Flosse's accordance of exclusive cement importation rights to Baudry was in 
breach of free market principles and overturned it. Braun-Ortega took the case to 
Paris and laid charges against Flosse in September 1986; these were later 
dismissed.462 
A longer case implicating Flosse involved the misuse of territorial funds 
for the development of property belonging to him. In May 1987, Les Nouvelles 
de Tahiti revealed that around looMF CFP had been paid from public works 
funds to lay a private road leading to a residence owned by Flosse.463 Litigation 
over the case dragged on until December 1992 when the Court of Appeal in 
Paris ruled that his appeal of an earlier guilty verdict had failed.464 Flosse was 
given a six month suspended sentence and he paid a symbolic IFF fine for the 
misuse of public funds.465 
Such misuse of public position was not limited to Flosse. It was 
considered standard practice among territorial administrators to appoint friends 
and relatives to positions of responsibility, to dispense public funds in various 
forms to interest groups around election time, and to reap personal benefit from 
public office.466 The head of the Interisland Aid Development Fund in 1990, 
Roger Marara, offers a blatant example of the extent to which such practices 
were exercised in French Polynesia. In 1990 he had employed on his payroll his 
brother, his cousins, his sister-in-law, his brothers-in-law, his deacon, and his 
mistress, all of whom received their share of some 4,343MF CFP distributed in 
monthly salaries. Braun-Ortega discovered that the agency was employing some 
odd accounting techniques. On Nuku Hiva in the Marquesas, around 28,OOOMF 
CFP were distributed to build public housing, for which the construction costs 
were only 14,400MF CFP. Where the difference went could only be speculated 
upon.467 
Conduct by Juventin in his capacity as Mayor of Papeete offered proof 
of the extent to which corruption had penetrated municipal administration. 
Mention of his partisan support for protest against the Flosse Government from 
June to July 1991 has already been made, as has mention of the use of Papeete 
municipal vehicles to form roadblocks on 10 July 1991. Another irregular 
practice, revealed in 1990, was the receipt by Juventin of a monthly salary of 
400,OOOF CFP as director of Taraama-Nui (The Big Clean-up), a rubbish 
collection firm employed by his municipality.468 Questions were asked about the 
legality of Juventin having both a financial interest in this company, and granting 
it exclusive rights over his municipality's waste collection. In October 1992, 
Juventin was charged with corruption, concerning which appeal proceedings 
promise to be as protracted as those surrounding Flosse.469 Juventin was not 
the only local body administrator who attracted the interest of the law. In August 
1992 Hiti Tetoe, the municipal chief of police in Papeete, and Pierre Chanut, a 
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fonner adviser to luventin, were charged with abuse of public office and "active 
corruption".470 
For all this, French Polynesian voters have continued to offer their 
backing to established formations in territorial politics. French Polynesian 
abstention rates in territorial and in national elections have shown no generalised 
increase since 1981. Flosse's career has not been greatly affected by his 
protracted court cases, and nor has luventin's. In the legislative elections of 
March 1993, Flosse won back his seat as Deputy for East Polynesia, while 
Juventin was elected RPR Deputy for West Polynesia. (Table 48) Some 
discontent could however be read into the unprecedented level of support which 
Temaru received in the elections. He gained 44.32% of the vote in the second 
round in West Polynesia,471 far ahead of past levels of support for Tavini 
Huiraatira candidates, which usually fell between 10% to 15% of the vote. 
Temaru attracted a greater percentage of the vote in his electorate than either of 
the FLNKS candidates managed in New Caledonia during the legislative 
elections. Roch Wamytan obtained 13.82% of votes cast in the first New 
Caledonian constituency, while Leopold 10redie gained 28.90% in the second 
constituency. (Table 22) It was speculated by Temaru and his sympathisers that 
the unusually high level of support gained by the Tavini Huiraatira candidate in 
West Polynesia was a sign of disaffection among French Polynesian voters 
looking for a radical change.472 
It has yet to be seen that the political class in Papeete has deserved the 
greater powers accorded by Paris from 1984. The behaviour of politicians in 
Papeete has had a tendency to be immature, self-interested and inherently 
unstable. Territorial Governments since 1984 have shown neither great 
administrative flair, nor imagination, in addressing the developmental problems 
facing them, preferring to recycle old ideas offered by state plans that have had 
limited success. Policy packages proposed by Flosse for economic recovery 
proved as incapable of improving the efficiency of the territorial economy as 
Leontieffs, although admittedly the fonner was faced with trying circumstances 
from 1991. In 1992 and 1993 Flosse was in the unenviable position of trying to 
develop an economy troubled by strikes, political infighting and factionalism, 
not to mention the imposing question of the suspension of the CEP. 
On the basis of French Polynesian political behaviour, it could plausibly 
be asked whether a return to the arbitrary, impersonal state dirigisme of the 
1960s might not be preferable to the greater territorial self-administration 
exercised since 1984. The State could exercise greater control over the profligate 
spending of the territorial bureaucracy if not for the barrier to intervention posed 
by the Internal Autonomy Statute. But such a recentralisation would not resolve 
socio-economic and structural questions. Politically motivated mismanagement 
is not solely a French Polynesian failing: it has not been absent from 
metropolitan French political conduct. Many of the troubles facing French 
Polynesia in the 1990s were the creation of the State, either directly or indirectly. 
The implantation of the CEP was organised in Paris long before 1981 with little 
regard for the socio-economic consequences in the territory. Territorial leaders 
may have been inadequate administrators, but they have acted under conditions 
of autonomy granted to them by the French State. Intellectual renovations will be 
needed in Paris as well as in Papeete to stabilise the administration of the 
territory. 
A decade after the foundation of internal autonomy, French Polynesia 
was still in search of the financial means to its realisation, and of the original 
policy which might transfonn it from an institutional condition into political 
reality. 
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French Foreign Policy in the South Pacific since 1981 
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5. France and the South Pacific 
Le Gouvernement fran~ais entend poursuivre avec tous les Etats du 
Pacifique une politique patiente et perseverante de dialogue qui 
permette de faire connaitre sans ambiguYte la position de la France. 
II s'emploie a dissiper les malentendus ou les incomprehensions 
que pourraient susciter certains aspects de notre politique, je songe 
en particulier a nos experimentations nucleaires et a notre presence 
dans les territoires d'outre-mer. Nous souhaitons, en effet, dans un 
environnement qui ne nous est pas toujours favorable, developper 
des relations soutenues avec tous 1es Etats de 1a region et reaffmner 
dans Ie meme temps, de fa~on claire, notre position constante: la 
France est presente dans Ie Pacifique par Ie vreu librement exprirne 
des populations de ses territoires et elle refuse toute ingerence dans 
ses affaires interieures. 
Claude Cheysson, French Foreign Minister, November 1981.1 
In Pursuit of Dialogue 
Although the words above were taken from a statement elucidating the 
policy of the Mauroy Government on relations with Vanuatu, they none the less 
offer a lucid. concise summary of French foreign policy goals and motives in the 
South Pacific since 1981. Cheysson's words were a model of restraint, a quality 
which was not always apparent in those French ministerial comments on the 
region reported by the French and South Pacific media. Journalistic coverage 
preferred to highlight certain immoderate comments which were made at this 
level when tempers were aroused by criticisms from regional governments over 
questions such as New Caledonian independence, nuclear testing at Moruroa, or 
the Rainbow Warrior bombing. The remark made by Chirac on 29 August 1986 
during a vi~it to New Caledonia, that Bob Hawke, the Australian Prime 
Minister, was "very stupid" in his analysis of the territory's situation was one of 
the more memorable examples.2 The importance of such comments should not 
be overemphasised. As will be demonstrated in this and the following three 
chapters, successive French Governments since 1981 persevered in developing 
closer links with South Pacific states while reaffirming their right to exercise 
unhindered various domestic political prerogatives in the Pacific TOM. Attention 
in the media devoted to periodic contretemps between Paris and regional 
governments has tended to obscure generally improving multilateral relations in 
the period under discussion} 
The wider motives for the maintenance of the Fifth Republic's presence 
in the South Pacific pose the first concern of this chapter. Examination is made 
of the explanations proffered as to why France wished to retain its South Pacific 
possessions into the 1980s and beyond. Cheysson's argument for patient and 
persevering dialogue to explain France's position and to reaffirm its 
preparedness to stay on in the Pacific serves as a point of departure for 
examination of why the Fifth Republic wanted to retain its regional presence. 
Analysis of the various factors involved endeavours to sort realistic reasons 
from the affective, erroneous theorising that drove much discourse on this topic. 
It will be demonstrated that the Pacific TOM held a certain geostrategic interest 
for Paris, although some estimations of their value by certain figures in the 
RPR, in the French military, and by private think-tanks, were both overstated 
and unrealistic. 
·It should be borne in mind throughout this chapter that while these 
groups exercised a degree of influence on regional policy since 1981, the 
dominant strand in this period consisted of government attempts at dialogue and 
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reconciliation of the sort advocated by Cheysson. While from 1986 to 1988 the 
Chirac Government differed from its Socialist predecessors over the means 
deployed to pursue dialogue in the South Pacific, and Chirac's Ministers spelled 
out in no uncertain terms their objections to what they perceived as interference 
by regional neighbours in the domestic affairs of the Pacific TOM, this liberal-
conservative administration likewise made efforts to improve French relations. 
Chirac evinced an approval of better French relations and cooperation with the 
South Pacific that transcended the occasionally testy remarks he made about 
regional leaders like Hawke. For Chirac, the grandeur of France was intertwined 
with its global presence, and the South Pacific should not be neglected. While 
still out of government, on 25 September 1985 he had announced to a public 
rally in Noumea: 
II est notre devoir d'ctre pr~sents et actifs dans Ie monde, et dans cette region 
plus que partout ailleurs. A I'egard de nos voisins du Pacifique Sud, la France 
ne developpe qu'un desir de bonnes relations et de cooperation. C'est d'ailleurs 
la nature des liens qui nous unissent avec nombre d'etats de cette zone. Et 
comment oublier les sacrifices que la France a consentis avec, notamment, 
I'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zelande, hier dans la lutte pour la democratie et 
aujourd'hui dans la defense du monde Iibre? Mais qu'i1 soit bien clair que Ia 
I~gitimite de la presence de la France - egale a toute autre - ne saurail etre 
contestee dans ccUe partie du globe ni ramenre a une peripetie de I'histoire 
condamnee par je ne sais queUe evolution. Ce n'est que sur cette base que 
peuvent se developpcr les relations que nous devons entretenir avec nos 
voisins.4 
This outlook was consistent with the French regional policy priorities which had 
been articulated by Cheysson in November 1981. A prominent sign of Chirac's 
willingness to promote the French presence in the South Pacific came with the 
appointment in March 1986 of Flosse as Secretary of State to the South Pacific. 
He was to act as a roving ambassador to countries in the zone, explaining 
French policy and developing bilateral aid links. As Secretary of State, Flosse 
would have been hard put to disagree with the position expounded by Cheysson 
in November 1981. Flosse's mission, as outlined by Chirac in April 1986, 
(Appendix 8) lay comfortably within the context of French regional policy 
described by Cheysson over five years before. 
The part Flosse played in representing Paris from 1986 to 1988 forms a 
significant element of the second concern of this chapter: the manner in which 
France articulated its South Pacific policy. A chronologically-ordered narrative 
outlines the expansion and revision of French diplomatic structures dealing with 
the zone since the beginning of the 1980s. To what extent the party policies of 
the French Left and Right affected governmental management of these structures 
is ascertained. In spite of structural changes, a degree of continuity in French 
regional foreign policy conduct, as defined by Cheysson, will be demonstrated. 
This background analysis precedes more detailed assessment in chapters 
6, 7, and 8, of French policy conduct as it touched on nuclear issues, the 
question of decolonisation, as well as regional aid and cooperation. France's 
resistance to South Pacific anti-nuclear sentiment, its refusal to follow what the 
region presumed to be the precedent offered by British South Pacific 
decolonisation, and its efforts to increase aid and cooperation will be discussed 
with reference to the wider foreign policy considerations of dialogue and 
reconciliation outlined in this chapter. In all three areas, considerable evidence of 
generally improving French relations with South Pacific states is presented. 
These improvements are at odds with the adversarial image of French contacts 
with the region presented by the media in periods of political tension. 
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The Geostrategic Context 
Although at times characterised by French commentators as an aberrant 
legacy from the days of empire-building,S there has been general agreement 
among French Governments that the DOM-TOM represent a significant part of 
the Fifth Republic. Unlike London, which decolonised the bulk of its remaining 
overseas possessions from the late 1960s, Paris has displayed every intention of 
retaining sovereignty over its citizens in French terres de souverainete scattered 
around the world, for as long as those inhabitants might wish to remain French. 
In the epigraph to this chapter, reference was made by Cheysson to the 
continued exercise of French sovereignty over the Pacific TOM as constituting a 
response to "Ie vreu librement exprime des populations de ses territoires". 
According to such thinking, the Pacific TOM, as well as the rest of France's 
overseas possessions, were primarily French because the majority of their 
inhabitants desired to stay French. Such democratic principle also coincided with 
some of the interests of the State. French Governments of the Fifth Republic, 
whether Gaumst, Giscardian, or Socialist, have all acted on the assumption that 
the DOM-TOM presented certain advantages to France. Only the extent to which 
French Governments mayor may not have worked to extend these assumed 
advantages was an issue of extended debate, as remarks made in the National 
Assembly debate on the DOM-TOM in June 1980 indicated. 
Declarations of the importance of ties between metropolitan France and 
its DOM-TOM were expressed in the 1980s in vigorous terms by UDF, PS, and 
RPR leaders alike. Various pronouncements mentioned in preceding chapters 
constitute examples of the expression of a national concern which has 
transcended party boundaries. Giscard d'Estaing's New Year's message for 
1981 to the inhabitants of the DOM-TOM assured them of the Republic's 
ongoing solidarity with its overseas territories. and stressed the importance they 
assumed in assuring the French global presence.6 As Minister to the DOM-
TOM, in July 1986 Pons proclaimed the significance of overseas France, and 
announced the strengthening of links with metropolitan France after five years of 
supposed Socialist Government neglect.7 Jacques Toubon, as Secretary-General 
of the RPR, echoed these sentiments in December 1987. He declared that frol)} 
1981 to 1986 the DOM-TOM had been let down by government inertia, 
uncertainty and disorder. With the advent of Chirac, all would be set right.s 
This interpretation was open to contradiction. Whether reforms in the 
DOM-TOM endured, as was the case with the Internal Autonomy Statute for 
French Polynesia, or whether they proved short-lived, as was the case with the 
Lemoine Statute in New Caledonia. this legislation suggested that France's 
overseas possessions were a policy priority for the Socialists in government. 
Since the beginning of the second septennate of Mitterrand. the Socialists have 
not been heedless of the DOM-TOM either, as their reforms in New Caledonia 
and French Polynesia suggested. Mitterrand clearly affrrmed his high regard for 
the DOM-TOM during a broadcast on RFO on 26 February 1993: 
C'est la France modifiee dans son sein par la presence de centaines de mUliers 
d'habitants d'outre-mer qui lui apportent quelque chose de plus. Done fa France, 
sans cela, sans I'outre-mer, c'est moins que la Fmnce. [ ... ] Je crois que I'outre-
mer a besoin de la France; je crois que la France a tout autant besoin de l'outre-
mer. Ce qui nous unit est fort. [ ... ] Nous sommes une seule communau~.9 
The comments made by Giscard d'Estaing, Pons. Toubon and Mitterrand 
involved official declarations of a banal, predictable nature rather than concise 
arguments for French sovereignty over the DOM-TOM. These statements serve 
nevertheless to display the unanimity of PS, RPR and UDF leaders in agreeing 
on the importance of links between the DOM-TOM and France. Of the major 
French political parties in the 1980s the PC alone was at variance with this joint 
stance because of its traditional ideological and moral objections to colonialism. 
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Near the other end of the French political spectrum, the FN has differed from the 
UDF, PS and RPR by advocating a tightening of the ties between overseas and 
metropolitan France, to the extent of proposing the departmentalisation of the 
Pacific TOM and urging a policy of increased French settlement there.10 
Other statements by political representatives were more significant in that 
they indicated the direct benefits the State enjoyed through retained sovereignty 
over the DaM-TOM. Franceschi, speaking in June 1980 on behalf of the PS in 
the DaM-TOM debate at the National Assembly, pointed out that these 
possessions permitted France to have the third largest maritime zone in the 
world, and contended that no one contested their political and strategic 
importance to the Repu blic.11 For French Governments a major advantage of the 
DaM-TOM was that they furnished the Fifth Republic with the means by which 
it could enjoy a physical presence around the world. This physical presence 
reinforced French aspirations to continue playing a global role in international 
relations, in spite of the decolonisation of African and South-East Asian 
territories since the days of the Fourth Republic. 12 Through its remaining 
possessions France was not limited to being a European power, although it 
could hold a presence in the Caribbean, the Antarctic, the Pacific, the North 
Atlantic and in the Indian Ocean. The DaM-TOM were highly regarded by 
French Governments for the prospects they offered to enhance French relations 
with nations in these zones. In 1981, the information service of Prime Minister 
Raymond Barre portrayed the DaM-TOM as global stepping stones for French 
culture and technological influence: 
L'outre-mer est une pi~ce maitresse du rayonnement international de la France. 
Par Ia cooperation, les Dtpartements et Territoires d'outre-mer sont appel6s a 
etre de plus en plus les meilleurs instruments de la diffusion de la technologie, 
du savoir-faire, de la culture et de I'influence de la France dans leur zone 
goographique.13 
This statement was as applicable to the Pacific TOM as it was to the rest of the 
DOM-TOM. From the Pacific TOM, France projected its technological capacity 
through scientific research and development organisations such as ORSTOM 
and IFREMER, based in New Caledonia and French Polynesia. France was a 
major participant in the South Pacific Commission, which had kept its 
headquarters in Noumea since 1947.14 And since 1987 the French University of 
the South Pacific, with its centres at Noumea and Papeete, has attempted to offer 
a Francophone counterpart to the University of the South Pacific, based in Suva. 
The part that the Pacific TOM play in promoting French regional 
cooperation is examined in greater detail in chapter 8, but the assumption that the 
presence of the TOM might be a necessary instrument for such cooperation 
deserves more immediate consideration. The emphasis on the need for little 
exten~ions of France in regions outside Europe to secure national influence there 
reflected a peculiar outlook with roots in French colonial history. In the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such enclaves were 
necessary to European nations which aspired to great power standing, both to 
assure their own presence and to counter that of their rivals. Not only was the 
annexation of overseas possessions considered a source of prestige, it served to 
strengthen national interests. France was prominent in this respect in 
establishing a collection of dominions scattered around the world which 
comprised a total population and surface area second only to the British Empire. 
In the late twentieth century such notions appear dated. 
France is the last European nation with significant possessions in the 
South Pacific. These territories have played a role in French regional 
cooperation, but possessing these regional bases was not necessarily 
indispensable. While the French Pacific territories served as centres for French 
influence in the region, other major powers have managed to promote their 
presence without such support bases. To the extent that Britain has wished to 
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retain its regional influence, its lack of such territories has not hindered that 
country's relations with countries in the zone since the late 1970s. In the 1980s 
and early 1990s British technology, culture and influence were maintained in the 
region through various diplomatic posts, participation in the South Pacific 
Commission, IS and through Commonwealth links. Japan, the sole Asian power 
to have occupied parts of the South Pacific, if only from 1941 to 1945, has 
overcome resentment caused by its imperialism in World War II and during the 
1980s established an important and growing technological, commercial and 
cultural presence in the South Pacific without the benefit of Japanese enclaves 
there.l 6 
As outposts for cooperative efforts with the region, New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia have moreover not been without their drawbacks. Le Pensec 
pointed out in 1990 that anti-nuclear and anti-colonial sentiment existing in 
island states in response to French policy in New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia had acted as a barrier to regional cooperation: 
Le fait que Ie maintien de la souverainete fran~aise sur tel departement, tel 
territoire ou telle collectivite territoriale soit considere localement comme un 
sujet majeur de debat politique represente, l'experience l'atteste, un grave 
handicap au renforcement des actions de cooperation regionale. Le cas de la 
Nouvelle-Cal&1onie ces demieres annees et, dans une moindre mesure, [ ... ] de la 
Polynesie fran~aise, r ... ] montrent que, dans un tel contexte,la nature du debat 
politique local, les relations qui se nouent entre elus locaux et responsables 
nationaux et la maniere dont l'evolution de la situation est suivie a l'etranger 
sont incompatibles avec une action coordonnee vers l'exterieur.17 
The extent to which this has actually been the case since 1981 will be examined 
closely in the next three chapters. As will be demonstrated, the point made by Le 
Pensec is valid only to a degree, as regional anti-nuclear and anti-colonial 
policies have not posed insurmountable barriers to French cooperation in the 
South Pacific. None the less, this aspect of French relations should not be 
overlooked. France's need to pursue "une politique patiente et perseverante de 
dialogue", as it was described by Cheysson in November 1981,18 was a 
necessity not faced by Britain, as its South Pacific nuclear and colonial policies 
had become matters of largely historical debate by the 1980s and 1990s.19 
Japan, on the other hand, has faced some criticism from island states over its 
nuclear policies, notably its dumping of nuclear waste in the Pacific. Such 
protests have not been as sustained as regional opposition to French nuclear 
testing. 
Another stake offered by the DOM-TOM, as mentioned by Franceschi, 
was the fact that they gave France the third largest EEZ in the world. In 1976, 
the French Parliament voted for the extension of the French maritime zone to a 
200 nautical mile (about 370km) limit.20 This increased the EEZ of metropolitan 
France to 340,290km2, that of the DOM to 648,300km2, and that of the TOM to 
lO,153,825km2; a total of 1l,142,415km2.21 These limits were recognised 
under the Law of the Sea convention, which was signed by 119 nations in 
December 1982.22 This agreement recognised sovereign countries' claims to a 
monopoly over maritime resources within their 200 mile EEZs. 
In spite of the massive area France obtained control over under this 
convention, maritime exploitation was held back as most of the French EEZ in 
the Pacific encompassed deep waters with no continental shelf.23 The deep 
water fisheries of the EEZs of the Pacific TOM have yet to be greatly exploited 
by the local fishing industry, although territorial administrations receive revenue 
from selling fishing licenses to US, Japanese and Korean trawlers. Seabed 
minerals, in the form of polymetallic nodules, including manganese, copper, 
nickel and cobalt, had been found in the maritime zones of the Pacific TOM by 
the 1980s. Their drawback was that they were located at depths which rendered 
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their extraction commercially unviable with the technology available at that time. 
By 1985, ORSTOM and IFREMER had not conducted a systematic survey of 
mineral resources in the French Pacific EEZ, and a spokesman for the Fabius 
Government stated that insufficient data was available to ascertain where seabed 
minerals might be concentrated. It was considered unlikely that commercial 
exploitation would be worth the effort at that stage.24 Nevertheless, France was 
then working to claim international exclusive mining rights over a 75,OOOkm2 
area outside its EEZ, which it was granted by the International Maritime 
Resource Authority in December 1987.25 Despite not being commercially viable 
at that point, France was preparing for a future time when this concession could 
be exploited. 
France has made efforts to safeguard its maritime domain, adopting the 
long-term view that ahhough its South Pacific EEZ might not yet be worth a 
great deal commercially, in years to come the zone will be economically 
valuable. Since the establishment of its 200 nautical mile limit in the South 
Pacific, France has been careful to negotiate territorial delimitation agreements 
with neighbouring states in order to secure its boundaries. (Table 50) The Law 
of the Sea convention left unresolved the question of precisely how the 
boundaries between the EEZs of two countries should be determined. 26 
Generally, France has negotiated delimitation agreements which place 
boundaries at an equidistant point hetween the closest land in the French Pacific 
TOM and the closest land of its foreign neighbours.27 An exception to this 
otherwise harmonious delineation was posed by the New Caledonian boundary 
with Vanuatu. On 9 and 10 March 1983, an official Vanuatu landing party 
occupied Hunter Island, a barren rock between the Loyalty Islands and Vanuatu, 
and hoisted a flag to claim sovereignty over it and neighbouring Matthew 
Island.28 A plaque proclaiming French sovereignty, which had been placed on 
Hunter Island in 1975, was removed before the party left.29 Cheysson, then 
Foreign Affairs Minister, stated that the Mauroy Government did not recognise 
this claim by Vanuatu, as the two islands had been allocated to France in an 
agreement with the British Government in 1965, during the days of the 
condominium of the New Hebrides.3o On 11 March 1983, the High 
Commission in Noumca issued a proclamation placing Matthew and Hunter 
islands off limits to all foreign vessels}l In late March, an unspecified number 
of French soldiers were transported by helicopter to Matthew Island, the only 
one of the pair large enough to enable landing troops on, and aerial surveillance 
was increased.32 A permanent camp was established on Matthew Island, 
garrisoned by a platoon. This position was still being manned as late as 1989.33 
Hunter was left unmanned, as it is little more than a rock jutting out of the 
ocean. In stationing troops on Matthew, France was deploying a force, however 
small, to protect its maritime zone, as neither Matthew nor Hunter islands had 
any land resources. They are desolate, uninhabited rocks, incapable of 
supporting anything more than seabirds. Although the Vanuatu claim to the 
islands was played down by Cheysson as a minor matter, the effort made to 
secure these two islands indicated the active seriousness with which France 
watched over its Pacific EEZ. 
The DOM-TOM in general are seen by Paris to possess a certain strategic 
value to the Fifth Republic which justifies their maintenance. Toubon offered a 
glowing assessment of their worth in December 1987. Like Mitterrand in his 
RFO broadcast in February 1993,34 Toubon indicated that France would be less 
than whole without the DOM-TOM: 
L'Outre-Mer fran~ais, ceta ne consiste pas seulement en mesures 
~conomiques, en s~curite retablie, en progres social. C'est aussi, c'est vrai, un 
coup de creUf r&:iproque. La France ne serait pas ce qu'elle est sans les DOM-
TOM. Elle leur doH sa pr~sence dans toutes les parties du monde, que ce soit en 
Amerique, dans Ie Paciftque, l'Ocean Indien ou les terres antarctiques. Par eux, 
Table 50. French Territorial Demarcation 
Agreemen ts 1978-1990 
8 August 1978: with Great Britain for New Caledonia and 
the New Hebrides. 
16 April 1980: with Tonga for Wallis and Futuna. 
4 January 1982: with Australia for the French Antarctic 
Territories and New Caledonia. 
17 January 1983: with Fiji for Wallis and Futuna. 
25 May 1984: with Great Britain (Pitcairn Island) for 
French Polynesia. 
22 September 1986: with Tuvalu for Wallis and Futuna. 
3 August 1990: with the Cook Islands for French Polynesia. 
Sources: Herve Coutau-Begarie: Geostrategie du Pacifique 
p.272; Ministere des affaires etrangeres: Recueil des 
trailes et accords de La France 1986 vo1.2 p.l 007, 1990 
p.97; Ernest Moutoussamy: Les DOM-TOM: enjeu 
geopolitique, economique et strategique p.99. 
215 
eUe formeJe troisl~me empire maritime de la p)an~te. sur onze millions 
dekro2. 
Sans I'Outre-Mer, pas de base de Kourou. pas d'avenir spatial fran~s. 
Ce n'est qu'un aspect, non des moindres. Mais iI ne s'agit pas de speeuIer, de 
compter ce qui s'av~re incommensurable. La vocation universelle de notre 
Nation se situe aussi Jll-bas. Les OOM-TOM representent Ie temoignage 
concreto bien vivant, que notre Mritage, peut servir de bien commun a des 
peuples tres divers. qui nous enrichissent de tout ce qu'its sont. Notre Outre-
Mer constitue la preuve vivante de la chance rran~aise a )tecbeIJe du 
monde, a la veille du XXleme siecle.35 
Here, Toubon mixed an assessment of the strategic worth of the OOM-TOM 
with a dose of Republican idealism. Through the DOM-TOM, France remained a 
global power. Though Toubon did not mention it here, they offered the Republic 
a global network of military bases, as well as points for satellite communication 
ground stations.36 The DOM-TOM have been exploited for the use of high 
technology. The space centre at Kourou in Guyane was conveniently located 
near the equator, permitting the easier launch of satellites into orbit.37 The 
nuclear testing facilities of the CEP in French Polynesia offered a remote 
location for the testing of nuclear devices. From its commencement in 1966 until 
its suspension in April 1992, nuclear testing in French Polynesia rendered the 
territory an important component of the national defence complex. Eighty-four 
tests were conducted on Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls from 1981 to 1991 as 
six succeeding governments under Mitterrand oversaw the modernisation and 
expansion of French nuclear capabilities. (Table 51) 
In spite of this nuclear presence, the French nuclear deterrent played no 
role in the military balance of power in the Pacific region. While Moruroa and 
Fangataufa formed the test sites for nuclear devices, no bases for the French 
nuclear arsenal existed in the Pacific TOM, or for that matter anywhere else in 
the DOM-TOM.38 In an interview in 1986 Vice-Admiral Pierre Thireaut, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the French Pacific Naval Squadron, denied that nuclear 
weapons were housed at the Moruroa test site, which he described as Itonly a 
physics laboratory".39 Thireaut indicated that no nuclear weapon had been 
detonated at Momroa since 1974, when France had ended its atmospheric testing 
there. The components for French nuclear arms were manufactured and 
assembled in metropolitan France. The nuclear devices exploded in French 
Polynesia were far from constituting complete weapons. The radioactive and 
non-radioactive pieces of these devices were manufactured in metropolitan 
France and assembled at the test sites prior to detonation.4o Delivery systems for 
nuclear arms were not housed in French Polynesia. 
The nuclear strike force was deployed for the defence of metropolitan 
France from foreign aggression and played no part in the defence of the DOM· 
TOM.41 Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the force was 
potentially most likely to be used to defend France in the event of an invasion of 
Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, its target was the Soviet 
Union.42 The French nuclear umbrella did not extend to encompass the Pacific 
TOM, any more than it did to the rest of the DOM-TOM.43 The most far-ranging 
component of the French nuclear force, the FOST, consisted in 1993 of three 
nuclear-powered submarines on patrol at anyone time, armed with nuclear 
missHes.44 Based in Brittany, the FOST conducted extended patrols lasting eight 
to ten weeks. Although its precise deployment was a closely guarded secret, 
during the 1980s the FOST most likely patrolled the North Atlantic and Arctic 
Oceans, within missile range - 5,OOOkm - of the Soviet Union. Elements could 
conceivably have been present in the Pacific from time to time, but there is no 
declassified evidence to confirm such speculation. Visits to the South Pacific by 
French submarines not belonging to the FOST were generally rare. The well-
publicised calls made to New Caledonia in May 1985 and to French Polynesia in 
July 1985 by the Rubis, a nuclear-powered (and not nuclear-armed) attack 
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submarine, was the only known instance of such a submarine visit to the region 
in the 1980s.45 
The voyage of the Rubis in 1985 was portrayed by the Fabius 
Government as a sign of French intentions of boosting the French military 
presence in the South Pacific. In 1985 Fabius46 shared the position of politicians 
of the Right and the extreme Right47 that New Caledonia lay in a strategically 
important position adjacent to major shipping lines to Australia and New 
Zealand. Australian and New Zealand leaders were warned that should control 
of New Caledonia fall into the hands of a hostile nation, the two countries would 
be economically threatened. Noumea however was not as well located for 
cutting off shipping to Australia and New Zealand as might be imagined. In the 
outlandish circumstance of a hostile power (Indonesia?) taking over the territory 
and attacking Australian and New Zealand shipping, trade with Asia could be 
rerouted from the Coral and Tasman Seas. Both Australia and New Zealand 
have long, open coastlines which are as difficult to blockade as they are to 
defend. It was by no means coincidental that this fictional scenario was offered 
in the mid-1980s, when regional support for independence for New Caledonia 
had both French Socialist Ministers and figures on the Right searching for 
reasons why New Caledonia's Pacific neighbours ought to oppose this 
possibility. This scenario hinged more on these political motives than it offered a 
rational response to regional security issues.48 
That announcements concerning the newly found strategic importance of 
New Caledonia were more a response to Kanak activism and to the anti-
colonialist lobbying of South Pacific nations than to any projected foreign threat 
was confirmed by government unwillingness to act upon its arguments. In 1985 
the assertion that New Caledonia was considered in Paris to be of strategic 
importance was given some credence when plans were announced for the 
expansion of military facilities there. After his arrival in New Caledonia aboard 
the Rubis on 10 May 1985, Charles Hernu, the Defence Minister, announced 
plans to extend the international airport runway at Tontouta so that French 
Jaguar fighter aircraft could land there, as well as proposing the construction of 
port facilities to enable corvettes and a nuclear attack submarine to berth at Pointe 
Denouel in Noumea.49 This latter project was described as constituting the 
construction of a strategic base, the urgency of which was proclaimed four 
months later in a government decree signed by Hernu and Fabius.50 Mitterrand 
expressed his approval of the plans in 1986.51 For all the proclaimed urgency of 
these plans, there has been no consequent sign of haste in Paris to fulfill them. 
The runway extension at Tontouta was constructed, although by 1993 no Jaguar 
aircraft had taken advantage of its presence. In 1985 New Caledonia was 
presented by French military officials and by Hernu as a "French aircraft carrier 
"in the South-West Pacific.52 If this were the case, the territory has been 
curiously lacking in combat aircraft. The few Mirage III fighters to use the 
airstrip at Tontouta in the 1980s were planes from a visiting RAAF squadron, 
which made a stop in transit from New Zealand in March 1983.53 The Fabius 
Government projected that 400MFF would be spent on naval facilities. This plan 
failed to be translated into reality. 54 By March 1987 it was surmised that plans 
for the strategic base had been abandoned, in spite of Chirac's expression of 
support for it in 1986.55 Although no official announcement was made on the 
matter, a mixture of budgetary constraints and the realisation that the proposal 
constituted geostrategic pie in the sky were probably the motives for this 
inaction. If indeed New Caledonia did have strategic potential, Paris has not 
availed itself of the opportunity to fulfIll it. It is more probable that the proposal 
formulated by Hernu was a response to Kanak activism than to any imminent or 
remote foreign threat. 56 
Geostrategic arguments as marginal as those applied to New Caledonia 
have not been advanced to support the military presence in French Polynesia. 
The importance of the test programme was in itself adequate to vindicate that 
Table 51 French Nuclear Tests 
1981-1991 
Date I,ocation Yield (kt)l 
1981: 21 February Moruroa 8 
6 March Moruroa 2 
28 March Moruroa 5 
10 April Moruroa 8 
8 July Moruroa 20 
11 July Moruroa 8 
18 July Moruroa 2 
3 August Moruroa 15. 
t 1 November Moruroa 3 
5 December Moruroa 5 
8 December Moruroa 15 
1982: 20 February Moruroa 3 
20 March Momroa 15 
21 June Momroa 2 
1 July Moruroa 20 
21 July Moruroa 2 
25 July Moruroa 55 
1983: 19 April Moruroa 40 
2S April Moruroa 1 
25 May Mornroa 40 
18 June Moruroa 3 
28 June Moruroa 35 
20 July Momroa 10 
4 August Moruroa 8 
3 December Moruroa 4 
7 December Momroa 15 
1984: 8 May Moruroa 20 
12 May Moruroa 55 
12 June Moruroa 2 
16 June Moruroa 35 
27 October Moruroa 3 
2 November Moruroa 35 
1 December Moruroa 1 
6 December Moruroa S5 
1985: 30 April Momroa 15 
8 May Moruroa 90 
3 June Moruroa 10 
7 June Moruroa 5 
24 October Moruroa 2 
26 October Moruroa 20 
24 November Moruroa 5 
26 November Moruroa 55 
1 Estimated maximum possible yield. Figures mainly from the New Zealand 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research seismographic station in 
Rarotonga. 
1986: 26 April 
6 May 
27 May 
30 MRY 
10 November 
12 November 
6 December 
10 December 
1987: 5 May 
20 May 
6 June 
21 June 
23 October 
MoruroR 
MoruroR 
Moruroa 
MoruroR 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
MornroR 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
5 November Momroa 
19 Novemher Moruroa 
29 November Moruroa 
1988: 11 May 
25 May 
16 June 
23 June 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
1989: 
1990: 
1991: 
25 October 
5 November Moruroa 
23 November Momroa 
30 November Fangataufa 
11 May 
20 May 
3 June 
10 Jlme 
25 October 
31 October 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Fangataufa 
Moruroa 
MoruroR 
20 November Moruroa 
27 November Fangataufa 
2 June 
7 June 
26 June 
4 July 
14 November 
21 November 
7 May 
18 May 
29 May 
14 June 
Monlroa 
Moruroa 
Fangataufa 
Moruroa 
Fangataufa 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Moruroa 
Fangataufa 
Moruroa 
5 
5 
4 
30 
6 
25 
9 
30 
5 
30 
3 
15 
50 
20 
60 
3 
20 
80 
5 
30 
2 
50 
40 
100 
1 5 
2 
20 
70 
25 
20 
30 
90 
30 
3 
100 
20 
120 
35 
10 
60 
110 
30 
Sources: Burrows et al.: French Nuclear Testing, 1960-
1988 pp.33-37; Delius, Ulrich: SOS Moruroa: les essais 
nucUaires /ranfais dans Ie Paciflqut! pp.88-89; Smith, 
Warwick: "Underground Nuclear Explosions in the Tuamotu 
Archipelago" pp.2~4; The Press 15 June 1991. 
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presence without recourse to additional justification. The sort of theorising 
applied to New Caledonia would have been fanciful in any case. Scenarios of 
projected foreign invasion seemed even less probable when applied to French 
Polynesia than to New Caledonia. French Polynesia was geographically isolated 
even by South Pacific standards, positioned far from major shipping routes in 
the North Pacific. The territory lay too distant from South America to constitute 
an offshore base of any threat to Latin American security in the event of a French 
decolonisation. Military bases in French Polynesia, with the exception of the 
naval and army bases at Papeete which date from the nineteenth century, were 
constructed to serve the operations of the CEP. Airfields at Papeete, Hao, 
Fangataufa and Moruroa were used for the transport of staff and material to and 
from the testing sites, as was the port at Moruroa.57 
Maintaining the internal security of the Pacific TOM, rather than 
defending them against any marginal risk of foreign aggression, formed a major 
task for French military units stationed in the South Pacific. In Wallis and 
Futuna, the deployment of gendarmes to Mata Utu during the state of emergency 
declared in October 1986, and to Futuna in October 1993, were the only two 
incidents in the period under discussion when this consideration had any bearing 
on the territory. French gendarmes in French Polynesia were at times employed 
to quell industrial unrest in Papeete. French Navy vessels stationed in the 
territory were used to patrol the waters around Moruroa, and to track 
Greenpeace and other anti-nuclear protest vessels, a task that they performed 
from the first Greenpeace protest there in 1972, until the tests held in 1991.58 In 
New Caledonia, gendarmes were in the front line of confrontations with the 
FLNKS during its violent protest actions from 1984 to 1988. Regular army 
troops were not involved in the troubles during 1984 and 1985, although they 
were available for the control of any potential insurrection should the need have 
arisen. Regular army troops played a part in efforts to pacify and monitor rural 
tribes from 1986 to 1988 in the "nomadisation" programme implemented under 
the Chirac Government.59 The changing number of troops stationed in New 
Caledonia during the 1980s reflected the seriousness with which the potential for 
insurrection was regarded in Paris. The Chirac Government in particular staged 
a proportionately large build-up of ground forces in the territory. In 1979, the 
total number of military personnel in New Caledonia, including gendarmes, had 
been 2,472 men.60 During the 1980s, numbers far exceeded this level. In late 
November 1984, at the time of the FLNKS active boycott, there were 2,826 
army personnel present, of whom 1,300 were gendarmes, and the remainder 
were regular army.61 This force was strengthened the following month with 
eight companies of CRS.62 The military presence in New Caledonia peaked 
during the time of the FLNKS active boycott from April to June 1988. By 24 
April 1988 there was a combined total of 10,990 CRS, gendarmes and regular 
army personnel deployed in New Caledonia; one for every 14 local 
inhabitants.63 As a result of the Ouvea incident, this command was reinforced 
with 100 further gendarmes, a platoon of GIGN and 150 Marines.64 This was a 
sizeable force, and was instrumental in prompting the FLNKS decision to back 
down from its active boycott. By the end of the following year, after the 
lessening of tensions under the Matignon Accords, this French force had been 
considerably reduced. (Table 52) 
While land forces deployed in New Caledonia were expanded in 
response to internal unrest, the French military in the South Pacific was too 
thinly spread to guard against external aggression. The French naval squadron, 
of which the most powerful components were its three frigates and five patrol 
boats, was a small unit with which to guard a maritime zone of 6.78Mkm2 
(Tables 1, 23, 33) composed of three territories separated by thousands of 
kilometres. Nor were the small forces in the French Pacific TOM evenly spread. 
While New Caledonia and French Polynesia had army, air force and naval 
elements in their garrisons, Wallis and Futuna had no permanent French military 
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presence other than half a dozen gendarmes stationed there on police duties. The 
Pacific squadron was the smallest of the French Navy fleets stationed overseas. 
Its commander in 1993, Vice-Admiral Fran~ois Querat, stated that it represented 
5% to 6% of the total means of the French Navy.65 The squadron had minimal 
air cover, with only surveillance aircraft to provide long-range support, the rest 
of the aircraft present in New Caledonia and in French Polynesia consisting of 
helicopters and cargo planes. (Table 52) 
When compared to the French Indian Ocean fleet, the modest nature of 
the French air and naval commitment to the South Pacific becomes more 
apparent. At times in the middle of the 1980s, the French Indian Ocean fleet was 
larger than that of the Soviet Union in the zone. The French fleet usually 
consisted of a destroyer, five frigates, a submarine, a fast attack craft, an 
amphibious assault ship, a naval workshop vessel, two supply ships and two oil 
tankers. Air support was provided by a fighter squadron equipped with seven 
Mirage TITs, and two squadrons of helicopters and transport craft.66 The heavier 
commitment of French forces in the Indian Ocean than in the South Pacific was a 
reflection of the former's greater strategic importance to France. French units 
stationed at Djibouti and Reunion guarded the shipping route leading from the oil 
fields of the Persian Gulf through the Suez Cana1.67 The Gulf War of 1991 
demonstrated the threat that instability in the Middle East posed to this 
strategically important route. No trade in the South Pacific held the same 
importance to French economic interests as the protection of the oil trade in the 
Middle East. 68 Neither did French forces in the South Pacific face the immediate 
threat of foreign aggression disrupting French regional trade. 
If the French Pacific military was unlikely to face foreign aggression and 
was not deployed in great enough strength to guard its huge zone from external 
threat, it might legitimately be asked what in fact its role was. Four official 
explanations were offered by Vice-Admiral Thireaut in 1988. The conventional 
military role was given last. 69 Internal security duties were not mentioned, to 
avoid giving the impression that the domestic situation of the Pacific TOM was 
unstable. The functions described by Thireaut as forming the duties of the 
French military in the South Pacific appeared instead to be quite banal although 
useful. 
He pointed out the diplomatic utility of naval visits. The attendance of 
French warships at national events such as independence day celebrations in the 
region was usually the result of invitations by island leaders, and these calls 
offered good opportunities as flag-waving exercises for the Republic.10 French 
warships attended the Australian bicentenary celebrations in February 1988,71 
and were regular attendants at self-government anniversary celebrations in the 
Cook Islands.72 Such ceremonial visits formed part of a wider policy of warship 
visits to foreign ports in the South Pacific to promote the French regional 
presence. French vessels stationed at Papeete are regular visitors to,the Cook 
Islands. They have not simply paid courtesy calls, but have been used to 
transport sick Cook Islanders to hospital in Papeete, and to help with French 
development efforts to the islands.73 
Thireaut described the second mission of the French Pacific forces as 
entailing cyclone relief, both to the French Pacific, and to foreign island states.74 
The French military has lent its support to cyclone recovery efforts in Wallis and 
Futuna, for which it has assigned army and navy personnel from Noumea.75 
French legionaries from Papeete were posted to Rarotonga in January 1987 to 
help with recovery from cyclone Sally, and French naval vessels were used to 
ship heavy machinery and supplies from Papeete.76 In September 1986 the 
Jacques Cartier, a transport landing ship, was sent from Noumea with food and 
medical supplies after cyclone Namu hit the Solomon Islands.17 
These efforts represented the limits of French military contacts with 
nations of the South Pacific until the beginnings of changes from the late 
Table 52. French Military Forces in the South 
Pacific 
1989 
Pacific Naval Squadron 
Command: Papeete 
Commanding Officer: Vice-Admiral (also acts as 
Commander-in-Chief of armed forces in French Polynesia) 
Three frigates; Commandant Birot (A69), Amiral Charner 
(F727), Enseigne de Vaisseau Henri (F749) 
New Caledonia station: 
2 P-400 patrol boats; La Moqueuse (P688), La Glorieuse 
(P686). 
t Bfttiment de Transport et Soutien (BTS); BougainviUe 
(L9077). Holds 1 Engin de Debarquement pour Infanterie et 
Chars (EDIC) landing craft and can carry 2 Puma 
helicopters 
1 Batral class landing craft; Jacques Cartier (L9033). Can 
carry t 80 men and 12 vehicles 
2 oceanographic research vessels; Boussole (A 781), 
L'EstaJette (A 766) 
2 Gardian long-range surveillance aircraft 
French Polynesia station: 
Papeete: 
3 P-400 patrol boats; La Gracieuse (P687), La Railleuse 
(P689), La Tapageuse (P690) 
1 Batral class landing craft; Dumont D'UrviUe (L9032) 
I gendarme coastguard vessel 
t oceanographic research vessel 
3 Gardians 
t Alouette III helicopter 
Moruroa: 
5 supply tenders; Tapatai (A 779), Taape (A633), Chamois 
(A 767), Rari (A634), Rev; (A635) 
3 coastal tugs; Maroa (A636), Mairo (A637), Manini (A638) 
3 oil tankers; Papernoo (A625), Punaroo (A632) 
3 EDIC landing craft; L9051, L9072, L9074 
2 light patrol boats 
1 Alouette 
French Air Force Pacific Wing 
New Caledonia: 
100 personnel 
2 C-160 Transall transports 
2 Alouettes 
4 Puma helicopters 
French Polynesia: 
550 personnel 
3 Caravelle transports 
3 Alouettes 
3 Pumas 
Army Units l 
Command: Noumea 
Commanding Officer: General (also acts as Commander-in-
Chief of armed forces in New Caledonia) 
New Caledonia: 
1,530 regular army personnel 
1,100 gendarmes 
298 transport vehicles 
10 Panhard armoured cars 
5 armoured personnel carriers2 
5 105mm howitzers 
French Polynesia: 
1,854 regular army personnel 
900 gendarmes 
77 transport vehicles 
Sources: Jean-Michel Boucheron: 1990-1993 
Programmation militaire pp.338, 339, 341; The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military 
Balance 1990-1991 p.66; Nic Maclellan: "Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity? French Military Forces in the Pacific" in 
Interdisciplinary Peace Research voL2 no.l pp.5-8. 
1 Figures do not include CRS, who were under the command of the High 
Commissioners in Papeete and Noumea, or Papeete and Noumea's municipal 
police. 
2 Wheeled riot control vehicles armed with a machine gun each, used by the 
gendarmes. 
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1980s.78 French military cooperation in the Pacific generally was not well 
developed before this time.79 Two decades after de Gaulle had partially 
withdrawn the Republic from NATO in 1966, and had refused to participate in 
SEATO,80 the Fifth Republic under Mitterrand retained a Gaullist stance of 
avoiding participation in military alliances in which French interests would have 
been subordinate to those of the USA.81 This stance had its implications for the 
Pacific, as well as for other regions of strategic interest to France. Given the 
preponderance of US military strength in the Pacific, France could only have 
been a subordinate partner in any regional military alliance there. France 
therefore played no part in defence pacts in the South Pacific, of which the most 
prominent was ANZUS.82 French Pacific forces did not regularly exercise with 
Australian, New Zealand or Pacific island forces. 83 France had no programme 
to compare with the network of military exchange, training and assistance 
schemes that Australia, New Zealand and the US had implemented in the island 
Pacific. 
The patrolling of the French Pacific EEZ was the third role described by 
Thireaut, a major undertaking given the expanse of this zone.84 As was the case 
with the RNZN in New Zealand's EEZ, rather than a vigil against foreign 
invasion, the monitoring of fishing trawlers in territorial waters was the principal 
concern of this effort. Thireaut listed the protection of the Pacific TOM against 
invasion as the fourth role of the forces under his command. He pointed out that 
his forces were intended to hold open access to ports and airports so that 
reinforcements could be despatched from metropolitan France.85 
This point represented a tacit admission that forces already present were 
inadequate to defend the Pacific TOM in the event of invasion. Whether French 
forces could be deployed to the Pacific TOM rapidly enough and in adequate 
numbers to counteract foreign invasion is open to doubt. The Gulf War revealed 
the logistical difficulty, among other problems. that the French military had in 
deploying units in the Middle East. French commanders faced problems with 
insufficient supplies, uniforms and equipment adapted to a hot environment, and 
long-range transport aircraft.86 France experienced problems sending from its 
300,000 strong army fewer than 10,000 ground troops to the Middle East, 
probJems that call into question its ability to defend its farther-flung DOM-
TOM.87 Similar logistical problems to those experienced in the Gulf War, 
accentuated by the greater distance involved, would be confronted in the event of 
having to deploy a large force from metropolitan France to defend the Pacific 
TOM. 
Admittedly, the chances of such an operation being needed were 
extremely low. German surface raiders in World War I and Japanese 
expansionism in the Pacific in the 1940s represented the only concrete foreign 
military threats to the French Pacific in the twentieth eentury. Statements during 
the 1980s made by French admirals, both in service and retired, affirming that 
the Pacific was a key strategic zone, threatened by the possibility of Soviet 
expansionism.88 tended to portray the French Pacific as being more directly 
concerned than it actually was. They omitted mention of the extreme logistical 
problems that would be involved in the organisation of Soviet aggression. 
Soviet naval bases in the Pacific maritime provinces of the USSR, and at Cam 
Ranh Bay in Vietnam, were far removed from New Caledonia, the closest 
Pacific TOM. Vietnam lies over 7,000km from Noumea, while Vladivostok is 
situated over 8,000km away. The US Pacific Command had the upper hand 
strategically in that Soviet bases were restricted by their geographical location. 
Ship movements could be monitored easily as Soviet vessels had to pass 
through narrow straits linking the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea with the 
Pacific Ocean. Soviet operational capacities were limited by the cold climate of 
the Soviet far east. Ports there were ice-bound during winter. The Soviet far east 
was thus not a well-located area from which to launch military operations in the 
South Pacific.89 Soviet concerns were more immediate: the protection of its own 
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borders,90 and the peaceful development of relations with its Asian 
neighbours.91 
It is moreover uncertain what gain the Soviet Union might have made 
from infiltrating the island South Pacific. The region was not abundant in readily 
exploitable strategic resources. Its fisheries were an attraction, although Moscow 
had no need to stage a major regional incursion to pursue this resource. Those 
mineral resources to be found in the South Pacific, such as New Caledonian 
nickel, were more easily and cheaply available to the Soviets from deposits in 
the Soviet Union. The USSR was a long way from exhausting its own 
resources in the 1980s, and Russian economic exploitation of these remained 
unfulfilled in the early 199Os. 
Superpower rivalry in the 1980s did not directly affect the South Pacific, 
still less the Pacific TOM. Soviet Navy penetration of the South Pacific in the 
1980s was minimal. Incursions by its surface vessels or submarines in French 
Pacific waters were rare. The last official visit by a Soviet warship to the Pacific 
TOM was made to Noumea in 1970.92 A Soviet submarine was sighted in 
French Polynesian waters in November 1982, but this was a rarity.93 
Various conservative politicians attempted in the 1980s to inflate the 
minimal Soviet presence in the South Pacific into a menace in order to call into 
question the defence conduct of Socialist Governments. For example in 
November 1982, in response to the sighting of the Soviet submarine, a written 
question was tabled in the National Assembly by an RPR Deputy, Bruno Bourg-
Broc. He postulated: "On assiste en effet au developpement de la presence de 
bateaux de la flotte sovietique dans nos eaux territoriales du Pacifique." Then he 
asked what measures the Mauroy Government intended to take. Two months 
later Hernu gave an unruffled reply: "Aucun batiment de guerre de la marine 
sovietique n'a ete localise a proximite de la Polynesie et de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie au COUTS des dernieres annees et Ie nombre des escales effectuees par 
des batiments de commerce - en general des paquebots - n'a pas varie, restant a 
un niveau faible. "94 This comment remained valid ten years later. By the 1990s, 
Japanese and Korean trawlers represented a more important foreign maritime 
presence in the French Pacific EEZ, whereas the Russian presence was still 
marginal. The most visible sign of Russian maritime activities in the Pacific 
TOM were the cruise liners which regularly made calls to Noumea. 
Other conservative French politicians, none of whom held prominent 
positions in the formulation of French foreign policy in the 1980s, showed a 
predilection for painting dark scenarios of Soviet expansion to counteract the 
arguments of sceptical governments in the South Pacific that the French military 
was present in the region merely to shore up what were perceived as French 
colonial interests. Pierre Lacour, the Senator for Charente, published a book in 
1987 in which he asserted that the Soviet Union was conducting a systematic 
campaign of infiltration in the South Pacific.95 He called for greater unity 
between the United States, Australia, New Zealand and France, claiming that an 
erosion of the French presence in the zone would open an avenue for Soviet 
penetration.96 Plosse, as Secretary of State to the South Pacific, offered the 
same message in early 1988, and suggested that the United States, Britain, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand and France should form a defence pact against 
this eventuality.97 He and other commentators pilloried Australia and New 
Zealand for advocating anti-nuclear and anti-colonial policies in the region 
during what was portrayed as a time of peril. 98 
Nor was the suggested Soviet threat portrayed as purely military by 
conservative French commentators. In 1984 Jacques Baumel, a former Gaullist 
Minister and an RPR Deputy, assumed that communist influence was not 
necessarily just external. He projected one scenario for the future as being the 
subversion and balkanisation of island states by Marxist agitators,99 presumably 
backed by the Soviet Union. Plosse, as Secretary of State to the South Pacific, 
warned of the need for vigilance against trade unionist Fifth columnists inspired 
221 
by Moscow. He stressed the need for unity against "l'offensif communiste 
classique des organisations syndic ales largement politisees" .100 
Such analyses were not vindicated in the 1980s. Internal unrest in the 
South Pacific came from groups which were difficult to portray as communist 
agitators: Fijian nationalists led by Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, who led two coups 
in 1987 to assert indigenous dominance over the growing local influence of 
Indian immigrants; Kanak nationalists in New Caledonia; and tribal landowners 
on Bougainville Island who from 1989 led a rebellion against the refusal of the 
PNG Government to give greater compensation for mining rights. South Pacific 
island states were unpromising ground for the penetration of Marxist-Leninist 
thinking. IOl Communists played no role in the democratic institutions of South 
Pacific nations. Unlike metropolitan France, no South Pacific nation had 
Communist Party representatives in its parliament. Where Communist parties 
were present, as was the case in Australia and New Zealand, they were small, 
fractious groups preoccupied with arguments over which of them was the truest 
bearer of the Marxist flame. The persistence of traditional hierarchical social 
structures and values in most island states rendered their leaders unreceptive to 
Marxist social values which would in any case have been ill-adapted to South 
Pacific societies. The Marxist theory of class struggle in nineteenth century 
European industrialised countries was not easily applicable to the predominantly 
rural, agricultural, subsistence societies to be found in the South Pacific in the 
late twentieth century. 
Neither before nor since such conservative French speculation in the 
1980s that the Soviet Union was practising a campaign of regional 
de stabilisation has much concrete evidence been presented to back the 
assumption. From the 1970s the Soviet Union opened diplomatic relations with 
various newly-independent island states, although these steps did not lead to an 
entrenched Soviet regional presence. Soviet relations established with Fiji in 
1974, Tonga in 1975, and with Papua New Guinea as well as Western Samoa in 
1976, did not involve sending resident ambassadors to these countries.102 
Permanent Soviet diplomatic representation consisted of two Embassies, one in 
Wellington and one in Canberra. New Zealand and Australia regarded with 
unease Soviet negotiations for fishing contracts with island states, considering 
them as the possible beginning of further penetration, even though little came of 
them.l03 Soviet fishing deals with island states ended up being less important 
than those that New Zealand and Australia had themselves concluded with the 
Soviet Union. Apart from the use of some ports in the region for its fishing 
trawlers, the Soviet Union had no bases in the South Pacific. Nor was there any 
great reason for it to want to construct such bases. The USSR had no client 
states in the South Pacific, and none eventuated. 
With hindsight, it is easy to ridicule the scenario of a Soviet menace. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and its subsequent 
balkanisation into a grouping of quarrelsome, economically unstable states, the 
spectre of Soviet expansion no longer haunts the South Pacific. Faced with more 
pressing internal social and economic problems, Russia has abandoned its arms 
race with the United States. As part of its global dismantling of overseas bases, 
Moscow is reducing its naval forces at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, the closest of 
its bases to the South Pacific, and plans a total withdrawal by 1995.104 
Talk of Soviet expansion in the South Pacific in the 1980s by figures on 
the French Right consisted of little more than a series of politically-motivated, 
unrealistic scenarios. These images cannot be said to have exerted an important 
influence on the regional defence policy of French Governments since) 981 , but 
merit discussion in depth as they prompted much erroneous theorising. In a 
search for the motives behind the French military presence in the South Pacific, 
grandiose strategic reasoning was in many regards a red herring set up by 
conservative parliamentarians and military leaders to influence government and 
public opinion. Their images of the French Pacific forces offering a bulwark 
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against the advance of the Soviet Union, and assuring regional security, are, 
under examination, ultimately less convincing as a raison d'etre than the 
effective roles the military performed. French Pacific forces played their part in 
the maintenance of the Fifth Republic's global network by maintaining a minimal 
but effective vigil over the largely unexploited maritime resources of the Pacific 
TOM, guarding and manning the facilities of the nuclear test programme, and 
by keeping law and order during times of domestic unrest. Their role in realising 
Cheysson's goal of the pursuit of patient dialogue and cooperation with regional 
neighbours consisted of providing civil emergency and developmental aid, and 
representing France in the region. 
A New Centre of the World? 
Just as the military importance of the French Pacific was exaggerated by 
figures with vested political or career interests, so too misrepresentation has 
been evident in official and unofficial French evaluation of the economic 
significance of the Pacific TOM. In the early 1980s certain figures in Paris 
shunned Cheysson's simple, ungrandiose, democratic justification for a French 
Pacific presence, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, in favour of an 
overstated picture of the commercial value of the region to the Republic. The 
Parisian Institut du Pacifique, a private body founded by retired military men 
and civil servants, campaigned for greater recognition of the region in 
government and business circles. For its members, the consideration that the 
Fifth RepubJic was present in the South Pacific because it was the wish of the 
inhabitants of the Pacific TOM was not adequate reason in itself. The French 
Pacific was instead considered important because of the opportunities the greater 
Pacific region offered for French trade and investment. The humble scale of 
most economic activity in the Pacific TOM, and the troubles state planners were 
having there trying to encourage the productive diversity upon which export-
orientated prosperity might be founded, were cast aside for a macro-economic 
view engulfing the entire Pacific rim, where the potential for prosperity was 
presented as enormous. 
In its influential book published in 1983, Le Pacifique, nouveau centre 
du monde, the Tnstitllt dll Pacifique presented its case for the need for greater 
French participation in the Pacific basin. As well as being portrayed as an area of 
great power rivalry,IOS the zone was characterised as a centre of enormous 
resources, rapid economic growth, and as being of great market potential for 
France. 106 It was contended that the centre of global power was inexorably 
shifting away from Europe to the Pacific. The former's stake in global affairs 
was declining while the latter would be the new centre of gravity in the twenty-
first century that Europe had been until the middle of the twentieth century .107 
All was not lost however. It was pointed out that although Paris had 
traditionally neglected its trade and diplomatic interests in the Pacific in 
preference to concentrating on areas closer to metropolitan France, the Republic 
was still "une nation riveraine du Pacifique" thanks to its three TOM there.I08 
France retained the opportunity to become a major player in regional affairs if it 
made a concerted effort to expand its presence in the Pacific basin. This should 
be done through greater cooperation with regional organisations such as 
ASEAN, the South Pacific Forum and the Andes Pact, and through the 
exploitation of France's privileged position as a major participant in the EEC.I09 
As well as greater French liaison with the region through multilateral relations, 
improved bipartite relations should be pursued, including with countries 
sceptical of France's regional presence, such as the island nations of the South 
Pacific. Increased trade and cooperation with these states could dissipate 
misunderstandings. ltO The dire alternative to an increased regional presence, it 
was argued, was that France would become progressively marginalised and 
excluded from Pacific affairs, which would be a step further along the path of 
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France's declining influence as a global power since the early twentieth 
century. I I I 
The arguments laid out by the Institut du Pacifique should not be 
excluded from discussion of French South Pacific policy because of their non-
official nature. The views that the organisation offered concerning the Pacific 
had considerable bearing on the field of French regional policy, and their echoes 
are to be found in statements by political leaders of the Left, Centre and Right 
during the 1980s. In 1984 Lemoine offered an optimistic image of a New 
Caledonian future which resembled an extract from Le Pacifique, nouveau centre 
dumonde: 
[ ... ] nous avons ici un pays a construire [Ia Nouvelle-Caledonie] pour lui 
permettre d'aborder la fin du siecle avec toutes les chances qui vont s'ouvrir dans 
Ie Pacifique qui prendra de plus en plus d'importance dans les affaires du monde, 
compte tenu des puissances qui J'entourent, de leurs immenses populations et 
des richesses en hommes et en etendues marines. Le Pacifique est A la 
dimension du monde du XXIe siecJe et de grands esprits lui voient deja jouer 
dans les temps qui vienncnt Ie role dans I'histoire de I'humanite qu'a joue la 
Mediterranee pour les pays de I'Europe lorsqu'ils dominaient Ie monde. Le 
centre de gravite se Mplace et demain les grands courants economiques, les 
echanges, les marcMs seront peut-etre de plus en plus transferes dans Ie 
Pacifique. t t 2 
In the introduction to a book published in 1983 which stressed the growing 
importance of Asia and the Pacific, Raymond Barre too lent his support to the 
thesis that the Pacific was becoming the predominant zone in the world and that 
France should play a greater role in this evolution.l13 .Mitterrand 114 and the 
RPR 115 were in agreement on this point, and Rocard has recognised its 
value.116 Although none of these sources attributed their ideas to the Institut du 
Pacifique, it is evident that the theme of the Pacific as a new centre of global 
power formed a concept that was accepted in Paris in high places. 
The case for the Pacific as a new centre of the world should be examined 
critically to assess its applicability to, and impact on, the French role in the 
South Pacific. While the theory offered a clear economic rationale for French 
regional diplomacy and integration, it also contained numerous analytical flaws 
which, like its premises overall, were to find echoes in the official articulation of 
French Pacific policy. 
The term "Pacifique", as used by the Institut du Pacifique, is open to 
scrutiny. In Le Pacifique, nouveau centre du monde, the zone was defined as 
encompassing over 45% of global GNP, and half the population of the 
world. I 17 The Pacific community was defined as all the countries in the Pacific 
or with coastal borders on the Pacific, and included land-locked countries 
hundreds of kilometres from the ocean, such as Mongolia and Bolivia, on the 
grounds that they had dealings with Pacific nations. 
Yves Lacoste, a French geographer, cast doubt upon the validity of the 
arguments of the Institut du Pacifique from a geographical perspective. He 
questioned the inclusion of various peripheral nations in the Pacific region. He 
also asked whether the United States and the Soviet Union could be considered 
purely Pacific powers when the bulk of their populations and economic activity 
were not concentrated there. II8 Lacoste considered the organisation's definition 
of a Pacific community as inflated and described its presentation as the largest 
economic and population zone in the world as the product of "artifices 
statistiques".l19 Lacoste admitted that globally important trade had grown 
between Japan and North America, and pointed out the expanding importance of 
South-East Asian trade with these two nations and Australia, but questioned 
whether such developments warranted description as an identifiable Pacific 
economic community.120 
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His arguments were well-founded. The rapid economic growth which 
took place during the 1980s in Asian nations on the Pacific rim did not have 
parallels in the Pacific TOM, Australia, New Zealand or South America. During 
the 1980s, trade from the Pacific TOM was directed more to metropolitan France 
than to Pacific nations. French incursion into the three largest markets of the 
South Pacific was low. In 1983, French trade represented 2.7% of the 
Australian market, 1.5% of the New Zealand market, and 0.5% of the PNG 
market.121 There was no prospect of French initiatives to increase trade with the 
island states of the South Pacific reaping the great profits that a stake in Asian 
economic growth might accrue. The French trade that had developed with these 
states of the South Pacific by the early 1990s was appropriately minor. Setting 
aside Vanuatu, where French trade was long-established from the colonial 
period, by 1993 there had not been a remarkable degree of French investment in 
the island states of the South Pacific. In accordance with their relative 
importance in regional trade, of the island states Papua New Guinea and Fiji 
enjoyed the greatest amount of trade with France. By 1993 there were eight 
French companies which had directly invested in Papua New Guinea, and four 
in Fiji- l22 In 1992 French imports from Papua New Guinea were worth 
31.66MFF, while French exports to Papua New Guinea amounted to 
22.44MFF.t23 French imports from Fiji that year were worth 1.99MFF, while 
French exports to Fiji were valued at 50.19MFF.124 In proportion with the 
small population and resource bases of island states, French trade with them was 
on a sman scale. For example in 1992, French imports from Tuvalu were 
valued at O.18MFF, while French exports to the island amounted to 
O.07MFF.125 In the case of Nauru, both French exports and imports were 
worth 0.07MFF.126 French trade with Kiribati included O.OIMFF worth of 
imports and 14.63MFF worth of exports, while the respective figures for Tonga 
were 0.02MFF and 0.16MFF.t27 In the 1990s the island Pacific remained 
dependent on high levels of foreign aid and was one of the least economically 
advanced regions in the world, constituting an unpromising area for major 
French trade expansion. 
The geographical reductionism involved in grouping disparate countries 
under the umbrella of a Pacific super region by French commentators was an 
action which obscured the physical distances between states with vastly different 
economies, cultures, and govemments.128 The validity of the concept of the 
Pacific as a single community was difficult to accept. Culturally as well as 
economically, the asserted unity of this community was a fiction. l29 An Aleutian 
Eskimo, a Chinese peasant, an Australian sheep farmer and an Easter Islander 
have little in common other than their labelling by the Institut du Pacifique as 
inhabitants of this supposed Pacific community. In such a large grouping, the 
island micro-states of the South Pacific tended to be ignored in preference to 
attention concentrated on social and economic trends in Asia.130 
In discussion below of French policy on the Pacific, it is important to 
bear in mind that the South Pacific was in some cases assumed by politicians in 
Paris to be part of a much larger Pacific entity, even though the globally 
significant parts of that greater entity may have been distant from the South 
Seas. This attitude was evident in analyses by Baumel and Flosse mentioned 
earlier. They on occasion portrayed the French military in the South Pacific as 
being directly affected by superpower confrontation in the North Pacific, even 
though several thousand kilometres separated these elements. The references 
above to Lemoine, Barre, the RPR, Mitterrand and Rocard also showed similar 
signs of geographic reductionism. As much as anything else these examples 
illustrate the analytical shorthand that must be adopted, and the misleading 
impressions it can give, when referring to large expanses of the world. The 
same reductionism was evident when French politicians talked of French African 
policy, assuming that a single policy could be uniformly applied to the varied 
situations of African countries. The assumption made by the Institut du 
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Pacifique that the Pacific was a homogeneous entity was not adopted as a 
consistent argument in the foreign policy of French Governmen!S from 1981. 
Nevertheless, Asia and the South Pacific have been considered by 
French diplomatic structures to be part of a single entity, if only for 
administrative purposes. Traditionally, Pacific foreign affairs were handled by 
the Quai d'Orsay under its Asia and Oceania directorate.131 The Asian section of 
the directorate had greater administrative resources at its disposal due to its 
coverage of major nations such as Japan, China, Indonesia and India. The 
Oceania subdirectorate, created in 1978, was among the least well-staffed 
subdirectorates at the Quai d'Orsay, and consisted of three to five personnel in 
the 1980s.132 In the 1980s, there existed a growing awareness in the diplomatic 
corps that the South Pacific constituted a separate entity, with its own issues. 
Charles-Henri Montin, then the Political Counsellor at the French Embassy in 
Wellington, was careful in 1985 to distinguish between France's differing 
relations with various countries in the Pacific basin, and shied away from going 
so far as to state that these relations were evidence of an overall Pacific policy: 
In spite or [ ... J enthusiasm shown in France by our learned analysts of 
new trends, it is not possible to speak of an overall policy for the Pacific, 
taken as a whole. France, like other industrialised countries, has strong 
economic ties with countries of the North Pacific such as the United States, 
Canada, and Japan, but they do not really stem from their Pacific location but 
rather from their own intrinsic economic significance. 
Also, there does not seem to be the same community of approach to 
problems in the North Pacific as there is in the South Pacific. [ ... ] Therefore I 
would hesitate to say that France has an overall Pacific policy, but we are 
certainly trying to define a policy for the South Pacific.133 
Jean-Pierre Gomane, the co-founder and Vice-President of the Institut du 
Pacifique, has described France as having an "impressionist" Pacific policy, in 
the sense of it looking acceptably coherent from a distance, while not standing 
up to close scrutiny.134 In asserting this, he was not necessarily highlighting a 
deficiency in French foreign policy. Given the scope of the word "Pacifique" as 
defined by Gomane and his colleagues, it was not surprising that France should 
not have possessed a unified policy for such an enormous geographic area. It is 
questionable whether France could define a coherent Pacific policy, any more 
than it could formulate a coherent Eurasian policy. 
As the American historian Robert Aldrich has pointed out,135 the outlook 
of the Institut du Pacifique was part of an intellectual trend in the 1980s that was 
not restricted to France. The idea of a forthcoming "Pacific century" had its roots 
in Japan and California in the 1970s,136 where postwar economic prosperity led 
to the articulation of the belief that better was yet to come there. Such thinking 
has tended to ignore the South Pacific.137 The islands of the South Pacific had 
little importance in global trade, and were of marginal economic interest 
compared to the commercial activities of North America and Asia.1 38 
Californians had become less optimistic by the early 1990s. The Los Angeles 
riot of April 1992 was a symptom of racial disharmony in the State. A state 
fiscal crisis, declining employment opportunities in the defence and aerospace 
industry due to the end of the Cold War, increasing unemployment generally, 
and a slump in real estate prices, contributed to the depressed socio-economic 
condition of California by 1993)39 Japan has experienced a slowing rate of 
economic growth in the early 1990s as its rapidly developing Asian neighbours -
South Korea, China, and Taiwan - became increasingly competitive exporters on 
the international market. While neither California nor Japan was in decline, it 
was by no means manifest that they would enjoy the same economic prosperity 
in the twenty-first century that they experienced from the 1950s to the 1980s. 
Nor was the economic growth of various South-East Asian countries without its 
difficulties. Industrialisation had been accompanied by increased environmental 
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destruction and pollution, the collapse of traditional agriculture, and an 
increasing gap between rich and poor. Political unrest had not diminished in the 
region, as evidenced by civil disturbances in China, Thailand and Myanmar 
since the 1980s.140 A decade after the promotion of the image of a Pacific 
century, it appears that aspects of that vision as it might apply to North America 
and parts of Asia may not live up to expectations. 
Aldrich pointed out that as an intellectual trend, the vision of the Pacific 
as a new centre of the world was by no means a new one. The theorising of the 
Institut du Pacifique had its forerunner in the lobbyists of the Pacti Coloniale, 
who were active in metropolitan French politics in the 1880s. What Aldrich 
described as "a round of Pacific mania" followed the publication at that time of 
two books by Paul Deschanel, a French Deputy who became President of the 
Third Republic in 1920.141 Deschanel's message in the 1880s, like that of the 
Institut du Pacifique a century later, was that France's destiny as a global power 
was at stake in the Pacific. Either the Republic could boost its presence in the 
New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia in the 
face of rivalry between the regional powers of the day (Britain, Germany, 
Spain, the Netherlands), or it could let itself be marginalised and shut out, to the 
detriment of its future as a global power.142 Yet in the century that followed, 
France neither greatly boosted its South Pacific presence, nor saw itself shut out 
of the zone. The Pacific Ocean represented a less important part of its global 
presence than its African and Asian colonies, and it is debatable whether the 
global grandeur of France suffered as a consequence. This consideration should 
be borne in mind when contemplating millenarian predictions concerning the 
French role in the Pacific in the twenty-frrst century. 
Taken to the extreme offered by the Institut du Pacifique, arguments for 
the presence of the Fifth Republic in the South Pacific in the 1980s were vague, 
theoretically ill-conceived, nostalgic for a level of global grandeur which France 
no longer enjoyed, and consequently somewhat removed from reality. French 
diplomats like Montin who worked in the South Pacific had ample reason to be 
sceptical of such analyses and to sarcastically refer to their proponents as "our 
learned analysts of new trends". 143 
For all the unabashed boosterism of the Institut du Pacifique, stripped of 
extreme attendant assumptions, the basic assessment drawn by the organisation 
concerning the French stake in the Pacific region was correct. As a result of the 
presence of the Pacific TOM, France undeniably had and retained a stake in the 
zone. Faced with a changing international scene, France found itself in search of 
a new set of relations in the region, to replace those that it had previously formed 
with Britain, the last of its European rivals to decolonise. 
French Regional Diplomacy 
Discussion in the preceding two sections of the reasoning behind French 
foreign pOlicy in the South Pacific has drawn on unofficial discourse and 
theorising to serve as contrast to the positions of French Governments since 
1981. Considerable effort has been made to dispel both misleading official and 
unofficial assessments of the French military and economic role in the zone in 
order to gain a clear picture of why France was still present there. In the course 
of this analysis. it has been demonstrated that while some arguments offered by 
French politicalleaders and commentators were erroneous, France had certain 
tangible interests in the South Pacific which it desired to protect. Continued 
French sovereignty over its possessions there assured satisfaction of the desire 
of French citizens in the Pacific TOM to stay French, enabled the maintenance of 
a French nuclear deterrent, the guardianship of whatever resources lay beneath 
the extensive French Pacific EEZ, and assured the Fifth Republic bases for the 
regional projection of French political, economic, scientific and cultural 
influence. As Cheysson indicated in November 1981, the best method to protect 
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such French interests when confronted with criticisms from nations in the South 
Pacific was to engage in patient dialogue on French policy. This chapter's final 
section considers the administrative structures which Paris deployed in response 
to its desire to further dialogue with, and to promote its interests to, the nations 
of the South Pacific. 
A common assumption expressed in the 1980s was that Paris was in the 
process of belatedly rediscovering the South Pacific. The Institut du Pacifique 
asserted in 1983 that this circumstance was part of a wider rediscovery of Asia 
and the Pacific by Mitterrand and the Mauroy Government, after years of 
governmental neglect of those areas under the Fifth Republic.144 Actually, the 
stirrings of greater official interest in the Pacific date back to the 1970s. As was 
evident in the Eighth Plan for the DaM-TOM, published in 1980, greater 
regional integration of the Pacific TOM was already deemed a laudable goal in 
Parisian administrative circles before Mitterrand's presidency. In 1979 the 
Dijoud Plan for New Caledonia had also advocated regional integration, 
emphasising the desirability of a reduction in New Caledonian isolation from its 
Pacific neighbours. Improving communications, increasing commerce, and 
promoting more scientific, cultural and technical exchanges with the South-West 
Pacific was stated to be a major priority. 145 A necessary preliminary step to the 
attainment of this goal, both for New Caledonia and for the other two Pacific 
TOM, would be the extension and improvement of French diplomatic relations 
in the South Pacific. Under the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing, certain 
intitiatives were taken in this domain. 
A meeting took place late in December 1978 which was a forerunner to 
the different high-level committees formed in the 1980s to discuss Pacific 
policy. The meeting combined officials from the Quai d'Orsay and from the rue 
Oudinot. There had since the 1940s been liaison between the Foreign Ministry 
and the Ministry of the DOM-TOM where French foreign policy interests 
coincided with the administration of the Pacific TOM. The main example was 
provided by French decisions on matters arising from the South Pacific 
Commission, which included in its domain the French TOM. Officials from both 
Ministries had represented France in meetings of the Commission since its 
foundation in 1947, and interministerial discussions had regularly been held in 
Paris on the French response to matters concerning the Commission.146 At the 
meeting on Pacific policy in December 1978, the French High Commissioners 
of the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia, as wen as the 
Superior Administrator of Wallis and Futuna, and the Ambassadors to Australia 
and New Zealand attended alongside various Ministers. The group endorsed the 
Dijoud Plan and discussed wider French cooperation in the South Pacific.147 
The activities of Dijoud in the South Pacific as Secretary of State to the DOM-
TOM were not limited to the internal administration of the Pacific TOM and the 
implementation of reforms there. During two regional tours in June and 
September 1979 he visited Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, the Solomon 
Islands and Papua New Guinea to discuss French policy with government 
representatives. 148 Discussions by Dijoud involved fending off criticisms of 
French nuclear and decolonisation policies as well as offering an update of 
reforms in the Pacific TOM and in the New Hebrides. 
This was by no means the first visit by a French Secretary of State to the 
region to articulate French regional policy. As Secretary of State to the DOM-
TOM, Olivier Stirn had visited Australia and New Zealand in March 1975 to 
defend French nuclear testing and to brief government officials in Canberra and 
Wellington on his forthcoming administrative reforms. 149 Papua New Guinea, 
which had attained independence in 1974, was also the target of French 
diplomacy. In June 1976, Bernard Destremau, the Secretary of State to Foreign 
Affairs, had visited Port Moresby to inform the PNG Government of France's 
wish to develop closer links in the region. He was following up an 
announcement, made by the French Embassy in Canberra in 1975, that Paris 
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was contemplating establishing diplomatic representation in Port Moresby.I50 
Destremau inquired about the prospect of establishing a diplomatic post in Papua 
New Guinea.151 
This visit was an early sign of France's interest in expanding its 
diplomatic network in the South Pacific, which since the end of World War II 
had centred on two Embassies, one in Canberra and another in Wellington. Prior 
to British decolonisation, two posts had been adequate, as relations with the 
island states could be conducted via British, Australian or New Zealand 
channels. As various islands attained sovereignty in the 1960s and 1970s, it 
became apparent in Paris that a new set of relations would have to be formulated 
with the emergent states of the South Pacific. At first this was done by 
accrediting the French Ambassador in Wellington to island states. Formal 
French relations with Western Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga, were established in 1971 
by these means, followed by Papua New Guinea in 1976, then Nauru and 
Tuvalu in 1979.152 
While accreditation was adequate for the exercise of contacts with the 
smallest nations in the region, for larger countries it was decided in Paris that 
permanent representation would be more appropriate. Papua New Guinea, as a 
mineral-rich country with the largest population in the zone after Australia and 
New Zealand, appeared a logical site for an embassy. Although a diplomatic 
post was established in March 1978,153 two years passed before a resident 
ambassador took up duties there. This delay was largely due to the reluctance of 
the PNG Government to associate too closely with France. PNG Government 
representatives had attacked French handling of the decolonisation of the New 
Hebrides in 1979, and were opposed to ongoing French nuclear testing.l54 
These differences did not prove to be insurmountable, and an ambassador was 
eventually appointed. On 12 November 1980 Antoine Colombani, the first 
French Ambassador to reside in Port Moresby, had his credentials accepted.155 
The French Embassy at Port Moresby was one of three French 
Embassies created in the South Pacific in 1980. The second Embassy was in 
Port Vila, where Yves Rodriguez took up his posting as the first French 
Ambassador to Vanuatu on its independence in 1980. In view of the French 
colonial heritage in the islands, and the French-speaking community in Vanuatu, 
Port Vila was a natural choice for an ambassadorial posting. In spite of troubled 
bilateral relations during and in the months immediately following 
decolonisation, Paris wished to maintain cordial contacts with Port Vila, partly 
to support the survival of French language and culture in Vanuatu. 156 
The third ambassadorial posting was to Fiji. In June 1980 Robert 
Puissant became the first resident French Ambassador in Suva.157 There were 
varied motives for installing an ambassador there. Fiji's geographical position 
was one aspect. The islands lie roughly central in the South-West Pacific, at the 
hub of regional shipping and air routes. After Papua New Guinea and New 
Zealand, Fiji had the largest population of any South Pacific island state. It was 
also a major force in island politics. Suva had played a large part in the 
formation in 1971 of the South Pacific Forum, the first multilateral political 
grouping established in the zone, and had emerged as a prominent regional 
participant in the Lome Convention, a trade and development agreement set up in 
1975 between the EEC and African, Caribbean and Pacific nations. 
The establishment of three new ambassadorial posts in the South Pacific 
was a major step forward for the exercise and development of French policy 
there. Though none of them were created by a Socialist Government, the Port 
Moresby, Port Vila and Suva embassies were to serve as contact points with 
island states and were instrumental in furthering French regional relations under 
Mitterrand. In the wider scheme of French global diplomacy, such measures 
were of a small-scale nature, but along with the cross accreditation of the French 
Ambassador to New Zealand during the 1970s, these three embassies offered 
signs of increased French diplomatic activity in the South Pacific which 
229 
preceded the advent of Mitterrand. The South Pacific had not been a major 
concern in the workings of Fifth Republican foreign policy because of a 
combination of historical precedent, and geopolitical concerns from 1958 which 
kept French attentions and priorities preoccupied elsewhere. The decolonisation 
of Africa, the Cold War in Europe, relations with NATO since de Gaulle 
partially withdrew France from it in 1966, and European integration, to name 
just four broad areas which dominated French foreign policy. required a far 
greater deployment of state resources than did the South Pacific. Comments to 
the effect that the South Pacific had been neglected should be viewed in the 
context of these larger concerns. 
During the French election campaigns of 1981, the foreign policy issues 
which were the subject of debate were far removed from the South Pacific. The 
prominent topics of that periOd included European integration, relations with the 
United States and the Soviet Union, and areas of instability such as Nicaragua, 
Afghanistan, and Poland. Giscardian foreign policy had been dominated by the 
place of France in Europe. 15S The PS Cretei! manifesto of January 1981 offered 
noble sentiments advocating the reduction of the arms race between East and 
West while expressing support for French nuclear deterrence, the promotion of 
European integration, the maintenance of solidarity with developing nations, 
particularly in Africa, and the preservation of French cultural and democratic 
traditions in the world. It had nothing to say on the Pacific. 159 Mitterrand's 110 
Propositions called for superpower withdrawals from Afghanistan in the case of 
the Soviet Union, and from Latin American dictatorships in the case of the 
United States. Support was expressed for the Polish trade union movement, 
peace in the Middle East and the independence of Chad. These issues constituted 
the concern of the first five Mitterrandian propositions. Numbers 6 to 13 
concerned disarmament, the establishment of a more just global economic order, 
and France's place in Europe, while points 105 to 112 considered nuclear 
dissuasion, NATO, relations with the Soviet Union, China, the Mediterranean, 
Africa and Quebec.160 Again, no specific mention was to be found of the South 
Pacific. These points accurately reflected major French external interests in the 
early 1980s. When Mitterrand took over the presidency in 1981, his immediate 
foreign policy concerns touched on the Americas, Europe, Africa,the Middle 
East and Asia, and did not extend to the South Pacific. 161 
South Pacific affairs were none the less not entirely absent from the 
attentions of the Socialist Government. From 4 to 8 May 1982, a special 
conference was held at the Quai d'Orsay on Asia and the Pacific. This meeting 
followed the lines of that organised under Oiscard d'Estaing in late 1978. High 
officials associated with the Asia-Pacific region gathered to discuss what role 
France should play there. 162 The meeting arrived at similar conclusions to that 
of 1978. The need for greater French participation in the zone was reiterated, 
particularly if France did not wish to be excluded from the benefits of economic 
growth there. Cheysson underlined the importance of greater French economic 
activity in the region. Mitterrand took interest in this conference, and met with 
the various diplomats involved for two hours on 7 May.163 
Mitterrand was not to pay a presidential visit to the South Pacific until his 
brief stop in New Caledonia on 17 January 1985, which was more concerned 
with domestic TOM policy than with foreign relations. Prior to that though, he 
did send an envoy to the South Pacific to explain French policy. His choice of 
spokesman was an interesting one. Regis Debray had established his reputation 
in the 1960s as a fellow traveller of the Cuban revolution, and was as much 
admired on the French Left as he was reviled on the Right for the time he had 
spent in. the Bolivian jungle with Che Guevara. A staunch opponent of what he 
characterised as Yankee neo-colonialism in Latin America, Debray had written 
theoretical works on guerilla warfare on the basis of his experience. 164 
Mitterrand employed him as a presidential advisor on Latin American affairs, an 
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appointment which must have surprised state officials in Washington. From 
1983, Debray was assigned the South Pacific as well. 
In June 1983, Debray toured the region to explain French nuclear policy 
to regional leaders, and to inform them of developments in government policy in 
New Caledonia. From 13 to 23 June, he met leaders in Port Vila, Suva, 
Wellington, Canberra and Port Moresby, including Prime Minister Lini of 
Vanuatu, Jonati Mavoa, acting Fijian Foreign Minister, Robert Muldoon, the 
Prime Minister of New Zealand, Prime Minister Hawke, and Mr Nilkare, the 
acting PNG Foreign Minister.1 65 Debray proposed that a South Pacific 
delegation of scientists inspect the test facilities at Moruroa to allay any 
suspicions about their safety, explaining that Mitterrand had decided to continue 
testing to strengthen the French nuclear deterrence in the face of persistent 
superpower rivalry. The offer was accepted by New Zealand, Australia and 
Papua New Guinea. 
The irony of a figure who had opposed Yankee neo-colonialism in Latin 
America since the 1960s, acting in the 1980s as an apologist for what leftists in 
the South Pacific described as French nuclear colonialism, was not lost on some 
commentators. It was pointed out that various conservative Australian leaders 
were to the left of Debray in their desire to end French nuclear testing and to see 
the decolonisation of New Caledonia.1 66 It is fascinating to gauge through 
Debray the extent to which the cultures of the French Left and that of the South 
Pacific Left were divergent. Gough Whitlam, the former Australian Prime 
Minister, highlighted the differences speaking as the ALP delegate to a meeting 
of the Socialist International in Copenhagen from 24 to 26 April 1984.167 
Whittam derided the French Socialist Government for its continuation of nuclear 
testing, and described French sovereignty over its Pacific territories as an 
"anomaly",168 Whitlam portrayed these aspects of the French Pacific presence 
as chauvinist, backward, colonialist and conservative. It is a characterisation 
which was to be reiterated by Labor Ministers, as is discussed further in 
chapters 6 and 7. 
Debray on the other hand preferred to view the French South Pacific 
presence positively, emphasising internationalism and progress. In harmony 
with political figures of the Centre and Right, he lauded the Pacific TOM for 
their usefulness as ground stations for satellite communications and summed 
them up as bases for "un important potentiel technologique, scientifique et 
culturel que nous pouvons mettre a la disposition de la region".169 In the same 
vein, he characterised resistance to the French regional presence as reactionary: 
II est vrai qu'it y a un rejet massif de la presence franyaise prenant 
pr~texte du nucl~ire, et qui s'ancre dans ce qui fait l'unite de l'Oc~nie: une 
mentalit6 religieuse, une ethique anglo-presbyterienne, synthese entre Ie droit 
. coutumier des insulaires et la morale biblique des missionnaires de Londres. Le 
tout reI aye par l'Universite de Suva aux Fidji, jusqu'a present la seule du 
Pacifique Sud, qui a form~ toute l'elite politique de la region depuis 30 ans et 
pour qui Ie nuc1eaire est simplement immoral. Le rejet est d'ordre my tho-
affectif.170 
Debray's analysis contained various simplifications and inaccuracies. While both 
tribal and church leaders in the South Pacific were opposed to French testing, 
his attribution of regional anti-nuclear sentiment solely to a combination of 
Protestantism and tribal law was overly narrow. As will be discussed in depth in 
the following chapter, regional opposition to French nuclear testing has been 
based on more than moral objections. There were genuine scientific uncertainties 
that could be expressed about its safety, independent of any custom or religious 
ethics. It was likewise inaccurate to describe the USP as having formed all the 
political elite of Oceania during the preceding 30 years. For example while Prime 
Minister Walter Lini of Vanuatu, a vocal critic of French testing, had received 
the mix of Presbyterian and tribal upbringings described by Debray, he had 
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never attended tertiary courses in Suva. Nor was the. USP the only university in 
the region where certain students might assert anti-nuclear sentiment. The 
University of Papua New Guinea, to name just one other example, was a centre 
for anti-colonialist and anti-nuclear sentiment as well. l71 
Although his understanding of regional anti-nuclear activ:ism contained 
flaws, Debray reiterated the message that Cheysson had offered in November 
1981. Regional fears of, and distrust with, aspects of the French presence in the 
South Pacific would be overcome by patient dialogue: 
II faut traiter ces Etats avec consideration, dans un esprit d'ouverture et de 
dialogue, alors que jusqu'a maintenant on a eu tendance a vivre en camp 
retrancM, en affrontant Ie Pacifique des annees 80 avec la mentalit~ des annOOs 
60. [ ... J Mais nous ne devons pas avoir de complexe ni nous excuser d'~tre 
la. l12 
Debray agreed with the geostrategic analysis of the Pacific made by the 
Institut du Pacifique. He portrayed the Pacific as a single entity, stressing the 
economic and resource potential of the zone for France. He also shared ground 
with the French conservative politicians and military officials who hung the 
spectre of possible Soviet expansionism over the region: 
Le Pacifique est vide d'hommes, mais I'oc~~m est plein. De pro~jnes, d'~nergie, 
de nodules polymetalliques. 23 millions d'habitants sur un tiers du globe, avec 
ici et la des pays de 25km2, eela semble un peu d6risoire. Mais avec l'extension 
a 200 milles marins, la France est la troisi~me puissance maritime du monde 
parce qu'elle est aussi un pays du Pacifique.Et t'orean sera au XXIe siecle one 
ressource capitate. Le «complexe interarmees» en construction [sic] a Noumea 
est toum6 vers I'avenir. La strat6gie a horreur du vide; s'H n'y a pas encore de 
menace ext6rieure sur Ie Pacifique Sud, it aumit pourtant tort de se consid6rer 
comme miraculeusement protege. L 'URSS a deja sign6 un accord de peche avec 
Kiribati, et Jes Etats·Unis n'ont plus Ie monopole de la force navale dans Ie 
Pacifique Nord. J 73 
These were ironic words from a man who in the 1960s had backed Castro's 
Cuba, a base for Soviet military penetration in the Caribbean. Here Debray could 
be compared to a Pentagon spokesman warning against the potential for Soviet 
infiltration in the Americas, although no Soviet client state eventuated in the 
South Pacific to enable regional Soviet destabilisation of the sort that led to the 
Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Debray's discussion of the potential value of 
French maritime resources in the twenty-first century was a more valid 
projection, assuming the technology and the need to exploit it would exist. In 
both respects however, France was portrayed as taking a long-term view of its 
place in the Pacific. 
Before 1985, it was difficult to assess what Debray's superior, 
Mitterrand, thought of France's role in the South Pacific. His attention was 
preoccupied with other matters for the first three years of his presidency. 
Presidential statements on the region were limited to reiteration of French resolve 
to continue nuclear testing, and his attitude to the question of New Caledonian 
independence on the occasion of visits to the Elysee by regional heads of 
government. Such was the case in discussions with Muldoon on 17 June 1981 
and 9 May 1983, and with Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, the Prime Minister of Fiji, 
on 11 March 1982.174 
From 1985, Mitterrand took a more active interest in the region. The 
catalysts for this greater interest were the political troubles in New Caledonia, 
and the debacle of the Rainbow Warrior bombing which, along with ongoing 
nuclear testing, contributed to a nadir in French relations with South Pacific 
states. Mitterrand's first two presidential visits to the South Pacific,175 his stop 
in New Caledonia on 19 January 1985 and his first visit to Moruroa in 
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September 1985, offered visible signs of presidential support for the Fabius 
Government at a time when the French stance on nuclear and decolonisation 
issues had rendered it widely unpopular in the zone. The presidential trip to New 
Caledonia had no direct bearing on French foreign relations, being devoted to 
internal politics; such was not the case with the second trip. 
Mitterrand, accompanied by Hernu and Roland Dumas, then Foreign 
Minister, arrived at Moruroa on 14 September, at the height of controversy over 
French responsibility for the Rainbow Warrior bombing. It was the first 
presidential visit to the atoll since de Gaulle had been there in September 1966. 
In part, the presidential tour highlighted the importance of the DaM-TOM in the 
development of French high technology, although this technology was not 
without its hitches. En route to French Polynesia, the party stopped at Kourou in 
Guyane to attend the abortive launch of an Ariane rocket. 176 The Moruroa visit 
involved an inspection of the facilities of the CEP. No nuclear test was 
conducted in the presence of the President in September 1985. In this respect 
Mitterrand's itinerary differed from that of de Gaulle nineteen years before. 
While at Moruroa, Mitterrand presided over the first meeting of the 
South Pacific Coordination Committee, which had been created on 8 September 
1985. The members of the Coordination Committee were similar to those who 
had participated in the Asia-Pacific policy conference in 1982. In addition to the 
President, the Defence Minister and the Foreign Minister, in attendance were 
Pierre Joxe, then Interior Minister, Pisani, and Lemoine. French Ambassadors 
to Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United States, Fiji, and Vanuatu attended, 
plus civil and military government officials working in the region. In spite of the 
presence of the Ambassador to Japan, the Asian content of the earlier conference 
had been separated to allow greater concentration on the South Pacific. The 
choice of Moruroa as a meeting place for such an assembly of high officials was 
a novel one, although the subject of discussions was similar to the Asia-Pacific 
conference, and concerned French economic, cultural and diplomatic relations. 
The general aim of the South Pacific Coordination Committee was to serve as a 
forum for the ongoing review of French regional policy. The body was intended 
to meet again in four months.177 
Michel Vauzelle, the presidential spokesman, gave the impression that 
the meeting served as an affirmation of France's will to remain in the Pacific, 
and to pursue such policies as were deemed appropriate, without bending to 
regional pressure: "Ia souverainete de Ia France ne peut pas etre remise en cause [ ... J personne ne peut se substituer a sa volonte lorsqu'il s'agit de ses interets 
dans Ie Pacifique". 178 The projected insta11ation of the strategic base at Noumea 
was suggested to be a sign of the French will to preserve its regional interests. 
Mitterrand's own declaration, delivered on his return from Moruroa, indicated 
that France would make its own decisions concerning its Pacific presence, in the 
same manner as the other great powers in the region. He stressed that France 
would be increasing its role in the zone.179 
The presidential trip received the approval of UDF and RPR leaders. 
Giscard d'Estaing described Mitterrand's comments on the French presence in 
the South Pacific as encouraging after the proposal for independence in 
association for New Caledonia announced by Pisani on 7 January 1985. Charles 
Pasqua, then President of the RPR group in the Senate, portrayed the voyage as 
an affrrmation of the French South Pacific presence which fonned a justifiable 
riposte to regional critiques.l 80 Mitterrand's expression of French aims in the 
Pacific was made in tenns which the UDF and RPR found difficult not to agree 
with. 
The Moruroa meeting of the South Pacific Coordination Committee was 
to be its first and last. At a Council of Ministers meeting on 23 December 1985 
the Committee was replaced by the South Pacific Council. This new body was 
to have a wider brief than acting as a forum for the consideration of policy. The 
Council of Ministers announced that the South Pacific Council "contribuera a 
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affrrmer la presence de la France et a assurer la defense de ses interets, dans Ie 
dialogue avec ses partenaires de la region")81 Nevertheless the South Pacific 
Council had a similar membership to its predecessor. (Appendix 7) The 
President presided over council meetings, which were to be held either in the 
Pacific TOM or in Paris. Alongside the various Ministers, Ambassadors and 
High Commissioners, provision was made for the participation of the French 
Polynesian Territorial President, and of the New Caledonian Territorial 
Congress President. The Council was assigned a Secretary-General. chosen by 
the President. His initial choice turned out to be Debray, who was appointed to 
the post on 18 January 1986. Debray presided over the frrst meeting of the 
South Pacific Council in Paris on 26 February 1986.182 
This first meeting considered a draft decree for the establishment of a 
French University of the South Pacific, and adopted a programme. for the 
reinforcement of French scientific cooperation.183 The activities of the South 
Pacific Council were cut short by the instal1ation of the Chirac Government in 
March 1986, although council projects were not discarded. The South Pacific 
Council itself was allowed to gather dust on the sidelines as Chirac and his 
Ministers would have nothing to do with it. 184 Any prospect of Chirac and 
Pons, as well as Andre Giraud, the new Defence Minister and lean-Bernard 
Raimond, the new Foreign Minister, discussing an area as potentially 
controversial as South Pacific policy, at a meeting presided over by Mitterrand, 
and accompanied by Debray, was an unpromising one for all concerned. For the 
Chirac Government, the South Pacific Council did not offer an inspiring forum 
for the formulation of French policy. Had the Council been used, it is probable 
that its meetings would have been stultified by the same glacial ambiance which 
hampered sessions of the Council of Ministers from 1986 to 1988,185 The 
Chirac Government did not act to dissolve the South Pacific Council, perhaps 
because this step would have added another contentious issue to relations that 
were already tense in the novel setting of cohabitation. 
The South Pacific Council was effectively replaced by the Chirac 
Government even though it had not been formally dissolved. Chirac presided 
over a new body for the consideration of South Pacific policy: the 
InterministeriaI Committee devoted to the South Pacific. The Committee 
included F1osse, Raimond, Pons, Giraud, the Minister of Cooperation and the 
Finance Minister. For the Chirac Government the advantage of this body over 
the South Pacific Council was that policy could be discussed without the 
attendance of Mitterrand. The group met at irregular intervals to consider topics 
such as the establishment of the French University of the South Pacific, aid to 
Fiji, and the opening of a Consulate in Hawaii.186 A second group which 
considered Pacific policy under cohabitation was the conference of high officials 
and French diplomats working in the South Pacific. This body was reminiscent 
of the South Pacific Coordination Committee, except that again the President 
was not a participant. These conferences were held in the Pacific TOM. Three 
were held during cohabitation; the first at Papeete in November 1986, the second 
at Noumea in May 1987, and the third in French Polynesia at Huahine in March 
1988.187 Discussions concentrated on how to respond to regional discontent 
with French policy in New Caledonia and over nuclear testing, and provided 
opportunities to announce various aid initiatives. 
Under cohabitation the domain of French foreign policy became affected 
by a power struggle between the head of state and the head of government, just 
as DOM-TOM policy was. In the case of foreign affairs though, Mitterrand was 
in a stronger position to influence Chirac. Constitutional practice gave the 
President supreme control of the armed forces, which meant that Mitterrand 
could not simply be excluded from the formulation of defence policy, or from 
international disarmament negotiations. His role as head of state likewise meant 
he could not be excluded from dealings with bilateral and multilateral 
organisations, and he continued meeting foreign representatives. This situation 
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led to some unprofessional incidents, such as deciding who should represent 
France at EC summits, and tiffs over the relation of the Elysee to the Quai 
d'Orsay,188 but French foreign policy was not greatly disrupted by cohabitation. 
To a great extent, Mitterrand and Chirac agreed on the broad issues of foreign 
policy. 
This level of broad agreement can be discerned in the conduct of South 
Pacific policy from 1986 to 1988. A different style was evident in the handling 
of this domain by the Chirac Government that has been mistakenly interpreted as 
indicative of a "new South Pacific policy". Stephen Bates, an Australian 
academic, wrote that under Chirac France completely reversed standing New 
Caledonian policy and French relations with independent island states.189 Such 
an assertion is inaccurate. Pons carried out the self-determination referendum 
scheduled for New Caledonia by the PisanilFabius Interim Statute, and like its 
Socialist predecessors the Chirac Government was not prepared to hand 
independence to a Kanak minority. Rather than representing a complete reversal, 
such policy contained major elements of continuity. With regard to foreign 
policy too, the installation of a new government in Paris did not alter the 
mterpretation of French regional interests. As had been the case since 1981, 
during cohabitation the French Government worked to explain French positions 
on nuclear testing and decolonisation, while increasing cooperation and 
integration with South Pacific states, in broad continuity with French policy 
orientations as characterised by Cheysson in November 1981. Aid and 
development work undertaken from 1986 to 1988, described as signs of new 
French relations in the South Pacific, was not without precedents, whether 
Giscardian or Socialist, in spite of wider distribution during this period. 
Rather than relying on Debray to articulate French policy, on 20 March 
1986 Chirac chose to appoint Flosse to a new ministerial-level post: Secretary of 
State charged with the Problems of the South Pacific. Flosse's title was 
indicative of how the region was regarded by the Chirac Government as 
problematic. Following the rise in 1985 of regional lobbying over New 
Caledonian self-determination, the creation of the Rarotonga Treaty and the 
advent of the Rainbow Warrior affair, under the Fabius Government the South 
Pacific had become a touchy area that needed tending. In accordance with the 
criteria outlined by Cheysson in November 1981, the Chirac Government 
moved to dissipate regional opposition to the French presence via dialogue and 
improved cooperation. 
The decision to appoint Flosse showed a willingness to tackle French 
"problems" in the South Pacific from a new angle. Previous ministerial 
representatives active in the region had been metropolitan Frenchmen, with no 
great prior experience of the zone. Flosse enjoyed the distinction of being both, 
as he put it, "du Pacifique et fran~ais".190 two qualities that he claimed enabled 
him to represent France better than most metros. He had already established 
contacts with regional leaders during his time as Territorial President of French 
Polynesia, when he had cemented closer relations with the Cook Islands, as well 
as lobbying the South Pacific Forum. His Polynesian ancestry and his ability to 
speak Tahitian gave him an advantage over his predecessors in dealing with 
Polynesian countries. This acquaintance with South Pacific leaders and 
Polynesian culture gave Flosse an entree into regional affairs that Debray had 
lacked. 
According to instructions issued by Chirac (Appendix 8), Flosse was to 
act as a roving ambassador to the South Pacific, explaining French nuclear 
policy to regional leaders while endeavouring to improve France's standing with 
them by encouraging greater aid and cooperation. Flosse's new capacity entailed 
several novel features. Flosse was to be subordinate to Pons. As Secretary of 
State Flosse was not assigned the task of articulating French policy on the issue 
of New Caledonian self-determination. Despite the centrality of this "problem" 
in regional politics at that time, this deliberate omission was made because 
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Flosse's links with the RPCR put him out of contention. Unlike his ministerial 
colleagues. Flosse operated from Papeete rather than Paris. This was the fIrst 
time that a French representative at this level had had an office in the South 
Pacific. As Secretary of State to the South Pacific, FJosse would be working in 
an area normally the domain of the Quai d'Orsay. FJosse was given authority by 
Chirac to conduct negotiations with South Pacific states, and to promote French 
scientific, technological and economic activities, with the full assistance of the 
Foreign Ministry. (Appendix 8) 
In his instructions, Chirac showed signs of agreeing with the 
characterisation of the Pacific as an area destined to become increasingly 
important in world affairs, describing it as "un ocean appele a jouer un role 
croissant dans les annees a venir". Plosse was to improve the reputation of 
France in this increasing1y important zone, as part of what Chirac described as 
"l'effort important que j'entends mener pour redresser l'image de marque de la 
France dans Ie Pacifique Sud".191 Some of the more grandiose ideas Flosse 
advocated did not see the light of day, such as the regional defence pact 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, or the foundation of a pan-Polynesian 
economic, cultural and social community.l92 Regardless of such unrealised 
plans, Plosse was a vigorous and enthusiastic representative of France in the 
South Pacific from March 1986 to May 1988. He travelled extensively in the 
region, voicing French policy and organising various aid and cooperation 
initiatives. From 16 April 1986 to 21 November 1987, FJosse made 33 official 
trips in his capacity as Secretary of State. including 18 to Paris, 15 to South 
Pacific island states, and six to Pacific rim nations. During this period of 20 
months, he spent 247 days travelling.193 
In spite of the new ministerial appointment, the established basic 
elements of French South Pacific policy had not changed. The description 
offered by Flosse to the National Assembly on 21 October 1987 of how France 
should project itself in the South Pacific displayed striking similarities to 
Cheysson's summary of French regional policy conduct, which had been 
presented in the same forum in November 1981: 
Nous fie gouvemement fran~ais] devons expUquer dans un dialogue que nous 
voulons sans exclusive la pr6scnce de la France dans Ie Pacifique, son utilit~ et 
meme sa n6cessil~. ( ... ] I'arfirmation du rayonnement de la France dans Ie 
Pacifique Sud repond II un double objectif interieur [ ... ] Le premier est 
t'appartenance de ces territoires [les TOM] A la Republique. Elle s'appuie sur la 
tibre determination des peuples concemes. II convient que nos voisins Ie 
comprennent. ( ... ] Le deuxieme est la force de defense de Ia France et, par III 
meme, sa contribution a i'equilibre sttategique et au maintien de la paix dans Ie 
monde. Elles dependent de I'existence du laboratoire d'experimentations 
nucleaires qu'est Mururoa. [ ... ] 
Mais toutes les possibitites nouvelles de beneficier de notre presence, 
dont nous voulons faire profiter les pays du Pacifique. ne seront d'aucun effet si 
nous ne parvenons pas a retablir avec ces demiers une relation de confiance. 
C'est pourquoi j'ai chercM sans relikhe II nouer des contacts personnels avec les 
dirigeants du Pacifique. que j'approche les uns apr~ les auttes dans un ordre qui 
tient compte de leur position vis-a.-vis de notre pays.194 
Regardless of the departure of the Socialists from government, the concern that 
Cheysson, and later Debray, had stressed to sustain patient and persevering 
dialogue, on the double basis of democracy and the defence of French interests, 
persisted under Chirac. 
As was the case with Pons and New Caledonian policy, the re-election 
of Mitterrand in May 1988 and the installation of the Rocard Government cut 
short activities supervised by Flosse in the South Pacific. The position of 
Secretary of State to the South Pacific was abandoned. The PS did not have any 
suitable French Pacific representative in its ranks to fill the post, even had it 
wished to retain this creation of Chirac. The Quai d'Orsay also influenced the 
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decision. The appropriateness of having an unorthodox figure with an 
assortment of responsibilities transcending the boundaries of established 
portfolios had been questioned in some quarters. Resentment existed among 
career diplomats working in the zone over the arrival of an itinerant political 
appointee in their sphere.195 The aid and development initiatives negotiated by 
Flosse impinged on work already being done by diplomats in the region, who 
disliked being upstaged. 
Direct control of overseeing French relations with the South Pacific was 
transferred by the Rocard Government to a Permanent Secretary to the South 
Pacific. It was announced in September 1988 that this post, of ambassadorial 
rank, would be attached to the DOM-TOM Ministry, an indication of the 
Permanent Secretary's function of coordinating increased links between the 
Pacific TOM and the region. 196 The first appointee to this post was Philippe 
Baude, a career diplomat who had been Ambassador to Vanuatu in 1985.197 The 
Permanent Secretary was assigned the task of being French Ambassador to the 
South Pacific Commission, and became Secretary-General of the South Pacific 
Council. 198 
The reactivation of the South Pacific Council by the Rocard Government 
was announced in September 1988, but did not hold its second meeting until 
May 1990. Before that date however, high-level consideration of regional policy 
had been far from inactive. The Rocard Government retained the conferences of 
ambassadors and high officials in the South Pacific that had been set up under 
Chirac. The fourth of these meetings, presided over by Le Pensec, was held in 
Noumea from 10 to 12 February 1989. Apart from Le Pensec, in attendance 
from Paris were delegates of the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, 
Research and Technology, and for Rocard. The state representatives to the 
Pacific TOM were also present, as well as the First Secretaries of the French 
Embassies at Washington and Tokyo)99 The Noumea conference reiterated the 
concerns of past meetings on the position of France in the region. The three key 
orientations of the meeting consisted of deliberations concerning how to increase 
regional cooperation with the Pacific TOM, how to associate the TOM more 
closely with the conduct of French foreign policy, and how to integrate France 
more fully into the region. To this end twelve aid and cooperation priorities with 
Pacific nations were listed, covering a range of educational, cultural, technical 
and scientific concerns.200 This announcement made by Le Pensec concerning 
the need to open the Pacific TOM to greater integration into their regional 
environment harked back to ideas circulating ten years before. 
Le Pensec tied in the conference with the implementation of the Matignon 
Accords, highlighting the utility of increased regional cooperation for the 
development of New Caledonia and the other Pacific territories, and indicating 
that territorial leaders would be allowed to playa greater role in the expansion of 
regional cooperation: 
Cette approche regionale de l'ouverture des Territoires d'outre-mer ne peut 
reussir que si les elus participent directement. L'exercice de leurs responsabilites 
dans les actions de cooperation regionale menees a partir des Territoires dans les 
domaines economi~ue, social et culturel, permettront de rom pre leur relatif 
isolement regional. 01 
A certain intellectal evolution had taken place here compared with four years 
before, when Pisani had reacted vigorously against the proposals of the 
Interterritorial Alliance for giving territorial leaders a greater concern in external 
negotiations. Both the Matignon Accords the year before the conference, and the 
amendments to the French Polynesian Autonomy Statute the year after it, 
allowed territorial representatives a greater say in territorial external relations. 
Further discussion in chapter 8 analyses tours made, from the time of the Rocard 
237 
Government, by territorial delegations expanding foreign contacts in numerous 
fields. 
At Papeete on 17 May 1990, during his third presidential visit to the 
South Pacific since 1981, Mitterrand picked up the issue of the participation of 
territorial leaders in French regional integration and cooperation. In a press 
conference after the second meeting of the South Pacific Council, Mitterrand 
pointed to this participation as a major development since the first council 
meeting in February 1986.202 
The Papeete meeting of the South Pacific Council declared the need for 
greater cooperation between the Pacific TOM and their neighbours and 
announced the extension of courses at the French University of the Pacific as a 
step towards encouraging links. Inter-university exchanges and greater research 
would be encouraged through the extension of tertiary facilities. Environmental 
concerns were also discussed. An observatory for the surveillance of the 
environment was to be created, and it was announced that France would work to 
fulfil the protection of the environment under various existing conventions.203 
In other words Paris was to keep its promises on existing environmental 
commitments. These two points and the extension of university courses were 
significant if conventional declarations. Of greater interest were the final two 
measures announced in the council communique under the rubric "Protection des 
hommes et des ressources". Reserves of materials for disaster relief were to be 
set up in the Pacific TOM for use either there or in neighbouring states. In 
addition, it was announced that France was prepared to offer surveillance of 
foreign EEZs to those states which requested it.204 These were genuinely new 
intitiatives which were to be of considerable importance in furthering regional 
relations in the 1990s, as is outlined in greater detail in chapter 8. 
Overall, the second meeting of the South Pacific Council had the aura of 
a showpiece. It was organised as part of the presidential tour of French 
Polynesia during the centenary celebrations of the commune of Papeete. The 
initiatives it announced could have been made in Paris at less expense and with 
less flourish, and its introductory proposal to increase the part that territorial 
representatives were to play in regional policy was recycled from the conference 
of ambassadors and high officials that had been held in Noumea the year before. 
Since its foundation the Council has not been very vigorous. Its inactivity under 
the Chimc Government was through no fault of its own, but the Papeete meeting 
was the sole instance of a council gathering during the first five years of 
Mitterrand's second septennate. The policy role of the South Pacific Council has 
mainly consisted of rehashing messages on French regional integration which 
had already been presented elsewhere, and making announcements about the 
implementation of a small number of projects of modest prestige out of 
proportion with the rank and number of the members of the Council. The 
willingness of Mitterrand to increase French participation in regional affairs 
should not be doubted. The high rank of the Council's members indicated the 
degree of importance attached by the President to the South Pacific. It is less 
certain that the regional integration of three territories with fewer than 500,000 
French citizens between them merited a superintendant body as elevated as the 
South Pacific Council. 
Although not disposed to meet the jetset pace of Flosse during his time 
as Secretary of State to the South Pacific, representatives of the Socialist 
Governments from 1988 to 1993 maintained France's profile in the region. 
Prime Minister Rocard himself played a particularly important role. The pressing 
demands of the New Caledonian portfolio made him immediately aware of the 
South Pacific to a greater extent than any preceding Prime Minister under the 
Fifth Republic, and he extended that awareness to foreign relations in the zone, 
being the first French Prime Minister to visit Australia and Fiji, in August 1989, 
and New Zealand, in April 1991. This activity, as he himself pointed out, 
238 
underlined the regard with which Paris held the region, and was a sign of 
willingness in Paris to improve contacts and bridge differences.2os 
The two tours made by Rocard fulfilled comprehensively the criteria 
concerning the conduct of French South Pacific policy as laid down by 
Cheysson in November 1981. Rocard made patient efforts to explain French 
nuclear policy to the sceptical Australian and New Zealand press corps, and was 
able to present a positive summary of recent developments in New Caledonia 
under the Matignon Accords.206 While in Christchurch on 30 April 1991 he met 
New Zealand environmentaHsts to discuss French policy on the Antarctic, and 
drift net fishing.201 Emulating those French representatives who had gone 
before him, in 1989 and 1991 Rocard unambiguously informed his hosts in 
Canberra, Wellington and Suva that France reserved the right to conduct policy 
as it saw fit in the Pacific TOM. In the case of his New Zealand tour, the 
opening of another series of nuclear tests at Moruroa six days after his departure 
from Christchurch on 1 May 1991 drove that message home.20S 
Compared to earlier decades, French diplomatic activity since the late 
1970s has shown signs of greater attention being paid in Paris to foreign 
relations in the South Pacific. The three embassies established in 1980 provided 
a diplomatic network that reinforced the cross-accreditation in the 1970s of the 
French Ambassador in Wellington to island states. During the 1980s the French 
Ambassador in Suva took charge from his counterpart in Wellington of relations 
with Tonga, Tuvalu, Nauru and Kiribati. (Table 53) While French diplomatic 
relations with Polynesian island states generally fared well, links with 
Melanesian nations were beset with troubles. As will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 8, two French Ambassadors to Vanuatu were expelled in the 
1980s, and the Solomon Islands declined cross-accreditation of the French 
Ambassador in Port Vila. In Papua New Guinea the French Embassy survived 
the minor tribulations of periodic anti-nuclear and anti-colonialist protests by 
local unions, only to be struck in March 1991 by the announcement of its 
impending closure by the Quai d'Orsay as part of budgetary cutbacks. After the 
reduction of the embassy staff to two by April 1992 (one diplomat and a security 
guard), it was decided in Paris to retain the post after a11.209 The decision to 
close the Port Moresby Embassy had been described in July 1991 by Alain 
Vivien, then Secretary of State to Foreign Affairs, as a major mistake that would 
set back French regional diplomacy.210 In the end, Vivien's position prevailed 
over budgetary considerations. In spite of the efforts of successive French 
Governments to improve relations with the South Pacific, progress during the 
1980s was uneven and interspersed with diplomatic setbacks in the cases of the 
Melanesian states. 
Above ambassadorial level, changing approaches to the region were 
implemented. Various bodies established to consider Pacific policy changed 
name and form due to the differing influences of metropolitan French political 
parties. The decision to form the South Pacific Council in 1985 was a response 
to the high profile that regional issues had assumed that year. From 1986 to 
1988 such measures as the appointment of Flosse, the conferences of senior 
officials, and the creation of the Interministerial Committee devoted to the South 
Pacific, similarly responded to the prominence of regional issues, and marked an 
attempt by the Chirac Government to distinguish its initiatives from those of the 
Socialists. After the end of cohabitation the reactivation of the South Pacific 
Council, and the creation of the post of Permanent Secretary to the South 
Pacific, were in tum motivated by the desire of the Rocard Government to 
distance itself from the activities of the Chirac Government. 
From 1988 to 1993 continuity in structures existed but, relieved of major 
controversy comparable to that of 1985, for Paris the South Pacific in general 
was no longer as pressing a dossier as it had been. That the South Pacific 
Council only met once during this period of Socialist Government is revelatory 
in this respect. French geostrategic rhetoric about the Pacific being the new 
Table 53. France's South Pacific Diplomatic 
Network 
Country 
Australia 
Cook Islands 
Fiji 
New Zealand 
PNO 
Tonga 
Vanuatu 
1993 
French 
Representation 
Embassy, Canberra 
Consulate, Melbourne 
Consulate, Sydney 
Honorary Consul, Avarua 
Embassy, Suva 
Embassy. Wellington 
Embassy 
Honorary Consul, 
Nuku'alofa 
Embassy. Port Vila 
Western Samoa Honorary Consul, Apia 
Accreditation 
Tonga, Tuvalu 
Nauru, Kiribati 
Cook Islands, 
Niue, Tokelau, 
Western Samoa 
Solomon 
Islands 
Sources: Steve Hoadley: The South Pacific Foreign Affairs 
Handbook p.193; Richard Sola: "Le Royaume de Tonga, un 
etat neutre du Pacifique" in L'Afrique et l'Asie modernes 
no.l66 automne 1990 p.14; N. & N. Douglas (eds.): Pacific 
Islands Yearbook (16th edition) passim; Matangi Tonga 
May-June 1991 p.18; Nauru Bulletin 22 August 1990; The 
Press 1 June 1991; Isabelle Cordonnier: La France dans Ie 
Pacifique Sud 1962-1988 p.204. 
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centre of the world, and about the necessity for France to bolster its interests 
there, had lost its asserted urgency by the early 1990s. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union removed whatever military threat there might have· been. And on. 
the politicalleveJ, the suspension of its nuclear testing and the implementation of 
the Matignon Accords rendered France a more welcome partner in regional 
affairs than it had been. In the absence of further sources of tension, France will 
be free to pursue its target of regional integration into the twenty-first century, 
although this evolution will be dependent on socio-economic and political 
stability in the Pacific TOM. 
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6. Nuclear Issues 
Le probleme que suscitent nos essais nucleaires demeure. 
La France peut comprendre les sentiments que ceux-ci suscitent 
dans certains autres pays de la region. Mais elle souhaite d'abord 
que sa politique de defense soit connue et comprise. La Francen'a 
pas d'autre choix dans la situation presente, pour garantir sa 
securite, que de conserver un instrument de dissuasion dont la 
credibilite ne peut etre assuree qu'en y incorporant tous les progres 
techniques necessaires. N'oubliez pas que la dissuasion nucleaire 
n'est pas etrangere ala paix que Ie monde connait depuis plus de 
quarante ans. Enfin, vous savez que toutes les precautions sont 
prises et toutes les verifications sont faites de telle sorte qu'il n'en 
decoule aucun dommage pour l'environnement naturel et les 
populations. . 
Prime Minister Rocaro, addressing the Australian 
National Press Club, Canberra, 18 August 1989.1 
A Long-Standing Problem 
In the 1980s, French nuclear testing held the distinction of being the 
longest-established divisive issue between Paris and the nations of the South 
Pacific. Numerous claims and counterclaims were issued concerning testing. 
(Appendix 9) Rocard, speaking in front of an audience that had traditionally not 
been very sympathetic to French testing, articulated a position which had been 
uttered by French Presidents and their Ministers since the time in office of de 
Gaulle. Superpower nuclear rivalry constrained France to keep a nuclear force 
for its defence, and nuclear testing formed an integral part of modernising that 
force. Nuc1ear deterrence was portrayed as an effective peace keeper, as it was 
claimed the devastation it would wreak had prevented global war for forty years. 
Any fears the inhabitants might have held over the dangers of environmental 
damage caused by the tests were groundless because of French precautions 
against any such risk. 
Regional governments and non-governmental pressure groups rejected 
this position. For example the Australian Labor Government, while retaining 
close ties with the US nuclear defence system in the 1980s, did not see any need 
for an independent French deterrent to maintain global peace. Three decades 
after Australia had itself played host to British nuclear tests, the Hawke 
Government rejected French testing on the grounds that radiation did not respect 
national boundaries, and that insufficient data existed to confirm French 
assurances that testing was harmless. Under these circumstances, it was 
asserted in Canberra that South Pacific states had a legitimate interest in 
objecting to French activities. As Rocard declared, France recognised these 
concerns, but national defence policy was a greater priority in Paris. 
The French case for nuclear testing and the regional anti-nuclear 
arguments against French activities had been argued in mainly circular, repetitive 
fashion since the establishment of the CEP in French Polynesia in 1963. The 
suspension of French testing announced in April 1992 brought about the 
abatement of this dispute without resolving it. The Beregovoy Government did 
not halt testing through any admission of major safety deficiencies. Nor had 
those opposed to French testing conclusively proved any such deficiencies. 
Neither party has renounced its position, both preferring to allow the matter to 
rest in the possibly provisional absence of further tests to provoke differences. 
This chapter is devoted to examining nuclear issues as they affected 
French South Pacific policy since 1981. Particular attention is paid to 
consideration of French statements on national nuclear policy, as past surveys in 
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English have tended to dwell on a non-French South Pacific perspective. In 
these surveys, analysis has been made of the political stances of regional states 
to a greater extent than that of France.2 Here, French efforts to articulate nuclear 
policy to the region are discussed, and the effectiveness of the arguments 
offered in defence of testing are critically examined. The French position has, to 
1993, prevailed over the anti-nuclear stances of various South Pacific micro-
states, whose opposition to French testing had been as ineffectual as that of 
New Zealand and Australia. France has reserved the right to conduct its 
domestic policies as it saw fit, independent of any regional protest over them. 
The prime example of this will has been the French development of a nuclear 
deterrent through the means of testing facilities in French Polynesia. 
The strategic justification for French testing and the role the CEP plays in 
French defence are examined first. There follows a presentation of French 
claims concerning the safety of underground nuclear explosions at Moruioa and 
Fangataufa. These claims are examined with reference to the scientific evidence 
that is available to support or disprove them as the case may be. The extent, and 
on occasion the extremes, to which France has gone to defend its testing in the 
face of criticism are outlined. This outline culminates in an overview of the 
motives for the Rainbow Warrior bombing, its implications for French party 
politics, and its effect on French relations in the zone. One major international 
response to French testing in the 1980s, the Rarotonga Treaty, was spurred on 
by the bombing. The French attitude to the creation by the Treaty of a South 
Pacific nuclear free zone is presented, before the chapter is concluded with 
assessment of the reasons for, and the response to, the French suspension of 
testing in April 1992. 
The Gaullist Legacy: MiUerrand and the Bomb 
When, on 29 May 1981, Hemu announced a halt to French nuclear 
testing, premature hopes were aroused in the South Pacific that France might be 
contemplating the end of its testing operations at Moruroa. Prime Minister 
Muldoon said that at first he thought the suspension might have been in 
recognition of regional complaints about testing, although this turned out not to be the case.3 On 17 June, at his first presidential meeting with a head of 
government from the South Pacific, Mitterrand informed Muldoon that France 
intended to continue nuclear testing.4 After the meeting, Muldoon commented: 
"Essentially it seems to me that his policy is no different from that of the 
previous administration. "5 The cessation had been made so that the new Defence 
Minister could review the activities of the CEP and assess to what extent 
experiments programmed by his predecessor would be retained. The review did 
not last long, as nuclear testing resumed on 8 July. (Table 51) 
The continuation of nuclear testing by the Mauroy Government was 
illustrative of continuity with the preceding government in nuclear defence 
policy. In 1981. Mitterrand and the PS contested the elections expressing 
support for the development of the French nuclear deterrent. The 110 
Propositions and the Creteil manifesto shared the same reference to the need to 
assure national security "par Ie developpement dlune strategie autonome de 
dissuasion".6 In June, after the presidential and legislative elections, Hernu 
stated his support for this policy, saying that he would work to modernise the 
French nuclear force. 7 Three months later, Mauroy announced the support of 
his Government for this goal and extended it to tactical nuclear weapons: 
"Comme pour nos forces strategiques, it convient de suivre les progres 
techniques en adaptant et en modernisant periodiquement les vecteurs et les 
armes de notre armement nucleaire tactique. "8 The technological development 
and continued modernisation of new weapons required further tests at Moruroa. 
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Chirac was in complete accord with Mitterrand and the PS on the need to 
modernise the nuclear strike force. Writing on French defence policy in April 
1981, he described the nuclear strike force as the key to national defence: 
LA DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE, CLEF DE NOTRE SYSTEME DE 
DEFENSE - La dissuasion doit rester la priorite absolue de notre defense, car 
elle seule prot~ge notre territoire et l'ensemble de nos autres moyens de defense. 
{ ... J It importe ( ... J par securite et pour etre en mesure de repondre a toutes les 
hypoth~es, de maintenir la diversite de notre panoplie dissuasive. 11 faut done 
poursuivre aetivement la modernisation [ ... J de nos forces nueleaires 
strategiques.9 
The year before, Giscard d'Estaing had announced modernisation 
measures for the French nuclear force. These were not to be implemented, even 
though Mitterrand and Chirac shared his stress on the need to update its 
weaponry. Giscard d'Estaing agreed with them on the importance of nuclear 
deterrence in national defence: "it y a un point central dans notre dispositif, c'est 
que toute attaque nucleaire sur Ie sol de la Frante appellerait automatiquement 
unc riposte strategique nucleaire."lO The three leaders shared the position that 
nuclear deterrence was France's ultimate response to foreign aggression. What 
differences did exist between Mitterrand, Chirac and Giscard d'Estaing in this 
field concerned the question of what modernisations should be made to the 
nuclear strike force, and how it should be deployed, considerations which led to 
differences being expressed in the meetings of the Council of Ministers during 
cohabitation from 1986 to 1988. 11 At no point did these three or their followers 
publicly question the need for France to retain nuclear arms. Some proponents 
of unilateral nuclear disarmament by France were present in the PS, but they 
were far from positions of national power. This GauUist, Giscardian and 
Socialist commitment to the necessity of nuclear deterrence for French defence 
contributed to a fundamental unity over the nuclear dimension of South Pacific 
policy in thc 19805. 
On the acceptance of nuclear deterrence, the PC did not beg to differ,as 
it did on DOM-TOM policy. On 11 May 1977, Jean Kanapa, a party 
spokesman, had announced Communist acceptance of the French strategic 
nuclear capacity, rejecting purely conventional defence systems as being 
inadequate to protect France. 12 However the Communist interpretation of the 
utility of the nuclear strike force diverged from the positions of the RPR, UDF 
and the PS. The nuclear arsenal was described as offering the means of 
protecting France from "imperialist blackmail", presumably of American 
provenance. Mention of the fact that French nuclear arms were targeted on 
various cities in the Soviet Union,and that all except the FOST was incapable of 
striking the American continent, was omitted. The Communists had abandoned 
their traditional opposition to nuclear defence, partly so that they could avoid 
characterisations by their opponents of the PC as the voice of Brezhnev, and 
partly to chase votes. 
In the 1980s, the views of Mitterrand on the nuclear arsenal reflected an 
essential continuity with Gaullist nuclear strategy. Although the groundwork for 
the French nuclear force had been laid during the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle 
was generally recognised as having been responsible for the integration of that 
force into the national defence system. Pointing to the inability of France to 
defend its frontiers from foreign invasion with conventional arms during the 
Franco-Prussian War, World War I and World War II, de Gaulle adopted 
nuclear defence as the ultimate deterrent against foreign invasion. Any foreign 
aggression would be dissuaded by the consideration that France had great 
enough retaliatory means to cause the deaths of millions and the destruction of 
various cities. The adoption of nuclear deterrence also permitted de Gaulle to 
loosen ties with NATO in 1966, confident that in the near future France would 
no longer have to rely on the American nuclear arsenal to defend its territory. 
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While France had neither the means nor the interest to build a nuclear 
force as large as the US or Soviet ones, the Fifth Republic could at least dispose 
of the means sufficient to assure its defence. By the 1980s, Mitterrand shared 
this outlook: 
La France ne cherche pas ~ rivaliser avec les arsenaux des deux plus grandes 
puissances, dont Ie surarmement d6;tabilise en permanence 1'&Juilibre des forces 
et sape, de ce fait, les bases de la paix. Le principe de suffisance [ ... J impJique 
que notre armement soit et reste capable ~ tout moment d'infliger ~ qui nous 
agresse des dommages intoMrables. Par reference ~ ce principe, notre strategie 
de defense met ~ Ia disposition de notre pays une panoptie assez puissante pour 
contraindre ~ la fois un adversaire potentiel ~ respecter notre independance et 
nos alti6; ~ en tenir compte.1 3 
Like de Gaulle, as President, Mitterrand stressed the need to retain the nuclear 
force to assure the protection of the Fifth Republic, and repudiated American 
claims to be the ultimate guarantor of the defence of Western Europe. As had 
been the case with de Gaulle, the possible foreign aggression Mitterrand had in 
mind when he talked of the need to defend France, was the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. In the early 1980s, Mitterrand 
presented the Soviet Union as a major threat to French and European security. 
Without detailed resort to statistical evidence to back his case, he asserted in 
1981 that "il existe une suprematie de I'URSS en Europe et j'y vois un reel 
danger".14 He repeated this assumption in later speeches and writing during the 
1980s, making reference to a presumed Soviet superiority in conventional arms 
which rendered necessary the French resort to nuclear defence.15 
History has passed by the scenario of a Soviet threat to Western Europe, 
just as events superseded the alarmist scenario of Soviet penetration in the South 
Pacific. In the late 1980s, glasnost reduced the tensions existing in Europe. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has withdrawn its troops from 
Eastern Europe. Before these developments occurred, ongoing testing in French 
Polynesia was the consequence of the presidential opinion that France was in 
peril from potential Soviet aggression. Testing for constant modernisation was 
essential for the defence of France, and its halt could not be contemplated, 
according to Mitterrand, who wrote in 1986: 
Toutes les puissances nucleaires sont contraintes de poursuivre leurs 
experiences souterraines et Ie font. En mettant fin aux siennes, la France se 
laisserait distancer dans sa connaissance des nouveaux systemes d'armes, ce qui 
l~rait gravement Ia credibilite de sa dissuasion. 16 
After his visit to Moruroa in September 1985, Mitterrand declared that France, 
like the other nuclear powers did, would continue testing as long as it seemed 
necessary: 
J'ai reuni Ie comite de coordination du Pacifique sud [ ... J J'ai rappele mes 
instructions: d'une part, la France, puissance presente au Pacifique, en tend y 
decider souverainement de ce qui touche ~ ses inter~ts nationaux. D'autre part, 
en application de cette regIe, eUe poursuivra autant qu'elle Ie jugera necessaire, 
comme Ie font de leur cote les quatre autre..c; puissances nuc1eaires: Etats-Unis, 
Union sovietique, Chine et Grande-Bretagne, les experimentations utiles ~ sa 
derense. I7 
Until April 1992 this position was consistently repeated on innumerable 
occasions by French diplomats and Ministers in response to calls by South 
Pacific nations to end testing. France had no intention of submitting itself to 
unilateral nuclear disarmament in a period of superpower confrontation. 
Figure 1. Test Conditions at Moruroa 
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The Question of Safety 
Throughout the 1980s, French officials insisted, as Rocard did to the 
audience at the Australian National Press Club in August 1989, that their nuclear 
testing was necessary in a world divided by superpower rivalry, and that testing 
presented no danger. Any suggestion that there might be safety problems on 
Moruroa or Fangataufa was usually met with official denials. French diplomats 
and visiting representatives repeatedly rejected any negative claims about the 
safety standards of the CEP, insisting on the infallibility of its technicians. In 
1986 Mitterrand described testing as perfectly safe, presenting no danger either 
to the environment or to the people of the South Pacific: 
Les Etats du Pacifique sud pressent la France de renoncer h ses essais 
nudeaires d'Oc~anie. Us craignent les retombees atomiques, la pollution des 
eaux, de la flore, de la faune. Pour r~pondre h ce I~gitime souci, Ie 
gouvernement fran~ais a substitu6 en 1975 les essais souterrains aux 
exp6riences atmospMriques. Depuis lors, un sys~me de controle mesure en 
permanence la radioactivit6 [ ... ], analyse les pr61~vements d'air et d'eau, 
surveilte la sismologie. 
Les exp6riences ont lieu a des profondeurs de sept h huit cents m~tres 
dans la roche basaltique. Elles vitririent la cavit6 provoqure par l'explosion. 
Aucune infiltration dangereuse n'a ~t6 relev~e. L'innocuii6 est telle qU'aussitot 
apr~ les explosions, qui ont lieu a la verticale au dessous de Mumroa, it arrive 
i\ nos marins et h nos ingenieurs de se baigner dans Ie lagon.18 
The cross-section in Figure 1 shows the conditions under which nuclear 
tests were made at Moruroa after the abandonment of atmospheric testing in 
1974. Bomb explosions occurred either beneath the lagoon, or under the rim of 
the atoll. Opponents of French nuclear testing have, at various times, contended 
that the switch from atmospheric to underground explosions did not eliminate 
the potential for environmental contamination with radioactive waste. They have 
asserted that radionuclides, or radioactive particles, could seep from test shafts, 
either by venting to the top of the atoll, or through cracks in the atoll wall. Once 
released, radioactivity would contaminate the environment, drifting through the 
ocean or the atmosphere. 
Such a possibility has been categorically denied by French officials. In a 
document entitled French Nuclear Tests prepared in the mid-1980s by the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the French 
Atomic Energy Commission, the likelihood of dangerous leakage in the 
foreseeable future was ruled out: 
The release of radioactive particles into the atmosphere is strictly out 
of the question, owing to the great depths at which the explosions take place. 
Thanks to the silica which constitutes the basalt, radioactive particles are either 
trapped in the vitrified lava resulting from the explosions, or absorbed by the 
rubble in the chimney. 
Radioactive gases cannot be vented through the various geological 
beds because of the exceptionally long route up to the surface; venting is 
further impeded by the presence of relatively impermeable strata and by the 
presence of water in the terrain. Even supposing some gas were to percolate up 
through the terrain, it could only consist of small quantities of rare, chemically 
inactive gases, which do not remain in living organisms and have a very fast 
radioactive decay rate. 
The lagoon is separated from the explosion cavities by more than 500 
metres, the ocean by more than several kilometers. Radioactive residues could 
only reach the outside of the atoll from the cavity by a very slow diffusion 
process within the basalt. [ ... ] Therefore one should not expect to detect any 
radioactivity whatsoever caused by underground testing within the next 500 to 
1,000 years. By that time the low level of activity, coupled with natural 
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decrease and dilution, will have rendered any detectable traces infinitesimal 
compared with natural radioactivity.19 
The possibility that nuclear testing might destroy the structure of the atoll base to 
the extent that leaks would flow through fissures created by explosions was also 
ruled out in the brochure. It declared that the geological structure of Moruroa 
was sound. Care had been taken to space the location of tests so that the local 
fracturing they created would not cause great structural damage: 
Some fissures have appeared on the outer reef at Mururoa. These cracks run 
parallel to the shore and are caused by subsidence of the slopes of the island 
massif under the weight of the overlying coral layers. This is a natural process, 
which has been observed on other Polynesian atolls such as Rangiroa. These 
cracks could of course shift under the effect of explosions. However, they are ' 
superficial and confined to the outer coral layers. A fracture zone is also 
observed in the basalt within a radius of 100 to 200 meters of the point of 
explosion. This is obviously taken into account when calculating the 
migration of radioactive materials. Because of the depth at which the 
explosions take place, this fracture zone is far from the surface, and farther stitt 
from the fringe of the atoll. So these two fracture zones are totally independent, 
and there is no possible communication between the two. Several hundred 
meters of undamaged rock overlying the point of explosion, and several 
thousand meters between that point and the ocean, guarantee the containment 
of the radioactivity.20 
Moruroa was characterised in the document as being geologically stable and 
unaffected by the tests. It was not admitted that external subsidence had taken 
place because of explosions. The importance of any seismic effects testing might 
have had was downplayed through emphasis on the "natural process" involved 
in the creation of any local fractures in the reef. Mention that these cracks "could 
shift" because of nuclear detonations was at best a vague, indecisive statement. 
Effort was made to point out that the limited nature of fracturing surrounding the 
bomb cavity precluded any leakage of radioactivity.21 
This official image of an atoll externally unaffected by nuclear testing has 
been contradicted in other quarters. Perhaps the most credible authority in this 
regard is Admiral Henri Fages, a former director of the CEP. While not going 
so far as to admit that it posed a danger, he indicated in 1988 that testing did 
cause geological instability at Moruroa. Surface subsidence was apparent around 
shafts where devices had been detonated, and tests produced a shock wave "qui 
se propage dans tout I'atoll, fragilise certaines parties superieures des flancs de 
ratoll et declenche des avalanches sous-marines de debris accumuIes depuis des 
millenaires, detectables par des seismographes et des microphones proches. 
Certaines provoquent une seche suivie, en retour, d'un train de vagues [ ... ] 
Mais la structure d'ensemble du massif basaltique n'en est pas affectee. Elle ne 
rest pas non plus par les cavites des tirs suffisamment eloignees les unes des 
autres pour dementir l'image repandue mais sans fondement, d'un 
«gruyere»".22 To what extent nuclear tests jolted Moruroa depends on which 
official source you choose to believe. Further evidence presented below 
suggests that Fages was closer to reality than the anonymous authors of French 
Nuclear Tests. 
Geography is another argument presented by official sources in defence 
of French nuclear testing. French authorities have gone to great lengths to point 
out the comparative remoteness of the CEP test sites. In response to regional 
claims that tests pose a threat to the inhabitants of French Polynesia and to 
neighbouring states, they have discounted them through resort to a geography 
lesson which indicated the thousands of kilometres between major population 
centres and Moruroa. For example, in a form letter sent in 1991 in reply to 
protest letters about French tests, Gabriel de Bellescize, the French Ambassador 
to New Zealand, wrote: 
Map 9. Population around Moruroa 
Source: Ministere des affaires etrangeres, Ministere de la 
defense, Commission fran9aise de l'energie atomique: 
French Nuclear Tests p.18. 
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The idea that New Zealand could possibly be inconvenienced in any way by our 
nuclear tests is completely absurd. New Zealand is further away from Mururoa 
than Paris is from certain Russian experimental sites and even further away 
than New York or Los Angeles are from the Nevada test range. [ ... ] How can 
New Zealand, which is on the other side of the Pacific, feel that it is being 
endangered?23 
Hernu likewise produced this argument to question why New Zealand should be 
worried about French testing.24 To back this position, French Nuclear Tests 
supplied maps comparing the number of inhabitants within a 1,OOOkm radius of 
Moruroa, with the number of inhabitants falling within the same distance from 
the US and USSR test sites to demonstrate this remoteness. (Maps 9, 10, 11) 
They showed that around 5,000 inhabitants fell within this distance of Momroa, 
compared with 37,500,000 within the same radius of the Nevada test site, and 
4,195,000 near the Kazakhstan test range. 
However illogical they might seem to French officials, anti-nuclear 
feelings have not been assuaged by their holders' sense of being distant from 
Moruroa. The distance argument has not deterred regional critiques of testing. 
Whether or not these tests take place hundreds or thousands of kilometres away 
from neighbouring island states, they are perceived by island leaders as morally 
wrong, and as occurring psychologically if not physically in their 'back yard', 
due to an energetically asserted pan-Pacific outlook.25 Moral indignation and 
regionalist assertiveness however did not form the sole criteria for regional 
opposition to nuclear testing, as Regis Debray suggested in 1986.26 Some 
scientific reasoning can also be attributed to this intransigeance. Distance did not 
prevent low level radioactive fallout from French nuclear tests being scattered as 
far away from Moruroa as Western Samoa and South America from 1966 to 
1974. Opponents to French testing wondered if such contamination might not 
reoccur if any radionuclides from underground testing leaked into the 
atmosphere or into the Pacific Ocean. The likelihood of this scenario is 
examined further below. 
Finally, an element of distrust can be attributed to the rejection by South 
Pacific leaders of French reassurances. In the 1950s Britain and the United 
States had suggested that their nuclear testing in Australia and in the Pacific 
islands was innocuous. The ill effects of their tests on the health of Pacific 
islanders and Australian Aborigines living in areas touched by fallout from these 
explosions had become public knowledge by the 1980s. If officials from 
London and Washington had either purposely or unwittingly misrepresented the 
dangers of nuclear testing then it could be assumed by the sceptical that there 
was little reason why Paris would be any different in the 1980s. This attitude 
was difficult to dispell by official French assurances. 
Symptomatic of regional distrust of French assurances concerning the 
safety of testing is a question frequently posed by South Pacific leaders: "if it's 
so safe why don't you do it in France?"27 The equally well-worn response is 
that Moruroa and Fangataufa are parts of France, over which the Fifth Republic 
has sovereignty,28 and that there is no basis under international law for it not to 
conduct tests there. Moreover, as there is no danger, why should France resort 
to the expense of relocating its operations? The sovereignty argument is 
extremely difficult to refute on the basis of international law, and regional 
leaders have not done so convincingly. Bill Hayden, the Australian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, attempted to cast doubts on the right of France to conduct tests 
in French Polynesia by singling it out as somehow different from other nuclear 
powers. On 25 October 1985, he argued that "France is the only country which 
continues to test outside the home territory of a nuclear weapons State", and 
called for testing to be shifted to metropolitan France.29 The concept of "home 
territory" has no basis in international law, and is open to differing definitions. 
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French representatives would have argued that French Polynesia, as an integral 
part of the Fifth Republic, was very much "home territory". 
Even assuming this was not the case, the assertion made by Hayden 
contained a double standard which he did not seek to apply to the other nuclear 
powers. The Soviet Union held some of its tests in Kazakhstan, which was not 
self-evidently Moscow's "home territory". Like the indigenous inhabitants of 
French Polynesia, Kazakhs had their own culture and identity, distinct from that 
of the nation which had annexed them. Kazakhstan was a former colony of 
Tsarist Russia which had been retained by Lenin after the Russian revolution of 
October 1917. The Bolshevik fiction of a unified Socialist state transcending 
ethnic divisions was demonstrated by the balkanisation of the USSR from 1991. 
Regardless of the presence of Russian immigrants, Kazakhs asserted their 
particularism by declaring independence, whereas French Polynesians had 
chosen to remain within the Fifth Republic in 1958 and have since shown no 
sign of majority support for independence. Hayden would not have applied such 
criteria to the Soviet Union, probably for psychological reasons. It can be 
speculated that he failed to see any comparison between France and the Soviet 
Union in this respect because no expanse of ocean separated Kazakhstan from 
Moscow. Whether or not Moruroa or Kazakhstan qualified as the "home 
territory" of the governments which administered them in the 1980s, France and 
the Soviet Union reserved their sovereign right to test nuclear devices in their 
respective domains. 
Apart from the status of Moruroa and Fangataufa as French territory. the 
comparative isolation of the two atolls was usually given as the traditional 
French response to the frequently repeated question "why don't you test it in 
metropolitan France?" French authorities have claimed that testing could not be 
conducted in metropolitan France because of the high population densities there. 
While French citizens would in no way be threatened by radiation, it was argued 
that the seismic effects from underground tests could destroy buildings within a 
20km to 40km radius of any test site. It was asserted that testing could not be 
conducted in metropolitan France as there was no unpopulated area of this 
size.30 The Australian Government has challenged this assertion. Hayden stated 
in Parliament on 11 September 1985 that sites existed in mainland France where 
testing could be safely conducted. 31 He drew his conclusion from a report 
prepared in 1985 by the Australian Office of National Assessments, which 
stated that Gueret and Margeride, in the Massif Central, were suitable regions 
for conducting tests. On what precise criteria the Office based its judgement on 
the suitability of these locations is difficult to ascertain. The Office of National 
Assessments has not made its findings public, and as a rule does not circulate its 
materials outside official circles.32 Assuming that the Australian Government 
has not had second thoughts about the conclusions of the report, it appears 
incongruous that such infonnation should be kept classified. The release of such 
technical data might serve to advance the case of regional opposition to French 
testing by refuting the claim that this activity cannot be conducted closer to 
Paris. 
Another motive for conducting tests in French Polynesia, which French 
leaders tended not to indicate. was that relocating this activity to metropolitan 
France might have been politically unpopular on "home" territory. Although 
French citizens did not voice widespread anti-nuclear sentiment in response to 
the construction of nuclear power stations and the deployment of nuclear arms in 
their midst. they might have reacted differently to nuclear tests. One political 
consequence of holding nuclear experiments in French Polynesia has been that 
they have been physically and psychologically distant from the attention of 
metropolitan French voters. 
As well as ruling out any danger to the environment posed by possible 
radioactive contamination from underground tests, French experts have ruled 
out the possibility of contamination as a consequence of human error. Fages 
stated that testing was completely safe, was carried out with great care, and had 
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never involved any major mishaps: "Sa preparation, son execution et son 
exploitation sont entoures de garanties d'efficacite et de securite, et il n'y a 
jamais eu ni echec total, ni accident."33 Interestingly, here Fages effectively 
conceded the occurrence of partial failures in testing. 
Certain incidents that have occurred since France shifted its testing 
underground give reason to disbelieve the assurance offered by Fages that they 
have been conducted without accidents. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, 
staff at Moruroa leaked information concerning a series of mishaps which did 
not reflect well on such assurances. 
On 24 November 1977, hours after the detonation of a nuclear device, a 
tidal wave washed over part of Moruroa. The cause was probably that the 
detonation had blown away part of the atoll wall, although French authorities 
have been reluctant to admit a causal connection between their testing and tidal 
waves.34 This event was not an isolated one. On 25 July 1979, a nuclear device 
was exploded after becoming stuck half way down a test shaft. It was detonated 
at a depth of only 400m, some 500m less than what was described as a safe 
depth for explosions in French Nuclear Tests.35 Three hours later a tidal wave 
hit Moruroa, injuring six people. The CEP denied the wave was produced by 
the bomb blast. A geologist at Victoria University in Wellington, Dr Chris 
Burgess, speculated that the tidal wave had been caused by the force of the 
explosion blowing away part of the atoll wall.36 In October, an official French 
investigative mission confirmed that the test had provoked the mishap, although 
no radioactive leakage was supposed to have occurred.37 
In spite of French claims that no radioactivity has leaked from Moruroa 
into the sea or atmosphere since the beginning of underground testing, 
radioactive waste has been spilled both into the atmosphere and the sea. On 6 
July 1979, an explosion followed by a fire took place in a bunker where, 
according to the four survivors interviewed by reporters from Le Matin, nuclear 
detonation experiments were conducted. For economic reasons, it had been 
decided to reuse this bunker after a detonation had been made, requiring its 
decontamination of plutonium trapped there. A spark from a machine used in the 
decontamination process was reported to have ignited radioactive gas present, 
causing an explosion. One man was killed. Another had his chest crushed by a 
door which was blown off its hinges. He died in hospital. Four others were 
badly burnt and were sent with their dead workmates to Paris for analysis. It 
was claimed by Le Matin that the explosion released an unknown quantity of 
radioactive gas into the atmosphere. The CEP claimed it was a non-nuclear 
accident.38 There was reason to doubt both sides on this final point. Le Matin 
might have gone too far in its search for a scoop, while the CEP might have 
been concealing something. 
While human error might have caused the release of radioactive gas fn 
this case, natural elements have been directly responsible for the release of solid 
radioactive wastes into the ocean around Moruroa. The greatest natural danger 
posed to Moruroa was its location at a latitude where cyclones are regular 
occurrences, which has led to safety problems. On 11 March 1981 a cyclone 
ripped off asphalt covering a nuclear waste dump on the north coast of Momroa. 
Around 20kg of plutonium debris were washed into the lagoon and out to sea. 39 
By 2 August 1981 the damage caused by this cyclone had still not been attended 
to. That day another cyclone scattered further radioactive waste into the 
lagoon.40 By September 1981, civilian technicians at Momroa were threatening 
to strike unless the radioactive waste scattered by cyclones was cleaned up.41 
On 30 November 1981, three technicians on Momroa circulated a report among 
personnel stating that radioactivity levels on Moruroa had doubled since July. 
The two cyclones in March and August had spread irradiated waste over an area 
of 30,000 square metres on the north beach of Moruroa. Extracts from the 
document were published in the London Sunday Times, generating adverse 
publicity not welcomed by the Mauroy Government.42 
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Hernu finally admitted the waste problems to the National Assembly on 
9 December 1981: "11 est exact que les dechets d'une explosion nucleaire 
anterieure ~ 1975, effectue sur ratoll de Mumroa, ont ete disperses dans la nuit 
du 11 au 12 mars 1981 par une tempete, creant une situation radiologiquement 
nouvelle. "43 This was a curious euphemism for a nuclear waste leak. Hernu 
claimed that nothing greatly untoward had happened and that all was being taken 
care of: "Une surveillance radiologique est exercee en permanence sur toutes les 
categories de personnel et, aujourd'hui, nous maitrisons parfaitement la 
situation."44 Concerning the above cases, the CEP has concluded that the 
radioactivity released into the air and sea did not pose great danger to the 
environment, although as opponents such as Greenpeace pointed out, the public 
only had the CEP's word on that.45 
These incidents have tamished French assurances about the safety of the 
tests. French representatives would have preferred to avoid mention of the 
hazards posed to test personnel by the device exploded under irregular 
conditions, the gas explosion, tidal waves and passing cyclones.46 French 
technicians at Moruroa have been proven humanly fallible by these 
misadventures. On the basis of these known problems, opponents to testing 
have been led to speculate that there might be other mishaps or safety 
irregularities which the CEP is either not aware of or is unprepared to publicise. 
Since 1981 France has worked to counter such doubts by opening 
Moruroa to visits from scientists and regional leaders. This policy, implemented 
under Mitterrand from 1982, differed from that existing before his election. 
Under Giscard d'Estaing French and foreign journalists had periodically been 
permitted to visit the test facilities. Foreign requests for technical inspections of 
Momroa were politely refused on the grounds of maintaining security and 
guarding national defence secrets.41 Mitterrand projected his policy of openness 
as a model other nuclear powers should adopt. At the UN General Assembly on 
28 September 1983, he invited other nuclear powers to follow the example of 
France and allow independent missions to their test sites.48 This idea was not 
taken up. The invitation made by Mitterrand to have Momroa independently 
investigated displayed a certain openness, while failing to answer various safety 
questions about the atoll. 
The first independent report prepared on Moruroa under Mitterrand was 
made by Haroun Tazieff, a French vulcanologist who led a mission there in 
June 1982. This mission was described by its members as being of an 
exploratory nature and the report emphasised that its findings were by no means 
conclusive.49 The mission lasted just two days, from 26 to 28 June 1982, 
inadequate time for anything more than a passing overview of test operations. 
The Tazieff mission returned from Momroa with the conclusion that no urgent 
measures needed to be taken about safety there. The report concluded that a 
significant, although not dangerous, level of artificial radiation remained in the 
environment around Momroa as a result of the atmospheric testing that had been 
carried out until 1974. It was judged that the effects of atmospheric testing 
represented neither a threat to the health of test site workers nor to the French 
Polynesian population. 50 The sea walls and platforms erected in response to the 
danger of natural and artificially induced tidal waves at Momroa were described 
as adequate safety precautions for personnel on the atoll. 51 Contrary to official 
claims the report indicated that testing had caused some local subsidence in the 
coral of the atoll, and that testing was responsible for the odd tidal wave. The 
possibility that subterranean explosions might lead to the leaking of radioactivity 
into the environment was not excluded, although the mission had not spent 
enough time on Momroa, or had the equipment necessary, to conduct a 
geological survey. 52 The report also claimed that there were risks of slight 
radioactivity escaping during test explosions, but doubted that this was 
sufficient to harm workers on Momroa.53 Formally, the Tazieff Report 
contradicted earlier French governmental claims that no immediate threat existed 
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of radiation leaking from underground test shafts. However Tazieff stated that 
even if leaks occurred, they would contribute negligeable radioactivity. 
The Tazieff mission was the ftrst of three independent investigations of 
Moruroa that were made in the 1980s. The second was the Atkinson mission, 
led by Dr Hugh Atkinson of the New Zealand DSIR. In response to the 
presidential invitation to regional leaders that had been extended by Debray in 
June 1983, four months later Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea 
sent a scientific mission to inspect the atoll.54 The fmdings of the mission were 
released in July 1984 in a document known as the Atkinson Report,55 As was 
the case with the Tazieff mission, the Atkinson mission paid only a brief visit to 
Moruroa, lasting four days from 25 to 29 October 1983. The report concluded 
that environmental radiation on Moruroa was very low, and posed no danger.56 
No evidence was found of abnormal rates of cancer which might have been 
caused by radioactive fallout from atmospheric tests from 1966 to 1974. Like 
the Tazieff mission, samples taken by the Atkinson mission were from the 
surface of the atoll, and from the lagoon. 57 The Atkinson mission stated that 
radioactive waste management had been sorted out by the time of its arrival, and 
that this was no longer a problem. 58 
The limitation of the Atkinson Report was that it arrived at no firm 
conclusions on the geological soundness of Moruroa. The team did not have the 
opportunity to conduct a geological survey and had to restrict itself to some 
general observations and conjecture. The most the Atkinson mission was able to 
do was to measure the venting of radioactive gas to the surface from an old 
nuclear test site. Although only one measurement could be made, traces of 
radioactivity measured were presented as confirmation of the assessment that 
radioactive gas was able to reach the surface after a test. The report noted that 
the mission was not given permission to gather data on the geochemistry of the 
atoll to ascertain to what extent radioactivity might leak from test cavities in 
general.59 
CEP officials were opposed to a geological examination of test sites on 
the grounds that defence secrets might be breached.60 French unwillingness to 
al10w a geological survey of test shafts raised questions among the sceptical 
concerning what motive the CEP might have for keeping this area of 
investigation off limits. Were they afraid someone might ftnd a leak? 
The report stated that nuclear testing had damaged Moruroa and that 
radioactivity could leak from the atoll, but was vague on the time span involved, 
saying that the potential for leakage would probably be fulfllied "in less than 
1,000 years".61 It was pointed out by the Atkinson Report that water which had 
seeped into the base of the atoll was capable of leaching radioactive materials 
into the biosphere in the long term. The mission did not have the chance to 
obtain adequate data to enable a conclusion on the rate of this process .. 
The French response to the Atkinson Report was to hold it up as 
evidence that Moruroa was safe, despite failing to answer questions concerning 
the geological soundness of the atoll, and the capacity for leakage into the sea 
and air. French Nuclear Tests drew on the more positive parts of the report in its 
case for French testing. Mitterrand likewise presented the conclusions of the 
document in a positive light: 
Ce rapport confirme les conclusions pr6c&lentes; les essais souterrains 
n'entament pas I'inttgrite du massif volcanique et, de ce fait, n'entrainent pas 
dans la nature - et donc sur I'homme - d'effets d616teres. Malgre tout, la 
campagne anti-fran~aise continue.62 
Perhaps it might be more accurately described as anti-nuclear 
campaigning rather than as anti-French campaigning. Whatever the 
accompanying adjective, as Mitterrand noted. campaigning against testing 
continued. The South Pacific Forum was less reassured by the Atkinson Report 
258 
than Mitterrand was. At its meeting in Tuvalu from 27 to 28 August 1984, the 
Forum decided that while the report reduced fears over short-term effects of 
testing, there were still grounds to doubt the long-term safety of testing. Forum 
rejection of French testing in the South Pacific was therefore retained and 
reiterated in the meeting's communique.63 
Forum opposition was prompted by the remaining uncertainties about the 
safety of the tests. Essentially, the doubts that had not been dispelled concerned 
the geological effects of testing. Comparatively Httle was known about what was 
happening to the base and walls of Moruroa as a result of nuclear detonations. It 
could be questioned just how much the CEP knew about the atoll base, as it was 
not equipped with a bathysphere capable of descending to the base of the atoll 
wall for an underwater geological survey. 
The third independent mission to Moruroa was to highlight the 
limitations of what was known about the effects of testing on the geological 
structure of the atoll. From 20 to 25 June 1987, the Cousteau Foundation 
examined Moruroa, with the permission of the Defence Minister. The Cousteau 
mission differed from its predecessors in investigating the atoll wall and the 
floor of the lagoon with diving equipment. A submarine was used to examine, 
to a depth of 230m below sea level, the damage resulting from the test on 25 
July 1979. Divers estimated that around a million cubic metres of debris had 
colJapsed off the atoll wall as a result of the explosion, and they noted extensive 
faults visible to a depth of 18Om.64 The mission rejected the official assertion 
that such faults were natural and unrelated to testing. On 21 June, members 
were present for a nuclear test made under the lagoon. They were able to 
confirm that the explosion caused underwater fissures and rock falls on the 
external slopes of the ato11.65 They were however unable to confirm speculation 
about the rate of radioactive seepage, admitting that it was difficult togauge this 
effect of explosions due to the fact that the the depth and location of faults within 
the atoll could not be observed.66 The mission described the volcanic platform 
of the atoll as being a bad site for testing, because of the capacity of water to 
seep into test cavities and act as an agent to aHow radioactivity to leach into the 
ocean. However the report also stated that as far as was known, there was no 
likelihood of radionucHdes leaking out immediately, and by the time they did in 
several hundred years, any material would be very weak in radioactivity.61 
The rate and level of possible radioactive seepage, and the precise effects 
of fracturing within the atoll, are the crux of deciding whether testing represents 
a danger or not. Manfred Hochstein and Michael O'Sullivan, of the Geothermal 
Institute at the University of Auckland, have come to conclude with the aid of 
computer models that the rate of seepage from explosion cavities into the 
environment could require substantially less time than the several hundred years 
accepted by the three aforementioned reports. Their computer models 
demonstrated that convection currents might push radioactive material from a 
10kT explosion at a depth of 550m a distance of 200m in around six years. A 
100kT explosion at a depth of lkm could result in convection of 500m in 30 
years.68 If this rate was sustained the amount of time it could take radioactivity 
to reach the environment might be measured in decades rather than centuries. 
The authors could not find any reliable statistical data to support the assertion 
that radioactive material reaching the atmosphere or marine environment would 
be hazardous to the health of personnel on Moruroa.69 Computer models, while 
enabling projections of what may happen, are not as reliable a source of data as 
measurements made in situ and over a long period of time, so the work of 
Hochstein and O'Sullivan was largely conjectural. 
Conclusive judgement on what the effects of underground testing might 
have been cannot be passed without a detailed geological survey of Moruroa, 
including extensive examination of the floor of the atoll's lagoon and its outer 
walls to a greater degree than performed by the Cousteau mission. To avoid 
accusations of bias, such a survey would have to be conducted by an 
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independent third party which could not be associated either with the pro-nuclear 
or anti-nuclear camps. The French campaign of openness has not extended to 
pennitting a prolonged, comprehensive, independent survey. 
In the National Interest 
Concurrent with the policy of promoting the activities of the CEP as 
safe, and of working to convince outsiders of this image through a restricted 
opening of Moruroa to independent inspections, under Mitterrand great efforts 
were made to defend the test programme from various perceived threats. The 
defence by the French State of its prerogative to detonate nuclear devices in 
French Polynesia has at times been asserted to the extent of employing acts of 
violence against its opponents, of which the most flagrant example was the 
Rainbow Warrior bombing in July 1985. This section considers the sometimes 
paranoiac attitudes that state offIcials have demonstrated in their defence of 
nuclear testing against its critics, and the alienation that French attitudes have 
prompted in the South Pacific. Although such attitudes could be considered 
ephemeral in the broader scheme of French South Pacific policy, their bearing 
on the biggest French diplomatic gaffe in the regiort during the 1980s, the 
Rainbow Warrior bombing, is such that they merit examination. The decisions 
that led to the bombing, and the diplomatic consequences of it, are reviewed 
below in the context of regional policy. 
Since the 19608 French Governments have guarded the operations of the 
CEP against outside criticism. In response to calls from French Polynesian 
autonomist parties to conduct a territorial referendum on whether testing should 
continue, or in reply to concerns expressed over safety conditions at Momroa, 
the French Polynesian Territorial Assembly has been infonned since 1963 that 
defence matters are beyond the realm of its competence.70 As far as Paris was 
concerned, the territory abdicated its right to comment on Moruroa and 
Fangataufa when it ceded the atolls to direct state control in 1964.71 In any case 
territorial statutes before and since then reserved defence matters as a state 
domain. 
Environmental activists who have criticised the CEP have sometimes 
been subjected to rough handling by the French authorities. Incidents occurred 
during the frrst Greenpeace campaigns against French testing in 1972 and 1973. 
On 1 July 1972, the vessel Greenpeace III was rammed in international waters 
by a French warship, La Paimpoiaise, and had to be towed to Moruroa for 
repairs. The same vessel was boarded during another protest on 15 August 
1973. Its captain, David McTaggart, and his navigator, were beaten up by a 
French boarding party. French officials denied the veracity of the assault. Their 
denials were undermined by photos produced by McTaggart's crewmates. 
Accusing the French State of piracy on the high seas, in May 1975, McTaggart 
was awarded damages by a French court in Paris for the ramming.72 
The state response to foreigners and to certain French citizens who have 
voiced opposition to testing in French Polynesia has been expulsion from the 
territory. McTaggart and his crew were deported in August 1973 and were 
infonned that they would not be permitted to return to the territory. In March 
1986, Dorothee Piermont, a West German Green member of the European 
Parliament, was expelled from French Polynesia for calling for a halt to 
testing}3 In December 1990 French officials refused entry to the Greenpeace 
crew of the vessel Rainbow Warrior 1l.14 These are just three selected examples 
of a practice that appears to have become standard procedure in French 
Polynesia. Anti-nuclear activists have been systematically treated as undesirable 
aliens who pose a threat to public order. Such expulsions mark the limits of the 
French willingness to maintain open debate on the CEP. As the individuals in 
question were foreigners, the French State has been able to employ its 
immigration laws to political ends in order to remove them. Against French 
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citizens protesting tests the State has had less leeway. although in the 1960s it 
chose to act punitively. On 10 October 1962. the French Governor in Papeete 
issued a decree banning a metropolitan French journalist from visiting or 
residing in all but the Marquesas. The man in question, Jacques Gervais, was a 
resident of Papeete who had written articles questioning the safety of proposed 
French testing. The order was issued on the authority of a decree dating from 
1932. designed to quell fascist agitation under the Third Republic. Gervais 
could only with great difficulty have been characterised as a fascist. While the 
measure might have been contested as' defamatory, Gervais chose to return to 
metropolitan France with his family.75 A similar decree was issued in December 
1963, forbidding Maurice Lenormand from visiting the Society Islands. This 
measure was taken at the time when Lenormand, as the Deputy for New 
Caledonia, was lobbying Paris for administrative reform in close cooperation 
with his Tahitian counterpart.76 Both orders were politically motivated and 
infringed the civil rights of opponents to the regional policies of de Gaulle. 
Before 1985. that the French guardianship of its testing operations could 
have extended to espionage and sabotage on the sovereign territory of an allied 
nation would have been considered incredible, except perhaps to members of the 
environmental movement who had been subjected to the censure of the French 
State, and to students of the history of French intelligence agencies. The 
Rainbow Warrior bombing was to lead to various revelations, extensively 
reported by the media, which displayed that France was prepared to extend its 
campaign against peace activists well beyond its frontiers. 
The events surrounding the Rainbow Warrior bombing have already 
been discussed in exhaustive, repetitive. and partially conflicting detail. A 
recapitulation of those events is therefore somewhat superfluous. The various 
accounts concerning the bombing operation are listed in the bibliography. The 
motives for the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior merit closer attention here, as 
do its diplomatic consequences. The incident was undoubtedly damaging to the 
reputation of France in the South Pacific. Conduct by French officials before 
and after the bombing offers an insight into the depth of their pro-nuclear 
outlook, and the extent to which that outlook rendered them psychologically out 
of touch with anti-nuclear sentiment in the region. 
The major motivation for the bombing appears to have been the 
impression ~hat the operations of the CEP were being threatened by Greenpeace. 
Evident in the writings of high officials, from Mitterrand down, was the 
professed belief that France was being victimised by Greenpeace. This portrayal 
was taken to extremes in an attempt to portray Greenpeace as anti-French. In 
1986 Mitterrand wrote in Reflexions sur ta politique exterieure de ta France: 
Quoi qu'iI en CUt, je n'ai pas eu connaissance d'actions pacifistes proches du 
lieu des ex¢riences anglaises americaines ou rnsses. [ ... J La rigueur II klipses 
de ces intransigeants n'est sans faille qu'avec nous. II est difficile de ne pas 
discerner dans ce comportement une volonte politique a laqueUe it ne reste qu'a 
opposer 18 notre. 77 
Mitterrand attributed politically antagonistic, Francophobic motives to 
campaigning by Greenpeace against testing. Faced with such antagonism, 
France had to stand fast in its nuclear policy conduct. The sinking of the 
Rainbow Warrior bombing did not serve to undermine this conclusion. He 
concluded: 
Apres reflexion, it est apparu que leur objectif n'etait pas tant de verifier nos 
dices que d'entretenir une agitation politique hostile lla pr6sence fran~aise dans 
cette region du monde. L'attentat perptue dans Ie port d'Auckland contre Ie 
Rainbow Warrior, et la mise en cause de nos services secrets, ne changent rien 
au fond du debat. Personne ne peut tirer argument d'un acte qui n'engage pas 
mora1ement notre pays pour obtenir de lui qu'it relAche sa survei1lance autour 
des atolls et renonce a ses essais.78 
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Mitterrand's absolution of France from moral responsibility for the Rainbow 
Warrior bombing hinged on the point that the Fabius Government was not 
necessarily to blame for the actions of members of its secret service. They had 
acted under the orders of officials in the Ministry of Defence. The Fabius 
Government- had expressed its disapproval by dismissing the Minister of 
Defence and the head of the DGSE. France would continue to be vigilant against 
those opposed to its ongoing tests. 
Charles Hernu, Minister of Defence at the time of the bombing, 
attempted to discredit Greenpeace by portraying it as imbalanced in its 
campaigning. Greenpeace was not acting on moral pacificist principles. Rather 
the organisation was a bellicose enemy of France: 
Pourquoi «Greenpeace» De s'attaquait-il qu'A Ja France? Un pacifiste, c'est un 
homme. une femme. qui demande Ie d6sarmement bilat6ral. celui des deux 
grands. Le pacifisme unilateral n'est qu'un bellicisme d6guis6.79 
The argument that Greenpeace targeted only France and advocated unilateral 
disarmament disregarded the history of activism by the organisation against 
Soviet and American nuclear defence policy in general, and nuclear testing in 
particular. 
Greenpeace was founded in 1971 in Vancouver, British Columbia, to 
protest US testing in the Aleutian Islands. Since then it has regularly mounted 
demonstrations against the US test programme. For example, in 1983, four 
Greenpeace activists penetrated the Nevada test site in an attempt to disrupt 
testing there. In April 1986, and in February 1987, similar efforts were 
mounted.80 The anti-nuclear campaigning of Greenpeace members in Auckland, 
and of other peace activists, involved opposition to the US nuclear presence in 
the South Pacific as well as to that of France. From 1976 to 1984, the arrival of 
US nuclear powered naval vessels was regularly greeted by privately-owned 
boats, described as "the Peace Squadron", which attempted to block entry to 
New Zealand ports.81 
Greenpeace protests against the nuclear arms race were not limited to 
Western nuclear powers. Oreenpeace activists had experienced greater 
difficulties gaining access to the Soviet test sites to stage protests, but they had 
brought their anti-nuclear views to the attention of the Soviet Government. In 
1982, the Greenpeace vessel Sirius sailed into Leningrad, the base for the Soviet 
Baltic fleet, to stage a demonstration against Soviet escalation of the nuclear 
arms race. The ship and its crew were expelled by the Soviet Government for 
distributing anti-nuclear leaflets and balloons. In 1990, a Greenpeace delegation 
travelled to Kazakhstan to declare opposition to nuclear testing there. That same 
year, Greenpeace sailed a ship to the island of Novaya Zemlya, in the Arctic 
Circle, where Soviet tests have also been carried out. A team was landed to 
measure environmental radioactivity and was caught, which resulted in another 
expulsion.82 Less spectacular]y, Greenpeace members in Wellington staged 
regular protests against Soviet nuclear tests outside the Soviet Embassy in New 
Zealand during the 1980s. 
That Greenpeace had taken great pains to oppose nuclear testing was not 
in doubt. To read anti-French sentiment into this campaigning was to ignore the 
multinational record of the body's efforts. There were certainly members of 
Greenpeace who opposed the French presence in the South Pacific, and who 
were perhaps motivated by a degree of Francophobia, although this was not 
surprising given the history of antagonism between Greenpeace activists and the 
French State. It is difficult however to characterise the organisation as a whole 
as particularly Francophobic. If its aim was to campaign to force the ejection of 
the French from the Pacific, its leaders have been curiously reluctant to advocate 
this line. Elaine Shaw, who led Greenpeace New Zealand's anti-nuclear 
campaigning from 1974 through till 1986. gradually came to believe that French 
262 
nuclear testing could only be stopped if France decolonised. She sought to 
convince Greenpeace International of the need to move beyond environmental 
issues and adopt policy supporting indigenous nationalist movements, not only 
in the Pacific TOM, but in the Pacific generally. This attitude was not shared by 
many of her colleagues within Greenpeace New Zealand, who felt that she was 
attempting to politicise the movement. Greenpeace International rejected her 
views in the early 1980s.83 
Considering the opinion, expressed in the highest quarters, that 
Greenpeace was hostile to France, there existed ample motivation in Paris to 
assent to espionage against the organisation. In the months before the Rainbow 
Warrior bombing, at ministerial level there was no public hint from the Fabius 
Government that New Zealand was the subject of discontent in Paris. Protests 
by Wellington against French testing were long-standing, but they were less 
active in the early 1980s than they had been in the 1970s. In 1973 and 1974 
New Zealand had conducted a case against French atmospheric testing with 
Australia at the International Court of Justice in the Hague.84 In 1973 Norman 
Kirk, the Labour Prime Minister, had ordered the dispatch of RNZN frigates to 
waters off Moruroa to signal New Zealand opposition to atmospheric testing. 
Australian naval vessels also participated in this protest.85 Since 1974 New 
Zealand reaction to French nuclear testing had been limited to paper 
remonstrations in the form of government statements after French nuclear tests, 
and speeches at international fora such as the UN. Up to 1985 these activities 
had not been characterised by French Governments as particularly threatening to 
French interests. Certain French opposition parliamentarians at the time were 
less resigned to accepting New Zealand and Australian anti-nuclear policy. 
These individuals were not in a position to influence the conduct of the 
Government. Michel Debr~. the RPR Deputy for R~union, in particular 
portrayed the two countries as having the intention to challenge French 
sovereignty in the South Pacific through their anti-nuclear declarations. In 
October 1984 he called on the Fabius Government to take more vigorous 
diplomatic action in response. This action in the National Assembly did not 
prompt any governmental measures to this end.86 The position of the Fabius 
Government in early 1985 was that although France might have its differences 
with New Zealand over French testing, that was to be expected. During his call 
atNoum~a in May 1985. Hernu commented: 
AIors je ne considere pas que les Noo-Zelandais sont nos ennemis. lis ont une 
sorte de messianisme qui est Ie leur. protestant contre les essais nucleaires. lIs 
auraient dO Ie faire quand les Anglais faisaient les leurs ... mais c'est comme ca. 
c'est la vie.81 
At the time Hernu made this comment. a French agent, lieutenant Christine 
Cabon, was already in New Zealand, infiltrating Greenpeace and gathering 
advance information for Operation Satanic. the DGSE code-name for the action 
against the organisation.88 
Not everyone in the French Ministry of Defence was as dismissive of 
New Zealand as Hernu appeared to be. The undertaking of a French espionage 
operation in New Zealand offered reason to believe that the country was 
considered, if not an enemy, then not exactly the closest of friends either. Henri 
Fages. who was director of the test facilities at Moruroa until the end of June 
1985, demonstrated publicly in 1988 that he viewed New Zealand as 
antagonistic, presenting it as a base for Greenpeace in its campaigns against 
French testing: 
elle [la Nouvelle~Zelande] se veut la sentinelle de nos essais. Son 
gouvemement annonce officiellement toute detection sismique dont it attribue 
I'origine II un de nos tirs. II est Ie seul au monde II agir ainsi, et it semble que 
ses laboratoires ne per~oivent jamais les essais du Nevada ou du Kazakhstan, 
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gu~re plus distants. Aussi, la seule organisation tcologique contre nos essais, 
est bien implantre a Auckland. Ses dirigeants locaux recherchent, sans grand 
succ~, l'appui des clans indtpendantistes de Polyntsie.89 
New Zealand did, as suggested, announce seismic tremors pinpointed as 
originating from Momroa or Fangataufa. Until 1988, France issued few public 
details on its tests. In May 1988 the Rocard Government decided to release 
details of the number of French tests conducted each year. These disclosures 
have constituted the limit of French openness in this regard The DSIR has filled 
this statistical gap since the 1960s. With a monitoring station in the Cook 
Islands it was arguably the best stationed foreign body to monitor French 
activity. 
Some of what Fages wrote was inaccurate. Contrary to what he claimed, 
measured either from the Cook Islands station, or from DSIR facilities in New 
Zealand, the US test sight at Nevada and the Soviet test sights were not scarcely 
more distant than Momroa, as any casual glance at a globe proves. Fages 
singled out, and linked together, New Zealand and Greenpeace in their 
opposition to French tests, suggesting a uniqueness which did not exist. The 
New Zealand Government was not the only one in the world to announce 
French tests. Australia did likewise. In furthering his case for complicity 
between the New Zealand Government and Greenpeace, Fages neglected to 
draw attention to the fact that the organisation was as well implanted in 
Washington, London and Paris as it was in Auckland. 
The claim that the Auckland members of Greenpeace had links with 
Maohi nationalists in French Polynesia was well-founded. Anti-nuclear 
sentiment in French Polynesia predated the foundation of Greenpeace, and 
Maohi nationalist formations have welcomed Greenpeace visits to Papeete. 
However Fages misrepresented the relationship between Greenpeace and Maohi 
nationalists. It might be suggested, in contradiction to his claim that the latter 
had not supported the former, that it was Greenpeace which had not supported 
the pro-independence claims of Maohi nationalists. As mentioned above, neither 
Greenpeace International nor Greenpeace New Zealand have adopted anti-
colonialist policies. 
Fages held that the Australian and New Zealand publics, through their 
anti-nuclear policies, were attempting to challenge France in the South Pacific. 
He went on to postulate that Australia had neo-imperialist designs on the Pacific 
TOM: . 
l'opinion publique d'Australie et de Nouvelle-Ulande a repris ses protestations 
apr~s une accalmie qui a sQivi l'arret des tirs atriens. C'est aussi une 
contestation de la souverainelt de la France sur ses territoires du Pacifique Sud. 
L'Australie, imperialiste sans en avoir conscience, revendique un contrl'lle de eel 
octan, contrl'lle dont elle n'a pas les moyens.90 
Australian and New Zealand public opinion against French nuclear tests did 
represent a challenge to French sovereignty over its Pacific territories, in that 
members of this public were opposed to nuclear activities which France had the 
right to conduct under international law. Moreover this challenge was less 
menacing to life and property either than Operation Satanic proved to be in New 
Zealand, or than French testing might conceivably be in the event of nuclear 
leakage from Moruroa or Fangataufa. However considering the portrayal of 
Australia and New Zealand by Fages, it might be considered odd that their 
Labour Governments played no part in the 1985 Greenpeace campaign against 
Moruroa. In May 1985 Lange had refused formal calls by Greenpeace New 
Zealand to follow the precedent set by Prime Minister Norman Kirk in 1973 and 
to send an RNZN frigate to Momroa with protest vessels.91 The New Zealand 
Government was not as vigorous a supporter of Greenpeace as was believed by 
French conservatives.92 Wellington· and Canberra were less vociferous 
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opponents of the Prench Pacific presence in the 1980s than Pages would have 
his readers believe. 
The views of Pages, however erroneous in some respects, were in 1985 
to find a receptive audience in the upper reaches of the Ministry of Defence. 
Fages was not alone in the high command with his concern over the security of 
the test facilities at Moruroa.93 There, an espionage operation was set in motion 
which worked on the assumption that, as Prance was being victimised by 
Oreenpeace and New Zealand, they were both legitimate targets for a French 
riposte. 
The comments made by Pages could be dismissed as marginal if not for 
the fact that it was on his recommendation that DOSE surveillance was mounted 
on Greenpeace to protect Momroa from ecological activists. Vice-Admiral Pierre 
Lacoste, director of the DOSE, was approached by Pages in January 1985. 
Lacoste was the recipient of an alarmist scenario painted by Pages, who accused 
the DOSE of neglecting Prench security interests in the South Pacific at a time 
when anti-nuclear activism was mounting to the point where it would threaten 
testing operations on Momroa. Lacoste responded that he would scale up the 
activities of the DOSE if he received word from his superiors to do so.94 As 
Lacoste's immediate superior was Hernu, Pages wrote a letter to him, date 
unknown, which called for surveillance of Oreenpeace to be mounted in order to 
gauge its plans.95 
Hernu took the letter seriously, and met with Pages on 4 March 1985 in 
Paris. Pages presented a written report which reiterated his concerns, stating that 
he believed Oreenpeace intended to sail the Rainbow Warrior and three other 
ships to Momroa. On 24 June 1984, the day the Pacific Arts Pestival was to be 
held in Tahiti, the ship would disembark Maohi nationalists in outrigger canoes 
to land on Momroa.96 This was an outlandish scenario, and the intelligence 
which Pages drew on was lacking in credibility. The date for this projected 
Oreenpeace action was notable for the non-arrival on Moruroa's beaches of this 
invasion of Maohi nationalists. On 24 June, the Rainbow Warrior was 
thousands of kilometres from Moruroa, en route from Kiribati to Vanuatu, and 
the ship was not scheduled to reach Moruroa until mid to late July.97 Hernu said 
he would order the DOSE to take action to infiltrate Oreenpeace and pre-empt its 
imagined operation.98 During the following two weeks, Lacoste consulted 
Oeneral Jean Saulnier, the head of Mitterrand's military staff, who offered 
4MFF to fund the operation. Saulnier eventually authorised the release of 
4.5MFF for Operation Satanic on 8 July 1985.99 On 18 May 1985, the DOSE 
was able to announce to authorised personnel that Operation Satanic was to be 
launched. lOO At this point, Operation Satanic does not appear to have been any 
more than an intelligence gathering mission with some possible sabotage 
envisaged. Were it to have been what was picturesquely described as an 
"operation homo", or a homocide operation, direct presidential assent would 
have been required. 101 
Mitterrand later admitted that he was aware of the concerns raised by 
Pages about Oreenpeace prior to the bombing.102 To what extent he knew about 
the concrete details of Operation Satanic is open to speculation. To what degree 
Saulnier kept Mitterrand informed of the operation is unconfmned. Pabius does 
not appear to have known the operation was under way,103 although soon after 
the bombing both he and Mitterrand became aware of the role of the DOSE. The 
death of the Oreenpeace photographer Pernando Pereira during the sinking of 
the Rainbow Warrior on 10 July resulted in Mitterrand separately questioning 
Hernu about exactly what the DOSE thought it was up to. The arrest in 
Auckland of two suspected Prench agents two days later, Alain Mafart and 
Dominique Prieur, later identified as Prench officers, added greater urgency to 
this line of questioning. 
On 14 July, Hernu confirmed to Mitterrand that the DOSE had agents 
present in New Zealand, although he claimed he was not certain who had made 
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the decision to use explosives.104 At this point, Fabius was also making 
inquiries. Even though his signature had been appended to the authorisation of 
the Operation Satanic budget, financed from a special fund administered by the 
Hotel Matignon. this signature had been stamped by a subordinate rather than 
written by Fabius himself. 105 At a meeting with Fabius and Hemu on 15 July at 
the Elysee, Mitterrand informed Hemu that if the responsibility of the DGSE 
was pubJic1y estabHshed, it would cost the Minister of Defence his post.I06 
Fabius informed Hemu at a meeting at the Hotel Matignon the following day 
that he would not cover the Minister of Defence either.107 
It was not until 22 September 1985 that Fabius apologised to the New 
Zealand Government for the bombing on behalf of France.108 Comments in 
July from presidential advisors and the Prime Minister's advisors that French 
responsibility should be admitted had been rejected in preference to denials and 
protestations of officialdom's innocence. Initially it had been hoped that some 
amicable settlement might be made with New Zealand. This expectation misread 
the sense of outrage expressed by the Lange Government, and was not 
fulfilled. I09 In hoping that the incident would fade away, Mitterrand and Fabius 
underestimated the investigative abilities both of the New Zealand Police and of 
the French press. In Auckland, numerous members of the public contributed 
eyewitness testimony which established that Mafart and Prieur were involved in 
the bombing operation. The police were able to find out from Swiss authorities 
that the pair had been travelling on false Swiss passports, and that they and 
other French agents present in New Zealand had telephoned a DOSE number in 
Paris. From July to September, Mitterrand and Fabius experienced 
progressively greater difficulty denying that the order for the bombing had come 
from Paris and that the DOSE was responsible. Some wild attributions of blame 
for the bombing were being made by Hemu and his subordinates in the Ministry 
of Defence that did much to undermine the credibility of official protestations of 
innocence. In August, in a bizarre attempt to fuel the imaginations of Gallic 
subscribers to speculation over an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, HemullO and 
Defence Ministry officialslll claimed that the British secret service was 
responsible. 
The official inquiry into the bombing, ordered by Mitterrand, resulted in 
the Tricot Report of 25 August 1985. The document exonerated the DGSE, 
conc1uding unconvincingly that its agents were merely in New Zealand on an 
intelligence gathering exercise which did not involve the infiltration of 
Greenpeace.112 The leftist Parisian daily Liberation sarcastically responded with 
the page one headline "TRICOT LAVE PLUS BLANC" ,113 Prime Minister 
David Lange declared on 27 August that New Zealand was not satisfied with the 
Tricot Report and required an apology.1l4 Nor indeed was Fabius satisfied. On 
27 August he ordered Hemu to prepare his own report in an endeavour to find 
out who was culpable within the Ministry of Defence. Hemu drew the same 
conclusion as Tricot: although there had been French agents in New Zealand at 
the time of the bombing, they were not linked to the incident.115 Like other 
high officials in the Ministry of Defence, if Hemu knew what had happened, he 
was not prepared to say so.116 
Eventually, the fact that New Zealand was holding two French agents 
contributed to forcing the Fabius Government into an admission of the 
responsibility of the DGSE. So too, from August to September 1985, did the 
investigations of the Parisian press, which led to various discoveries about the 
identities and activities of the French agents who participated in Operation 
Satanic. Denials by Hernu of any link between the bombing and the French 
Ministry of Defence1l7 were made to sound increasingly implausible. Hemu 
accused the press and all his other opponents of mounting a libellous campaign 
against him and his subordinates in order to attack French deterrence: "ce n'est 
pas Ie fruit du hasard si tous ceux qu'on attaque sont des hommes d~ la chaine 
nucIeaire".1l8 This was a case of Hernu trying to evoke sympathy for himself 
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and his subordinates as victims while simultaneously appealing to French 
concerns for national security. 
As Fabius did not have any indication from Hernu as to who specifically 
had made the decision to bomb the Rainbow Warrior, he resolved that Hernu 
and Lacoste, as the two men at the top of their respective organisations, should 
assume responsibility. With the approval of Mitterrand, their resignations were 
caUed for. On 20 September, Hernu tendered his resignation, claiming that his 
subordinates had hidden the truth from him.119 Lacoste did likewise the same 
day. Hernu was replaced by Paul Quiles, previously Minister of Transport, 
while Lacoste's successor was General Rene Imbot, the Chief of Staff of the 
French Army. The pair were instructed to investigate who was covering whom, 
but were met with denials among their subordinates. For their part, neither 
Hernu nor Lacoste were prepared to contribute to these inquiries. Having 
already lost their posts they were disinclined to be so obliging. Hernu wrote two 
years later that he felt too much solidarity with his subordinates to assist any 
such inquiry, which is why he offered his resignation.1 20 He continued 
insisting, as he did until his death in January 1990, that he had not given the 
order to conduct the bombing, and did not know who did. 121 Mitterrand's 
position was that the affair was ridiculous, had gone on long enough, and that 
someone had to take the blame. He declared in 1989 that he doubted Hernu's 
profession of innocence: 
Pour moi, c'etait une execution foUe, une affaire idiote des services secrets, 
peuples de minabJes, de malandrins. Aujourd'hui, mon interpretation, mon 
'impression', c'est que tout cela fut un coup monte entre amiraux [Fag~ et 
Lacoste]. Les marins de la-bas ont concocte leur affaire, et Lacoste, lui-marne 
amimt, a charge ses services d'executer cette 'belle o~mtion'. Quant a Hemu, 
vous Ie connaissez, il a do dire: "Ahl La bonne ideel" 22 
This was a plausible explanation which was consistent with available evidence. 
In the absence of solid evidence to support this ilssumption though, room is still 
open for doubt as to whether Hernu knew about plans to bomb the Rainbow 
Warrior. 
On 22 September Fabius belatedly admitted what the members of the 
French press had been asserting for weeks: that the DGSE was responsible for 
the bombing.123 Further revelations to the public did not eventuate. Hernu and 
Lacoste had already shouldered the blame for the operation. It was considered 
unnecessary to punish the agents who had participated in Operation Satanic, on 
the grounds that they had been acting under orders. Imbot was not prepared to 
make inquiries which might demoralise the military or call into question its 
professional integrity,124 an attitude which severely limited the extent of his 
investigation. By 27 September, Imhot had declared that the investigation was 
over. Exactly who had ordered what is still the subject of a great degree of 
uncertainty, although the resignations of Hernu and Lacoste marked the 
beginning of government efforts in Paris to resolve the implications of the 
Rainbow Warrior bombing. 
The affair was not taken up by the Opposition to pillory the Fabius 
Government to the same degree as the New Caledonian troubles in 1984 and 
1985 had been. Although various criticisms were offered around the time of the 
admission by Fabius of the DGSE's culpability for the bombing, they were not 
to endure to the extent of derisive comments about New Caledonian policy. The 
comments offered by the UDF, RPR, PC and the FN concerned rather the 
institutional implications of the affair for the Fifth Republic. Leaders of these 
parties were less preoccupied with the violation of New Zealand sovereignty, 
the death of Pereira, and the destruction of Greenpeace property, than they were 
with the consequences for the good reputation of France and of Republican 
institutions. 125 Charles Pasqua, a senior RPR representative, observed 
perceptively: "Ce que reproche l'opposition a Mitterrand, ce n'est pas d'avoir 
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engage cette operation, c'est plutot de l'avoir fait, comme tout ce qu'il fait, c'est-
~-dire comme un zozo, avec un resultat grotesque. "126 Had Operation Satanic 
not gone awry and become a public matter, there would have been no grounds 
for complaint. In the absence of any incriminating evidence enabling New 
Zealand police to establish the involvement of the DGSE, the sinking of the 
Rainbow Warrior bombing would have remained an unattributed crime. The 
reputation of the Republic would not have been besmirched. 
The RPR placed the blame for the Rainbow Warrior affair on the Fabius 
Government, describing its conduct as amateurish. For the RPR there was no 
question of blaming military officials. On behalf of the RPR group, Claude 
Labbe stated to the National Assembly on 24 September 1985: "nous 
n'admettons pas que [ ... J soit reportee sur l'armee une responsabilite qui 
appartient tout entiere au pouvoir politique".t27 The military officials were 
merely subordinates on whom Fabius and Hernu had failed to keep a tight rein. 
Pierre Messmer, a former Minister of Defence, had stated before Herou's 
resignation that the Minister should immediately have accepted his accountability 
and quit his post.128 Toubon called for Fabius to take responsibility for the 
bombing. 129 The RPR did not seek to attack Mitterrand, perhaps because its 
leaders were anticipating the need to maintain good relations prior to what would 
probably be a period of cohabitation from March 1986.130 
Jean Lecanuet, the President of the UDF, agreed with Labbe that the 
bombing was a political decision for which the military was not to blame, but 
looked further up the state hierarchy than Fabius: "II n'est pas imaginable une 
seconde que la decision ait ete militaire, Ie sabotage resulte d'un ordre politique 
venu du plus haut niveau [ ... J. II n'est pas plausible que M. Mitterrand n'ait pas 
ete au courant. "131 The UDF rhetorically asserted that the affair was worse than 
the Watergate scandal. 132 This, as it turned out, was an overestimation and a 
misinterpretation. Some UDP representatives called for Mitterrand's resignation, 
claiming that his image had been irreparably damaged, however their stance was 
unrealistic.133 The President was not directly threatened by the consequences of 
the Rainbow Warrior affair. Other leaders in the UDF were more reticent to 
comment and no doubt were also anticipating the prospect of cohabitation with 
Mitterrand. 
The PC was more outspoken. Marchais described the affair as a 
"mensonge d'Etat sur terrorisme d'Etat" .134 Le Pen pointedly remarked "ou 
bien M. Mitterrand n'etait pas au courant, et alors c'est un jobard, ou i1l'etait et 
it est complice".135 Either way he placed the blame squarely on Mitterrand, 
pointing out that as head of the French armed forces it was he who was 
ultimately accountable. Both Marchais and Le Pen could afford to be 
immoderate in their commentaries. For their parties, participation in a possible 
cohabitation was singularly unlikely, and did not influence party policy on this 
issue. 
The RPR and the UDP were justified in pointing to the ineffective 
handling of the Rainbow Warrior affair by Fabius. Since July both Fabius and 
Mitterrand had been aware that the DOSE had been involved in operations in 
New Zealand against Oreenpeace. A prompt admission in of this in July, some 
dismissals in the Ministry of Defence, and a rapid offer of reparations to the 
aggrieved parties would have done much to bring the situation under control at 
an early stage. In July neither Fabius nor Mitterrand might have had all the facts 
on the DGSE's operation in New Zealand, but nor did they have them by 
September. When they finally decided to act, controversy had escalated over the 
bombing, partly because of previous French denials. 
The round of recrimination in Paris was not to last very long. Once the 
investigation at the Ministry of Defence had been declared closed, the French 
parliamentary parties largely closed ranks on the Rainbow Warrior affair. The 
fate of Mafart and Prieur became the new topic of the day, which led the 
Opposition to vent its discontent on the asserted obstinacy of the New Zealand 
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Government rather than on the supposed incompetence of Fabius.136 Here, the 
major parties were united: whether right or wrong, the Rainbow Warrior 
bombing was an act of State, for which the French Republic collectively could 
accept culpability, but for which French officers acting under orders were 
personally blameless. They should not be punished for a decision which was 
not their own. The New Zealand stance was that the pair were possibly 
criminals, and their fate would be determined by New Zealand justice. 
On 22 November, Prieur and Mafart were sentenced in Auckland by the 
New Zealand High Court to ten years' imprisonment for manslaughter. The 
verdict was arrived at on the first morning of the trial, without any presentation 
of evidence, after the prosecution and the defence had agreed that charges would 
be reduced from murder to manslaughter in exchange for an admission of guilt. 
The prosecution was uncertain of its ability to establish that Mafart and Prieur 
had been directly responsible for the death of Pereira. It was also in the interests 
of the French Government that the trial be resolved as swiftly as possible, with a 
minimum of factual revelations about the activities of its agents. There were 
suggestions in the French media that the Fabius and Lange Governments had 
come to an arrangement. This assertion was denied in Wellington, although the 
fact remained that for a criminal trial the hearing had peculiar features.137 
Lange stated after the verdict that the reduction of their sentences or their 
early release were not to be bargaining points in reparation negotiations with 
France.138 Lange held to this position into 1986, but was forced to abandon it in 
the face of pressure from the Fabius Government and, from March 1986, from 
the incoming Chirac administration. The arrival of cohabitation did not produce 
any change in French demands for the release of the agents. From February to 
April 1986 the Fabius Government and then the Chirac Government oversaw 
the implementation of restrictions on New Zealand imports to France. Customs 
regulations and the resort to various bureaucratic subterfuges were used to delay 
and obstruct numerous New Zealand products. This activity started in late 
February when the importation of lambs' brains was suspended.139 Although 
French customs officials claimed the suspension was for sanitary reasons, the 
timing of this and other hindrances placed on New Zealand wool, meat, fish, 
potatoes and kiwi fruit rendered suspect their claims to represent a disinterested 
bureaucracy. After the appointment of the Chirac Government, Michel Noir, the 
new Minister of External Cot1l1lierce, announced on 15 May that France would 
oppose the renewal of the preferential tariff agreement on New Zealand butter 
exports to the EEC.140 
This announcement, on top of the customs blocks and delays to New 
Zealand goods exported to France, constituted great concerns for Lange. He had 
pointed out on 27 August 1985 that New Zealand could not afford to permit its 
relations with France to deteriorate too far over the Rainbow Warrior affair: 
There are too many common interests and in particular New Zealand would be 
at risk if it had within the European market an implacable foe. What we need is 
an understanding lllllsociate. Therefore there is no suggestion that New Zealand 
diplomacy would set out to escalate this matter to the point where it rebounded 
on New Zealand. 141 
New Zealand trade with the EEC was too important to endanger. In 1984, 
around 20% of New Zealand exports were purchased in the Community. 
Annual New Zealand trade with France was worth around $NZ270M.142 The 
lack of preparedness shown by Lange to negotiate the release of Mafart and 
Prieur as part of the arbitration of the bombing damages had resulted in trade 
consider&:tions rebounding on him. 
Commercial pressures forced a reconsideration in Wellington. Lange 
assented to putting the matter to independent arbitration, an option preferable to 
deteriorating relations with Paris. On 19 June 1986, the French and New 
Zealand Governments announced that they had agreed to arbitration of their 
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differences, to be overseen by Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Se~etary-General of 
the United Nations. On 7 July, his ruling was announced.143 Both countries 
agreed to its tenns, which specified that in exchange for an apology from the 
French Prime Minister and reparation of $US7M, New Zealand would release 
Mafart and Prieur for internment on Hao Atoll in French Polynesia for three 
years. France also agreed not to oppose New Zealand butter import quotas to the 
EEC for 1987 and 1988.144 On 23 July, as agreed to in the arbitration accord, 
Mafart and Prieur were flown to Wallis, and then to Bao for internment. The 
commercial interests of New Zealand had ultimately taken precedent over the 
authority of the New Zealand High Court. 
The Quai d'Orsay announced French satisfaction with the ruling and its 
intention to honour it: "il va pennettre it 1a France et it 1a Nouvelle-Ulande de 
renouer des liens traditionnels d'amitie".l45 This was not to be the case. 
Differences surfaced over the ruling. Chirac broke the arbitration ruling by 
allowing the return of both Mafart and Prieur to metropolitan France before their 
three year sojourn on Hao was up. On 14 December 1987, Mafart arrived back 
in metropolitan France, reportedly suffering from a complaint that could not be 
cured by doctors on Hao. 146 On 7 May 1988, Prieur left Hao for metropolitan 
France as she was pregnant and her father was dying, Chirac claimed that the 
repatriations had not violated the arbitration agreement, while admitting to a 
degree of calculation in gaining the return of Prieur: 
L'accord avec la NouveUe-Ulande prevoyait que, si run ou l'autre etait malade. 
it pourrait renlrer en m~tropole. It pr~voyait ~ga1ement que si Mme Prieur 6tait 
enceinte, eJJe pourrait revenir. Le jour ou les «Turenge» s'installent 8 Hao. je 
fais dire au marl de Dominique Prieur, lui aussi officier, qu'i1 va etre mute 18-
bas et qu'iI serait bien inspire de faire rapidement un enfant 8 sa femme.147 
The accord did not in fact state that the pair could be returned to metropolitan 
France under the conditions Chirac mentioned.148 Chirac failed to act entirely in 
accord with the arbitration agreement, and the two repatriations caused New 
Zealand to call for further arbitration in September 1988. After protracted 
consideration over the matter, on 7 May 1990, an arbitration tribunal meeting in 
New York resolved that France had not broken its obligations in repatriating 
Mafart, as his condition of ill-health was such that he had to be evacuated. In not 
returning him to Bao after his recovery however, France had violated the 
accord.149 Prieur's departure had broken the accord as New Zealand had not 
given its consent to her evacuation, and she had not been returned after the birth 
of her child. There was no chance of them being returned in May 1990. The 
tribunal found that the three year period of their detention had expired on 22 July 
1989, so there was no need to return them. To compensate, it declared that 
France should create a Franco-New Zealand friendship fund to make amends for 
its breach of the arbitration agreement of July 1986.150 
Before their arrival in government in March 1986, RPR and UDF leaders 
had attacked the Fabius Government for mishandling the Rainbow Warrior 
affair, portraying it as having handled the matter ineptly, and damaged the 
reputation of France. The Chirac Government was far less inept in its handling 
of the aftennath. The trade pressure it applied on New Zealand from March 
1986 obtained the release of Mafart and Prieur to Hao, and the violation of the 
arbitration agreement obtained their return to metropolitan France. These 
measures damaged the credibilitiy of two French Governments in the eyes of 
New Zealand officials. Neither the Socialists, nor the Gaullists, nor the 
Giscardians remained untouched by the aftermath of the Rainbow Warrior 
bombing. Under both the Fabius and the Chirac Governments, the French 
national interest was the primary consideration, whether it was deemed to 
involve the destruction of private property and the death of a foreign national in 
a New Zealand port, the coercion of the New Zealand Government into 
releasing French agents, or the violation of the tenns of their release. 
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By May 1990 it appeared that the Rainbow Warrior affair had been 
resolved once and for all. This impression was confIrmed when, on 29 April 
1991 in Wellington, Rocard and Bolger signed an accord creating the Franco-
New Zealand Friendship Fund, to which France had contributed 11.7MFF, a 
not insubstantial token of its good-will.151 The actions of the Fabius and Rocard 
Governments resulted in a third and final apology on behalf of France during the 
tour of New Zealand made by Rocard: 
Des erreurs ont ete faites dans Ie passe. La France a commis one faute. Je I'ai 
dit pubtiquement.. je Ie redis ici. Des malentendus se sont d6veloppees. des 
incomprehensions nous ont 1poses. II faut aujourd'hui les d6passer. II faut 
penser l construire ravenir.15 
Rocard had the distinct advantage of not having been a member of the Fabius 
Government at the time of the bombing. He had resigned as Minister of 
Agriculture in April 1985, and he later criticised Fabius's handling of the 
Rainbow Warrior affair.153 
Although Rocard stated that it was necessary to go beyond past 
misunderstandings, the Rainbow Warrior affair was not yet in fact over. A 
strange coda to the affair took place in November and December 1991. On 26 
November, Gerald Andries, one of the French agents suspected to be involved 
in Operation Satanic, was arrested by Swiss officials. It became apparent that he 
was still the subject of an international arrest warrant issued by New Zealand in 
1985. 154 The warrant for his arrest, and those for the other Frenchmen 
suspected of having played a part in the bombing, had not been withdrawn in 
spite of the settlement of differences between Wellington and Paris. The Swiss 
police detained Andries and informed the New Zealand Government, which as a 
result found itself in an awkward position. Months after the Rainbow Warrior 
bombing had supposedly been settled, it had returned unexpectedly. On 17 
December Doug Graham, the Minister of Justice, declared that New Zealand had 
withdrawn outstanding warrants for the arrest of those suspected of participating 
in Operation Satanic. There was no longer any intention of seeking to extradite 
Andries and prosecute him, or to pursue any other French suspects over the 
bombing. 155 New Zea1and Government papers obtained under the Official 
Information Act proved that the National Government, like the Labour 
Government in 1986, did not wish to antagonise Paris for fear of the threat of 
French trade reprisals. 156 The issue was fInally closed. 
The Rainbow Warrior affair constituted the negative side of French 
efforts to defend its nuclear policy. The incident harmed France's reputation in 
the South PacifIc, although not irreparably. In spite of its protracted disputes 
with France since 10 July 1985, New Zealand at no point contemplated cutting 
off relations with France. New Zealand economic ties with Europe were 
considered too important to take this step. The Rainbow Warrior affair 
demonstrated that, however much a South Paciftc nation such as New Zealand 
might contest aspects of French nuclear policy, it was not in a position of 
sufficient power to push its opposition. Although New Zealand had the support 
of Australia and of other South Pacific nations, they also had no intention of 
endangering their economic situations for the same reason as New Zealand: they 
depended to a greater or lesser extent on trade with the EEC. New Zealand did 
not receive any substantial support from Britain or the United States in its 
dispute with France.157 As nuclear powers ruled by conservative governments, 
they had little sympathy for any problems Lange and his anti-nuclear Labour 
Government were having with the French,IS8 and had still less empathy for 
Greenpeace, which had campaigned against British and American testing at 
Nevada as well as against Moruroa. The status of France as a fellow Western 
nuclear power far overrode any cooperation between what the French 
indiscriminately portray as three Anglo-Saxon nations.159 
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The. bombing showed the degree to which the French military and 
French Governments were at odds with anti-nuclear sentiment in the South 
Pacific. The argument that Mafart and Prieur were patriots doing their duty 
clashed with the popular New Zealand image of them and their colleagues as 
state-sponsored terrorists. Coming just one month before the annual meeting of 
the South Pacific Forum for 1985, the bombing was in addition unfortunately 
timed. It drew the attention of the international media to regional nuclear issues 
just as the South Pacific Forum was about to consider the creation of a South 
Pacific nuclear free zone. 
A South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone? 
Since the election of Mitterrand in 1981, the South Pacific Forum has 
been as constant in its repeated opposition to French nuclear testing as French 
Governments have been in their pursuit of it. With the exceptions of Tonga and 
the Cook Islands, which have wavered on the issue, both the Forum as a whole 
and its individual member states have reiterated their rejection of French 
reassurances about the safety of operations at Moruroa and Fangataufa. 
(Appendix 9) 
While the PS was discarding its leftist anti-nuclear heritage in the 19705, 
the anti-nuclear movement in the South Pacific was gaining a larger following in 
governmental and non-governmental circles. From its foundation in 1971, the 
South Pacific Forum offered an avenue for statements of anti-nuclear sentiment 
by regional governments. In 1973 and 1974 New Zealand and Australia 
challenged France over its atmospheric nuclear testing at the International Court 
of Justice in the Hague. In 1975, the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific 
movement, an international body of non-governmental lobby groups from the 
North and South Pacific, held its first meeting in Suva. Greenpeace, originally a 
Canadian group, spread to the South Pacific in the 19708, with branches 
established by ecologists and peace campaigners in New Zealand and Australia. 
The first proposal for a South Pacific nuclear free zone was submitted to 
the South Pacific Forum at its meeting in Tonga in 1975 by the New Zealand 
Labour Government. This proposal lost momentum after the election victory of 
the National Party that ycar.160 Muldoon, the new National Prime Minister, was 
opposed to anti-nuclear sentiment as a threat to the Western alliance, and 
demonstrated this opposition by inviting US nuclear-powered warships to visit 
New Zealand. In Australia too that year, a Labour Government lost power, to be 
replaced by a new administration unsympathetic to anti-nuclear treaties. In 1983, 
the newly-installed Hawke Government took up the proposal at the meeting of 
the Forum in Canberra. Hawke sought a draft proposal which would ban all 
except the transit of nuclear weapons through international territory in the South 
Pacific, and which would allow port calls by nuclear powered and armed ships 
at the discretion of individual governments,161 It was apparent from the outset 
that Australia was concerned not to install a treaty. which would disrupt its 
defence cooperation with the United States, although the proposal contained a 
clause opposing nuclear testing, a feature which would challenge French 
activities. These choices showed a degree of selectivity which left the proposal 
vulnerable to the accusation that it was anti-French. 
It took two years before the South Pacific nuclear free zone proposed by 
Hawke was embodied in a document ready for acceptance by the Forum. It was 
tabled at the meeting of the Forum on Rarotonga on 6 August 1985, and covered 
the salient points outlined by Hawke in 1983. The articles of what became 
known as the Rarotonga Treaty were prefaced with an expression of regional 
concern at the advance of the global nuclear arms race that described the 
document as an attempt to further the cause of global disarmament, and to keep 
the South Pacific free from involvement in escalation.1 62 Under article 1, a 
nuclear free zone stretching from Australia to South America, and from the 
Antarctic to Kiribati and Tuvalu was declared. This huge expanse was rendered 
272 
less impressive by artic1e 2, which stated that the zone would not infringe on 
rights of passage through international waters. All parties would pledge to 
refuse to manufacture nuc1ear explosive devices under article 3. Under article 5 
they undertook to renounce the permanent stationing of nuclear explosive 
devices, although this condition did not exclude the possibility of allowing visits 
by foreign ships or aircraft carrying such devices. Article 6 rejected the use of 
the testing of nuclear explosive devices in signatories' territories. The Rarotonga 
Treaty was open to any member of the Forum, and there was provision for its 
ratification by nuclear powers. 
Some Forum members chose not to sign the Rarotonga Treaty. Vanuatu 
rejected the document. Prime Minister Lini pointed out that it did not really 
create a nuclear free zone in that the United States and other nuclear powers 
would be free to transport nuclear arms through the South Pacific.163, The 
Solomon Islands at fIrst adopted a similar stance, then later signed the document 
at the meeting of the Forum at Apia in May 1987.164 Tonga refused to sign for 
opposite reasons to these Melanesian members: its monarchy did not want to 
subscribe to a document which it felt might hinder US military deployment in 
the region. The Tonga monarchy was not greatly concerned by French testing, 
feeling that what France did on its territory was largely its affair. Tongan 
representatives have stated that the tests contribute to world peace by reinforcing 
Western security.165 Although the rest of the Forum states signed the Rarotonga 
Treaty, the omissions undermined the customary stereotype of united regional 
opposition to things nuclear. 
The initial official position of the Fabius Government concerning the 
Rarotonga meeting of August 1985 was that as France was not a Forum 
member, it would refrain from passing comment on the internal debates of the 
organisation. 166 When a Forum delegation arrived in Paris to lobby France from 
6 to 7 February 1986 for ratification of the Rarotonga Treaty, the Fabius 
Government could no longer remain so circumspect. The Quai d'Orsay issued a 
declaration on 7 February which indicated that France was not envisaging a 
ratification of the document: 
En particutier, la d61~gation fran~aise [3 la r~union] a rappel~ que l'interdiction 
propo~e des essais nucleaires ne peut etre envisagre que dans Ie cadre d'un 
processus 3 long tcrme de r6duction des armements d~bouchant sur un ~uilibre 
des forces 3 un niveau consid~rablement r~duit par rapport 3 ce qu'it est 
aujourd'hui. Pour la France, l'arret des essais ne peut etre une condition ou 
meme un prealable 3 la r6duction des arsenaux nucl~ires.167 
In other words. France would not contemplate stopping its nuclear testing 
unless first there was a massive reduction in nuclear arms on the part of the 
nuclear superpowers. A halt to French testing would not fulfil the agenda of the 
French Government requiring a global balance of nuclear forces at a 
considerably lower level before France would contemplate nuclear disarmament. 
Paris had been consistent in advocating this position since 1981. 
Eight months later, on 3 October 1986, the Quai d'Orsay released 
another statement of French policy on nuclear testing, quoting Chirac's speech 
to the UN General Assembly in New York: 
Aussi longtemps que la s~curit6 de la France passera par la dissuasion 
nucl6aire, la premiere exigence qui s'impose 3 mon pays est de maintenir la 
cr6dibili~ de ses forces strat~giques au niveau n6cessaire. [ ... ] Elle n'acceptera 
ni Ie gel num~riqtJe ou qualitatif de ses moyens, ni l'arret de ses essais 
nucl6aires. Les premiers ne d~passent pas Ie niveau indispensable pour assurer 
notre s6curit~ et notre ind~pendance. Les seconds se poursuivent dans des 
conditions de s~curit6 et reconnues comme telles par des experts ind~pendants 
[ ... ] La position de la France sur ce sujet ne se determinera pas en fonction de 
celIe d'autres Etats.168 
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Those South Pacific Forum members with diplomatic representation at the UN 
were delivered a clear message. Although no reference was made to them here, 
Chirac signalled that France alone would determine under what conditions its 
testing would be halted. Chirac's position was in accordance with Mitterrand's 
and with that of the Socialist Prime Ministers who had preceded him since 1981. 
On 29 September 1986 Emmanuel de Margerie, the French Ambassador 
to the United States, had stated at a conference at the Centre for Strategic 
International Studies at Georgetown University, Washington DC, that France 
did not intend to sign the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty. He gave two 
primary reasons for this stance. Firstly, the South Pacific was a strategic zone: 
"We [France] cannot support a plan for regional denuclearisation in any part of 
the world where security appears to depend on nuclear deterrence". Secondly, 
France was not convinced the Rarotonga Treaty instituted a nuclear free zone: 
"We believe it would be a flagrant contradiction for States in the southern Pacific 
area to [ ... ] participate in military alliances in these regions while at the same 
time claiming to be part of a nuclear free zone".l69 
The proposition that the South Pacific was a zone of strategic 
significance was open to doubt. It was not a zone of superpower confrontation, 
and the French nuclear defence system did not extend to the region. Moreover 
the assertion that France could not support regional denuclearisation in any part 
of the world where security appeared to depend on nuclear deterrence had not 
been applied by France in the case of Latin America. As a regional response to 
the confrontation of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, in February 1967 Latin 
American states established the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which constituted the 
world's first nuclear weapons free zone. France, as a nuclear power with 
territory in the region, was directly concerned by this document. France signed 
protocol II of the document, which committed it to respect the denuclearisation 
of Latin America countries, although it refused to sign protocol I, which would 
have obliged it to denuclearise its Latin American domains.170 The motive for 
this refusal was that Guyane was used as a transit point for the nuclear materials 
freighted to French Polynesia for the testing operations of the CEP, although as 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco did not expressly prohibit the transit of nuclear materials 
via Latin America, Paris was able to sign protocol II. France would have had 
similar leeway with the protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty. Although protocols 1 
and 3 would have forbidden testing in the French TOM and were clearly 
unacceptable to France, protocol 2 consisted of an undertaking not to use or 
threaten nuclear devices against South Pacific parties to the Rarotonga Treaty, 
which would have been less onerous to sign. 
French opposition to the Rarotonga Treaty was unconditional as the 
document was asserted to serve Soviet interests and erode regional security. As 
commander-in-chief of French Pacific forces, Vice-Admiral Thireaut indicated 
this attitude bluntly in March 1988. He stated to an Australian audience: 
You know our position about the Rarotonga treaty: we are opposed to it, we 
will not sign any of its protocols and there is no point arguing about it But I 
would like to draw your attention to the fact that this treaty served the Soviet's 
[sic] interests so well, that they signed it immediately. This treaty apparently 
provided more security for South Pacific countries, but we view it as an 
ineffective and useless arms control agreement.171 . 
In January 1988 the Soviet Union ratified the protocols relevant to it (2 and 
3),172 largely because in the absence of nuclear forces in the South Pacific it had 
little to lose strategically by doing so, and because the gesture created goodwill 
in the South Pacific. The document did not seriously obstruct the movement or 
possible escalation of the dominant US nuclear forces in the Pacific, and parties 
to the Rarotonga Treaty could still welcome nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed 
vessels from the US Navy or from any other. The Treaty did not prevent US 
nuclear deployment in the region. 
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De Margerie's second point is of greater interest. Although he was 
vague, he was making reference to the fact that the Rarotonga Treaty in no way 
disrupted regional, notably Australian, defence cooperation with US nuclear 
anned forces. In promoting its version of a nuclear free zone, the Hawke 
Government had been careful to draw up a document that did not challenge the 
Australian uranium mining and processing industry or disrupt US naval and 
airforce visits. It designed the Rarotonga Treaty partly to pre-empt the drawing 
up of a more extreme document by island states, and partly to appeal to regional 
anti-nuclear sentiment.113 Seen from this perspective, the Treaty catered more 
for Australian national interest than for regional advocacy of nuclear 
disarmament. The provisions in the Treaty against nuclear testing support this 
assessment. As the sole nation conducting nuclear tests in the zone defined by 
the document, France was the specific target of these provisions. Just as the 
Rarotonga Treaty was selective in protecting Australian nuclear interests, so too 
it was selective in serving as a vehicle against French nuclear policy. Kim 
Beazley, the Australian Defence Minister, admitted as much in Washington on 1 
September 1985, when he announced that the Rarotonga Treaty was "aimed at 
France".114 Showing a hilarious sense of understatement, he added that 
Australia was not optimistic that France would approve the Treaty, although that 
it would serve to indicate the strength of South Pacific opposition to testing at 
Moruroa and Fangataufa. Any pretence the Hawke Government had to advocate 
regional nuclear disarmament was rendered highly suspect by the biased terms 
of the Rarotonga Treaty. Visits to Australian ports by nuclear-powered, and 
possibly nuclear armed, US Navy warships continued into the 1990s.115 
Frustratingly for Canberra after all its efforts to formulate conditions 
acceptable to the United States, Washington reacted defensively against the 
establishment of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific. Like France, it refused 
to sign any of the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty. On 5 February 1987 the 
US State Department announced the refusal of Washington to sign the 
Treaty.t16 Even though the Treaty did not seriously challenge US nuclear 
deployment in the Pacific, and no American nuclear testing had taken place there 
since the 1960s, the United States did not want to back the Rarotonga Treaty 
and thereby set a precedent for the creation of other nuclear free zones which 
might hinder its global interests. The suspicion also existed that if the Soviet 
Union was prepared to sign the Rarotonga Treaty it must be of benefit to Soviet 
strategic interests, and therefore potentially damaging to Washington.111 
The Chirac Government played a role in the US decision not to ratify the 
Rarotonga Treaty. A week before the US announcement, Flosse had been 
despatched to Washington in his capacity as government spokesman on nuclear 
testing to voice French opposition to the Rarotonga Treaty. He had met with 
George Shultz, the US Secretary of State on 26 January 1987.178 The US 
decision was taken by Flosse to imply an unwillingness in Washington to 
oppose French testing and hence undermine solidarity between the Western 
nuclear powers. Flosse wrote in 1988: 
Fort heureusement nos allies americains et britanniques ont refuse, comme 
nous, de ratifier les protocoles annexes du traite de Rarotonga [ ... ] Le risque 
aurait ete de faire naitre, sur un sujet aussi fondamental, une division entre 
Occidentaux. Lorsque je l'ai rencontre Ie 26 janvier 1987, M. George Shultz a 
port6 une appreciation favorable sur la poursuite de nos essais. 179 
Although Paris was not the only factor which motivated the American decision 
not to sign, the United States preferred not to inconvenience France by adhering 
to the Rarotonga Treaty. Washington supported the French territorial and 
military presence in the South Pacific, however small, as a stabilising factor in 
regional defence,180 and was in favour of continued French nuclear testing. 
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In 1987 Admiral Baker, the Defense DepartmentDirector for the East 
Asia and Pacific region, stated in Washington to the US House of 
Representatives subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs: 
The Free World and all those nations that wish to deter the expansionist 
policies of the Soviet Union benefit from the fact that there is a French nuclear 
test programme. Because French testing contributes an additional level of 
deterrence against Soviet nuclear capabilities the United States cannot in good. 
conscience sign a protocol [the Rarotonga Treaty protocol] against il l81 
Shultz shared this view, and outlined it during a visit to Western Samoa in June 
1987. At a press conference in Apia on 23 June, he declared that the United 
States defended the French right to test nuclear devices in order to maintain a 
strong deterrent against possible Soviet aggression. He rejected claims that 
French testing posed an environmental hazard. Shultz mentioned the US refusal 
to sign the Rarotonga Treaty in the context of the necessity for continued French 
testing,182 As was the case with the Rainbow Warrior bombing, the United 
States did not intend to break ranks with a fellow nuclear power. 
Although for chronological reasons his visit could not have had an 
influence on the British decision to reject the Rarotonga Treaty, Plosse also 
discussed the document on 19 November 1987 in· London with Lord 
Glenarthur, Secretary to the Foreign Office.t 83 Part of his visit involved 
discussions on the British refusal to sign the Rarotonga Treaty, which had been 
announced in March 1987, in the aftermath of the US decision. 184 Plosse wrote 
of British policy: 
Le soutien It nos positions [nucl~airesJ est plus nuanc~ It Londres, compte tenu 
des relations priviMgi~es qu'entretient encore la Grande-Bretagne avec 
l'Australie, la Nouvel1e-Ulande et tous les Etats du forum du Pacifique Sud 
[ ... J. On pe~oit cependant une certaine exas¢ration vis-h-vis de l'attitude neo-
z61andaise de la part du gouvernement britannique.185 
Conservative Ministers in London, like their Republican counterparts in 
Washington, were predictably not enamoured with the espousal by the Lange 
Government of anti-nuclear policy, or with the spread of anti-nuClear sentiment 
generally in the South Pacific. By the 1980s Britain no longer had any military 
presence in the South Pacific, and was not directly affected by the installation of 
a nuclear free zone there. Nevertheless, the Thatcher Government chose to side 
with the United States and France on the Rarotonga Treaty. The British nuclear 
programme was heavily dependent on US technology and facilities. A 
declaration of support for the Treaty by London would have jarred in 
Washington. London shared US concerns about the possibility of the creation of 
further nuclear free zones, and was not prepared to undermine the nuclear 
policies of France. 186 
The Rarotonga Treaty was the strongest regional expression of anti-
nuclear policy aimed at France in the 1980s. It failed to halt French nuclear 
testing as it did not meet French criteria for disarmament. Moreover the 
ratification of the Treaty by Paris would have prevented further modernisation of 
its nuclear strike force. France's signature was never contemplated as a realistic 
prospect, either in Paris or probably in the capitals of the South Pacific. The 
non-negotiable French position on nuclear testing was well establishedr and had 
been reiterated for years. This consideration, combined with the lack of 
limitations the Treaty placed on the US nuclear presence in the zone, apd the 
refusal of the United States to sign it, precluded any effectiveness of the 
document as an arms control measure. -
After France had formally announced its rejection of tl)e Rarotonga 
Treaty to the South Pacific Forum in February 1987,187 Forum members 
returned to their more usual expressions of discontent about French testing. 
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Annual Forum communiques ritually included a section stating disapproval of 
French testing and calling for its halt. Individual Forum members have also 
addressed their concerns to the UN General Assembly. (Appendix 9) Overall 
however, the nations of the South Pacific were powerless to halt French nuclear 
testing as long as Paris desired its continuation. 
This lack of influence over French nuclear policy was not surprising 
considering the lack of diplomatic influence of Forum members. Any attempt by 
Forum members to coerce France in an attempt to sway its stance on testing 
would have been absurd. Written and verbal declarations of principled 
opposition have generally been used by South Pacific governments instead of 
sanctions. The one major exception to this rule only underlined the futility of 
South Pacific nations attempting to apply sanctions on France in an effort to 
influence its testing policy. On 10 June 1983, Hawke announced in Paris on 
behalf of his newly-appointed Government the decision to suspend Australian 
uranium exports to France in an attempt to force a halt to French testing.188 
Some members of the new Labor administration deemed it ethically inconsistent 
of Australia to protest French nuclear testing while supplying France with 
uranium, even if that material was contracted for use in non-military power 
plants. The Government compensated Australian suppliers by buying up the 
stocks destined for France. The suspension was more symbolic than 
intimidating, as Australia was not one of the major uranium suppliers to France. 
The non-delivery of Australian uranium to France disrupted neither its civil nor 
its military nuclear programmes, as ample supplies were available from African 
and Canadian companies. As well as being ineffectual, the embargo proved 
costly to the Hawke Government and had to be abandoned. On 19 August 1986, 
Paul Keating, then the Australian Treasurer, announced that the Government 
had decided to lift its uranium embargo on France. It had been decided to sell the 
stockpiles that the Government had purchased to cover a budget shortfall.l89 
Australia, like New Zealand, did not have the economic power to mount 
effective trade sanctions against France, even assuming the political will to do so 
might have been present. A ware of the importance of European trade for 
AustraHa, Canberra, like Wellington, was not prepared to endanger its economic 
future by pushing opposition to French nuclear policy to this extent. The island 
micro-states of the South Pacific, with fragile economies dependent among other 
sources on French and EC aid, were still less prepared than Australia or New 
Zealand to contemplate this option. The decision to halt French testing was not 
to be made under the influence of South Pacific protests, because these exerted 
no great influence. Rather, and ironically, the impetus to suspend testing in 
French Polynesia came from Paris. 
The Test Suspension: a Step Forward 
The announcement by Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy in April 1992 
that Mitterrand had instructed him to declare the suspension of French testing for 
the rest of the year came as a surprise. In an uncharacteristic move, Mitterrand 
intended the action to serve as an example for the other nuclear powers to 
follow.l 90 Previously, faced with the far greater level of superpower nuclear 
armament, his attitude had been one of 'you first'. Mitterrand had announced in 
May 1989 that France would not halt its testing until the other nuclear powers 
had.l91 Three years later, strategic nuclear tensions in Europe had declined to 
the extent that he was prepared to act as a pace-setter rather than a follower. The 
President pointed out in a press conference in Paris on 12 April 1992 that he 
reserved the right to recommence testing if he deemed it necessary.t92 There 
was, he suggested, a chance that the example presented by France would not be 
followed. At the time of the French suspension, only Russia had ceased its 
testing, and that halt did not appear likely to last long. Although the Soviet 
Union had declared the suspension of its tests on 5 October 1991, it was the 
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Commonwealth of Independent States that had observed it. In April 1992 the 
Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, had ordered the preparation of test sites on 
Novaya Zemlya. Four Russian tests were scheduled for October 1992.193 That 
month President George Bush had no immediate intention of stopping US 
nuclear testing. The United States conducted six nuclear tests in 1992. Bush 
used his presidential power of veto to override a Senate resolution on 19 
September 1992 calling for the suspension of US tests until July 1993 and their 
total halt from 30 September 1996.]94 
The test suspension ran counter to all previous indications presented by 
Socialist Government Ministers on the willingness of France to maintain its 
deterrent. Until the announcement of the suspension, Paris had to all external 
appearances been prepared to continue conducting its tests. As late as March 
1992, preliminary work for the series of tests scheduled at Moniroa that year 
was under way, activity which had attracted the traditional Greenpeace 
protests. 195 The position of the Cresson Government, like that of its 
predecessors since 1981, had been that nuclear testing was still necessary for the 
maintenance and modernisation of French defence systems. Prime Minister 
Cresson had stated to Jim Bolger, the New Zealand Prime Minister, during his 
visit to Paris in October 1991, that France had no intention of abandoning this 
activity.]96 Pierre Joxe, then Minister of Defence, had affirmed two weeks 
before the meeting that lila France fera des essais tant qu'eHe aura des armes 
n ucleaires" . ] 97 
While prepared to suspend testing, there was no presidential intention of 
abandoning the French strategic nuclear arsenal. Mitterrand had repeatedly 
declared in the 1980s that France would not contemplate any reduction of its 
nuclear arsenal until the two superpowers reduced their level of nuclear 
armament to a similar level to France's.]98 He maintained this position after the 
test suspension, as he pointed out in an interview with three French television 
reporters on 14 July 1992.1 99 In spite of steps taken by Moscow and 
Washington since the late 1980s to reduce their respective nuclear arsenals, at 
the time of the announcement of the French test suspension, the superpower 
forces were still far larger than France's, and would remain so after envisaged 
reductions. In January 1992, France had a total of 791 nuclear warheads 
deployed in its nuclear strike force. 2OO After the announcement in June 1992 of 
further US and Russian disarmament measures it was estimated that by 2003, 
assuming full implementation of treaty measures, each country would be left 
with between 3,000 and 3,500 nuclear warheads. 201 This last projection fell 
short of a reduction similar to the French level of minimum dissuasive force 
deemed by Mitterrand in the 19805 to be the necessary precondition for Paris's 
participation in multilateral nuclear disarmament 
While Mitterrand's step was outwardly bold, France did not stand to lose 
much with regard to national security if it failed. The effectiveness of the nuclear 
strike force would not be affected by the halt of testing operations for a few 
months. Should other nuclear powers fail to follow the French example, 
Mitterrand would at least have the satisfaction that he had taken a positive 
disarmament initiative, and French testing could resume. . 
In November 1992 Mitterrand and Ministers of the Beregovoy 
Government considered extending the suspension until July 1993.202 The 
United States had prolonged testing until September but had announced a nine-
month moratorium on 1 October. The explosion of two Chinese nuclear devices 
after the French suspension announcement in April was discouraging, although 
this development was outweighed in importance by the maintenance of the 
Russian test suspension.203 The announcement in November of any firm policy 
position on the extension of a French test suspension was precluded as a new 
period of cohabitation looked imminent from March 1993. Consequently no 
clear position was taken on what was to become of the French suspension in the 
first months of 1993. There was some speculation prior to the installation of the 
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Balladur Government that a return of the RPR and the UDF to power would 
result in a resumption of testing. By January 1994 this scenario had not 
eventuated. As head of the French armed forces, Mitterrand enjoys final say on 
matters of nuclear defence policy. In any event he has received the backing of 
the Balladur Government on the suspension.204 
On 4 July 1993, Mitterrand announced that the French test suspension 
would be extended indefinitely, and he expressed French willingness to sign a 
total test ban treaty. 205 The declaration came in response to decisions taken by 
Moscow and Washington. On 23 June, the Russian Foreign Ministry had 
announced that Moscow had no intention of renouncing its suspension.206 
Hours before the extension of the French test suspension by Mitterrand, 
President Bill Clinton had prolonged the US moratorium until at least September 
1994.207 Mitterrand's announcement went further than that of any other French 
President on the issue of nuclear disarmament, and he could do so without 
plausibly being accused of endangering the nation. 
In 1993 Mitterrand was the first French President since the end of World 
War II who did not have to consider the threat of possible invasion or attack 
from Eastern Europe. The changing international situation allowed Mitterrand to 
contemplate the abandonment of aspects of Gaullist defence doctrine. For 
example in January 1992, he announced that France was open to the integration 
of the French nuclear strike force into a joint EC defence arrangement.20S That 
same month Mitterrand declared that in the 1990s the function of the French 
nuclear strike force would have to be reconsidered in response to international 
changes such as the end of the Cold War, European integration, and the 
withdrawal of Russian forces from Eastern Europe. He mentioned the 
possibility of French coordination with the British nuclear deterrent.209 
Early commentary on the initial French test suspension of April 1992 
asserted that Mitterrand had taken the measure to improve the popUlarity of the 
Beregovoy Government among voters of the French Left. It was argued in 
particular that the Socialists were in search of votes from PS supporters who 
had left to follow the electoral coalition of two green parties, Generation 
Ecologie led by Antoine Waechter, and Les Verts led by Brice Lalonde. If so, it 
was an appeal exhibiting signs of desperation, and was made to a small segment 
of the electorate: one which failed to minimise the severe Socialist defeat in the 
legislative elections of March 1993. The argument that the Socialists were 
aiming to catch the ecological vote belittled the importance of the suspension and 
overlooked the fact that the ecological movement in France was not 
unambiguously anti-nuclear. Despite the fact that Lalonde, for example, had 
established his reputation as an anti-nuclear campaigner, prominent for his 
participation in protests off Moruroa from 1973 to 1981,210 as Rocard's 
Secretary of State to Environmental Affairs from 1988 to 1991, he had 
expressed support for French testing and defended its safety.211 
French peace organisations such as Stop Essais, Le Mouvement de la 
Paix and Solidarite Europe-Pacifique, as well as Greenpeace International, saw 
the suspension as a belated positive response to anti-nuclear campaigning since 
the 1970s. On 1 January 1992 French peace organisations, along with the 
Catholic and Protestant churches in France and other European countries, had 
organised a European Campaign for a Moratorium on French Nuclear Tests.212 
Greenpeace members too preferred to think that the decision was at least in part 
a response to their anti-nuclear campaigning.213 During March 1992 the 
Rainbow Warrior II had visited French Polynesia to signal opposition to the 
projected series of tests that year. This argument was a case of wishful thinking. 
If successive French Governments had refused to accede to demands by anti-
nuclear movements to halt testing for so many years, there was little reason to 
think Paris would suddenly change its mind to satisfy them. 
Following the decline in superpower confrontation since the 1980s, the 
most significant factor behind the French test suspension was to be found in 
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budgetary considerations. The ambition of French political leaders to maintain 
the standing of their nation as a nuclear power had always been limited by 
slender financial resources. The French nuclear deterrent had not been 
established at a level of minimal necessary dissuasive force solely out of free 
strategic preference. Paris had not had the means to establish a nuclear force as 
extensive as those of the Soviet Union or of the United States. The "very 
moderate"214 level of French nuclear testing has been a consequence of the 
inability of Paris to fund testing on the same scale as the superpowers. The 
annual number of French tests generally declined from 11 in 1981 to four in 
1991, and were held increasingly close together chronologically to reduce the 
costs involved in fmancing the operations of the CEP at peak activity. (fable 51) 
French defence spending in general in the 1980s was the subject of some 
difficult decisions. Governments were faced with a shrinking defence budget, 
which fell from 17% of the state budget in 1981 to 14.9% in 1986,215 at a time 
when the various branches of the nuclear strike force, and substantial segments 
of conventional forces brought into service in the 1950s and 196Os, were 
becoming obsolescent. Governments had to balance the distribution of funds . 
necessary for the maintenance and development of conventional and nuclear 
forces, an act which they had difficulties performing. Important re-equipment 
programmes were delayed for lack of funds, compounded by technical delays 
and escalating research and development costs: the Rafale fighter and the Leclerc 
main battle tank were designs which had originally been intended for service in 
the 19808, as was a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to replace the ageing 
Clemenceau. By the time of the Gulf War, none of these were yet in service, 
highlighting deficiencies in the re-equipment of French forces. France found 
itself increasingly restricted in its choice between conventional and nuclear 
priorities. The end of the Cold War and the advent of the Gulf War revealed the 
limitations of French defence funding priorities, which in the 19808 had given 
priority to the ongoing development of nuclear arms. 
In the early 19908 it was decided that the decline in a military threat from 
Eastern Europe, and superpower nuclear disarmament, were circumstances 
which would permit several nuclear projects to be discarded or postponed to the 
advantage of conventional spending. The 1992 to 1997 military budget 
programme projected an annual average reduction of 6.6% in nuclear defence 
spending.216 The projects rejected to fulfil these budget cuts implied some major 
reductions for the French nuclear force. For example, on 1 September 1991 it 
was declared that the strategic nuclear bombing force would be phased out by 
1996, without being replaced or upgraded.217 On 4 June 1992 the re-equipment 
of army units with Hades tactical nuclear missiles was halted even though the 
programme was near completion. Those units which had been re-equipped were 
withdrawn from service and mothballed. By 1993, all prestrategic land-based 
nuclear arms had been withdrawn from service in the French Army. It was 
intended that the silo-based missiles on the Plateau d'Albion would be retired by 
1996.218 Again, no measures have been made to replace them. A project to have 
the missiles replaced with mobile launchers was cancelled by Mitterrand in July 
1991.219 If and when implemented, these reductions wi1lleave the FOST as the 
sole remaining French strategic nuclear force by the end of the decade.220 
In the early 1990s there was reason to believe that the French re-
equipment programme for its nuclear force had been cut back so far that there 
might not be any need to carry out nuclear tests for some years. In 1992, the 
French military had only one new nuclear weapons design under development: 
the M5 missile, intended to re-equip the FOST, was due in service in 2005. The 
military were also contemplating a version of the M5 suitable for mobile launch 
from the Plateau d'Albion.221 The test series in 1991 had already included wo* 
on the warhead for this missile before the test suspension. Further tests may not 
be required for the manufacture of these weapons.222 In the 1980s, the French 
Ministry of Defence had argued that the explosion of nuclear devices was 
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essential to the research and development progress of nuclear weapons,223 and 
that computer simulations were not a fit substitute for the real thing. Since then, 
advances in simulation technology have been made, to the extent that a Ministry 
of Defence working party was set up in July 1993 to examine whether it would 
be feasible to use simulations rather than actual tests.224 Fran~ois Leotard, the 
Defence Minister for the Balladur Government, was led to conclude in October 
1993 that France could do without nuclear tests for "quelques annees" without 
adversely affecting national security or the effectiveness of the French nuclear 
force.225 The working party presented its report to the National Assembly on 17 
December 1993. The report concluded that in spite of advances in simulation 
technology and past tests, a further 20 tests would need to take place before real 
detonations could be discontinued.226 The possibility of a recommencement of 
testing therefore persisted in spite of the end of the Cold War. 
The possible recommencement of nuclear testing was a prospect not 
viewed positively by certain functionaries in the Ministry to the DOM-TOM. 
Jacques Le Blanc, stationed there as the Permanent Secretary to the South 
Pacific, commented in May 1992 that the suspension of testing removed a major 
barrier which had hindered the development of French relations in the South 
Pacific. He said that a recommencement of testing would have detrimental 
implications for these regional relations.227 Although at its meeting in Honiara 
from 8 to 9 July 1992 the South Pacific Forum praised the suspension,228 it 
indicated on 6 May 1993 that a resumption of testing would harm French 
relations with the region.229 The harmfulness of such a Forum response in this 
eventuality should not be overestimated. Were France to restart testing, it is 
probable that it would be faced with ineffectual, largely vocal and paper Forum 
protests of the sort it weathered during the 1980s.230 
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7. The Question of Decolonisation 
Je veux parler de la presence fran~aise dans Ie Pacifique. 
Celle-ci a longtemps ete mal expliquee et partant, mal comprise et 
done contestee. Elle a aussi efe parfois mal avisee. Fort 
heureusement, Ie cours des choses est aujourd'hui change et je 
crois y avoir pris une certaine part. Vous Ie savez, je suis un 
socialiste. J'ai passe une partie de rna jeunesse a lutter contre Ie 
colonialisme. Et Ies responsabilites que j'assume aujourd'hui ne 
mfont nullement amene a renier mes convictions passees. [ ... J 
C'est pourquoi mon gouvernement mene aujourd'hui en Nouvelle-
CaIedonie, en Polynesie fran~aise et a Wallis et Futuna, une 
politique qui ne me parait absolument pas assimilable a une 
politique coloniale. 
Prime Minister Rocard at the Christchurch Town Hall. 
30 April 1991.1 
Both Territories and Colonies 
Rocardfs image of his enlightened Socialist administration over the 
Pacific TOM overcoming the mentalities of yesteryear was tailored for 
consumption in a part of the world where the French Pacific presence had 
repeatedly been pejoratively characterised as colonialist. (Appendix 10) Rocard 
and other Socialist leaders since 1981 were selective in their references to 
colonialism, tending to use it in the past tense, in negative association with 
former French Governments of the Centre and Right, and in reference to a pre-
World War II colonial past. Several examples of this outlook have already been 
presented in this work. Mitterrand was cited at the beginning of chapter 2 
referring in 1986 to the need to eradicate colonialism in New Caledonia, while 
Rocard himself had in 1988 referred to the New Caledonian heritage of 
colonialism as the reason why the living standards of the indigenous 
Melanesians there were lower than those of the immigrant populadon.2 
Reference was also made in the introduction to chapter 2 of how Socialist 
parliamentarians, along with Communist representatives, employed negative 
references to colonialism when haranguing their RPR and UDF opponents in the 
National Assembly. Thus Socialist representatives used the concept of 
colonialism when referring to the distant past, or to periods in the more recent 
past when the Left was not in government. As Rocard did above, they refused to 
accept that their own policies could be associated with the term, owing to its 
antediluvian and reactionary connotations for them. RPR and UDF leaders 
rejected accusations assimilating a colonialist mentality to their policies, although 
they did not hesitate to use similar accusations to attack Socialist Government 
reforms.3 For Giscardians and Gaullists, as for the Socialists, the DOM-TOM 
were neither colonies nor the remnants of French colonialism, but stood as fully-
fledged components of the Fifth Republic, representing a stake in France's 
global future, symbols of modernity and diversity. 
In the 1980s the selective French use of the term 'colonialism' was 
rejected, both within the Pacific TOM, where indigenous nationalist groups such 
as the FLNKS regularly referred to France as the colonial power, and by their 
sympathisers elsewhere in the South Pacific, viewed France as the last of the 
European colonial powers in the zone. From these South Pacific vantage points, 
French colonialism was neither an outlook associated merely with the distant 
past, nor with periods of liberal-conservative government in Paris. French 
colonialism stood rather as the direct consequence of the annexation of lands 
which were not those of the Republic by right of original occupancy. and over 
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which unjust French claims of sovereignty had not been relinquished. 
Colonialism was viewed as existing irrespective of whether the Left or Right 
was in government in Paris, and was dependent on the consideration that Paris 
ultimately determined the administration of its South Pacific possessions from 
half a world away. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the words 'colony', 'colonialism', and 
'colonial', are not used in the limited senses ascribed above to metropolitan 
French political leaders. Analysis below is derived from broader, more neutral 
definitions that coincidentally agree with the characterisations of indigenous 
nationalists in the Pacific TOM. Le Petit Robert refers to a colony as an 
"etablissement fonde dans un pays moins deve10ppe par une nation appartenant a 
un groupe dominant; ce pays, place sous la dependance du pays occupant, qui 
en tire profit". Under this definition, New Caledonia and French Polynesia were 
colonies by virtue of the military subjugation by France of their indigenous 
peoples in the nineteenth century, and their concurrent settlement by French 
colonists. New Caledonia and French Polynesia consisted of islands less 
developed than France, if considered by European economic criteria, over which 
Paris had imposed the preeminence of French settler communities. France had 
exploited its sovereignty over those two territories to various ends, although 
unevenly and not always with great success. New Caledonia served as a naval 
base, as a penal colony for those of its citizens considered undesirable, and later 
as a "colonie de peuplement" for law abiding citizens. While the local 
agricultural production of French colonists failed to become important on a 
national level, the exploitation of territorial mineral resources proved more 
significant. French Polynesia, while traditionally of little economic importance to 
France, has been strategically important. In the nineteenth century Papeete 
offered France a naval base in a region of expanding British influence. The 
significance of nuclear testing operations for the Fifth Republic has already been 
discussed. Wallis and Futuna does not fit the definition above very well, due to 
its original status as a French protectorate, the marginal level of French 
settlement there. and the minimal nature of both French economic and military 
activities there. Even though it was not a demographic colony, Wallis and 
Futuna had nevertheless been colonised in the sense that it was financially 
dependent on France and, like the other Pacific TOM, was ultimately controlled 
from Paris. 
'Overseas Departments and Territories'. the official nomenclature for 
these and the other French overseas possessions, was modernistic terminology 
introduced to replace the term 'colonies' after World War II. The name change 
was part of an attempt by Paris to retain its overseas possessions by introducing 
various administrative renovations which would allow the claim that France's 
relations with its domains had broken free of the model of a European colonial 
power reigning over its colonies. The change in administrative status was 
accompanied by the granting of French citizenship to inhabitants there, and 
voting rights to those of age. Under the Fourth Republic, it was hoped in Paris 
that the secession of French dominions would be staved off by placating 
nationalist aspirations to self-rule there through greater local participation in 
Republican institutions. This measure did not prevent the large-scale reduction 
of the colonial empire. During the 1950s the nationalists in most of the newly-
instituted DOM· TOM became dissatisfied with the limited nature of the self-
administration granted to their respective areas. The departmental standing of 
French Algeria could have been thought to have deterred indigenous nationalist 
claims until the second half of the 1950s, but it did not, just as the granting of 
territorial status to the components of Sub-Saharan French Africa did not block 
the growth of indigenous nationalism there. 
Like the metropolitan French Departments, the remaining French DOM-
TOM are still controlled from Paris. In the cases of the Pacific TOM, certain 
allowances have been made for a large degree of local administration, while the 
statute of each reserved sovereign control for Paris. Although their 
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administrative standings had been redefined under the Fifth Republic, the DOM-
TOM remained French possessions to which metropolitan French citizens might 
migrate and where, in the case of New Caledonian Kanaks, a degree of 
sUbjugation was necessary as recently as the 1980s. In these respects. New 
Caledonia was not unique. For example parallels existed between the political 
situations of New Caledonia and Corsica. The Corsican nationalist minority has. 
like the FLNKS. resorted to violence in its assertion of local identity in the face 
of metropolitan French administration, the primacy of French institutions, 
culture, and immigration. The policy of successive French Governments since 
the 1970s has consisted of efforts to placate nationalist claims through the 
recognition of Corsican identity within the Fifth Republic. 
Colonialism, according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary is "a policy of 
acquiring or maintaining colonies". Le Petit Robert offers a narrower definition. 
listing "colonialisme" as meaning a "systeme d'expansion coloniale". The term 
is described as pejorative. a standing in line with its usage by French politicians 
in the 1980s. While France has not actively pursued the acquisition of colonies 
since the nineteenth century. the persistent policy of its governments into the 
1990s has been to maintain its remaining possessions as long as most eligible 
voters there do not vote to leave the Republic. Paris has retained sovereignty 
over the DOM-TOM because they are considered either useful. or potentially 
useful to the Fifth Republic. France continues to exploit its sovereignty over 
those possessions to various ends. The DOM-TOM provide France with a global 
network of military bases, centres for high-technology projects in the cases of 
French Polynesia and Guyane. points for the spread of French cultural and 
economic influence. and hubs for regional development and cooperation work. 
In a literal sense deprived of emotive French overtones, administrative control 
exerted by Paris over the Pacific TOM, whether determined by French 
Governments of the Left or Right, can be defined as colonialism .. 
Rocard rejected any assertion that such administration constituted a 
colonial policy, for the reason that he considered such a description pejorative. If 
this French interpretation of the word 'colonialism' is taken alone, then Rocard 
could be considered correct. His policies could not plausibly be characterised as 
expansionary or reactionary, yet they do conform to the broader definition of 
'colonialism' to be found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary. During Rocard's 
period as Prime Minister, the rule of French law, the primacy of French 
institutions, and the priority of administrative policy determined by Paris were 
maintained in New Caledonia by the Matignon Accords of 1988, and in French 
Polynesia by the revision of the Internal Autonomy Statute in 1990. To this 
extent Rocardian reforms constitute colonial policy. 
Under international law, in the mid-1940s France had been considered a 
colonial administrator of the Pacific TOM. The UN had never recognised New 
Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna or French Polynesia as sovereign nations. Aiming 
to avoid provoking controversy among its founding members, the UN did not 
go so far as to defme these and other territories as colonies, preferring instead to 
apply a technocratic euphemism to them: 'non-self-governing territories'. 
However enlightened the administrative policies of French Governments mayor 
may not have been since then, and no matter what degree of administrative 
autonomy the Pacific TOM might have attained, legally France could not be 
considered to have decolonised them when it had neither formally nor informally 
renounced sovereignty. France was not alone in this regard. Other nations which 
had not renounced their sovereignty over various South Pacific islands were 
Chile, Britain, the United States and New Zealand. Directly because of South 
Pacific Forum lobbying, in the 1980s France was the only one of these external 
administering powers in the South Pacific to attract disapproval by the UN of its 
policies. 
Representatives of the Chirac Government argued in 1986 that the South 
Pacific TOM had become integral parts of the Fifth Republic that should not be 
considered under UN decolonisation provisions. It was declared that New 
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Caledonia, like French Polynesia and to a lesser extent Wallis and Futuna, had 
attained a large degree of self-administration within the Fifth Republic and could 
not properly be considered non-self-governing territories. Moreover, under 
French constitutional practice full allowance was made for these territories' 
democratic self-determination. Nevertheless France could not be considered to 
have decolonised by having pursued a policy leading to the complete integration 
of its Pacific possessions into the Fifth Republic. Unlike the DOM, the Pacific 
TOM retained the constitutional right to self-determination, an important 
indication that they had not become indissolubly attached to the Fifth Republic. 
Among other considerations, part 1 discussed the consequences of 
lobbying by indigenous nationalist movements in the Pacific TOM, notably New 
Caledonia, and the effect this development had on the formulation of French 
internal policy. This chapter is concerned with the implications that indigenous 
nationalist demands in the Pacific TOM posed for French foreign policy in the 
South Pacific. Attention below falls on the external dimension of the question of 
New Caledonian decolonisation. The assumption existed among the leaders of 
South Pacific governments that New Caledonia in the 1980s, like the New 
Hebrides in the 1970s, was on the verge of attaining sovereignty. The 
decolonisation of the New Hebrides falls outside the chronological frame of 
reference of this work, although mention of the implications of that event for 
Vanuatu support for New Caledonian Kanaks is made below. Because of the 
presumed imminence of Kanak independence, regional leaders gave the claims 
of the FLNKS a degree of prominence which they would not otherwise have 
gained. While Maohi nationalist parties of French Polynesia were sporadically 
active in soliciting international support, their marginal following in the territory 
in the 1980s left regional governments reluctant to take up their cause to the 
extent that they did in the case of the FLNKS. The high point of international 
lobbying for Maohi nationalists during the period under consideration came in 
October 1990. Temaru travelled to New York to lobby the UN and the Solomon 
Islands representative called, to no effect, for the reinscription of French 
Polynesia on the UN list of non-self-governing territories.4 No further 
significant observations can be made about the influence of Maohi claims to self-
determination on French regional policy. The indigenous popUlation of Wallis 
and Futuna did not have an independence movement, and thus French 
sovereignty there was an issue of neither internal nor international debate. 
Political questions in the Fifth Republic related to its colonial heritage 
and demands for decolonisation were commonly considered in Paris to have 
been resolved under de Gaulle in the 1960s. Events in the 1980s suggested that 
this chapter of French history was not yet closed. 
The Case for French Sovereignty 
Whereas its nuclear testing was a policy issue which governments of the 
Fifth Republic had imposed on the South Pacific, decolonisation was a question 
which political representatives of the South Pacific pressed on Paris. As part of 
efforts to explain their regional policy by means of the sort of patient dialogue 
outlined by Cheysson in November 1981,5 French Governments of the 1980s 
found themselves having to respond to the governments of the newly-
independent states of the South Pacific, which wanted to know why the self-
determination demands of nationalists in the French TOM were not being met. In 
their attempts to improve French relations with the region through dialogue, 
French Governments tackled the problematic task of justifying the Fifth 
Republic's maintenance of sovereignty over its South Pacific territories to 
governments which had recently attained their own self-rule and were manifestly 
unsympathetic. In this section French justifications for sovereignty over the 
Pacific TOM are examined. 
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The defence of France's South Pacific presence in the 1980s rested on 
certain historical/aits accomplis and constitutional points coherent to those who 
defended them, but which were less convincing to those who held that Kanak or 
Maohi claims had primacy. Those who advocated the case of indigenous 
nationalism likewise had recourse to historical precedent. They stressed the fact 
that Kanak and Maohi nationalists were the descendants of the original 
occupants of their respective islands. At its simplest level, the dispute between 
the two contesting nationalist legitimacies could be reduced to the slogans used 
in New Caledonia during debate over the question of independence. Banners 
belonging to French loyalists would proclaim words to the effect of "Ici, c'est la 
France!", while Kanaks brandished the slogan "Kanaky vaincra". 
For the representatives of the French State, established French 
sovereignty was of overriding importance. New Caledonia was French, a "partie 
integrante de la Republique" as Lafleur referred to it.6 The future of the territory 
would therefore be determined according to French law. Supporters of Kanak 
nationalism pointed to the comparative recentness of the establishment of French 
sovereignty over New Caledonia, and France's decolonisation of most of its 
colonial empire in the twentieth century, to suggest that French rule was a 
passing phase. They displayed a disregard for French law and questioned its 
legitimacy, considering indigenous rights to be paramount. However the 
FLNKS did not totally reject French institutions which, from a militant 
nationalist viewpoint, was perhaps its major philosophical inconsistency. The 
combative rejection of French democratic institutions expressed in the FLNKS 
charter, the document's accompanying declaration of a Kanak national liberation 
struggle, and the foundation of the provisional government of Kanaky, might be 
attributed greater credibility if the Front had not opted to participate in French 
democratic institutions since 1984.7 Having cooperated with· the Pisani/Fabius 
Interim Statute, and the Matignon Accords, as well as having accepted the 
conditions of the Rocard Government for a self-determination vote in 1998, the 
FLNKS can no longer consistently claim to be above French constitutional 
considerations. 
The defenders of French sovereignty hold that in 1853 New Caledonia 
was occupied, but it had not previously constituted a sovereign entity, because it 
was balkanised among the numerous Melanesian clan groupings present. 
Although Mitterrand and Socialist Governments since 1981 have shown some 
sympathy for claims of Kanak nationalists, the authenticity of Kanak nationalism 
was contested by French loyalists in the 1980s. Nationalism, French loyalists 
pointed out, was a philosophical concept alien to traditional Melanesian values. 
It had taken until the 1970s for the concepts of Kanak nationalism and an . 
independent Kanaky to begin to be accepted among New Caledonia's 
Melanesians. By that stage, French sovereignty had long been established, to the 
point of being incontestable. The inhabitants of New Caledonia were French by 
nationality, and benefited from essentially the same rights under Republican law 
as citizens of metropolitan France.· Under these conditions, to claim Kanak 
independence in New Caledonia by reference to the right of prior occupancy, 
French loyalists argued, was unrealistic and historically illegitimate. You might 
as well try, it was argued, to give metropolitan France back to the Gauls.8 
Clearly, the difference between the two groups was that the Melanesian tribes of 
New Caledonia, unlike the Celtic tribes of Gaul, had not receded into history. 
For all its internal divisions,. and in the face of French cultural dominance, New 
Caledonia's indigenous Melanesian population had managed to form its own 
ethnic identity. In the 1980s the rising claims to self-determination of the Kanak 
majority of the Melanesian population could not simply be ignored in Paris. 
Both Socialist and liberal-conservative reforms constituted responses, of greater 
or lesser advantage as the case may have been, to the activism of the FLNKS. 
The spirit, if not the letter, of the French Constitution, required that 
Kanak claims be heeded, although assessed according to fonnaldemocratic 
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criteria. From 1981 President Mitterrand and Socialist Governments were 
constrained to act according to the dictates of French constitutional law . While 
reform attempts were made, in the face of RPCR opposition, to improve the 
disadvantaged material and social situation of Kanaks, the requirements of the 
Constitution had to be observed. These elements provided the basis for Socialist 
Government refusals to respond to Kanak demands for immediate independence 
through a restricted self-determination vote likely to result in a majority poll for 
secession. Instead in Paris the preference of the electoral majority had to be 
recognised, whether with reservations on the part of Socialist Governments, or 
more enthusiastically by the Chirac Government 
Under constitutional criteria, the foremost sign of the legitimacy of 
French sovereignty over the Pacific TOM was that their populations were French 
by choice thanks to local majority votes for adherence to the Fifth Republic in 
the self-determination referenda held in September 1958 in New Caledonia and 
in French Polynesia, and in December 1959 in Wallis and Futuna. Since then, 
no nationalist movement in any of these three TOM had commanded the majority 
following of the local electorate necessary to lead the way to independence. As 
an anonymous writer for the High Commission in Noumea pointed out in 
August 1980: 
La France resle en Nouvelle-CalCdonie parce que telle est la volont~, h plusieurs 
reprises r~ffirrnre, de ses habitants. En 1958, les ~Iecleurs calCdoniens ont 
approuv~ rnassivernent, par referendum, la Constitution de la Verne R~publique 
fran~aise [ ... J Ce choix de la population caledonienne ne s'estjarnais dementi.9 
This observation was reiterated by Cheysson when he addressed the National 
Assembly on French South Pacific policy in November 1981. He concurred in 
stating that the legitimacy of the French Pacific presence rested on "Ie vreu 
librement exprime des populations des territoires" .10 This legitimacy was 
reaffirmed in the case of New Caledonia in the territorial self-determination 
referendum of 1987. 
The agitation of the FLNKS in 1984 and 1985 led to speCUlation by 
liberal and conservative French politicians that New Caledonian independence 
might push the first of a series of toppling French dominoes in the remaining 
OOM-TOM.lt The decolonisation of the New Hebrides in 1980s had already set 
a precedent of sorts in the South Pacific, although as a Franco-British 
Condominium it had been a special case. In 1984 and 1985 the RPR and the 
UDF sounded the alarm over the contemplation of the issue of New Caledonian 
independence, accusing the Fabius Government of leading a policy of 
abandonment in the OOM-TOM. 
Should New Caledonian independence be won, it was asserted, a chain 
of events could be set in motion which would diminish France's status as a great 
power. Not only members of the Opposition professed to be concerned about 
the implications of possible decolonisation. Calling into question the correctness 
of the UDF and RPR assertion that all members of the Fabius Government were 
in favour of decolonisation, Hernu lent official credence to the domino theory 
when he stated in April 1985: "Ce n'est pas que la defense de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie qui est en cause, c'est aussi la Guyane et la Polynesie".12 The Pisani 
Plan responded to such concerns by preserving vestiges of French sovereignty 
over New Caledonia in the unlikely eventuality that it acceded to a form of 
independence in association with France. Although the Fabius Government was 
concerned with the maintenance of the French global presence, it did not succeed 
in reassuring its opponents concerning this point. In January 1985, shortly after 
the announcement of the Pisani Plan, Chaban-Delmas declared to an RPR 
meeting in Bordeaux that decolonisation in New Caledonia could spread and 
threaten the standing of France as a nuclear, global power: 
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Si )a France disparait de Ia Nouvelle-CaIMonie. ce ne sera pas seulement Ia 
Nouvelle-CalMonie qui partira, ce sera ensuite)a Polyn~sie [fran~se]. Or, c'est 
Ie seul centre d'essai souterrain nucl~aire possible pour Ia France. C'est la 
tMorie des dominos qui se met en place. La Nouvelle-CalMonie entraine la 
Polyn~sie (fran~aise] et la France disparait. Vos enfants seront de pauvres petits 
enfants de rien de tout, apres ran 2000 car, si la France cesse d'8tre une 
puissance nucl~aire, eUe cesse d'8tre une puissance tout court. 13 
This conjecture represented more the individual reaction of an old-guard Gaullist 
than an expression of RPR policy. It should be noted that, at this time, Chirac, 
Pons and Jacques Toubon, then the Secretary-General of the RPR, did not argue 
that Socialist policy in New Caledonia would lead to a succession of toppling 
dominoes in the rest of the DOM-TOM. The scenario presented by Chaban-
Delmas was in any case unrealistically alarmist. . 
Chaban-Delmas voiced an extreme, unofficial reaction to the question of 
decolonisation: that the world standing of France might be diminished by the 
Joss of any further territories. The possibiHty of the loss of French territory 
through internal nationalist campaigning was, like projections about the Soviet 
threat to the French Pacific, an illusory menace. In 1985; the dominant parties in 
both New Caledonia and French Polynesia opposed independence. The RPCR 
controlled the territorial electoral majority in New Caledonia, while Tahoeraa 
Huiraatira enjoyed political dominance in French Polynesia. Certain 
conservatives in the metropolitan French Opposition held that the attention the 
FLNKS was receiving through negotiations with Pisani and the fonnulation of 
refonns to meet some of its demands would serve to encourage the rise of 
nationalist movements elsewhere in the OOM-TOM. A Conference of the Last of 
the French Colonies, held on Guadeloupe from 5 to 7 April 1985, and attended 
by nationalist delegations from all the DOM -TOM except Wallis and Futuna and 
Saint Pierre and Miquelon, appeared to offer confmnation of the impression that 
nationalist movements were being encouraged by events in New Caledonia. 14 In 
the National Assembly on 3 April 1985, Michel Debre called for the meeting to 
be banned. Pierre Joxe, then Minister of the Interior, replied by saying that he 
had no recourse to law to ban a private meeting, although he expressed 
disapproval of it. I ~ A decolonising domino effect did not materialise as a threat 
to the DOM-TOM. Of all the nationalist parties in the DOM-TOM, the FLNKS 
was the one with the proportionately largest following on its home ground.16 
Both the FLNKS and its counterparts elsewhere in the DOM-TOM commanded 
insufficient electoral backing to achieve independence through a majority vote in 
a referendum, assuming that Paris would have been prepared to undertake such 
an exercise in the case of the DOM. Like the spectre of Soviet expansionism, 
New Caledonian independence was an illusory prospect exploited by members 
of the Opposition as political capital in metropolitan French debate. That same 
image of independence was exploited even more in the context of political debate 
by South Pacific leaders, although for regional motives diametrically opposed to 
the French Republicanism of individuals such as Chaban-Delmas and Debre, as 
will be discussed in the following section on the campaigning of the the South 
Pacific Forum. 
Claims by members of the Opposition in Paris that the power of the Fifth 
Republic would have been seriously damaged by the loss of its Pacific territories 
were contentious in other respects. Militarily, France. did not stand to lose a great 
deal through the loss of New Caledonia. Despite government and opposition 
declarations of their strategic worth, the islands had not been a major military 
base since US forces had used them in World War II. The partial and short-lived 
militarisation of New Caledonia in the 1980s was more a response to internal 
unrest than a sign of the strategic value of the islands. The loss of French 
Polynesia would have been more significant due to the presence of the CEP. If 
possible, any relocation of the test facilities would have involved great expense. 
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Moreover, France would not have been greatly affected economically by 
the loss of New Caledonia or French Polynesia. As Jean-Christophe Victor 
pointed out in 1990, New Caledonia and Polynesia contributed almost nothing 
to the French state budget, whereas the yearly public funds transfer from 
metropolitan France to New Caledonia amounted to about 2,500MFF. The 
figure was almost double that amount for French Polynesia. Considering the 
populations of the two territories, this was a disproportionately heavy level of 
expenditure, although these figures combined were the equivalent of less than 
1 % of the annual national budget. l7 Setting aside geostrategic arguments and 
constitutional considerations, fiscal pragmatists could argue that a marginal 
saving would be made in state spending if the Pacific TOM were no longer 
components of the Republic. . 
The natural resources of the Pacific TOM were usually pointed to by 
French political leaders as adequate justification for continued French 
sovereignty there. Yet apart from New Caledonian nickel reserves, little else in 
the way of natural resources had been exploited in the Pacific TOM by the 
1980s. The value of mineral resources on the ocean floors surrounding the three 
territories had not been established, and whatever might be found there was not 
yet commercially viable to extract. While nickel had been proclaimed by the 
Billotte law of 1969 to be a national strategic resource for France because of its 
uses in the armaments industry, by the 1980s very little New Caledonian nickel 
was being used by France for this purpose. In 1985 for example, 97% of New 
Caledonian nickel was exported, not to metropolitan France, but to Japan)8 
Canada and other suppliers, geographically closer to metropolitan France than 
New Caledonia, could supply nickel cheaper thanks to lower freight 
overheads. 19 
Victor concluded with regard to the purported necessity of the Pacific 
TOM for the maintenance of France's standing as a global power: "Whether it is 
true or not is more a question of faith or perception than a calculation of 
figures".20 This faith was hased on a long-term strategic view in Paris that 
valued the future potential that the Pacific TOM offered. However in the past, 
the potential of other French possessions had not been realised. A French 
economic historian, Jacques Marseille, had come to this conclusion in response 
to the larger question of whether the French colonial empire contributed to 
France's economic strength as a great power. In 1984, his Empire colonial et 
capitalisme franfais challenged both the French colonialist and Marxist theory 
that the acquisition of a global empire contributed to national economic growth 
through the exploitation of resources for use in the metropole. At the height of 
its economic power, the colonial empire was the largest trading partner of 
metropolitan France, although Marseille insisted that its influence should not be 
overestimated. In 1928, when the colonial empire acceded to this status, trade 
with the colonies comprised 12.7% of French imports and 17.3% of its exports, 
and thus constituted a small relative majority of national external trade overalJ.21 
Marseille found that economic expansion in the French colonial empire was 
artificially supported through government subsidies and protectionist measures 
against foreign goods on the metropolitan French market. Rather than 
contributing to French national economic growth, colonial trade held it back, as 
French Governments preferred to develop dealings with the colonies in 
preference to opening more profitable new markets in foreign nations. To the 
contrary of predictions of France's economic ruin upon decolonisation in the 
1950s, the Fifth Republic experienced a period of rapid economic growth after 
the loss of French Mrican and Asian domains.22 Marseille wrote in 1993: 
la perte de I'Empire n'a pas affect6 la croissance de 1'6conomie fran~aise. Mieux, 
on peut m~me soutenir l'hypotMse qu'e\le I'a stimulre. Car si l'Empire 6tait il 
y a trente ann6es Ie premier client de la France, c'6tait un client tout ~ fait 
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particulier qui payait ses achats et ~uilibrait son budget avec les dons que lui 
versait 1a m~tropole.23 
Clearly the possession of overseas dominions was not a condition of the 
economic well-being of the nation. There are strong grounds for the application 
of these conclusions to the economic relationship between metropolitan France 
and the Pacific TOM, as well as to the relationship of the former with the DOM-
TOM in general. In the 1980s the DOM-TOM, like the French colonial empire 
before them, possessed economies heavily dependent on subsidies and technical 
assistance from the French State. Only with difficulty could they be 
characterised as anything except a financial burden, however minor, to the state 
budget. 
Formal democratic considerations dictated by the Constitution, and the 
influence of geostrategic arguments asserting the long-term value of the DOM-
TOM, determined much of the outlook of French Governments since 1981 on 
the issue of the decolonisation of the Pacific TOM. A component of the defence 
of French sovereignty in the South Pacific resided in unwillingness to have what 
was considered an internal affair the subject of political declarations by foreign 
governments. In response to a question from Lafleur which observed that South 
Pacific Forum lobbying on New Caledonia was inadmissible, Cheysson, 
Foreign Minister to Mauroy and Fabius, agreed. He outlined the position of the 
Fabius Government in November 1984: 
La France ne reconnmt au Forum des Etats du Pacifique Sud aueun droit de 
regard sur les affaires qui rel~vent de sa seule souverainet6. [ ... ] Les relations 
que nous entretenons avec chacun des Etats oc6aniens nous foumissent 
l'occasion de rappeJer A nos interlocuteurs notre refus de toute ing~nce et de 
dissiper. dans Ie meme temps, incomprebensions et malentendus.24 
However much the PS and the RPR may have disagreed on the appropriate 
measures to take to remedy New Caledonia's problems, they were in accord on 
the point that as an internal aspect of French government policy it was none of 
the business of Forum members. In the 1980s French Governments, whether 
Socialist or not, displayed irritation over official foreign statements concerning 
self-determination, particularly in times of civil unrest in New Caledonia. This 
irritation was expressed in various ways, which affected, although not durably, 
French relations with South Pacific states, and which demonstrated a mental gulf 
between attitudes in Paris and in the region. 
On 27 November 1984, during the first FLNKS active boycott, Bill-
Hayden, the Australian Foreign Minister, declared on behalf of the Hawke' 
Government that New Caledonia was "one of the last vestiges of colonialism in 
the South Pacific".25 The following day Peter Curtis, the Australian 
Ambassador to Paris, was summoned to the Quai d'Orsay. He was informed by 
Michel Combal, Director for Asia and Pacific Affairs, of the astonishment of the 
Fabius Government over Hayden's comment about New Caledonia, and was 
told that the future of New Caledonia was a domestic French matter of no 
concern to Australia.26 Some unofficial reactions came from the RPR too. In 
January 1985, Toubon sent a letter to the Australian Ambassador in Paris 
expressing the discontent of the RPR with Comments by the Hawke Government 
on New Caledonia, in effect telling it to mind its own business.27 
These early indicators showed that the RPR shared the Socialist position 
of rejection of the right of foreign governments to comment negatively about 
New Caledonian affairs. At the time of the Ouvea troubles from late April to 
early May 1988. the Chirac Government became annoyed with statements by 
New Zealand Labour Government Ministers. On 27 April 1988 Judith Trotter, 
then New Zealand Ambassador to Paris, was the recipient of remonstrations 
from the Secretary-General of the Quai d'Orsay after Lange had made 
disapproving comments at a press conference in London on Chirac's handling of 
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New Caledonia.28 French discontent was expressed at a higher level in Paris 
from April to May 1988. Reacting from Wellington, Russell Marshall, the New 
Zealand Foreign Minister, asserted on 30 April that the Chirac Government was 
responsible for the implementation of overly colonialist, repressive policies in 
New Caledonia which were reminiscent of the French response to Algerian 
independence claims.29 On 2 May Jean-Bernard Raimond, the French Foreign 
Minister, described Marshall's comment on New Caledonia as constituting an 
"ingerence intolerable" in French affairs.3o 
The reaction of French Governments in response to the claim of any 
South Pacific government to speak on New Caledonian affairs did not stop 
official regional comments. The position of the Australian and New Zealand 
Labour administrations was that they were justified in speaking on New 
Caledonia due to the relative geographical proximity of their countries to the 
territory. The Hawke Government responded to French complaints in late 
November 1984 by stating that Australia had the right to comment on affairs that 
affected regional security in the South-West Pacific}1 
The New Zealand Labour Government responded in similar terms. As 
Fran Wilde, then Associate Foreign Minister, indicated in Noumea in October 
1987: "La France donne son opinion sur les problemes europeens. Pourquoi la 
Nouvelle-Ulande ne Ie ferait-elle pas sur Ie Pacifique? Nous sommes oceaniens. 
Nous appartenons a une communaute regionale. 11 est normal que nous fassions 
entendre notre voix."32 Wilde's analogy was false. France did not comment on 
internal Spanish, German or Italian problems. French politicians saw no 
comparison between their commentaries on European affairs and South Pacific 
leaders' commentaries on New Caledonian affairs. France had the right to 
comment on the former due to its membership of the EC and the growing 
interdependence of its community partners. No such formal political partnership 
existed between Paris and the South Pacific Forum. France had policy 
aspirations in the direction of regional integration with the South Pacific, but 
theydid not extend to allowing the Forum to advise it on New Caledonian 
policy. The Forum could not consistently exclude New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia from its ranks and stiH assert the right to involve itself in their internal 
affairs. 
The Chirac Government weathered foreign criticisms about New 
Caledonian policy less passively than the Fabius Government had. Michel 
Debre, as noted earlier, had been hostile to the Hawke Government since 1983, 
acting on the assumption that it was the leader of regional criticisms of France. 
Chirac picked up the arguments of Debre to some extent. On 26 August 1987, at 
an RPR youth section meeting at ArIes, Chirac similarly accused Australia and 
New Zealand of leading "une politique de destabilisation de notre pays"}3 
Chirac appealed to a suspicion harboured by French conservatives. 
Regional critiques of the French presence reinforced the central suspicion 
subscribed to by followers of a theory to explain anti-French sentiment in the 
South Pacific. Certain French figures of the Right had chosen to portray regional 
opposition to the French South Pacific presence in a fashion which could best be 
described as an Anglo-Saxon Protestant conspiracy theory. According to the 
exponents of this theory, opposition to aspects of the French presence in the 
zone represented evidence of a Francophobic hangover from Anglo-French 
colonial rivalries of the nineteenth century. Although Britain had decolonised the 
region by the 1980s, the independent states it had left behind retained an 
adversarial mentality inherited from their former colonial master. Their ultimate 
goal was asserted to be the eviction of France from the South Pacific, so that 
Anglo-Saxon Protestant dominance could be asserted over New Caledonia, 
Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia, resulting in a united culture stretching 
from Australia to Canada.34 
In 1986 and 1987, such disquietude was acted upon. On 19 December 
1986, following disparaging comments from Hawke and his colleagues about 
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the conduct of New Caledonian policy, the Australian Ambassador in Paris was 
informed by Raimond that the Chirac Government had decided to suspend 
ministerial contacts between the two countries. On 5 January 1987, Raimond's 
office issued a declaration confirming the measure. It made reference to: 
la decision du gouvemement francais de suspendre, pour une peri ode 
indeterminee, toute echange [interministerielle] entre I'Australie et la France, 
compte tenu de l'attitude inamicale du gouvememeitt australien au cours des 
demiers mois en ce qui conceme la politi que franCaise dans Ie Pacifique Sud et 
en particulier s'agissant de la Nouvelle-Caledonie. [ ... J 1'Australie n'a cesse de 
mener, pendant cette periode, une campagne systematique contre la politique 
francaise malgre la volonte de dialogue et les efforts d'explication des autorites 
francaises.35 
Patient explanation having proven inadequate, Paris had resorted to more 
vigorous measures. Hayden regretted the French decision, although any apology 
that might have been expected was not forthcoming from the Hawke 
Government, which claimed to be mystified as to why the action had been 
taken.36 Canberra was playing the part of a provocative ingenue. 
Five days later the Quai d'Orsay announced the expulsion from New 
Caledonia of John Dauth, the Australian Consul-General, for purported 
interference in local politics}7 Dauth's error, the Quai d'Orsay asserted, had 
been to establish overly friendly contacts with Kanak political groups. Dauth had 
dispensed Australian aid funding to Kanak groups, and had held meetings with 
Kanak political leaders. Dauth responded that the High Commission had been 
notified of the aid, which consisted of 30,OOOFF for a school bus, 20,OOOFF for 
the Kanak cultural centre at Hienghene, and 5,OOOFF for a Catholic aid group to 
assist in cyclone recovery work. Moreover, similar Australian funding to Kanak 
groups had been going on throughout the 1980s. As for Dauth's meetings with 
Kanak political leaders, these were stated to be a normal part of his diplomatic 
duties, and were complemented by his meetings with French loyalist leaders.38 
The expulsion appeared unjustified on the level of the Quai d'Orsay's complaint 
that Dauth had been aiding and abetting Kanak nationalism, although it was 
consistent with the suspension of ministerial exchanges. It is more likely that 
Dauth was being used as the object of French discontent with broader Australian 
"interference" over New Caledonia, including its lobbying at the UN in 
December 1986, which will be discussed further below. 
French subscribers to the Anglo-Saxon conspiracy theory were in fact 
hard put to find evidence of material support for FLNKS militants from South 
Pacific governments. Dauth's distribution of aid for a school bus, cultural 
purposes and cyclone recovery work did not constitute striking evidence of 
succour for Kanak activism. In September 1987, while visiting New Caledonia, 
Chirac accused Australia and New Zealand of searching to destabilise France's 
South Pacific presence through support for the FLNKS.39 Other than paper 
protests and lobbying at the UN, proof to lend weight to this accusation was 
difficult to find. There was some evidence of official funding for the FLNKS 
that could be viewed as political in intent, but it was not substantial. For 
example, in July 1985, the New Zealand Labour Government funded a visit to 
Wellington by Tjibaou.40 Lange denied that his Government had supplied aid to 
the FLNKS,41 although paying for its president's air fares represented a minor 
contradiction of this assertion. 
The most overt campaigning for the FLNKS in Australia and New 
Zealand came from non-governmental bodies. In 1985 Australian church groups 
and teachers' unions had been active in raising funds for the Kanak Popular 
Schools.42 In January 1985, the Australian Federation of Secondary Teachers 
had raised the equivalent of 75,OOOFF to assist the FLNKS in setting up its own 
press.43 Roland Jacquard, a reporter for Le Point, attempted to portray New 
Zealand non-governmental aid for Kanak education as evidence of the veracity 
300 
of Chirac's theory. After sounding a waming by making vague, unsubstantiated 
reference to purported Libyan and Soviet destabilisation, he quoted a letter dated 
4 June 1986. The letter had been written by David Small, a representative of 
CORSO, a private New Zealand aid agency, and discussed a donation of 
$NZ7,000 for the Kanak: schools. Jacquard then made reference to the presence 
of an FLNKS office in Sydney, and to the financial support of Australian trade 
unions for the Front.44 The article was sensationalist. The only specific example 
of aid mentioned, whether Australian or New Zealand, was not of an illegal 
nature. While revelations of money for Kanak arms trafficking would have been 
more convincing in affirming allegations of a foreign conspiracy, no evidence 
for such close links has been found. Nor is there reason to suggest it exists. 
Non-governmental support for the FLNKS similar to that of private New 
Zealand and Australian agencies was offered by private French groups in the 
1980s, including the pacifist Larzac Foundation, and the Association of 
Information and Support for the Rights of the Kanak People among others.45 
The activities of these organisations tended to dispell the impression that support 
for the FLNKS was limited to the so-called Anglo-Saxons of the South Pacific, 
even if these French groups contained Protestant supporters. 
Franco-Australian ministerial contacts were unofficially resumed on 26 
September 1987, when Raimond met Hayden in New York to discuss South 
Pacific issues.46 They were officially restored when Andre Giraud, then 
Defence Minister, attended the Australian bicentenary celebrations in February 
1988 as the French representative.47 The importance of the differences between 
the Chirac Government and the Hawke Government should not be 
overestimated. Sub-ministerial contacts between Paris and Canberra continued 
during the suspension of interministerial relations, and it could be argued that the 
French suspension was largely diplomatic window-dressing. Neither Paris nor 
Canberra wished to leave their spat unresolved for too long. The halt of 
ministerial exchanges had been a nuisance for Australia, which had planned talks 
with French Ministers over European trade for 1987.48 To allow relations with 
France to deteriorate during a period of economic depression might have been 
damaging for the national economy.49 For its part, the Chirac Government, 
while discontented, did not desire a complete break in relations with Canberra. 
Prior to taking retaliatory measures, Raimond had outlined the governmental 
position in the National Assembly on 17 November 1986. He noted French 
discord with Australia and the South Pacific Forum over New Caledonia, but 
declared: 
Toutefois, notre politi que dans cette region vise a approfondir Ie dialogue avec 
I'ensemble de nos partenaires et voisins [ ... J. n convient de souligner, a cet 
egard, que I'Australie est un pays influent dans la region, un allie avec lequel 
no us entretenons des relations politiques sui vies, des echanges economiques 
substantiels et une cooperation culturelle scientifique et technique benefi~e, 
tant pour la France et I' Australie que pour I'ensemble des Etats du Pacifique. 0 
To continue a suspension of ministerial contacts for more than a few months 
would have been contrary to the long-term French policy of South Pacific 
integration, which had been supported by successive governments in Paris since 
the 1970s. 
That Franco-Australian differences over New Caledonia were not 
allowed to develop too far calls into question the extent of division between 
Paris and Canberra in 1986 and 1987. Regardless of Chirac's hostile comments 
about Australia, and Hawke51 differences were not allowed to become 
irreparable. Certainly no personal animosity seemed to exist on the part of 
Chiracor Hawke. On 19 June 1989 during a visit to Paris on the eve of the 
French bicentenary celebration of of the French Revolution, Chirac and Hawke 
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had what the latter described as an amicable meeting. As Mayor of Paris, Chirac 
received Hawke to accept an Australian gift to the city, a bust of La Perouse.52 
Negative comments on the political stance of the Australian and New 
Zealand Governments by RPR leaders were also partly motivated by demagogy. 
Such statements appealed to patriotic conservative voters in metropolitan France 
and to French loyalists in the Pacific TOM. Caldoche loyalists held as an article 
of faith that Australia and New Zealand aimed to extend 'Anglo-Saxon' 
influence over New Caledonia. The fact that for most of the 1980s these two 
countries were led by Labour Governments sympathetic to the FLNKS 
aggravated this suspicion. 53 From 1982 to 1985 Australophobia was evident in 
the physical harassment and death threats made by French loyalists. to Helen 
Fraser, the only Australian journalist permanently present in the terri tory. 54 In 
1987 the RPCR approved of the expulsion of Dauth, stating it was a good 
lesson for Canberra.55 
Wellington and Canberra, of course, rejected the accusation that they 
were pursuing nationalistic interests in supporting New Caledonian self-
determination. Hawke's reply to the thesis was: 
It is nonsense and a palpable nonsense. [ ... ] I and my government have our 
hands completely full in conducting the affairs of Australia and in handling, 
within the limit of economic resources, the amount of aid that we were able to 
make available to the countries of the region. We have neither ambition nor 
capacity to take the place of France in the region. And I must say that any view 
that we want to do that is both a misapprehension and if I may say so borders 
on the paranoic.56 
While betraying a predilection for giving advice where it was not wanted. neither 
Canberra nor Wellington had designs on New Caledonia in the 1980s. Certain 
French commentators have been more moderate than members of the French 
Right in their assessment of Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific. They 
have more plausibly indicated that expansionist designs were beyond Canberra's 
financial means, and that there existed no great public interest in such a goal.57 
The same arguments applied to a greater extent to New Zealand. 
Another French position related to the sentiment that South Pacific 
nations were not justified in passing judgement on ethnic problems in New 
Caledonia, was the belief that they were hypocritical in doing so. Australia and 
New Zealand were former colonies where massive European immigration had 
marginalised indigenous identity to a far greater extent than French settlement 
had done in New Caledonia or in the other Pacific TOM. Defending the New 
Caledonian policy of the Chirac Government from accusations of colonialism in 
the UN General Assembly on 2 December 1986 Claude de Kemoularia, the 
French representative, riposted with an attack on the state of inter-ethnic 
relations in Australia and New Zealand.58 Chirac, at ArIes on 26 August 1987, 
accused Australia and New Zealand of hypocrisy in venturing to comment on 
New Caledonia when they too had internal ethnic problems stemming from their 
colonial histories. 59 Although Pons refrained from naming countries, he had 
employed the same argument on 8 November 1986 when addressing the 
National Assembly on the matter of South Pacific Forum lobbying at the UN.60 
On 2 December 1986 Charles Pasqua, speaking as Minister of the Interior, 
declared at the time of South Pacific Forum lobbying in the UN on New 
Caledonia: 
Nous [Ie gouvernement fran~ais] n'avons aucune le~on ~ recevoir de l'Australie 
et de la Nouvelle-Zelande, ni sur Ie plan de la democratie ni sur Ie plan de la 
civilisation. II est clair que les problemes d'independance des indigenes 
australiens et neo-zelandais oot ete regles, it y a tres longtemps, a leur maoiere, 
par les Australiens et les Noo-UJandais.61 
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Pasqua was alluding to repressive colonial policies which had extended to the 
point of genocide in the nineteenth century. The underlying message of such 
comments was that Australia and New Zealand should resolve their own ethnic 
problems before venturing to pass judgement on those of France in New 
Caledonia, and that they were ill-equipped, both politically and morally, to 
extend such judgement. 
Of all the members of the South Pacific Forum, Australia was a prime 
target for French critiques. The treatment meted out to Australian Aborigines 
since the beginnings of British colonisation had been particularly brutal. and the 
indigenous population was still a disadvantaged minority in the 1980s. In an 
interview with TFI on 16 December 1984, Mitterrand criticised disparaging 
Australian commentaries referring to unjust French colonialism in New 
Caledonia, considering them singularly inappropriate if the number of 
Aborigines killed in the name of British colonialism was taken into account. 62 In 
February 1988 Giraud responded to Australian surprise that France should be 
displeased with South Pacific lobbying at the UN by asking: 
Imagine the French Ambassador at the UN writing a letter to everybody trying 
to make an issue of [the Aborigines] and putting it on the Jist of decolonisation 
because in the Northern Territory of Australia you have about the same 
percentage of Aborigines that we have Melanesians in New Caledonia. Would 
your Government be happy?63 
This scenario was not implausible. By the 1990s, the Aborigines of Australia 
had moved beyond claiming land rights and were contemplating seeking self-
detennination, in much the same way as Kanaks had in the late 1970s. In May 
1993 Bob Weatherall, the Queensland leader of the Foundation for Aboriginal 
and Islander Research Action, declared that if Australia was going to become a 
Republic,Aborigines should be granted the right to a self-detennination vote to 
ascertain whether they wanted to join or regain their own sovereignty. 64 In 
October 1993, it was reported that Torres Strait Islanders had hopes of fonning 
a self-governing territory by 2001.65 Aboriginal leaders may yet seek UN 
support for their claims. 
French critics have had ample material to back their claim that, taking 
into ccmsideration the heritage of oppression of Aborigines, white Australians 
were hypocritical in advising France how to solve ethnic and political problems 
in New CaJedonia. The policy of genocide in the nineteenth century which led to 
the eventual eradication of Tasmania's aboriginal population was more brutal 
than the colonial repression practised by the French against tribal insurgents in 
New Caledonia.66 Injustices to Aborigines persisted beyond the colonial period. 
Aborigines were not accorded the full civil rights that non-indigenous 
Australians enjoyed by law until 1967,67 The question of indigenous land rights 
has been just as divisive in Australia as in New Caledonia. Aboriginal tribes lost 
huge tracts of their tribal domains to British colonisers, who did not recognise 
any prior right of ownership resultant from the status of Aborigines as the 
original inhabitants of the continent. It was not until 1992 that the Australian 
High Court declared, with what became known as the Mabo High Court ruling. 
that Aborigines, as the original inhabitants of Australia, had prior rights of 
occupation. The decision called into question the legality of land titles issued by 
State Governments to private companies as they had not taken into consideration 
indigenous title.68 The Mabo ruling opened up to Aborigines the prospect of 
claiming title over all Crown land in Australia. Aboriginal land claims followed. 
In 1993 the Austt:alian Government still had a long period of confrontation ahead 
of it over the question of the role of Aborigines in the transplanted immigrant 
society which had become culturally dominant over the two centuries since 
Britain had proclaimed sovereignty over the continent. 
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When asked in March 1987 by a reporter from Le Montie if Australia's 
relations with the Aborigines could be compared to France's problems with the 
Kanaks, Hayden's defensive response was "I don't see how it compares at 
a11".69 Avoiding blatant historical parallels such as the fact that the European 
immigrant societies in New Caledonia and in Australia were both founded 
largely by transportation, and that the colonisation of New Caledonia and of 
Australia had alienated indigenous populations from their land, Hayden 
preferred to indicate how much the Australian Government was doing to 
improve the welfare of Aborigines and how much their situation had improved 
since World War II. However he could not deny that Aborigines were 
disadvantaged compared to the non-indigenous majority in Australia. When 
questioned on the matter in January 1987, Hawke stated that the situation of the 
Australian Aborigines was different from that of Kanaks in New Caledonia 
because Australia was a sovereign nation and New Caledonia was not.70 It was 
an indisputable but fine distinction, ignoring the parallel that legally New 
Caledonia was a component of a larger sovereign entity, in much the same way 
as the Torres Strait Islands were part of the Australian Commonwealth. 
Australian leaders such as Hawke and Hayden were not very convincing in their 
defensive arguments. They seemed to dislike being confronted with the 
ambiguity of their self-proclaimed authority to give pointers to the French on 
decolonisation. As the leaders of a state established upon the imposed legitimacy 
of British sovereignty over Australia, they did not enjoy a position of moral 
superiority over the French on colonial matters. 
Similar arguments could be applied to New Zealand in the 1980s. The 
legacy of British colonialism there was far from being resolved. State 
recognition of Maori claims to land and other natural resources under the Treaty 
of Waitangi represented one of the major political issues of the decade. Maori 
language and culture had been in decline until the 1970s, due to the dominance 
of English culture. Only belatedly was recognition given to indigenous culture 
by the state education system. Lange and other Pakeha New Zealand 
Government Ministers were as much the leaders of a state founded on an 
imposed legitimacy as their Australian counterparts were. The misfortune of the 
Caldoches perhaps, was not to have been as successful in eroding the identity of 
New Caledonian Melanesians as white Australians had been in marginalising the 
Aborigines, and New Zealand Pakeha were in culturally dominating the Maoris. 
That the nations of the South Pacific Forum were selective in their 
pronouncements on decolonisation provided further grounds for French 
observations of hypocrisy. In September 1988 Pierre Lellouche, then deputy 
director of the French Institute of International Relations, and an advisor to 
Chirac, asked why it was that Australia freely passed comment on the French in 
New Caledonia while hesitating to criticise Indonesian suppression of 
indigenous peoples such as the Melanesians of Irian Jaya, and the East 
Timorese.71 Australian Governments have repeatedly avoided confronting 
Indonesia over its atrocious human rights record, and have failed to support the 
decolonisation claims of East Timorese nationalists since the Indonesian 
invasion of their nation in 1975.72 Australian unwillingness to aggravate a large, 
undemocratic, occasionally aggressive state is related to fears that such action 
could provoke border tensions, lead to a loss of Australian trade, and hinder 
developing wider Australian links with Asia. Lellouche rightly pointed out the 
selective morality of the Australian Government. Expressions of support for 
Melanesian nationalism by Papua New Guinea have also involved selective 
morality. Compared to its comments condemning French treatment of the PI and 
later the FLNKS in New Caledonia, Port Moresby has been reluctant to 
condemn the situation of Melanesians in Irian Jaya. Papua New Guinea does not 
wish to aggravate border tensions with Indonesia.73 
The South Pacific Forum in general could be accused of selective 
morality over its willingness since the 1980s to pass judgement on French 
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domestic policy in New Caledonia. Far more restraint was demonstrated by the 
Forum when certain of its own members were confronted with internal unrest 
stemming from ethnic divisions and undemocratic responses to them. The 
Forum avoided criticising the Fijian coups by Rabuka in 1987,74 and has been 
hesitant to embroil itself in the problems experienced by Papua New Guinea 
with nationalists on the island of Bougainville since 1989, even when that 
conflict spread to border clashes with the Solomon Islands.75 A major barrier to 
the arbitration of the internal and international disputes over Bougainville has 
been the insistence of Port Moresby that the confict was an internal matter.76 
Thus Papua New Guinea adopted an argument which had been voiced by France 
over New Caledonia. Cautious to preserve its unity, the Forum has been more 
willing to embroil itself in France's domestic problems in the Pacific TOM than 
in the internal unrest of its own members. 
The Forum Mobilises 
The previous section established the differing attitudes of French and 
South Pacific governments concerning the adherence of the Pacific TOM to the 
Fifth RepubHc. Although France rejected claims by the Forum and its members 
expressing support for the decolonisation of New Caledonia and, more rarely, 
French Polynesia, from the late 1970s till 1988 it was largely unpersuasive in 
deflecting such regional commentary. In this and the following section the 
course of French diplomatic efforts to justify and explain French sovereignty 
over the Pacific TOM in the face of regional opposition is charted. Through this 
examination, the extent to which the question of decolonisation affected French 
foreign relations in the South Pacific is assessed. 
As decolonisation was an issue raised by South Pacific leaders at the 
prompting of indigenous nationalists in the French Pacific, preliminary attention 
must accordingly be devoted to wider regional policy on decolonisation so as to 
understand the context of debate between the South Pacific Forum and Paris. 
While the French defence of the Republic's sovereignty over the Pacific TOM 
was motivated by a concern for constitutional demands, by an unWillingness to 
act against local electoral majorities opposed to independence, and by the 
maintenance of ilc; standing as a global power into the twenty-first century, 
South Pacific leaders exhibited contrary political predilections stemming from a 
different political culture. With the exception of Vanuatu leaders, independent 
governments in the region in the 1980s had had neither prior experience with, 
nor could plausibly claim any great understanding of, French democratic 
institutions. 
For example, Hayden unrealistically suggested in January 1982 that the 
Mauroy Government should "declare a firm target date for independence -
preferably one within five years - just as quickly as possible".77 In the absence 
of majority support for this option among the New Caledonian electorate, the 
Mauroy Government could not do this. Hayden was either blase about, or 
ignorant of, the French constitutional dimension as well as the New Caledonian 
electoral dimension. He described the argument that the minority status of 
Kanaks prevented such a declaration as "spurious". He incorrectly asserted that 
by the end of the 1980s Melanesians would once again represent a majority of 
the territorial popUlation, and might as well be given independence sooner than 
tater.7S This argument was in itself spurious, as Melanesian population increase 
in the 1980s would not affect voting patterns until the late 1990s or the 2000s, 
when the new generation would attain voting age, and by that time there would 
be no guarantee they would all be adherents to the cause of Kanak nationalism. 
Hayden also downplayed the importance of those he described as "French 
settlers", whom he said should "acknowledge the Kanak people's rights to 
determine the future of their own country" .79 This prospect was as likely as that 
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of white Australian settlers unconditionally surrendering their interests to 
Aboriginal nationalism. 
The political cultures South Pacific politicians had inherited from their 
colonial pasts had been derived from British democratic values, which placed 
less store than French democracy in the observation of a formal written 
constitution. Regional leaders were ill-equipped to comprehend the French 
concern to observe constitutional demands over the matter of self-detennination 
and. as in Hayden's case, were unrealistic or ill-informed in their assessment of 
certain political realities in the Pacific TOM. Again. with the exception of 
Vanuatu, their experience of British de co Ionisation compounded their 
incomprehension. Apart from Pitcairn Island. Britain had willingly ceded 
sovereignty to its possessions in the South Pacific, both because it no longer 
desired to assume the expense of their maintenance, and because local political 
leaders in each of these domains had been amenable to this evolution. 
Regardless of the important difference that no such conjunction of 
interests existed in the case of the French Pacific, Anglophone politicians in the 
South Pacific assumed. consciously or unconsciously, that the British 
decolonisation scenario would be applicable there. Their assumption 
underestimated the preparedness of Paris to maintain its control of its remaining 
global possessions, as well as overestimating the strength of indigenous 
nationalism in the Pacific TOM. And while the leaders of Vanuatu understood all 
too well the priorities of French political values, and French resistance to 
decolonisation, for them French preoccupations were deemed to be of lesser 
significance than pan-Melanesian solidarity with New Caledonia's Kanaks. 
Because of their own experiences of decolonisation, member states of 
the South Pacific Forum imagined that France would shortly follow the British 
example. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, French decolonisation of the South 
Pacific was considered by various regional leaders to be an historical 
inevitability. In 1979 Tom Davis, the Cook Islands Premier, optimistically 
predicted the total decolonisation of the South Pacific by 1985.80 This was a tall 
order. Setting aside the French Pacific TOM, there was no indication in 1979, 
and there has been none since, that the United States was prepared to decolonise 
American Samoa, that Britain was cutting ties with Pitcairn Island, that Chile 
was prepared to renounce possession of Easter Island, that Australia intended to 
grant independence to Norfolk Island, or that New Zealand would abandon the 
Chatham Islands. 
Regardless of the consideration that none of the other colonial powers in 
the South Pacific intended to renounce their island possessions in' order to 
follow the British precedent, the idee fixe that France was on the verge of 
decolonising was expressed by the most conservative leaders in the Forum. 
Although Muldoon reacted unfavorably to suggestions that the Forum should 
lend immediate backing to Kanak nationalist claims, he portrayed French 
regional decolonisation as ultimately being ineluctable. At the South Pacific 
Forum held at Honiara in July 1979, he refused to back a motion tabled by 
Papua New Guinea calling for France to organise self-determination votes in 
French Polynesia and New Caledonia.81 At the Port Vila South Pacific Forum in, 
August 1981, Muldoon only reluctantly went along with the majority support for 
a statement backing New Caledonian independence, thinking the motion was 
peripheral to the interests of the body. 82 After a meeting in February 1983 with 
Muldoon in Wellington. Tjibaou, who had asked for New Zealand support for 
the Fl, said of Muldoon: "Ie Ie pensais defavorable a la revendication [kanake] 
de I'independance. "83 Notwithstanding his reluctance to have the Forum support 
indigenous nationalism in the Pacific TOM, Muldoon had declared in July 1979 
that he thought the French Pacific would be decolonised by the year 2000.84 In 
May 1981, he told New Zealand journalists that Mitterrand would accelerate 
what Muldoon had perceived as the process of French decolonisation in the 
Pacific that had supposedly been set in motion by the Franco-British withdrawal 
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from the New Hebrides.85 Mitterrand informed Muldoon to the contrary at their 
meeting in Paris on 17 June 1981. that he had no intention of organising self-
determination referenda in the Pacific TOM.86 There had been no indication in 
territorial elections in the late 1970s that pro-independence support approaching 
that of an absolute majority of local electorates ex.isted in any of the French 
TOM. 
In spite of his conservatism on decolonisation issues, Muldoon 
subscribed to the theory that one day French decolonisation would occur. His 
successor was more fervent in this assumption. Just after his visit to New 
Caledonia from 6 to 7 October 1984, Lange conjectured confidently to the 
House of Representatives in Wellington: "That territory will be independent in a 
relatively short time".87 In May 1986, heedless of evidence that the opposite 
might be the case, Lange described New Caledonian independence as "an 
irresistible tide lt • 88 By that time, the New Zealand Labour Government held that 
independence should be granted as soon as possible, but did not go so far as to 
recognise Kanak primacy in the manner that Vanuatu did.89 The advocacy of 
indigenous rights above those of immigrants in New Caledonia would have been 
an undemocratic position difficult for the Lange Government to justify. As the 
authority of Lange's administration rested on a political system founded on the 
imposition of British colonialism, at the ex.pense of Maori identity, such an 
undemocratic, pro-indigenous stance would have led to uneasy repercussions on 
the New Zealand domestic political scene. Since the independence of Vanuatu, 
Lini had pushed for Kanak sovereignty in New Caledonia, in accordance with 
the demands of the FI and later the FLNKS.90 
Like Vanuatu since 1980, the South Pacific Forum at the height of its 
support for the FLNKS from 1985 to 1988 was less interested in the minority 
level of territorial support for Kanak nationalism than in the unconditional 
recognition of Kanak demands for self-determination. This outlook was 
fonnulated in fulfilment of a collective assumption that regional decolonisation 
was inevitable, and that. as a part of that assumed trend, Kanak independence 
was both practicable and just. This position was prefigured by the Forum 
communique issued in July 1979: 
Noting the desire of Paci fic Island peoples, including those in the French 
territories, to determine their own future. the Forum reaffirmed its belief in the 
principle of self-determination and independence applyiny to all Pacific Island 
peoples in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.9 
This motion was a moderated version of the original text proposed by Papua 
New Guinea, which specifically targeted the French Pacific, and was consistent 
with FI demands at the meeting. The term" all Pacific Islands peoples" went 
beyond reference to indigenous peoples due to the reservations of Australian, 
New Zealand and Fijian representatives. They could not adopt unqualified 
support for indigenous nationalism because non-indigenous inhabitants 
constituted absolute demographic majorities in Australia, New Zealand and Fiji. 
That decolonisation issues were being discussed at the Forum in 1979 
was partially attributable to the question of the impending independence of the 
New Hebrides. Yann Celene Uregei, Naisseline and Tjibaou attended the Forum 
meeting to remind its members that the VP was not the only Melanesian party 
seeking independence from France. Before the meeting, a petition signed by 
leaders of the UC, Palika, the PSC, the UPM and FULK had been sent to the 
member delegations· in Honiara. It asked the Forum to petition the UN 
decolonisation committee92 to list New Caledonia as a non-self-governing 
territory.93 Such a UN move would have been of considerable assistance to the 
Fl. It would have given international recognition to the political agenda of the 
Front and would have placed pressure on France to respond to FI calls for self-
determination. Like the FI, the FLNKS canvassed Forum members for support. 
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After the foundation of the FLNKS in September 1984, Tjibaou made visits to 
Vanuatu, while Uregei, as his foreign minister, extensively toured the South 
Pacific soliciting support. Foreign recognition of the Kanak cause was 
considered by the FLNKS to be of great importance for the achievement of 
independence. In its founding charter it made "un appel aux Peuples freres du 
Pacifique [ ... J pour apporter leur soutien et leur aide a la lutte du Peuple 
Kanak. "94 The Hienghene congress of the FLNKS in May 1985 reiterated the 
earlier demands of the PI that the South Pacific Forum take its case to the UN.95 
The Forum resisted demands for this step until 1986, although it did 
directly lobby Paris over New Caledonia. On 13 March 1982 Mara led a 
delegation to Paris to press the issues of New Caledonian and French 
Polynesian self-determination. Mitterrand indicated that reforms were under way 
in response to Kanak demands. At the Rotorua meeting of the -South Pacific 
Forum on 10 August 1982, Mara recommended that its members should 
constructively encourage steps toward decolonisation in New Caledonia by 
allowing the Socialist Government time to undertake the necessary reforms to 
this end.96 The Forum outlined this position in its official communique, where it 
stated that it "urges the French Government to work closely with the Kanak 
people of New Caledonia in formulating a political programme for a peaceful 
transition to independence".97 This 'wait and see' attitude persisted until the 
Forum's meeting in 1986. Forum communiques in 1983, 1984 and 1985 backed 
Socialist reforms and the shortening of the self-determination timetable in the 
declared belief that independence was becoming a more likely prospect. While 
Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea were enthusiastic to offer 
more vigorous Forum support to the political agenda of their fellow Melanesians 
in New Caledonia through UN lobbying, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji were 
reluctant to lend their backing. Like Suva, Canberra and Wellington were 
confident that under Mitterrand a solution would be found to New Caledonian 
tensions without the need to resort to UN lobbying. Australia supported the 
New Caledonian reforms of Emanuelli,98 Lemoine99 and Pisani. tOO So too did 
FijilOI and New Zealand. 102 The position of these three countries was pivotal as 
they were the only Forum members with large enough diplomatic corps to 
effectively lobby UN members for a vote on the territory. The commitment of 
Australia, New Zealand and Fiji was also necessary for the maintenance of a 
platform of consensual agreement in the Forum. 
Giraud, while in Australia in February 1988, accused the Labor 
Government of leading the South Pacific Forum's UN campaign over New 
Caledonia. He said the Chirac Government was "very much shocked that 
Australia was really leading an anti-French game in the UN corridors" and that 
its members could not understand "why Australia has been so active at the UN 
to bring on the international scene a delicate issue which we consider to be 
essentially internal",103 Australia and New Zealand were not the originators of 
Forum support for New Caledonian decolonisation, although by 1986 they had 
inevitably become the ringleaders of this campaign. The Solomon Islands, 
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu were the most vigorous supporters of Kanak 
nationalism at the Forum, but lacked the means to present New Caledonia's case 
effectively at the UN. The desire of Papua New Guinea to see the issue 
presented at the UN has already been noted, as has Vanuatu's close support for 
the positions of the PI and FLNKS. The Solomon Islands shared their positions 
on Kanak independence,104 which were substantially different from the 
moderate stance of Fiji. In 1985 Mara declared that the concept of Kanak 
independence in New Caledonia was contrary to the multiracial principles that 
Fiji had been founded on.105 After the Forum resolved in 1986 to take action at 
the UN, as founding members of the UN with extensive diplomatic networks, 
Australia and New Zealand conducted the bulk of Forum lobbying, along with 
Fiji, which happened to be on the UN decolonisation committee at the time. It 
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was this predominant Australian and New Zealand role in lobbying which 
aroused the ire of the Chirac Government. 
A lack of Australian, New Zealand and Fijian confidence in the Chirac 
Government enabled the Forum's change of heart about going to the UN. This 
shift instance was adopted officially at the meeting of the South Pacific Forum 
held in Suva from 8 to 11 August 1986. There Australia, New Zealand and Fiji 
abandoned support for French Government reforms. The Hawke Government 
was troubled by the appointment of Chirac. In May and in August 1986 Hayden 
had declared the Australian rejection of Pons's reform plans for New Caledonia, 
stating that the centralisation they envisaged was a retrograde step that would be 
antagonistic to Kanaks. 106 In August, Hawke warned Chirac that he was 
embarking on a dangerous, divisive course.1 07 Lange shared Hawke's 
position,IOS while since the advent of Chirac, Mara had changed his mind about 
non-interference in New Caledonian affairs.109 By 11 August 1986 all of the 
Forum's members except the Cook Islands were in favour of taking the New 
Caledonian case to the UN. Davis, who had arrived at the meeting just after 
holding discussions with Chirac on French assistance to the Cook Islands, at 
frrst suggested that the new administration in Paris be given the chance to prove 
itself. Other Forum members were unconvinced.110 
The Forum communique declared: 
While the Forum acknowledged that there were some positive aspects to the 
approach of the new French Government they did not, in its view, adequately 
recognise the aspirations of the Kanak people. In particular it noted that 
whereas the previous Government had appeared committed to a form of 
independence for New Caledonia the new Government appeared committed to 
New Caledonia remaining a territory of France. [ ... J the change in French 
policy towards New Caledonia over the previous year was a significant 
backward step. I II 
Here the Forum simplified and possibly misread the positions of both the Fabius 
and the Chirac Governments. Under the self-determination conditions projected 
by the Fabius Government in 1985 it was by no means certain that New 
Caledonia would have attained independence in association with France. As the 
Chirac Government had not gone back on the previous administration's 
commitment to a self-determination vote, and as the conditions of that vote had 
at that stage not been finalised, it was perhaps premature to state that a 
significant backward step had taken place in the recognising the aspirations of 
the Kanak people. 
It is significant that this Forum communique, unlike that of 1979, had an 
ethnic bias. "All Pacific Island peoples" had been succeeded by specific 
recognition of "the Kanak people", tacitly considered to be one and indivisible. 
In this regard, at the insistence of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and 
of Vanuatu, the South Pacific Forum had adopted the definition of the FLNKS. 
The past democratic concerns of Australia, New Zealand and Fiji were 
overridden. Although the Forum communique had earlier announced its concern 
for "the rights and interests of all inhabitants"112 in New Caledonia, the 
reference to "the Kanak people" in the resolution demonstrated bias toward the 
Kanak section of the population. The declaration of August 1986 went on to 
announce that the Forum had decided to request the rein scription of New 
Caledonia on the UN list of non-self-governing territories, to ensure that the UN 
would monitor the situation there. 
On 2 October 1986, Fiji informed the UN decolonisation committee of 
the Forum decision to pursue New Caledonia's case.113 The status of New 
Caledonia was special, in that it had already been on the list of non-self-
governing territories. Although it was one of 74 such territories on the UN's 
frrst decolonisation list in 1946, the Fourth Republic had signalled its refusal to 
transmit information about New Caledonia since 1947, thus resulting in a lapsed 
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status. Governments of the Fifth Republic maintained their predecessors' 
position that New Caledonia, as a TOM, was an integral part of France with a 
large degree of self-administration which excluded it from qualifying for the UN 
list. 1 14 
On 2 December 1986, a motion was tabled at the UN General Assembly. 
It stated that New Caledonia qualified as a non-self-governing territory, that 
France was obliged to transmit information on New Caledonia to the UN and 
should cooperate with the UN decolonisation committee to this end, and 
announced the inalienable right of the New Caledonian people to independence. 
Here the UN resolution differed from the Forum communique of August 1986, 
which had accorded recognition to the rights of "the Kanak people". Kanak 
identity was thus subsumed by recognition of a larger group in the UN motion. 
The item, listed as General Assembly resolution 41/4IA, was adopted with 89 
votes for, 24 against and 34 abstentions. lIS Among those in favour were 
Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu, the only Forum members with UN representation. France voted 
against, as did several of its former African colonies such as Chad, the 
Comoros, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Togo. It 
was asserted by Forum members at the UN that France had attempted to 
influence its former colonies on the vote. If this was the case it was not 
universally successful. Certain former French possessions voted for the motion: 
notably Algeria, Kampuchea, Laos, Madagascar and Vietnam. Others abstained, 
such as the Central African RepUblic, and Mali. Britain and the United States 
likewise abstained. As both countries retained overseas possessions from their 
days of colonial expansion, they were not prepared to call into question French 
sovereignty. Neither did they oppose the right of New Caledonians to accede to 
independence.116 
The reaction of the Chirac Government, as outlined by the Quai d'Orsay 
on 3 December, was a total refusal to accept the recommendations of the 
resolution. The French rejection of "ingerence" was similar to that which it had 
already declared to South Pacific governments: 
La France ne repondra pas favorablement aux demandes de renseignements 
rclatirs ~ la NouvclJc-Cal~donie ~manant du Comitt5 de docolonisation sux 
Nations unics et n'y donnera aucune suite [",J, La France n'acceptera pas non 
plus Is pr~sence de missions ni d'observateurs sur place. dans Ie but de 
surveiller Ie Mroulement du rM6rendum prevu [ ... ], On estime [ .. ,] que 
I'Assembl6e g6n6rale des Nations unies n'a pas ~ s'ing6rer dans les affaires 
interieures de la France d'autant [ .. ,J que c'est lila population cal6donienne qu'iI 
appartient de se prononcer sur son propre avenir, par voie de ref~rendum.ll1 
The UN vote had in no way sought to predetermine the choice of the New 
Caledonian electorate, even though those who tabled the motion were 
sympathetic to the FLNKS. The Quai d'Orsay's statement went on to downplay 
the importance of the UN vote, comparing it to a UN motion on the Falklands 
War, when against British claims 116 countries had backed Argentinian claims 
of sovereignty over those disputed islands. 
Paris refused to be influenced by the UN any more than by the South 
Pacific Forum, resting on its argument of non-interference and on its evident 
commitment to self-determination. French representatives at the UN indicated 
that as a democratic self-determination vote in New Caledonia was already being 
organised, the interest of the UN was superfluous. The Forum campaign at the 
UN was the most concerted effort it had made on the issue of New Caledonia's 
future; ultimately it achieved little in the face of a French refusal to comply. As 
was the case with nuclear issues, the South Pacific Forum members did not have 
the power necessary to force French compliance. None of the countries in the 
UN which backed the Forum qunpaign were prepared to take any more than 
paper and media action over New Caledonia, and it is unlikely they would have 
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gone any further. France, as one of the pennanent members of the UN Security 
Council, and as a G7 member, had too much influence in global affairs. The 
pro-independence lobbying of an electoral majority among the approximately 
63,000 Melanesians inhabiting an obscure group of islands in the South-West 
Pacific was not sufficient cause to arouse international interest to that extent. 
Nor was resolution 41/41A in itself an undertaking which furthered the 
cause of Kanak independence. The resolution placed New Caledonia within the 
context defined by chapter XI of the UN Charter, the declaration relative to non-
self-governing territories. This chapter declares the obligation of powers 
administering such territories to work to improve their prosperity and to develop 
their capacity for self-administration while taking into account the political 
aspirations of their inhabitants.1l8 This piece of text makes no reference to any 
obligation by the administering power to lead its non-self-governing territories to 
independence. France could claim to be in the process of fulfilling all of these 
stipulations quite adequately. Resolution 41/41A also made reference to UN 
General Assembly motion 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. Resolution 1514 
(XV) specified notably that all peoples have the right to self-detennination.119 
The question this item begs is whether the Kanaks of New Caledonia constituted 
a people and a people to the exclusion of other territorial groups. The Chirac 
Government maintained that they did not. Moreover, resolution 41/41A itself 
referred to "the people of New Caledonia" rather than specifically to Kanaks. 
The UN decolonisation committee had rejected the narrower emphasis of the 
South Pacific Forum on promoting the interests of the "Kanak people" as 
undemocratic and imprecise. Resolution 41/41A was of symbolic importance 
only, and did not constitute international diplomatic backing of FLNKS 
demands for Kanak independence. 
Although the Forum declaration of August 1986 on New Caledonian 
self-determination had expressed support for the priority of "the aspirations of 
the Kanak people", it did not specifically voice backing for Kanak sovereignty in 
answer to FLNKS calls for recognition. To the disappointment of Vanuatu, the 
Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, other Forum members such as 
Australia, New Zealand and Fjji were reluctant to promote Kanak independence 
explicitly and exclusively. A compromise of sorts was reached to account for the 
presence of other ethnic groups in New Caledonia. In August 1986 the Forum 
referred to Kanaks and "other peoples": 
It [the Forum] concluded that if the results of that plebiscite ruled out the 
prospect of independence, this was likely to exacerbate rather than resolve 
problems in the territory. It urged the French Government to give careful 
attention to the question of those eligible to vote, so that the result accurately 
reflected the aspirations of the Kanak and other peoples who had a long-term 
residence in and commitment to New Caledonia.120 
There was some slack logic involved in this proclamation. If the results of the 
self-detennination referendum ruled out the prospect of independence, it was 
precisely because they demonstrated the lack of majority electoral backing in 
New Caledonia for Kanak positions, thus clearly reflecting the aspirations of the 
"other peoples" who were present. 
The looseness of Forum thinking on the self-detennination referendum 
was to become more apparent as time passed. The Forum meeting of 29 to 30 
May 1987 in Apia reiterated the earlier position of the body on self-
detennination: 
The Forum once again expressed its firm support for an early and peaceful 
transition to an independent New Caledonia in accordance with the innate and 
active rights of the indigenous people and in a manner which guaranteed the 
rights and interests of all inhabitants of this multi-racial society.121 
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It was recommended that a self-determination vote should involve: "Inclusion in 
the franchise of only those who can demonstrate long term residence in and 
commitment to New Caledonia. It should ensure that the rights and interests of 
all inhabitants are guaranteed, with special recognition of Kanak rights. "122 This 
final condition loosely suggested some sort of special voting rights for Kanaks. 
This point clashed with the earlier stipulation that the transition to independence 
would guarantee the rights of "all inhabitants", unless one adheres to the 
Orwellian maxim that some are more equal than others. 
The Quai d'Orsay responded to the Forum position with reference to UN 
legislation. It indicated in October 1987 that a vote based on ethnic origin was 
incompatible with UN principles as well as with French constitutional practice, 
which demanded that such an exercise not be influenced by distinctions of race, 
belief or colour. It declared that the three-year residential qualification for local 
voter eligibility, introduced by Chirac in February 1987, satisfied considerations 
concerning long term residence, Normally under French law. only six months' 
residence was required for eligibility in an electoral consultation. The three year 
period was the same that had been used by France for the self-determination vote 
which led to the independence of Djibouti, an exercise which had been approved 
by the UN General Assembly.l23 To round off its tight argument, the Quai 
d'Orsay suggested that the self-determination referendum thus fulfilled UN 
conditions for a such a vote and was democratic. 
As well as being vague and confused in its logic. the demand of the 
South Pacific Forum was fundamentally unachievable. The Forum lambasted the 
Chirac Government for setting up a vote that the FLNKS could not win. 
heedless of the fact that if the vote were weighted to the advantage of Kanaks. it 
would violate French law and UN principles. and would doubtless lead to a 
backlash from French loyalists. It was highly improbable that, under the 
conditions the Forum wished established, France could have managed a 
"peaceful transition to an independent New Caledonia in accordance with the 
innate. active rights and aspiration of the indigenous people and in a manner 
which guaranteed the rights and interest of all inhabitants of this multi-racial 
society." The Forum might as well have asked the Chirac Government to square 
a circle. The Quai d'Orsay indicated the difficulties and contradictions involved 
in following Forum demands: 
La th~e reservant Ie droit de vote II une fraction de la popUlation, notamment 
sur une base ethnique, est ~videmmenl inacceptable. BIle remeltrail notamment 
en cause des principes fondamentaux comme ta non-discrimination et "a chacun 
une voix", Ce demier principe a ~te expresrement affinn~ par l'Assemblre 
generate dans Ie cas de Ia Rhod6sie du Sud. devenue Zimbabwe, (resolution 
1747 (XVI» et de Fidji (resolutions 1951 (XVIII) et 2068 (XX». 
Manifestement contra ire aux principes des Nations unies, t'idoo selon taquelJe ta 
pMnitude des droits potitiques devrait etre reserv~e a une partie seuJement de la 
population caledonienne est en outre dangereuse. ElJe peut etre source de 
violence et d'instabilit6. comme en temoignent certains developpements recents 
intervenus dans la region du Pacifique Sud.124 
For the French Government setting up a biased vote for Kanaks was 
unacceptable in that such an undertaking would have led to a constitutional 
crisis, and to civil disorder. The reference to recent developments in the South 
Pacific clearly alluded to events in Fiji. although specific mention was avoided to 
avoid antagonising Suva. In September 1987, Rabuka had established a Fijian 
Republic which enshrined the supremacy of the indigenous Fijian minority of 
the population. The Quai d'Orsay's resort to UN resolutions to back its case was 
somewhat hollow given its own rejection of that body's motion concerning New 
Caledonia, although the statement made a valid point in indicating the problems 
of a restricted vot~ excluding a large segment of New Caledonia's non-
indigenous voters. 
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The Forum kept pushing its demands through the UN as well as through 
its own declarations. On 17 March 1987, the UN decolonisation committee 
urged the French Government to undertake a New Caledonian self-determination 
referendum in accordance with UN principles and in cooperation with the 
committee.t 25 France rejected this for the reasons already outlined. Such 
cooperation would have been superfluous, and the self-determination vote 
organised by the Chirac Government fulfilled UN conditions. 
After the self-determination referendum of September 1987 reaffirmed 
the will of a majority of New Caledonian voters to stay with France, (Table 12) 
support for the Forum declined. On 28 October 1987, the UN General 
Assembly faiJed to approve a motion tabled by the decolonisation committee 
condemning the New Caledonian self-determination referendum. Of. 158 
countries. 43.67% backed the motion: 69 voted for, 27 against, 46 abstained 
and 15 failed to vote. 126 The support presented the previous December did not 
stretch to the extent of calling France to account over a democratic self-
determination vote. The international community did not lend majority backing 
to the assertion made by the FLNKS that the vote was unjust. On 4 December 
1987, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution reaffirming the right of 
the New Caledonian people to self-determination and independence. While this 
motion covered the same ground as resolution 41141A a year before, this time 
support had fallen by 20 votes: 69 countries were for the motion, 29 against and 
47 abstained. The South Pacific Forum no longer enjoyed the support of an 
absolute majority of the Assembly for its motion of generalised support for New 
Caledonian self-determination in consultation with the UN. 127 
The Quai d'Orsay pointed out this decline in backing in a communique 
released that day. Noting that 90 countries had refused to support the 
decolonisation committee, this outcome was taken as a sign of confidence in the 
actions of the Chirac Government: 
Le Gouvemement constate que la grande majorite des Etats ont ainsi pris en 
compte les faits essentiels que sont Ie referendum et l'adoption en cours dtun 
nouveau statut qui asslIrera I'alltonomie de gestion du territoire [Ie statut Pons], 
une representation equitable des differentes comrnunautes que l'histoire y a 
reunies et I'assoclatlon effective de la minorite h la gestion des affaires. Le 
Gouvemernent sten felicite et exprime l'espoir que les pays du Forum du 
Pacifique Sud respecteront desormais la volonte dtmocratiquernent exprimee par 
la majoritt de la population caledonienne et rtnonceront it leur entreprise.128 
This reading of the motive for the vote was open to question. The decline in 
international support for New Caledonian decolonisation could as plausibly be 
seen as a sign of lack of interest in an obscure and marginal matter in the wider 
scheme of global politics. The Forum had originally aroused support from 
various countries which assumed that New Caledonia was on the verge of 
independence. The self-determination vote proved otherwise. It is doubtful 
whether many of the countries which voted either for, against, or not at all, had 
any detailed conception of the political situation in the territory. still less of the 
import of the Regional Autonomy Statute being prepared by Pons. 
By the end of 1987 the internationalisation of political debate over New 
Caledonia had turned out to be inconclusive and unsatisfying for the FLNKS, 
for the South Pacific Forum, and for France. FLNKS efforts to gain 
international support feU short of a vigorous, unqualified recognition of Kanak 
sovereignty which would have served its cause better than the motions of 
general support for the self-determination rights of the New Caledonian people 
expressed by the UN. The lobbying of the South Pacific Forum had not induced 
a change in the New Caledonian policy of the Chirac Government. And for all of 
French representatives' efforts to rebutt the lobbying of South Pacific nations, 
and to outargue their adversaries' loose logic, they had demonstrated themselves 
incapable of dissuading these critics. Neither the cutting of ministerial relations 
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in the case of Australia, nor the logic of the French diplomatic corps, served to 
sway the regional conviction that New Caledonian independence would come 
and that regional states were justified in exercising their prerogatives on the 
matter. Whereas the position of the Chirac Government was that the self-
determination vote had settled the question of independence, it did not satisfy the 
South Pacific Forum, which continued calling into 1988 for a 'genuine' act of 
self-determination. It had been asserted at the May 1987 meeting of the Forum 
that the non-participation of the FLNKS invalidated the referendum.129 At the 
UN, Forum members continued opposing the result of the referendum on these 
grounds, stating that the vote had caused the situation in New Caledonia to 
deteriorate rather than improve. The worsening internal situation in the territory 
during the first months of 1988 was asserted by Forum members to represent 
vindication of regional claims. 
Although its initiatives had failed to influence the New Caledonian policy 
of the Chirac Government, and had not advanced the cause of New Caledonian 
independence, the South Pacific Forum showed no sign of abating its criticisms 
of French policy. To the contrary, regional comments became more intense at 
the time of the FLNKS active boycott of April and May 1988. Forum members 
expressed the opinion that FLNKS activism was the direct consequence of an 
administration in Paris insensitive to Kanak political demands. It was a valid 
assessment to the extent that Pons showed little regard for the Front following 
the self-determination vote. But equally, the FLNKS had shown little regard for 
the self-determination vote. Even had Pons wanted to appear conciliatory to the 
FLNKS, this was politically difficult for him in the face of the refusal of the 
Front to participate in new territorial institutions. 
Several members of the Forum issued individual statements objecting to 
Chirac's handling of the Ouvea incident. Although members of the FLNKS had 
initiated violence on Ouvea by killing four gendarmes at Fayaoue, France was 
portrayed as the aggressor by the PNG Government.130 Mara talked 
dismissively of French "gunboat diplomacy".131 Vanuatu concurred with these 
assessments and went a step further in organising a protest which disrupted the 
voting of French residents in the second round of the presidential elections on 8 
May. Barak Sope, the Immigration and Tourism Minister, padlocked the gate of 
the French Embassy in Port Vila in a demonstration of support for the FLNKS 
boycott. While around 200 protesters tried to prevent French nationals from 
entering to vote, many voters sneaked in through a side entrance.t32 From 
Wellington, Marshall made his aforementioned comparison to the Algerian 
War. 133 Hawke was more measured in his assessment, hoping that the FLNKS 
would renounce violence and that the French Government could open 
dialogue. 134 
The Matignon Accords 
By the time of the meeting of the South Pacific Forum in Tonga in 
September 1988, New Caledonian self-determination was not a major issue of 
debate. Criticism of French treatment of the New Caledonian portfolio had been 
replaced by praise for the new atmosphere of reconciliation installed by the 
Matignon Accords.135 The reintroduction of self-determination by the Accords, 
scheduled this time for 1998. had served to satisfy Forum demands regardless 
of the fact that the conditions involved were as unlikely to guarantee Kanak 
independence as the conditions of the 1987 vote. In the place of ill-reasoned 
opposition to French policy on New Caledonian self-determination, the Forum 
had substituted equally ill-reasoned support. The consequence was that from 
1988 New Caledonian policy became less of an obstacle to French regional 
diplomacy than it had been, although as the Forum has analysed the Accords 
more it has become more critical. 
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The departure of the Chirac Government in May 1988, the re-election of 
Mitterrand, and the negotiations which led to the signature of the Matignon 
Accords, allowed a calming of regional tempers over New Caledonia, and 
enabled the beginning of a period of more relaxed dialogue between France and 
the Forum over the territory. 
Nevertheless the willingness of the Solomon Islands, Papua New 
Guinea and Vanuatu to back Kanak self-determination above the interests of 
non-Kanaks did not diminish in the months following the signature of the 
Accords. Although he had sent letters to Rocard and Mitterrand congratulating 
them on their role in setting up the new territorial framework,136 Lini called in 
November 1988 for the immediate decolonisation of New Caledonia, and his VP 
Government maintained its backing ofFLNKS primacy.137 This position was at 
odds with the policy of the FLNKS at the time. By signing the Matignon 
Accords, the FLNKS had recognised French loyalists as partners in territorial 
development, and had deferred the issue of independence at least ten years. 
Since 1988 Vanuatu has been less vocal in its position over New Caledonia. 
This change has come partly out of concern to restore aid links with France, and 
partly because for Port Vila, as with the rest of the South Pacific Forum 
members, it was politically untenable to make vehement statements about the 
malevolent influence of French colonialism in New Caledonia when the FLNKS 
was working in cooperation with French institutions there. As is shown in the 
next chapter, the period of the Matignon Accords. along with the arrival of a 
new Vanuatu Government in December 1991, coincided with the improvement 
of aid relations between Paris and Port Vila. 
The Hawke Government declared its relief that Mitterrand had been re-
elected so that the Socialists could sort out New Caledonia, and was united with 
the Lange Government in approving the signature of the Matignon Accords.138 
The time of marked temperamental differences based on party political 
divergences between Paris, and Canberra and Wellington came to an end. The 
end of civil disorder in New Caledonia for the time being removed Australasian 
worries about the decline of regional security. 
Changed Franco-Australian attitudes were perceptible during the visit to 
New Caledonia from 14 to 15 September 1988 by Gareth Evans. the Australian 
Foreign Minister. Among his entourage was Dauth, serving as a ministerial 
adviser, whose presence aroused no official protests in spite of his controversial 
departure from Noumea the year before,139 The visit was hailed by Bernard 
Grasset, the local High Commissioner, as a sign of Franco-Australian 
reconciliation over New Caledonia. Ukeiwe expressed on the RPCR's behalf the 
hope that past differences would not be renewed. Both. declared their 
preparedness to cooperate with Australia to improve trade and cooperation links 
with New Caledonia.l40 By February 1992, Evans had visited the territory four 
times in an effort to diversify Franco-Australian cooperation,141 showing greater 
interest in the territory than his predecessors. The removal in February 1992 of 
trade barriers affecting Australian exports to New Caledonia marked just one of 
the signs of improved relations between Noumea and Canberra.142 Hawke made 
an effort to improve relations with New Caledonia too. Breaking a remarkable 
symbol of Australian indifference towards New Caledonia, from 27 to 28 July 
1989 he paid the first visit to the territory by an Australian Prime Minister since 
1941. Hawke congratulated France's progress in New Caledonia with the 
Matignon Accords, and stated his support for greater bilateral trade and 
cooperation. 143 
Following the signature of the Accords Franco-New Zealand relations 
similarly improVed. On 30 Apri11989, Marshall arrived in Noumea and praised 
the Accords. IM Grasset and Marshall resolved to organise student exchanges 
between New Caledonia and New Zealand. The installation of a National 
Government in Wellington from November 1990 calmed the situation further. 
Bolger had disagreed with commentaries made on New Caledonia by Labour 
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Governments, concurring with the French position that the situation in the 
territory was an internal matter. He had responded negatively to comments made 
by Lange during the Ouvea incident.145 Bolger's Foreign Minister, Don 
McKinnon, arrived in New Caledonia for a tour from 21 to 24 November 1991. 
McKinnon announced a different New Zealand response to territorial politics: 
"Contrairement au gouvernement d'avant [Ie gouvernement travailliste]. nous ne 
vous dirons pas ce que vous devez faire". McKinnon said he would not make 
pronouncements on the question of independence. and that the Bolger 
Government would not push the issue at the South Pacific Forum.146 This 
stance was a major change from the days ofthe Lange Government, when New 
Zealand had ventured to ask France to annull the self-determination referendum 
of 1987.147 McKinnon was enthusiastic about the improvement of New Zealand 
contacts with New Caledonia, placing emphasis on the libetalisation and 
expansion of bilateral trade.l48 The days when Wellington, along with 
Canberra, had been considered the ringleaders of a campaign to push France out 
of the South Pacific, were now clearly over. The two most developed nations of 
the region were prepared to respond to French efforts at regional integration 
under the Accords, a trend which was applicable to New Caledonia's nascent 
relations with the island states. As is discussed in chapter 8. the Matignon 
Accords spurred French regional cooperation. 
Since 1988, with some reservations from Melanesian member countries, 
the South Pacific Forum has expressed encouragement of the Matignon 
Accords, and has declared its support for development work taking place under 
them.149 The Forum responded positively to the Rocard Government's aim to 
encourage territorial trade and development cooperation with the nations of the 
South Pacific. In other respects, however~ differences which separated France 
from the Forum over New Caledonia have not been eliminated by the Matignon 
Accords. 
The Forum has continued issuing advice to France on how it should 
conduct itself. The 1991 and 1992 Forum communiques, for example. urged 
Paris to expand its education and training assistance to Kanaks, and advised it 
on how the 1998 self-determination referendum should be run. I50 The Forum 
has maintained its call on France to permit visits by UN missions to New 
Caledonia, in line with UN resolution 41/41A. Whatever doubts might have 
subsisted about the forum's claim that the transition to independence should 
take into account the interests of all the communities in New Caledonia were 
dispelled by its statement of July 1991. This declaration mentioned that the 
Forum "offered to assist the FLNKS in developing a programme of action for 
ensuring that their [sic] objectives were met through the Matignon Accords. It 
further agreed to the establishment of a fund to assist with the training of Kanaks 
within and outside the region to be administered by the [Forum] Secretariat".151 
Since 1988. the FLNKS has not publicly disavowed its advocacy of Kanak 
sovereignty, meaning that the above statement offers direct Forum support for 
Kanak-led independence. Interestingly, as a Forum member New Zealand 
supported this statement, which appeared to contradict the claim made by 
McKinnon in Noumea in November 1991. In 1991 the Bolger Government was 
simultaneously trying to be conciliatory to France and to Melanesian nations in 
the Forum. 
Under the Fabius or Chirac Governments. such a Forum declaration 
would have received an outraged response from the Quai d'Orsay about 
intolerable interference in French internal politics. Such sentiment still exists in 
Paris, although objections to Forum commentary on, and involvement in, New 
Caledonian affairs have not been as strenuous. As might be expected. French 
Governments since 1988 have been happy to see regional governments make 
positive comments about New Caledonian policy, even though such comments 
too could strictly be seen as an,aspect of foreign meddling in domestic affairs. 
There was a time when the Forum's Kanak training fund might have been 
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perceived, in the same way as Australian aid administered by Dauth, as 
interference in domestic affairs. This attitude had been discarded. No complaints 
were made about the training fund, which was in operation by 1992,152 as it 
was seen by Paris to be in harmony with the spirit of Kanak integration 
promoted by the Accords. 
Certain limits remain. Under the Matignon Accords, France has 
maintained its refusal of any UN involvement. Forum calls to permit UN 
monitoring teams to visit New Caledonia during the lead up to the self-
determination referendum of 1998 have been rejected. The stance of Paris over 
this matter has been in line with arguments previously put forth about the 
superfluousness of such assistance. After the Forum reiterated this call at its 
meeting on Nauru on 11 August 1993 Jacques Le Blanc, the Permanent 
Secretary to the South Pacific, rejected the demand: "we [France] don't accept 
any foreign intervention. especially from the United Nations, since self-
determination is exactly what the UN is looking for" .153 
With regard to visits to New Caledonia by Forum delegations, French 
authorities have been more flexible than might be presumed from Le Blanc's 
comment. Rocard rejected a Forum application in 1990 to allow members of its 
Ministerial Committee on New Caledonia to visit the territory to monitor the 
Accords, on the grounds that this constituted interference in internal affairs.1S4 
However, after FLNKS prompting, two members of the Ministerial Committee. 
the Fijian Trade Minister Berenado Vunibobo and the Solomons Foreign 
Minister, Sir Peter Kenilorea, were eventually allowed to tour New Caledonia 
from 13 to 22 July 1991 on the understanding that they did not refer to 
themselves as a monitoring team. This subterfuge could not conceal the fact that 
the pair did in fact constitute a monitoring team, which travelled around the 
provinces reviewing developments under the Accords, and later submitted a 
report of its findings to the Forum meeting at Pohnpei.155 Paris in addition 
permitted leremia Tabai, the Secretary-General of the South Pacific Forum, to 
visit New Caledonia in August 1992 to hold discussions with the partners in the 
Matignon Accords and to view their progress. The visit was hailed by RPCR 
leaders, and by officials from the High Commission, as an indication of the 
degree to which a rapprochement had taken place between France and the Forum 
over New Caledonia.156 
Early indications suggest that the appointment of the Balladur 
Government and the commencement of a second period of cohabitation is not 
going to cause a souring of relations between Paris and the Forum. During a 
stop in Suva on 18 June 1993, on his first tour of the Pacific TOM as Minister to 
the DaM-TOM, Dominique Perben stated French willingness to maintain 
contacts and cooperation established between New Caledonia and the Forum. 
After a meeting with Perben at the offices of the Forum Secretariat in Suva, 
Tabai was globally positive about Franco-Forum entente over New Caledonia: "I 
reiterated to the Minister the Forum's support for the Matignon Accords and its 
gratification that all parties are committed to accelerating economic and social 
progress under the accords. The Minister assured me of the French 
Government's continuing commitment to the process."l57 
That the relaxing French attitude to the South Pacific Forum had not been 
reversed by the installation of the BaUadur Government was further 
demonstrated in July 1993. Just before the South Pacific Forum meeting held on 
Nauru in August, a full Forum delegation was permitted to travel around New 
Caledonia to gather material for its annual report. The Ministerial Delegation on 
New Caledonia was led by Francis Saemala, the Solomon Islands Foreign 
Minister. He was accompanied by Ratu Jo Nacola. the Fijian Minister for 
Women, Culture, Social Welfare and Multiethnic Affairs. Vinsen Detanamo, the 
Nauruan Minister of Public Works, and Willie Star, a Nauruan 
parliamentarian. 15S This time there was no pretence that the party was not an 
official delegation. 
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By 1993, the question of decolonisation, like nuclear issues, no longer 
represented the hindrance to French relations with the states of the South Pacific 
that it had in the 1980s. As long as the FLNKS and the RPCR adhere to the 
Matignon Accords. these cordial foreign relations should remain intact. While 
the South Pacific Forum has expressed certain misgivings about French 
unwillingness to cooperate with the UN in the self-determination vote scheduled 
for 1998, and has urged that greater efforts be made to improve the lot of 
Kanaks, it has nevertheless welcomed the Matignon Accords as a positive, 
peaceful response to the future of New Caledonia 
318 
Notes 
I "Reception a la mairie de Christchurch (30 avril 1991). Allocution de M. Michel Rocard, 
Premier ministre." Photocopied speech notes p.l. 
2 "La communaute melanesienne, originaire du territoire de Nouvelle-Caledonie, premiere 
victime des desequilibres issus de la colonisation". Rocard's letter to Mitterrand, in Republique 
fram;aise: Referendum dll 6 novembre /988 sllr la NOllvelle-CalMonie p.l. 
3 For example, in September 1982, Chirac referred to the Mauroy Government's New 
Caledonian reforms as "[l'Jincarnation d'un colonialisme perime". Le Monde 4 septembre 1982. 
4 The Press 10 October 1990; Pacnews 19 October 1990. 
5 See the beginning of chapter 5. 
610. Questions ecrites de l'Assemb/ee Nationale 5 novembre 1984 pA885. . 
7 With Jean-Marie Tjibaou's status as Mayor of Hienghene in mind Jean-Loup Vivier, a 
metropolitan French commentator, observed of the FLNKS: "11 convient de s'etonner en 
premier lieu de ce que les membres d'un gouvernement provisoire inclependantiste participent 
aux institutions coloniales qu'ils pretendent combattre: imagine-t-on Ho Chi-Minh maire de 
Hanoi" sous la IVe Republique?" Jean-Loup Vivier: Mon chemin avec Ie FLNKS p.53. Vivier 
worked as a lawyer for members of the FLNKS in the late 1980s. 
8 ARLR: La NOllvelle-CaIMollie: la strategie, Ie droit et la Repub/ique pxn. 
9 Haut-Commiss!!r-i!!t de I!! Republique tbns I'Ocean Pacifique: Argumelltaire relatif a la 
presellce de la Frallce ell Nmll'elle-CaIMonie p.l. 
10 10. De/mts de l'Assemhlee Nationale. Questio1ls ecrites 30 novembre 1981 p.3450. 
11 Christnacht: La Nouvelle-CalMonie p.64. 
12 Le Qllotidiell de Paris 18 !!vril 1985 cited in Coutau-Begarie & Seurin: La Nouvelle-
CalMonie. Les antipodes de la dbllocratie p.198. 
13 Le Monde 13-14 janvier 1985. 
14 Ibid. 7-8 avril 19'85,9 avril 1985. 
IS Ibid. 5 avril 1985. 
16 Aldrich & Connell: France's Ol'erseas Fmntierp.207. 
17 Jean-Christophe Victor: "France in the Pacific" in The Pacific Review vol.3 noA 1990 
p.346. 
I R 1,401,229t of 1,443,908t. Christnacht: La NOlIl'elle-CalMonie p.90. 
19 H!!ut-Commissariat de I!! Republique dans l'OCe!!n Pacifique: Argumentaire relatif a la 
"re.W:'IIce de la Frallce ell Nouvelle-CnlMollie p.lO. 
20 Victor: "France in the P!!cific" p.345. 
21 Jacques Marseille: Empire coloninl et capitafisme franrais. Histoire d'un divorce pAl. 
22 Ibid. p.31. 
23 J!!cques Marseille: "Ces colonies qui appauvrissaient la France" in L'Evenement du jeudi 15-
21 avril 1993 p.52. 
24 10. Questions ecrites de I'Assemblee Nationale 5 novembre 1984 pA885. 
25 The beginning of the official statement issued by the Minister's office said: "The Minister 
for Foreign Affairs [ ... J said today that New Caledonia represented one of the last vestiges of 
colonialism in the South. Pacific. Australia strongly supports the principle of self-
determination and would like to see New Caledonia join the community of the South Pacific 
countries as soon as is realistically possible." Australian Foreign Affairs Record November 
1984 p.1259. 
26 "Communique tlu ministere des relations exterieures en date du 29 novembre 1984 sur la 
convocation de I'ambass!!deur d'Australie a propos de la situation en Nouvel\e-CaJedonie" in 
BJPA green fjle 001 184842931700; LiberatiOll29 novembre 1984. 
27 Australia" Foreign Affairs Record April 1985 p.345. In December 1984 Jean Cherioux, an 
RPR Senator for Paris, resigned from the Franco-Australian Friendship Group, of which he 
was Vice-President, decl!!ring his outmge at H!!yden's comments, which were described as 
constituting an "ingerence inadmissible" in French affairs. Le Monde ler decembre 1984. 
28 The Press 30 April 1988; Le Monde 30 avril 1988. 
29 "Si vous [Chirac] persistez dans la repression, vous vous acheminez vers un conflit sanglant 
et plein d'amertume qui pourrait aboutir non seulement a un carnage, mais aussi a une situation 
ou des gens pourraient etre contraints de quitter [1a Nouvel1e-CaledonieJ." Les Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 2 mai 1988; Le Monde 2 mai 1988. It should be noted that in the 1950s 
Australia and New Zealand had supported France rather than Algerian nationalists during the 
319 
period of nationalist struggle in French Algeria: Pierre Chaussan: "La France dans Ie Pacifique" 
in Defense nationale vol. 34 juillet 1978 p.76. 
30 "Les dernieres declarations de M. Marshall concernant la Nouvelle-Ca16donie constituent une 
ingerence intolerable dans les affaires interieures fran<;;aises." "Communique du ministere des 
affaires etrangeres en date du 2 mai 1988 sur les positions neo-zelandaises sur la NouvelJe-
CaJedonie" in BIPA green file 002 262 882009700. 
31 Le Monde ler decembre 1984. 
32 Les Nouvelles Catedofliennes 12 octobre 1987. 
33 L'amree politique, ecollomique et sociale en France 1987 p.60; Liberation 27 aofit 1987; Le 
Monde 28 aoilt 1987. 
34 For examples see A. Huetz de Lemps & c. Huetz de Lemps: "Les forces geo-politiques en 
presence dans Ie sud-ouest du Pacifique" in ARLR: LaNouvelie-Caledonie: fa strategie, Ie droit 
el fa Republique p.33; Herve Cout8u-Begarie: "Pacifique Sud, mer oublil!? in Journal de la 
.wcMte des oceallistes 87 annee 1988 no.2 p.55; Doisy: Chroniques des allllees de cendres pAD. 
3S "Communique du ministre des affaires etrangeres en date du 5 janvier 1987 sur les relations 
franco-australiennes" in BIPA green file 001 513872000500. 
36 Le Momle 7 janvier 1987. 
37 Ibid. 13 janvier 1987. 
3R Ihi(1. 15 janvier 1987. 
~q te Poillf 7 septembre 1987. 
40 Tftc Press 23 July 1985. 
41 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 6 July 12 August 1985 p.6416. 
42 Tile B!tlletin 5 March 1985. 
43 Le MOllde 10 janvier 1985. 
44 I.e Point 7 septembre 1987. 
45 Comite FLNKS de Lyon et 01.: "Independance pour Ie peuple kanak". Supplement a 
DOl/lOdes no.32 avril/Illai 1988 p.27. 
46 Le MOlldc 29 septcmbre 1987. 
47 Ibid. 21 fevrier 1988. 
4R Ibid. 7 janvier 1987. 
49 The Guardkm 16 March 1986. 
50.10. QuestiOll.f lerites de l'A.uemblee Natiollale 17 novembre 1986 p.4263. 
51 Le Monde 2 septernbre 1986. 
52 AtlSlmliall Fareif?ll Affairs alld Trade June 1989 p.247. 
53 For example, Isabelle Doisy wrote: "L'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zelande commentent 
abondamment la situation caledonienne. lis appuient les revendications independantistes, un 
peu inquiets toutefois des accointances Iibyennes de ces derniers. Cependant, leur desir d'etendre 
leur influence dans la zone du Pacifique-Sud semble etre Ie plus fort. Les richesses minieres et 
marines de rile ne sont pas etrangeres a cette optique. En outre les deux pays ont [chacuns] un 
gouvernement travailliste." C/zroniques des amlees de cendres p.40. 
54 Fraser: Your Flag's Blocking ollr SUfi. 
55 I.e Matin 13 janvier 1987; Le Figaro \3 janvier 1987. 
56 "Transcript of interview with Bob Hawke. Television France Channel One, 31 January 
1987" photocopy p.3. 
57 See Queval: "Asie/Pacifique" p. 182; and Roland-Pierre Paringaux, Le Monde correspondent, 
in Tire Guardian 16 March 1986. 
58 Le MOl/de 3 decelllbre 1986; The Press 3 December 1986. 
59 Liberation 27 aoOt 1987; Le Maude 28 aoOt 1987. 
60 "Et je m'cleve avec force contre les proces, contre les attaques et les accusations qui ont ete 
partes contre In France dans cette region [Ie Pacifique Sud], alors que ceux-Ia m~mes qui portent 
des accusations contre notre pays devraient balayer devant leur porte car, dans bien des cas, ils 
n'ont pas eu une attitude convenable a regard de certaines minorites qui existent sur chacun de 
leur territoire et dans chucun de leur pays." JO. Comptes relldus. Debats de I'Assemblee 
Nationale 9 novembre 1986 p.611 I. 
61 Le Monde 4 decembre 1986. 
62 HE! iI yen a, des appetits exterieurs! La fa90n dont agit, par exemple, !'Australie, est tout a 
fait surprenante, parce que, si Ie probleme des autochtones d'origine, en Australie, ne se pose 
plus, c'est parce que enfin il y a bien encore des aborigenes -c'est parce qu'on les a tues!" Ibid. 
18 decembre 1984. 
63 The Australian 23 February 1988. 
64 The Press 17 May 1993. 
320 
65 Pacific Islands Monthly October 1993 p.8. 
66 Concerning the eradication of Tasmanian Aborigines, and the colonialist campaigns 
conducted against the Australian Aborigines, see Henry Reynolds: The Other Side of the 
Frontier. Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia. 
67 Richard Broome: Aboriginal Australians: black response to white dominance p.178. 
68 Pacific News Bulletin September 1993 p.3. 
69 "Mr Hayden: interview with Sylvie Crossman, Le Monde, on 5 March 1987. 
AustralialFrance relations on New Caledonia". Photocopied transcript p.7. 
70 "Transcript of interview with Bob Hawke. Television France Channel One, 31 JalJuary 
1987" photocopy p.3. 
71 Canberra Times 9 September 1988. 
72 See John Fuhrmann: "East Timor: an intractable problem" in New Zealand International 
Review vol. 17 no.6 NovemberlDecember 1992 pp.26-29. 
73 Ibid. 
74 "Eighteenth South Pacific Forum, Apia, Western Samoa, 29-30 May 1987. Forum 
communique." Photocopy p.l. 
75 The 1991, 1992 and 1993 meetings of the Forum were strenuous in their efforts to ignore 
the internntionalisntion of the Bougainville conflict. The Press 18 July 1991, 14 August 1993; 
Pacific Islands Monthly August 1992 p.27. 
76 Pacific Islands Monthly December 1993 p.6. 
77 Sydney Morning Herald 7 January 1982 cited in Ward: New Caledonia - the Immediate 
Prospects p.54. 
78 Ibid. p.55. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Pacific Islands Monthly September 1979 p.14. 
R1 Ibid. p.IO. 
82 The Press 11 August 1981. 
83 Les Nouvelles Caledonielllles 9 mars 1983. 
R4 The Press 18 .July 1979. 
85 Tbid. 12 Mny 1981. 
R6 "France-Nouvelle-Zclande" 17 juin IlJR I in 811'/\ white file 811152400. 
R7 New Zenland Parliamentary lJe;wte.\· (lIallSnrd) vol.458 9 October 1984 p.931. 
88 The Press 19 May 1986. 
R9 New Zealand Parliame1lfary Debates (HnllSard) vol.475 23 October 1986 p.5195. 
90 Elise Huffer: "Les lies dans Ie monde ou Ie monde vu des l'Ies: une approche comparee de la 
politique exterieure des trois micro-Etats oceaniens: Fidji, Tonga et Vanuatu" in Journal de la 
socif!re des oceanistes 92-93 annee 1991 nos. 1 & 2 p.14. 
91 Cited in Pacific Islands Monthly September 1979 p.ll. 
92 The official title of this body is the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the 
Implementation of the Declaration of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In the 
interests of brevity, its unofficial title, 'UN decolonisation committee', is used in this work. 
93 Ihid. p.IO. 
94 FLNKS: La charte dll FLNKS p.7. 
95 Ibid. p.l7. 
96 Le Monde II aoilt 1982. 
97 Cited in Ward: Nell' Caledonia· the Immediate Prospects p.52. 
98 Le Monde 5-6 decembre 1982. 
99 Les Nouvelles Caledonienl1es 26 mars 1983. 
100 Le Monde 10 janvier 1985. 
101 Huffer: "Les TIes dans Ie monde ou Ie monde vu des tIes: une approche comparee de 1a 
politique exterieure des trois micro-Etats oceaniens: Fidji, Tonga et Vanuatu" p.13; Le Monde 
10 janvier 1985. 
102 NelV Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) vol.452 26 August 1983 pp.1853-4; De 
Deckker et at.: 011 en est la Nouvelle-Zelallde? p.43; The Dominion 9 January 1985. 
103 The Australian 23 February 1988. 
321 
104 Solomon Islands News Drum 13 March 1981; Solomon Islands Government Monthly 31 , 
July 1982. 
105 "New Caledonia, like Fiji, has a multiracial and multicultural population. When we in 
Fiji sought independence for our country from Britain, we did so in dialogue with the British 
Government, and the status we wanted and were given by Britain was an independent Fiji with 
a secure and equal place for everyone in our multiracial and multicultural society. [ ... ] If Fiji is 
asked to support independence for New Caledonia but only for the Kanak people, the 
government clearly cannot lend its support to such a position." Islands Business August 1985 
p.IS. Mara's cooperation from October 1987 with Rabuka in the foundation of a Republic of 
Fiji founded on the primacy of indigenous Fijians later undermined the sincerity of Mara's 
professed concern for a multicultural Fiji. 
106 Le MOl/de 23 mai 1986; Australian Foreig1l Affairs Review August 1986.,.726. 
107 Le Maude 28 aoOt 1986. 
108 Ibid. 1 aoOt 1986. 
109 Islands Business September 1986 p.12. 
110 Ibid. 
111 "Seventeenth South Pacific Forum, Suva, Fiji, 8-11 August 1986. Forum Communique." 
Photocopy p.2. 
112 Ibid. p.1. 
113 Yearbook of the Ullited Nations 1986 p.913. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. p.914. 
117 "Communique dll ministere des affaires etrangeres en date du 3 dtkembre 1986 sur les 
demarches du comile de decolonisation de I'ONU aupres de la France it propos de la Nouvelle-
CllIedonie" in B1PA green file 001 525872001900. 
11 R "By Chapler XI, all the members of the United Nations which have or assume 
responsibility for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full 
measure of self-government recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these 
territories are paramount. They accept, as a sacred trust, the obligation to promote to the 
utmost the wel1-being of the inhabitants of these territories. To that end they accept certain 
specific obligations. including the obligation to develop self-government and to assist the 
inhahitants in the progressive development of their free political institutions." Yearbook of the 
UI/ifl'll NtIt;oll.\· IWo· 7 pp.80·81. 
119 Ziller: Les DaM· TOM p.32. 
120 Seventeenth South Pacific Forum, Suva, Fiji, 8-1 I August 1986. Forum Communique. 
Photocopy p.3, 
121 "Eighteenth South Pacific Forum, Apia, Western Samoa, 29-30 May 1987. Forum 
communique." Photocopy p.4. 
122 Ibid. 
123 "Memorandum du ministere des affaires etrangeres en date du 9 octobre 1987 au sujet de la 
Nouvelle-CaIedonie" in BIPA green file 002 139872015200. 
124 Ibid. 
125 UN Chronicle vol.24 no.2 May 1987 pAO. 
126 Le MOllde 30 octobre 1987. 
127 Ibid. 6-7 decembre 1987. 
128 "Communique du ministere des affaires etrangeres, en date du 4 decembre 1987, sur Ie vote 
de l'Assemblee generale des Nations unies slIr la NouvelJe-CaIedonie" in B1PA green file 002 
167872019700. 
129 "Eighteenth South Pacific Forum, Apia, Western Samoa, 29-30 May 1987. Forum 
communique." Photocopy pA. 
130 Les Nouvelles Caledoniell11es 7 mai 1988. 
131 Ibid. 6 mai 1988. 
132 Vanuatu Weekly 14 May 1988; The Press JO May 1988; Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 9 
mai 1988. 
133 Les Nouvelles Caledolliennes 2 mai 1988. 
134 Ibid. 6 mai 1988. 
135 The Press 21 September 1988; Le Monde 22 septembre 1988. 
136 Val1uatu Weekly 24 September 1988. 12 November 1988. 
322 
137 Pac~fic Report 20 July 1989. 
13R Le Mot/de 12 mai 1988, 29 juin 1988, 2 juillet 1988. 
139 Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 14 septembre 1988. 
140 Ibid. 15 septembre 1988; The Age 14 September 1988; The Brisbane Courier-Mail 14 
September 1988. 
141 Les Nouvelles Caledonienlles ler fevrier 1992. 
142 Sydney Morning Herald 1 February 1992,3 February 1992. 
143 us Nouvelles Catedollielllles 3 aoOt 1990. 
144 Ibid. 30 avril 1989. 
145 The Press 6 May 1988. 
146 Les Nouvelles CalMofliefllles 25 novembre 1991. 
147 L'mmee politiqlle. eCOIlOl1Iiqlte et soeiole ell France 1987 p.60. 
148 Deputy Prime Minister: "Media Statement" 23 November 1991. 
149 "Twenty-third South Pacific Forum, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 8-9 July 1992. Forum 
Communique" in New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and Trade: The South Pacific 
Forum: Regional Cooperation at Work. Information Bulletin no.41 December 1992 p.37. 
150 Ibid.; "Twenty-second South Pacific Forum, Palildr, Pohnpei, Federated States of 
Micronesia, 29-30 July 1991. Forum Communique" in New Zealand Ministry of External 
Relations and Trade: The South Pacific Forum: 21 Years of Regional Cooperation. 
Information Bulletin no.38 December 1991 p.35. 
lSI "Twenty-second South Pacific Forum, Palikir, Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 
29-30 July 1991. Forum Communique" p.35. 
152 Tlte Press 16 June 1992. 18 June 1992. 
153 Fiji Times 17 August 1993. 
154 Pae(fic Report 14 March 1991. 
155 Pacl1(!ws 22 July 1991; Pacific Rcport 22 August 1991. 
156 Les Nouvelles Caledolliell1les 25 aoOt 1992, 26 aoOt 1992, 27 aout 1992, 28 aout 1992. 
157 Fiji Times 21 June 1993. 
158 Pae(fic Report 26 July 1993. 
323 
8. French Regional Aid and Cooperation 
In 1987 Rabuka staged his illegal coup in the name of indigenous 
rights. But where is his concern now at the plight of our brothers 
and sisters in Kanaky and French Polynesia? The silence is 
deafening because he has been bought off by the Pacific's most 
hated colonial regime, the French. 
Tirnoci Bavadra. deposed Prime Minister of Fiji. September 1989.1 
It's a sort of obsession, people saying that France is paying off 
Fiji, the Cook Islands, Western Samoa - it's absurd. 
Philippe Baude. French Permanent Secretary to the South PacifIC, 
July 1989.2 
Cheque-book Diplomacy? 
During the 1980s aid and cooperation were aspects of the French role in 
the South Pacific which were neglected in analysis made both by French and 
foreign commentators. This situation remained unchanged early iIi the 1990s. 
Outside administrative circles, little attention has been dedicated to the patient 
efforts of French diplomats and aid workers in the Pacific Islands.3 The 
exception to the rule was provided by Flosse during his time as Secretary of 
State to the South Pacific. His rapid interventions in May 1986 and in January 
1987 with cyclone relief assistance to the Solomon Islands and to the Cook 
Islands, as well as his negotiation of development aid to the nascent Republic of 
Fiji in 1987, held significant domestic political implications for the countries 
. involved. Aid initiatives by Flosse also prompted some conjecture in Wellington 
and Canberra over French motives. Otherwise more dramatic events usually 
preoccupied and conditioned regional scrutiny of France's South Pacific 
presence. An examination of the bibliography will reveal a plethora of 
pUblications devoted to the controversial questions of Kanak nationalism and 
French nuclear testing, and very little in relation to French foreign aid, either 
from a South Pacific or from a French perspective. 
For those interested in French foreign aid efforts in the South Pacific 
since the 1980s, there exists very little source material to work on. The author's 
researches failed to reveal a single published book or article solely devoted to the 
topic, although doubtless some pertinent classified reports reside in ministerial 
files in Paris yet to be opened to public access. This deficiency has only 
inadequately been compensated for by resort to regional press coverage, 
resulting in an admittedly incomplete, and statistically patchy, overview. The 
inadequacy of available material stands in poor contrast to the French literature 
available on the aid and cooperation of the Fifth Republic in other regions of the 
world. For example, many reports, books and articles have been published on 
French aid and cooperation to Sub-Saharan Africa. It is most likely that these 
differing levels of coverage stem from the recentness and small scale of French 
aid operations in the South Pacific when viewed by African or Asian standards. 
France has most of its aid workers and development projects deployed in Mrica. 
a circumstance which reflects the higher level of French economic, cultural and 
military interest in that continent than in the micro-states of the South Pacific. 
When the matter of French foreign aid in the South Pacific was raised in 
the member nations of the South Pacific Forum during the 1980s, it was usually 
introduced in a partisan manner with reference to heated. political disputes. The 
first epigraph on French aid to Fiji by the fonner Prime Minister of Fiji. Timoci 
Bavadra, furnishes a vivid example of this tendency. Bavadra employs 
Rabuka's acceptance of French aid as a rhetorical bludgeon with which to swipe 
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at the claim of his opponents to legitimacy. Bavadra was highly critical of 
French aid to Fiji after the coups of 1987. He portrayed such assistance as a 
"bribe", which Paris was employing to buy the silence of the Fijian Republic on 
the questions of Kanak nationalism and nuclear testing at Moruroa.4 His 
speculation made extensive reference to a concept colloquially termed 'cheque~ 
book diplomacy': the dispensation of aid by a power to influence the foreign or 
domestic policy of recipient nations. In response to such uncomplimentary 
comments, Rocard cancelled a meeting with Bavadra which had been organised 
as part of his stop in Suva on 23 August 1989.5 
As the second epigraph by Baude demonstrates, such allegations were 
emphatically rejected by French representatives. Henri Jacolin, the French 
Ambassador to Fiji from 1990 to 1993, likewise rejected the assertion that Paris 
was attempting through the distribution of aid to buy off the Fijian Government, 
or indeed any other in the South Pacific.6 The official French position on aid 
was that it came without strings attached, and reflected France's willingness to 
pursue its goal of regional integration. As Pons indicated to the French 
Polynesian Territorial Assembly in May 1986: 
La France entend ( .. J developper avec Ie moude polynesien et melanesien, avec 
les pays anglo-saxons de ta zone, une politique d'amitie et de cooperation 
d~pourvue d·arrj~rc-pens6es. Elle nc cotltestc, pour ce qui la concerne, ni les 
institutions, niles orientations de politique interieure et exterieure d'aucun de 
ses voisins du Pacifique.7 
There is reason to doubt the validity of Bavadra's dismissive 
characterisation of the motives for French aid. Contrary to the image he 
projected, such assistance to the Fijian Republic did not buy the silence of its 
leaders on events in New Caledonia and French nuclear testing. It was Mara, 
then Prime Minister of Fiji, who in. July 1991 announced the South Pacific 
Forum's declaration of support for the FLNKS goal of sovereignty, and its 
backing for the intention of the Front to persuade non-Kanaks to vote for 
independence in the referendum of 1998.8 In June 1989 Ms Taufa Vakatale, the 
Fijian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, declared that Fiji intended to continue stating 
its opposition to French nuclear testing regardless of the level of French aid to 
his government.9 Fijian opposition to French testing, which had not progressed 
beyond statements of opposition in the early 1980s, was maintained after the 
coups of 1987, t 0 when Suva began receiving larger amounts of French aid. 
Whereas in the case of French aid to Fiji there was no clear evidence to 
suggest that France either attempted to, or succeeded in, influencing Fijian 
policy, it is unnecessary to assume that the distribution of French aid, to Fiji or 
to any other nation, was totally disinterested. As was the case with other 
regional powers such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States, aid was 
employed by France as a method of promoting national foreign policy interests. 
French aid to Vanuatu in particular was subject to political considerations. In 
1981 and again in 1987, when faced with confrontation from Lini's VP 
Government that led to the expulsion of the French Ambassador, Paris did not 
hesitate to use the reduction of aid to force a reconsideration of attitudes in Port 
Vila. However the actions of Vanuatu left France with little alternative but to 
react, and these signs of deterioration in bilateral relations were 
counterproductive to the promotion of dialogue and cooperation pursued by 
France. 
Island nations, for their part, had their own interests which should not be 
overlooked when considering Freneh regional aid. Since 1988, Vanuatu has 
made concerted efforts to rebuild its relationship with France, in spite of past 
differences, as French finance is essential to the economic development of the 
archipelago. Island micro-states, confronted with the physical limitations of 
marginal resource bases, and slender financial means for their development, 
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have usually been reluctant to reject French aid in the name of political 
principles, such as support for New Caledonian decolonisation, or opposition to 
nuclear testing. The mainly receptive attitude of South Pacific nations to French 
aid and cooperation marked the limit of their opposition to the French regional 
presence. A misconception which persists, heedless of this receptiveness, is that 
South Pacific Forum members have refused to build substantial links with Paris 
due to differences over matters such as nuclear testing. In 1992, Keith Suter, 
President of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of 
Sydney, wrote: 
France has been a military power in the South Pacific, but not a South Pacific 
nation. Its nuclear testing has alienated too many nations for it to develop close 
ties. If the testing were to stop permanently [ ... J it has an opportunity to 
develop closer ties with the surrounding nations. It could use its foreign aid, 
education and cultural programmes to create a fresh set of relations. tt 
The bulk of this chapter demonstrates that France in the 1980s and early 1990s 
was not as alienated from South Pacific nations as was frequently believed. 
French financial, agricultural, scientific, educational, and military aid was 
offered to, and accepted by, island states during this period. The misconception 
that the members of the South Pacific Forum were implacably opposed to France 
in the 1980s is belied by the fact that since 1981. well before the advent of 
improved multilateral relations due to the implementation of the Malignon 
Accords in 1988 and the suspension of nuclear testing at Moruroa in 1992, Paris 
diversified and expanded its aid and cooperation with Forum members. This 
chapter examines the particular forms this activity took, its international and 
domestic implications, and its part in the broader French policy of regional 
dialogue and integration. 12 
The aid referred to throughout this chapter is French external aid. French 
subsidies to the Pacific TOM have been considered by some South Pacific 
analysts to fall under the same definition. For the purposes of this work, official 
French criteria are applied. French ministerial thinking treats aid to the DOM-
TOM as domestic funding. 13 This chapter concentrates on French bilateral aid to 
South Pacific nations. French government policy has greater direct influence 
over the distribution of bilateral aid than over French aid channelled through 
multilateral agencies such as the South Pacific Commission, or the EC. Private 
French aid distributed to the region by non-governmental agencies is 
disregarded. In the absence of available data, a detailed statistical analysis of the 
various aid initiatives undertaken by France, and the effectiveness of these 
projects in promoting development, is not offered in this chapter. Such an 
examination is properly the concern of a specialist in the field of development. 
Rather. the intention below is to ascertain the political consequences of French 
aid and cooperation in the South Pacific since 1981 to assess the extent to which 
efforts in this field contributed to. or hindered. the French goal of regional 
integration. 
A Question of Scale 
The level of French aid in the South Pacific was one of various aspects 
of the Fifth Republic's presence in the region which was described by the 
Pacific boosters of the Institut du Pacifique as inadequate. In 1983, the 
foundation's book 1£ Pacifique, nouveau centre du monde called for increased 
. French aid and cooperation in the region in order to promote national interests.14 
It was argued that more funding, more personnel and the opening of new 
facilities would enable greater French participation in the Pacific, and would 
increase the prestige and influence of the Republic. Similar arguments have been 
applied more specifically to the South Pacific by Georges Ordonnaud, one of the 
founders of the Institut du Pacifique: 
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[ ••• J par impr~voyance, arrogance ou manque d'imagination, la France n'ait pas 
~t~ II m~me dans Ie pass~ d'accorder II ces petits Etats (Papouasie-Nouvelle-
Guinre - ties Salomon - Vanuatu - Fidji - Tonga - Samoa - Cook - Kiribati -
Tuvalu, etc.) une [aide] bila~rale sous forme de subventions, importantes pour 
ces pays, mais extremement faibles par rapport lll'ensemble de nos crMits de 
coop~ration. Cela nous aurait permis de nous faire des amis et de mieux 
justifier nos ex¢rimentations nucl~ires.15 
The members of the Institut du Pacifique had unrealistic expectations. 
Considering that most of the island states of the South Pacific mentioned by 
Ordonnaud had received independence in the 1970s, were insignificant actors in 
global politics. retained ties with Britain, Australia and New Zealand rather than 
with France, and were of marginal interest for French foreign policy, it should 
not be considered unnatural that France had no close bilateral aid relations with 
them. Moreover Ordonnaud neglected to do justice to French efforts in Vanuatu, 
Fiji and Papua New Guinea, where the establishment of resident ambassadorial 
posts in 1980 demonstrated that Paris was not unaware of the role bilateral aid 
could play in its South Pacific diplomacy. 
It is none the less reasonable to assert that the South Pacific played a 
marginal part in French global development programmes. In 1984, the French 
Foreign Ministry admitted that aid to Asia and the Pacific was of a modest 
nature, before pointing out that this was largely because of the comparatively 
recent establishment of aid operations there,16 Paris had turned its back on 
South-East Asia after the collapse of French Indo-China in the 1950s and only 
once more began taking an active interest in the region from the 1970s. The Fifth 
Republic had maintained a presence in the Pacific through the three TOM there 
and until 1980 the condominium with Britain over the New Hebrides. 
Nevertheless, prior to British decolonisation in the 1970s there had been no 
great need, or indeed possibility, for Paris to develop direct relations with the 
island possessions of its historical rival. Such a development might have been 
counteractive to good relations in any case as it could have been misinterpreted 
in London as an attempt to promote French influence at British expense. 
During the 1980s, French development aid was concentrated in Africa. 
In 1984, 68% of French state development and cooperation funding was 
deployed in Africa. 17 French aid funding for "Reste Asie et Oceanie", a polyglot 
area consisting of certain Asian nations that formed minor areas of French aid 
distribution and appended states of the South Pacific, amounted to 9.9% of total 
French aid in 1981,8.0% in 1982, 11.0% in 1983, and 9.3% in 1984,18 The 
number of aid workers deployed in the Pacific confirmed the modest nature of 
French development operations there in relation to its global efforts. In 1984 
there were three French aid workers in Fiji, two in Papua New Guinea, one in 
Western Samoa, two in Tonga and 76 in Vanuatu. The total number of French 
aid workers in the region was 84 from a global figure of 15,711 (0.5%). In 
1985 there were four aid workers in Fiji, one in Papua New Guinea, one in 
Western Samoa, one in Tonga, and 59 in Vanuatu; amounting to 66 personnel 
among 13,549 (0.49%).19 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the level of French financial aid to its 
various South Pacific recipients was negligible to their economies in all cases 
except that of Vanuatu. In 1980, Vanuatu received 41.95% of its foreign aid 
from France,20 a reflection of the historical links between the two countries and 
French preparedness to maintain a major presence after independence. The 
recipient of the next largest amount of French aid was Papua New Guinea, 
although this sum amounted to 0.1 % of its total foreign aid received that year.21 
Following were Tonga, for which French aid constituted 0.5% of its foreign 
aid,22 and Western Samoa (0.4%).23 French regional projects that transcended 
national boundaries accounted for 2.5% of total foreign aid of a similar nature in 
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the region.24 Total French foreign aid in 1980 amounted to approximately 
99.76MFF.25 
By 1986, French aid distribution in the South Pacific remained similarly 
orientated, with Vanuatu again as the largest single recipient. That year France 
dispensed 78MFF to Vanuatu, 5.4MFF in total to Fiji, Tonga and Nauru, 
2.3MFF to Papua New Guinea, and 0.9MFF to Western Samoa. Including 
technical and scientific cooperation with the two developed countries of the 
South Pacific, Australia and New Zealand, which was worth 14MFF and 
2.3MFF respectively, the total bilateral French aid and cooperation budget 
amounted to 1D2.9MFF.26 For 1987, total bilateral aid allocated to the South 
Pacific was 107.1MFF, and was budgeted at 104.7MFF for 1988.27 The annual 
total for French aid to the South Pacific fell slightly at the end of the 1980s. In 
1989, France spent approximately 95MFF on regional cooperatioh.28 
In comparison with the sums spent annually on development assistance 
to the Pacific TOM during the 1980s, these figures are of a modest nature. These 
amounts were also modest compared to the level of aid Britain continued to 
dispense in the South Pacific after its decolonisations there. In 1984, Britain 
contributed the equivalent of around 313MFF in bilateral aid to its fonner Pacific 
island possessions.29 During the 1980s Australia was the largest single donor of 
bilateral aid to the South Pacific. In 1988 its total bilateral aid to the region 
amounted to approximately 1,750MFF. In 1989 the Australian regional aid 
figure was around 1,880MFF.30 New Zealand was the second largest aid 
contributer in the South Pacific in the 1980s. In 1987 its annual bilateral aid to 
the region totalled around 260MFF, and had fallen in value to around 220MFF 
by 1989.31 
Although not the principal concern of this chapter, some passing 
indication should also be given of French contributions to multilateral aid 
agencies working in the South Pacific. France was a major contributor to 
development schemes for the African Caribbean and Pacific states associated 
with the EC. For the period of the third Lome Convention, from 1986 to 1990, 
France contributed 23.57% of the 133M Beu worth of European aid to the South 
Pacific.32 This percentage was equivalent to 33MFF.33 Such funding was 
channelled to Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, Tuvalu, .Westem 
Samoa, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga, the eight convention members in the region. 
French aid to the South Pacific Commission in 1988 amounted to 14% 
of the organisation's core budget, compared with the 33% contribution by 
Australia, 16% by both New Zealand and the United States, and 12% by 
Britain. Extrabudgetary funding supplied by France amounted to 14% of the 
total in 1988, second only to the 16% of the United States.34 French funding to 
the Commission for 1988 for the core budget amounted to 3.59MFF, while 
extra-budgetary funding was 4.13MFF. Total French funding to the South 
Pacific Commission that year reached 7.72MFF.35 French .participation in the 
Lome Convention began with its creation in 1975. The French role in the South 
Pacific Commission dated back to its foundation in 1947, further evidence that 
although this was not bilateral aid, France had not been as neglectful of aid to the 
zone prior to the 1980s as members of the Institut du Pacifique might suggest. 
In February 1991 France opened a new avenue for its aid to multilateral 
development projects when it agreed to provide funding for the South Pacific 
Forum. This participation constituted a major sign of the degree to which 
relations between Paris and the Forum had improved since the middle of the 
1980s. The traditional view in Paris was that French funding for multilateral 
development in the South Pacific should be distributed mainly by the body 
specifically established for that task: the South Pacific Commission. The Forum 
had been an unlikely candidate for French development funding because of its 
traditional ambivalence to France, and because neither France nor its Pacific 
TOM were members and in the TOMs' case had been refused membership. By 
1991, mutual differences between Forum members and Paris had been shelved. 
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The Forum Secretariat was prepared to receive direct assistance from a power its 
members had characterised as a destabilising, reactionary presence in the South 
Pacific. Paris on the other hand was prepared to fund a body which had been 
formed in 1971 as a platform from which to attack French nuclear policy, and 
which had developed during the 1980s into the main critic of French sovereignty 
over the Pacific TOM. By November 1993, France had contributed a total of 
$F408,OOO to Forum aid projects.36 The funding was distributed by the Forum 
Secretariat to regional trade promotion, technical assistance, training schemes, 
and energy projects in member countries. Paris would argue that this assistance 
was not counter to its interests as the money was not to going to be used by the 
Forum for political activism. 
The French approach to international aid and development is pecul~ar in 
that it distinguishes between countries which are "du champ" and flhors champ" 
for the Ministry of Cooperation and Development. The field of operations 
administered by its personnel is centred on Mrica, followed by the Indian Ocean 
and the Caribbean. The South Pacific is considered to be oul'lide the domain of 
the Ministry.37 For this reason, the Quai d'Orsay has played the dominant role 
in administering French bilateral aid in the South Pacific, although where 
specialised advice was needed it has necessarily acted in consultation with 
experts from other Ministries and technical bodies over certain development 
programmes. Usually, the tasks of approaching island governments, organising 
assistance packages, and financing them, are performed through the offices of 
the Foreign Ministry. An exception was the period during which Plosse was 
Secretary of State to the South Pacific. His mission to improve French relations 
in the region included provision for arranging development assistance to island 
states. Plosse had placed at his disposition a special aid and development fund, 
drawn from the budget of the Quai d'Orsay.38 This South Pacific Cooperation 
Fund grew rapidly during his time as Secretary of State. He was allocated 
lOMFF for 1986. 29MFF for 1987 and 35MFF for 1988.39 By 1988, Plosse 
had also been accorded the command of 50MFF for treasury loans to South 
Pacific states.40 It is unclear just how much of his 1988 budget he disbursed 
before the end of cohabitation brought about the closure of his Secretariat in 
June 1988. The channels open to Plosse for the distribution of his development 
funding were threefold: his office in Papeete, and the French Embassies in 
Wellington and Suva.41 A large part of Flosse's aid funding went through the 
Suva. embassy, which in 1987 spent 7.88MFF on regional development 
. projects. Of this sum, multilateral aid (exchanges between Fiji, Vanuatu and 
New Caledonia) accounted for 3.77MFF, aid to Fiji 1.31MFF, and aid to Tonga 
2.51 MFF, while Tuvalu received 0.3MFF.42 The activities of Plosse were seen 
by French diplomats in the region as intrusive. The need to give what was in 
effect a roving ambassador discretion to negotiate aid packages to Fiji was 
superfluous considering that the Quai d'Orsay already had a permanent staff 
there able to form more lasting contacts with local community and political 
leaders than Plosse could have made on his flying visits to Suva. Nevertheless, 
Flosse's travels did have an impact, as is discussed further below. 
As the figures offered above demonstrate, during the 1980s, overall 
French regional aid did not radically increase in scale, although its distribution 
pattern changed, and greater provision was made for loans to regional 
governments. Globally and regionally, development funding offered by Paris to 
the South Pacific remained a financially small concern. This fact should not be 
considered extraordinary given the sizes of the populations and the economies of 
island states. Appropriate aid to such countries tends to be on a small scale. 
While for some countries this assistance came to be perceived as increasingly 
important, certain relativities should be borne in mind. Although on Rarotonga a 
soft loan of 50MFF from Paris might be regarded as an outstanding example of 
French munificence, such a figure is small when compared to French 
development loans to Africa or to Eastern Europe. While still a minor budgetary 
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expenditure for the French State, the political importance of French regional aid 
increased to some degree during the 1980s, particularly in Fiji and the Cook 
Islands, where French finance contributed to improved bilateral relations. 
Conversely, in Vanuatu, the withdrawal of French spending during the 1980s 
was an indicator of French discontent with the Lini Government. 
This difference in scale should not be overlooked, although it might have 
been in Paris. Massive increases were not necessarily advisable for regional aid. 
Such a change in state spending might have led to detrimental consequences. 
However unlikely, were France to have flooded the South Pacific with aid 
funding in the 1980s, transferred say from a portion of its African operations, 
other regional aid donors such as Australia and New Zealand would have 
regarded this push as a French intrusion on their zones of interest. Moreover, 
the harmful economic effects that a sudden large influx of metropolitan French 
funding could have on an insular economy have already been observed in the 
case of French Polynesia, where local production has collapsed and a cycle of 
dependence on metropolitan France has been installed. More was not necessarily 
better in the case of aid funding to the South Pacific. 
The remaining sections of this chapter discuss the political role of French 
aid and cooperation with various island states since 1981. French aid to the 
South Pacific remains a small, peripheral part of French development activity in 
the world, but for island states the comparatively small sums involved are 
desirable for their socio-economic progress. and in certain cases have 
represented an increasingly important political stake. 
Overcoming Ambivalence: Aid to the Spearhead Group 
From 1980 French relations with Papua New Guinea, the Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu were marred by trouble in maintaining normal diplomatic 
links, and by the animosity of these three Melanesian states toward French 
nuclear testing and policy in New Caledonia. The expression of attitudes 
inamical to France from Port Moresby. Port Vila and Honiara was made on the 
basis of a sentiment of pan-Melanesian solidarity. This solidarity came to find its 
most unified expression in meetings of Melanesian leaders. held from June 
1985.43 which passed judgement on French regional policy independently of the 
South Pacific Forum. In Port Vila on 14 March 1988. Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomons and Vanuatu formally established what had already become known as 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group.44 The Group maintained opposition to the 
French presence as the cornerstone of its policies after the signature of the 
Matignon Accords in 1988. In June 1991 the FLNKS became a full member,45 
enjoying the same status as the three member countries. at a time when the South 
Pacific Forum was still insisting that the Front could not attain observer status in 
the Forum because it did not have governmental status.46 
The Spearhead Group did not represent all Melanesian countries: Fiji has 
remained notably absent from it. Moreover. the Group demonstrated growing 
disunity in the early 1990s over border clashes near BougainviIle between the 
Solomons and Papua New Guinea. To the extent of its members' traditional 
animosity with France the body can be considered homogeneous. and may thus 
be treated as a unified entity in discussion of French regional policy. This 
section considers how ambivalence and periodic disputes with the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group members hindered French efforts to further relations through 
aid and cooperation. 
As the recipient of the largest portion of French foreign aid to the South 
Pacific in 1980, compared to other island states, Vanuatu found itself in a 
privileged relationship with France. Yet less than a year after independence. 
political differences between Paris and Port Vila suggested that the distinction 
might not last. Both in the months before and the years since the election of 
Mitterrand in 1981, the level of French bilateral aid has reflected the general 
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health of relations between Paris and Port Vila. A diplomatic incident in the 
months before the elections of 1981 offered the first example of the relationship 
between the two elements. 
On 2 February 1981, Prime Minister Lini handed Yves Rodriguez, the 
French Ambassador to Vanuatu, a letter informing him that he was required to 
leave the country within 24 hours. Rodriguez was also ordered to reduce 
embassy staff from 13 to five within 48 hours, with the excess personnel 
likewise being constrained to leave.47 The measure represented retaliation for the 
refusal by French authorities to allow Serge Vohor, the Vanuatu First Secretary, 
to enter New Caledonia at the end of January. Sixteen hours after being issued 
with a visa in Port VHa, he and other members of an official delegation were 
refused entry at Tontouta airport. on the grounds that the intention of the 
delegation to meet members of the FI constituted interference in local politics.48 
The dispute called into question the implementation of a series of aid 
agreements between France and Vanuatu, which had been negotiated in 
November 1980 but which had yet to be signed. They had been scheduled for 
signature the day after Rodrigues was expelled, a piece of poor timing by the VP 
Government. Lini insisted that the expUlsions were a matter of national pride, as 
the treatment of Vohor and his colleagues was an affront to the VP 
Government. 49 Stirn, then Secretary of State to Foreign Affairs, indicated that 
Paris was not going to suffer Lini's retaliation. On 3 February he announced that 
the 200 French aid workers in Vanuatu would be returned to France.50 It was an 
open-ended threat, in that no timetable was offered for the return of personnel, 
although 20 of them were instructed to prepare to leave as early as 7 February,51 
The differences between Paris and Port Vila were not to last and the 
promised withdrawals of aid workers did not occur. Lini, in a belated placatory 
statement on 8 February, said that he did not wish to see bilateral relations 
broken, and'expressed the hope that the contretemps would be just a transitory 
one. 52 Paris ejected not to turn its threat into reality and did not, in the end, 
repatriate all its workers. The incident was set aside in the weeks that followed. 
By 10 March, the eight aid agreements negotiated in November, worth 
approximately 46MFF,53 had been signed, and the two countries had officially 
buried their differences for a future of entente cordiale. The agreement declared: 
A cette occasion les deux gouvernements affirment leur volont~ de promouvoir 
entre leurs deux pays des relations cordiales fondees sur Ie respect mutuel du 
principe de non-ing~rence dans les affaires interieures de I'autre pays.54 
Both parties consented to protect their respective citizens residing in each other's 
territories from discrimination and harassment. After the expulsion of expatriates 
accused of having participated in the attempted secession on Santo Island in 
1980, France wanted an assurance that those French citizens who remained in 
Vanuatu would not be discriminated against, or victimised. Vanuatu wanted 
similar assurances for ni-Vanuatu living in New Caledonia. 
The non-interference undertaking was designed to avoid a repeat of 
events in February_ Both parties to the agreement compromised in order to 
maintain relations deemed mutually beneficial. Vanuatu agreed to permit French 
embassy representatives to determine the allocation of the approximately 33MFF 
which was to be offered to Francophone education in the archipelago, whereas 
formerly it had insisted that the Vanuatu Ministry of Education should determine 
which state or private schools were to be recipients of the funds. France showed 
some patience in concluding negotiations in the absence of an ambassador in 
Port Vila, and did not press for the return of Rodriguez.55 
Neither country desired a break in relations. Vanuatu was too dependent 
on foreign development funding to antagonise France to that extent. In 1980, 
41.95% of foreign aid to Vanuatu had been supplied directly by Paris.56 French 
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aid formed a vital component of national development plans to diversify exports 
and boost the importance of the cash economy in Vanuatu. At independence, the 
productive capacity of the nation was low by Western standards. Average GNP 
per capita was $A452, of which $A325 was derived from foreign aid transferred 
to the local cash economy. The value of Vanuatu's exports in 1980, $A31.40M, 
was outstripped by aid revenue, which amounted to around $A38.0M.57 
Although Vanuatu had gained political sovereignty, it remained in a state of 
economic dependence on London and Paris which its leaders could disregard 
only at the peril of national economic health. 
French motives for wishing to retain relations with Vanuatu hinged on 
questions of national prestige and regional influence. Interviewed by FRJ on 20 
March 1981, Stirn stated that the aid agreement between France and Vanuatu 
represented the appeasement of Vanuatu bitterness over the troubles on Santo 
during decolonisation. He added that the aid agreements would assure the 
maintenance of French technical cooperation in the archipelago; The undertaking 
that neither country would involve itself in the internal problems of the other was 
portrayed as being of special significance. Stirn claimed "c'est ainsi que Ie 
Vanuatu reconnait tout a fait que la Nouvelle-CaIedonie est une terre 
fran~aise". 58 As later events were to demonstrate, this was a case of wishful 
thinking. 
In spite of local political stirrings, Paris wished to maintain its influence 
in Vanuatu. The islands, while not representing· any great, or even minor, 
economic or military interest to France, were the only place in the South Pacific 
outside the TOM where there existed a French-speaking population. In 1979, 
around 40% of the national population of approximately 120,000 were French-
speakers. Paris did not intend to abandon this group, and was concerned that 
Francophone interests should be assured under the administration of the 
Anglophone VP Government, which was not notable for its Francophile 
tendencies. At the time of independence, aid was considered to hold a significant 
part in maintaining relations with Vanuatu. It was considered that the closer 
relations were, the more the likelihood of vehement local opposition to France 
would be reduced. As Jean Fran~ois-Poncet, then Foreign Minister, replied in 
answer to a written question dated 16 February 1981: 
( ... J la politi que du Gouvemement en Oc~nie doit viser h dMendre les in~rets 
politiques et strategiques importants de ta France dans cette zone et pro~ger les 
territoires fran~ais du Pacifique contre toute tentative d'ing~rence ext~rieure. 
Cette politique doit s'appuyer sur Ie d~veloppement des relations bilat~rales 
avec les Etats de la region. C'est ainsi qu'en meme temps qu'i1 s'est employ~, 
des I'independance du Vanuatu, h obtenir des autorit6s de Port Vita les garanties 
indispensables de securite pour nos ressortissants, leurs personnes et leurs 
biens, Ie Gouvernement a negocie des accords de cooperation culturelle, 
scientifique et technique ayant pour premier objectif de preserver I'heritage de 
notre pays dans un Etat OU it a e~ present pendant de nombreuses annees et 00 
une importante partie de ta population, notamment au sein de la jeunesse, parle 
notre langue. 59 
In 1981, the VP considered a referendum on the issue of making English the 
principal foreign language in Vanuatu. Although the measure was not 
implemented, it showed that Paris had reason to be wary.60 The stipulation that 
the educational funding under the accords signed in March was to be distributed 
by the French Embassy was a timely precaution that assured it would not be 
diverted to Anglophone schooling. 
During the period of Socialist administrations from 1981 to 1986, 
French foreign policy regarding Vanuatu did not change. Cheysson, the first 
Socialist Foreign Minister during that period, articulated a policy of restraint 
which was exercised by the Mauroy and Fabius Governments in the face of 
opposition in Port Vila to French activities in the South Pacific. This opposition 
332 
assumed the fonn of discontent with perceived French slowness to recognise 
Kanak claims in New Caledonia, and with French nuclear testing. In November 
1981, in answer to a written question from Michel Debre, which asserted that 
Paris should not put up with insulting behaviour from Lini and his subordinates 
while continuing to dispense aid to Port Vila, and asking why relations should 
not be reduced, Cheysson declared: 
II ne m'est pas possible de partager votre analyse car, au contraire, je suis 
convaincu des effets desastreux qu'aurait pour nos inter~ts dans Ie Pacifique Sud 
une attitude vindicative de la France, contraire h sa tradition et h son image. 
Toute degradation de nos relations avec Port Vila aurait pour consequence la 
constitution d'un front uni - contre nous - des jeunes Etats du Pacifique qui 
interpreteraient toute reaction trop vive de notre part comme une humiliation 
inftigre ~ un gouvemement n'ayant encore qu'une experience limitre des regles ' 
de la vie internationale.61 
France should therefore be patient with the inexperienced leaders of Vanuatu, as 
it was in the better long-tenn regional interests of the Fifth RepUblic. Cheysson 
had some reason for adopting this stance toward Vanuatu. Papua New Guinea's 
despatch of troops to Vanuatu to quell separatists on Santo Island in August 
1980 was an example of support for Lini in reaction to what was considered to 
be French-inspired intransigence over decolonisation. 
It turned out that Vanuatu too had to be patient. The aid funding 
agreement concluded in March, the ftrst instalment of which was due to be paid 
in March, was not paid until September 1981. While French offtcials in Port 
Vila blamed bureaucratic complications in Paris, the change in government, and 
even the summer holidays, Lini's Ministers perceived the delay as French 
vindictiveness.62 They were not above further antagonism themselves. On 1 
October 1981, it was announced that Ukeiwe, then the New Caledonian 
Territorial Vice-President, had been refused pennission to attend the South 
Paciftc .Commission conference in Port Vila as the head of the New Caledonian 
delegation. This measure, taken against a Melanesian RPCR leader well known 
for his opposition to the FI, followed an undertaking by Lini after the death of 
Pierre Declercq in Noumea in September 1981. Lini had declared he would 
intensify the support of his administration for Kanak campaigning against 
French rule.63 Ukeiwe asserted that the visa refusal should be challenged by the 
Mauroy Government, as foreign affairs were beyond his jurisdiction under the 
New Caledonian territorial statute. At that time the Mauroy Government 
preferred to calm relations rather than antagonise them. 
On 12 October 1981, a new Ambassador, Marc Menguy, was appointed 
to replace Rodrigues.64 Unlike his predecessor, Menguy managed to complete 
his tenn of office without being summarily evicted by the Lini Government. His 
appointment appeared to indicate the beginning of a new phase in bilateral 
relations. From 16 to 21 November 1981 Lini, Kalpokor Kalsakau, his Minister 
of Finance, and Donald Kolpakas, his Education Minister, visited France to 
discuss development funding. They were accorded high-level meetings with a 
range of Socialist Ministers. As well as Mauroy, they met Jean-Pierre Cot, 
Delegate Minister for Cooperation and Development, Le Pensec, then Minister 
of the Sea, and Alain Savary, the Minister of Education.65 On 9 December 
1981, Lini announced that France was to donate approximately 24.1MFF in 
health and education aid to Vanuatu in the year to come,66 an indication that past 
differences were not to stand in the way of bilateral aid. 
French tolerance was likewise evident when Mitterrand accepted the 
credentials of Barak Sope, Vanuatu's roving ambassador, at the Elysee on 13 
May 1982.67 The acceptance statement made by Mitterrand pointed out that the 
occasion was symbolic of the "new quality of the relationship between our two 
countries" and that past difficulties had been overcome.68 Mitterrand held no 
personal responsibility for these past difftculties and he hoped that under his 
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presidency France would be able to open a new era or cordial relations with 
Vanuatu. This presidential observation fonned more a combination of wishful 
thinking and the observance of polite diplomatic fonnalities than a description of 
observable reality. Although there had been a change in President and 
Government in Paris, as there had been no change in French policy on nuclear 
testing or on New Caledonian self-determination. the hostile attitude of VP 
leaders to these aspects of the French South Pacific presence had not changed. 
While Vanuatu was eager to retain aid links, bombastic VP declarations against 
French and other nations' colonialism had not been abandoned. In December 
1981 Sope had addressed a conference at the USP on Vanuatuan foreign policy. 
He outlined VP policy of support for the decolonisation of all Pacific "peoples", 
"whether in West Papua, East Timor or French Polynesia", opposition to French 
"fascism and racism" in New Caledonia. He declared: "The Pacific will only be 
nuclear-free when it is free of colonialism".69 On 23 January 1982, a VP 
demonstration in Port Vila presented a petition to the French Ambassador 
demanding an end to French nuclear testing in French Polynesia.70 
These examples were expressions of the distrust harboured by the VP 
Government for large foreign powers in general, and of its desire to exert its 
autonomy and establish Vanuatu as an active, independent participant in 
international affairs.71 The antagonism of the VP Government toward what it 
regarded as neo-colonialism in the region was not limited to France. In May 
1987 Lini characterised neo-colonialism from Australia and New Zealand as 
being just as potentially threatening to the sovereignty of the nation as that of 
France.72 Vanuatu became a full member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 
1981, the first South Pacific state to join.73 In the 1980s, Port Vila was to 
explore the establishment of relations with some unorthodox prospective 
partners. Governmental contacts with Cuba were established in 1983, and with 
Vietnam in 1984. None of these links evolved into substantial economic or aid 
relations.74 In April 1987, two Libyan representatives arrived in Port Vila. They 
reportedly had plans to set up a Libyan diplomatic post there, a prospect viewed 
with alarm in Canberra, Wellington and Paris. In the event, the pair failed to 
achieve anything, and were expelled on 7 May for having failed to present their 
credentials to the VP Government. 7S Lini refrained from taking the matter 
further. The fishing agreement signed with the Soviet Union in January 1987 
proved short-lived, and was not the precursor of a major Soviet penetration in 
the region. Relations with these nations, explored in the hope of diversifying 
Port Vila's aid and economic relations beyond France, Britain and Vanuatu's 
regional neighbours, did not result in new directions for national development. 
They served instead to antagonise relations with established aid and trading 
partners.76 On 11 May 1987, responding to reports that Canberra disapproved 
of any Vanuatuan links with Libya, Lini suspended visits by Australian 
warships and military aircraft to signal his disapproval of the position held by 
the Hawke Government. Days before, Uni had asserted that as a sovereign 
nation Vanuatu had the right to form links with whomever it chose.77 In the 
absence of closer relations with Libya, Vanuatu pennitted Australian visits to 
resume, the fIrst of which was made by a patrol boat in August 1987.78 
It is unlikeJy that Mitterrand would have been unadvised of the foreign 
policy articulated by Sope, but he and the Mauroy Government chose to 
overlook it in preference to consolidating ties with Vanuatu. On 26 May 1982 
the French Council of Ministers approved cultural, scientific and technical 
cooperation accords with Vanuatu which, along with the aid accord of March 
1981, were promulgated on 20 October 1982.79 From 12 to 19 luly, a visit to 
Paris by Ati George Sokomanu, the President of Vanuatu, continued high level 
contacts. Sokomanu met Mitterrand on 15 luly, and Cheysson four days later. so 
Sokomanu was less dogmatic than Sope, and articulated moderate views on 
relations with France. He had criticised Uni for refusing to allow the entry of 
Ukeiwe into Vanuatu in 1981 as unnecessarily provocative, and did not agree 
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with much of the VP's militant foreign policy views.81 Sokomanu was one of 
those English-speaking, Protestant-educated, British-trained island leaders 
whose conciliatory attitude towards France undermined the Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant conspiracy theory voiced by certain conservative French 
commentators. He saw his role as President as that of encouraging national unity 
between Francophones and Anglophones.82 He was not convinced that Lini and 
his Ministers were acting in the best interests of the national economy when they 
took abrupt foreign policy actions. In this respect he shared the views of the 
largely Francophone leaders of the opposition UMP in Vanuatu. 
Moderation was granted a lower priority in government circles in Port 
Vila. The unilateral declaration of sovereignty over Matthew and Hunter Islands 
made by the Lini Government in March 1983 exacerbated Franco-Vanuatu 
relations. The action was rendered ineffective by the installation of a French 
garrison to assure the sovereignty of the Fifth Republic over these desolate 
islets. Dijoud's declaration in March 1981 that Vanuatu had agreed not to 
interfere in French internal affairs sounded increasingly hollow as Lini 
campaigned from 1980 for the South Pacific Forum to voice support for Kanak 
demands in New Caledonia, and to take the territory'S case to the UN 
decolonisation committee. 
Lini presented himself as the unstinting supporter of Kanak nationalism, 
acting in pan-Melanesian solidarity with those who still remained subject to 
French control. When he was asked in 1982 how far he was prepared to go to 
support New Caledonian Kanaks, he boldly stated: "Je suis pret it aller aussi loin 
que possible et aussi longtemps qu'i1le sera necessaire. [ ... ] C'est mon devoir 
moral de Melanesien d'agir ainsi et de prouver que ce territoire doit acceder it 
l'independance plus rapidement que ne Ie pensent certaines personnes."83 
Unabashedly pro-FI and later pro-FLNKS, Lini publicly attributed 
responsibility for New Caledonian problems to the French Government, which 
he described as resistant to change.84 He portrayed decolonisation as the sole 
solution to New Caledonia's divisions, ignoring the complex ethnic balance, and 
the absence of majority electoral support for independence. 85 
In November 1984 Lini backed the provisional government of Kanaky 
as the basis for an independent state in New Caledonia.86 During their visits to 
Vanuatu to lobby for international support, from November 1984 to early 
1985,87 FLNKS leaders such as Tjibaou and Yann Celene Uregei predictably 
found Port Vila to be the foreign capital most in tune with their outlook, mainly 
due to Vanuatu's experience of French colonialism, which set it apart from the 
other Melanesian states. While VP Government representatives offered them 
verbal support, and lobbied the South Pacific Forum, there were limits to 
Vanuatu campaigning for the FLNKS. Lini admitted that he was not prepared 
to offer Port Vila as the base for a Kanak government in exile for fear of 
alienating the French.88 There is no evidence of any material support offered by 
Port Vila to Kanak activists. Vanuatu leaders lacked the means, either to offer 
clandestine military assistance of any consequence, or to impose economic 
sanctions on France. The formal abandonment of the FLNKS boycott from May 
1985 to cooperate with the French State under the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute 
meant that these options were not to become even remote prospects. The VP 
Prime Minister was slow to respond to FLNKS pragmatism. In August 1985, 
Lini predicted that the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute was destined to fail.89 He 
later changed his mind, and told the UN General Assembly in October 1985 that 
France should be given more time for its "decolonisation".90 Vanuatu exercised 
some moderation of its previous support for immediate decolonisation. While 
the FLNKS was collaborating with the French State it would have been 
incongruous to have actively maintained a militant posture. 
While the Mauroy and Fabius Governments did not view positively 
Vanuatu lobbying for the FLNKS, they did not waver from the standing 
policy of assisting Vanuatu to assure French regional interests. For Paris, the 
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importance of the maintenance of its regional presence outweighed the marginal 
pressure of VP Government lobbying over New Caledonia. Substantial amounts 
of French aid continued to be transferred to Port Vila. On 8 December 1985 
France finalised a loan of 78MFF to Vanuatu for coffee plantation development 
on the island of Tanna. Philippe Baude, then the French Ambassador to 
Vanuatu, signed the agreement in Port Vila.9l On 1 January 1986, Baude 
presented a cheque worth 1O.17MFF to the Vanuatu Ministry of Health for the 
renovation of the Georges Pompidou Hospital in Port Vila.92 Mauroy and 
Fabius alike refrained from implementing sanctions against Vanuatu for its 
stance regarding Kanak nationalism. 
France's tolerance of Vanuatu solidarity with the FLNKS continued 
into the period of cohabitation. Restraint was exercised in Paris in spite of 
provocative actions and adverse comments from Lini about reforms instituted for 
New Caledonia under Chirac. For instance, in September 1986 Lini presented 
the FLNKS's case to the Non-Aligned Movement summit at Harere, Zimbabwe, 
and gained the approval of the Movement to take the issue to the UN.93 Lini 
referred to the "apartheid" in New Caledonia while speaking at the UN in 
October 1986, and pleaded for the cause of the FLNKS.94 Opposition to French 
policy persisted into 1987. The VP and a variety of church, lobby and social 
groups in Port Vila responded to the New Caledonian self-determination 
referendum by organising a demonstration outside the French Embassy on 13 
September and presenting a petition calling for the abandonment of the vote.95 
The Foreign Minister of the day, Sela Molisa, condemned France for staging the 
referendum and praised the FLNKS abstention.96 
A greater challenge to French restraint was presented by Vanuatu's 
notice of expulsion served on 1 October 1987 to another French Ambassador in 
Port Vila, Henri Crepin-Leblond, as well as to the head of the Cooperation 
Mission, Denis Pelbois. They were claimed to have interfered in local politics by 
allegedly channelling finance to the Francophone UMP. AlthoughLini claimed 
to have irrefutable proof of this allegation, he failed to present it.97 Hours after 
the announcement, the Quai d'Orsay announced that· there would be "un 
reexamen de l'ensemble de la cooperation avec Ie Vanuatu".98 . 
In 1986 the Chirac Government had already decided on a redistribution 
of French aid to the South Pacific.99 French aid to Vanuatu dropped from 
64.7MFF allocated in the 1986 budget, to 28.3MFF in the 1987budget.100 
Vanuatu's expulsion of Crepin-Leblond and Pelbois served to aggravate matters. 
Pons stated while in New Caledonia on 2 October that the expulsions showed 
"une escalade de radicalisation" was under way in Port Vila; "Je ne peux que Ie 
regretter pour Ie Vanuatu."lOl Funding that had been allocated to Port Vila was 
diverted for distribution elsewhere, notably from September 1987 to the new 
Republic of Fiji, which was in need of foreign aid as Australian and New 
Zealand programmes there had been either cut or suspended. Funds allocated to 
Vanuatu dropped sharply from 60.4% of the French bilateral aid budget for the 
South Pacific in 1987, to 27.02% of the budget for 1988.102 As had been the 
case in February 1981 after the expulsion of Rodriguez, France could not take 
the traditional retaliatory action of expelling the Ambassador to Paris, as Port 
Vila had no permanent representation there. Its sole permanent overseas 
diplomat was Robert Van Lierop, a private consultant paid to represent Vanuatu 
at the UN General Assembly.l03 The reduction of aid thus served as French 
reprisal. 
Lini was unrepentant: on 3 November 1987 three more French diplomats 
were expelled from Port Vila on similar charges of interfering in local politics. 
The domestic political context of the period had bearing on these and earlier 
expulsions. The accusation that the UMP was dealing with the French was 
aimed to discredit it in the weeks before the general elections scheduled for 30 
November. Lini faced a dual challenge to the renewal of his mandate, from both 
the UMP and Sope. As VP Secretary-General, in July 1987 Sope had 
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unsuccessfully contested the re-election of Lini as VP President.104 The UMP 
and Sope advocated improving relations with France, the latter having 
moderated his earlier hostility to French colonialism. Linits refusal to reconcile 
with Paris distinguished him from his opponents. After the Prime Minister had a 
stroke in February, opponents of Lini characterised him as unfit to lead the 
nation. The articulation of militant foreign policy positions was one of the 
stances which exercised enough appeal among VP supporters and members to 
permit the re-election of a six member VP majority in Parliament, and to allow 
the formation of a new government led by Lini on 15 December 1987. 
Lini held on to political power, but was constrained to bear the 
consequences of his actions. Paris responded to the various expulsions by 
cutting back its diplomatic staff, and by withdrawing 30 aid workers. A skeleton 
staff of two was left at the French Embassy in Port Vila. 105 Although bilateral 
relations had not been broken, the extent of the displeasure of the Chirac 
Government with the VP Government was clear. Attitudes did not immediately 
change in Paris with the arrival of the Rocard Government in 1988. French aid 
continued to be dispensed at a reduced level, totalling 29.6MFF per annum by 
1989.106 At that time, the total number of French aid workers in Vanuatu was 
61, of whom 51 were employed as teachers in Vanuatu schools. The 
remaining ten were working in agricultural development.107 
Lini continued to pillory French conduct in New Caledonia after the 
departure of the Chirac Government in May 1988. In April 1988 both Lini and 
Donald Kalpokas, his Foreign Minister at that time, had attributed blame for the 
violence in New Caledonia to Chirac and his Ministers. lOS The VP 
demonstration which attempted to prevent French residents from voting at the 
Port Vila Embassy during the second round of the French presidential elections 
took place in this climate of disapproVal. The VP Government did not exhibit 
much concern about the promotion of detente with Paris from April to May 
1988. The end of cohabitation and the return of the Socialists to power in Paris 
did not greatly change relations. The VP Government was the major critic of the 
Matignon Accords within the South Pacific Forum, berating them for not 
guaranteeing independence to Kanaks, and holding that 1998 was too long to 
wait until a self-determination vote.109 In November 1988, Lini reiterated VP 
calls for the unconditional decolonisation of New Caledonia, even though the 
FLNKS had abandoned that stance by its signature of the Matignon Accords. 110 
Just as the VP was slow to rally to approve the implementation of the Accords, 
so too the Rocard Government was slow to restore aid funding to Port Vila. 
Bilateral aid dropped from the level of 29.6MFF in 1989 to 25MFF in 1990, and 
20.9MFF in 1991.111 
The economic price for the expression of an independent foreign policy 
in the 1980s had been high. While Lini had demonstrated his capacity to 
champion Kanak nationalism in international fora, Vanuatu economic 
dependence was not reduced under his leadership. In its first National 
Development Plan for 1982 to 1986, the Lini Government had declared the 
ambitious target of obtaining economic self-sufficiency within ten to 15 
years. 112 By the end of the 1980s, it was apparent that this target was not likely 
to be achieved within that period. In 1989, foreign aid still accounted for around 
50% of government revenue.113 By 1991 the national trade deficit was 
approximately Vt9,2ooM. The value of exports totalled around Vtl,600M, while 
imports were worth around VtlO,800M.114 Lini's administrations had not 
managed to stimulate local production to the extent desired. 
Two key sectors of the economy experienced a marked decline after 
independence. Tourism, the income earner with the best chances of rapid 
expansion, proved disappointing. In the absence of an established international 
reputation, a well-developed hotel industry, and for want of good marketing, 
tourist arrivals fell from around 32,000 in 1982 to 14,600 in 1987.115 Since 
then, concerted efforts to improve facilities and to advertise overseas have 
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reaped benefits. The number of tourist arrivals rose to 31,047 in 1989,45% of 
whom were Australian.116 As is the case in the Pacific TOM, tourism in 
Vanuatu has yet to realise the potential expected of it, and has not provided 
economic salvation. 
Copra exports, the single most important Vanuatu crop, collapsed in 
the 1980s. The departure of most French plantation owners during 
decolonisation had a disastrous effect on copra production, which fell from 
almost 40,OOOt in 1979 to just under 27,OOOt in 1980.117 This decline continued 
after independence due to a combination of elements. Lack of careful 
management resulted in the production of lower quality copra after 
independence, while the reduced number of experienced plantation owners 
affected harvest levels. The market price for the commodity also fell in the 
1980s, from $US598 per tonne in 1984 to $US204 in 1987. The combined 
result was lower production levels, both because of lower productive capacity, 
and due to lower returns on the international market. In 1984,46,682t were 
exported, worth $US27.76M. In 1987, 31,846t were exported, worth 
$US6.49M.118 
The state of the national economy led President Sokomanu to open 
Parliament on 28 March 1988 with a call for Lini to normalise relations with 
France. He declared that it was in the better interests of Vanuatu to restore full 
relations with France, as its cooperation was needed for economic development. 
Maxime Carlot, the UMP leader of the Opposition, agreed with these statements 
and added that Vanuatu should set its own internal affairs in order before 
venturing to criticise France over New Caledonia.119 
The restoration of full relations with France was to take over four years. 
The first sign that substantial improvements were to occur came when Kalpokas, 
as Linits Foreign Minister, made an official visit to Paris, from 12 to 15 
November 1989, to discuss the restoration of aid and diplomatic representation. 
He met with Rocard, Le Pen sec and with Edwige Avice, Delegate Minister to 
Foreign Affairs. Kalpokas managed to voice more positive comments about the 
Matignon Accords than Uni had in 1988, saying that they offered Kanaks a 
chance to gain their autonomy and that the agreement promoted peace and 
stability.120 By 1990, Lini was publicly supportive of an immediate resumption 
of full relations with France and increased aid.121 Whereas in previous years he 
had been less concerned, the easing of tensions over New Caledonia, combined 
with Vanuatu's need for development funding, brought about a·change in 
attitude. Symbolic of slowly dawning reconciliation was the presence of Le 
Pen sec as the French representative at the tenth anniversary of independence in 
July 1990. Le Pen sec declared in his speech for the occasion that the 
appointment of a French ambassador was a more immediate likelihood than it 
had been. Uni in turn declared his gratitude for French and British aid. Le 
Pensec was the first French Minister to have visited the archipelago since 
independence. 122 
It was not until the demise of the VP Government that reconciliation 
between Paris and Port Vila developed further. In 1991 the VP split over Lini's 
conduct as party leader. His behaviour had become increasingly erratic since his 
stroke in 1987. He had riposted against rising internal opposition by dismissing 
various government ministers, and by expelling dissidents from the VP. These 
methods failed to prevent his removal as VP leader and as Prime Minister. l23 
After having gained election to the presidency of the VP, on 6 September 1991, 
Donald Kalpokas was elected Prime Minister by the Parliament. The general 
elections held on 2 December 1991 changed further the face of Vanuatu's 
government. The Kalpokas Government was defeated by the UMP. Some 
exceedingly pragmatic alliance building ensued, of the sort commonplace in 
French Polynesian politics. Combining with Units newly created National 
United Party, on 16 December Carlot formed a predominantly Francophone 
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coalition government which regarded Paris far less antagonistically than had 
done the VP Governments of the 1980s.124 
Carlot exercised a more conservative approach to international affairs 
than Lini. As the Vanuatu representative of the World Anti-Communist 
League,125 he had had little sympathy for VP attempts at forming relations with 
Cuba, the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the 1980s. Past emphasis on non-
alignment was abandoned. Carlot pennitted the participation of Vanuatu in the 
Non-Aligned Movement to lapse by neglecting to send a delegation to its summit 
at Jakarta in 1992.126 In December 1993, Carlot dismissed Van Lierop as the 
Vanuatu representative to the UN, replacing him with Jean Ravou-Akii, an 
expatriate New Hebridean who had been living in New Caledonia since the 
Santo rebellion in 1980.127 As a Francophone and a Francophile, as well as 
being the Prime Minister of a tiny country in deep deficit and with a collapsed 
economy, Carlot was disinclined to berate French regional policy as vehemently 
as Lini had in the 1980s. However there persisted a governmental willingness to 
act imprudently toward major foreign aid donors. Claims by Carlot of foreign 
interference have been directed at Anglophone nations rather than at France, 
while retaining the same potential to be damaging to the economy of Vanuatu. 
While trying to fonn his coalition government in December 1991, Carlot accused 
Australian, New Zealand and British diplomatic staff in Port Vila of opposing 
his progress because they did not wish to see an upturn in French influence in 
Vanuatu.t 28 This unsubstantiated allegation held the same appeal to Carlot's 
Francophone support base as Lini's anti-French pronouncements had exercised 
on VP followers in the 1980s. In July 1992, Vanuatu expelled James Pearson, 
the Australian Ambassador. Pearson's offence was to have voiced Australian 
criticism of a new investment law, which was interpreted as being possibly 
discriminatory to Australian investors.129 The incident resulted in mild reprisals 
compared to past French reactions. Prime Minister Keating banned naval visits, 
ministerial and other high level contacts with Vanuatu until 31 December 
1992.130 To the extent that Carlot retaliated against what he perceived as foreign 
interference in domestic affairs, his foreign policy was no different from that of 
Lini. 
On the issues of French nuclear testing and New Caledonia, Carlot was 
restrained, and cautious not to offend Paris. During a visit to New Zealand in 
early April 1992, Carlot observed that although nuclear testing was a problem, 
the positive aspects of the French role in the Pacific had been largely overlooked 
by the regional media. His Government had made no decision to fonnally 
oppose nuclear testing, he said, and was more preoccupied with internal 
problems such as the welfare and the education of ni-Vanuatu. 131 Shortly after 
the announcement of the French test suspension removed any pressing need for 
Port Vila to take an individual stand on nuclear testing, although it has supported 
South Pacific Forum calls for the extension of the suspension into a general 
moratorium on testing. Carlot's policy on New Caledonia has facilitated better 
relations with France. Carlot regarded the question of the future of New 
Caledonia as an internal matter to be settled between France and New 
Caledonian political leaders. 132 At the end of 1991 Serge Vohor, his Foreign 
Minister, had commented "Ce n'est pas notre devoir de nous ingerer dans les 
affaires internes d'un autre pays."133 Carlot was reported in January 1992 as 
having confidence in the implementation of the Matignon Accords as the solution 
to New Caledonia's internal problems.134 Almost ten years after Dijoud stated 
that Vanuatu had recognised New Caledonia as an internal matter, Port Vila had 
finally officially adopted that position. During Carlot's tour of New Caledonia 
from 19 to 24 April 1993, Neaoutyine, as FLNKS President, refused to meet 
Carlot because of the Vanuatu Government's abandonment of support for 
Kanak independence.135 Carlot stated his position upon his return to Port Vila: 
his administration did not back the cause of the FLNKS, as to do so would 
constitute interference in the domestic affairs of France. Carlot did however back 
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the Matignon Accords as the path to a peaceful resolution of New Caledonia's 
problems. This support was assumed not to constitute interference in domestic 
politics as the Accords allowed territorial cooperation with foreign nations such 
as Vanuatu.I36 
VP critics pointed out that Carlot had ulterior motives for handling these 
two issues cautiously, as he wished to re-establish good relations with 
France,137 which would be the necessary precondition to the upgrading of 
French aid. One of his Government's ftrst gestures of good-will to Paris was the 
lifting on 31 December 1991 of the expulsion orders imposed on various French 
expatriates who had been accused of involvement in the Santo troubles in 
1980}38 This undertaking was litde more than a gesture, as it was unlikely after 
over a decade that the people concerned by it would be prepared to return. 
This New Year's resolution opened an eventful year for Franco-
Vanuatu relations. In February 1992, Carlot announced that he had asked 
Vice-Admiral Querat, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Paciftc Naval 
Squadron, for French naval assistance in the surveillance of the Vanuatu EEZ, 
as a supplement to Australian assistance. The proposal was accepted, and led to 
an arrangement for 30 hours' worth of aerial surveillance annually.139 Such 
military cooperation would have been unthinkable under a VP Government in 
the 1980s. From 11 to 20 May 1992 Carlot led a government delegation in 
Paris, the ftrst call there by a Vanuatu head of government since Uni's stay in 
November 1981. Although the theft of the delegation's passports and other 
documentation in a Parisian restaurant forced the abandonment of a scheduled 
meeting with John Major, the British Prime Minister,140 a meeting with 
B6regovoy did take place. The party returned to Port Vila with an undertaking of 
10MFF in French supplementary aid for small projects in various sectors, as 
well as for the establishment of a television network.141 During its visit, the 
delegation was informed that the Quai d'Orsay was considering who to appoint 
as Ambassador to Port Vila, and would consult Carlot in weeks to come.142 
This information represented the ftrst sign of substantial progress over French 
diplomatic representation at Port Vila since Kalpokas had made the frrst official 
request for the reappointment of a French Ambassador on behalf of the VP 
Government in August 1990.143 The appointment of Jean Mazeo, a career 
diplomat, was announced on 1 September 1992.144 From 1991 to 1993 French 
bilateral aid to Vanuatu rose. Whereas in 1991, total bilateral funding had been 
20.9MFF, in 1992 it reached 21.4MFF (as well as a Treasury loan of 3.5MFF), 
and 23.1MFF in 1993.145 
Assuming that Carlot can maintain power, Franco-Vanuatu relations in 
the 1990s are likely to continue improving. With the removal of past tensions, 
the way lies open for the restoration of French aid to Port Vila, and the more 
active promotion of French culture and influence in the only Francophone nation 
in the South Pacific. Two events in late 1992 offered evidence of changing 
times. On 28 August, the first director of the newly-established Alliance 
fran~aise in Port Vila arrived to take up her posting.146 Although a non-
governmental body, the Alliance fram;aise is recognised by the French State as a 
major promotor of French culture and language, and is a recipient of state 
funding. In December Vohor concluded an exchange agreement permitting 
French teachers to assist in Francophone education in Vanuatu)47 French 
participation in local education had dwindled in the 1980s. This agreement 
offered a new lease of life to the teaching of a language that had not been 
considered a high priority under Lini. 
While the fortunes of French relations with Vanuatu fluctuated in the 
period under consideration, Paris refrained from severing ties with Port Vila, 
perhaps in the hope that the end of the VP's time in government would come and 
that an administration more amenable to French interests would be installed. 
France had continued links, however reduced, in the face of VP 
pronouncements because of its established presence in the archipelago, and the 
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existence of a sympathetic Francophone community there. In this respect, 
Vanuatu initially enjoyed privileged status among island states in the South 
Pacific. VP foreign policy conduct tested the diplomatic resolve of Paris to 
maintain relations, although not to any great extent. Diplomatic squabbles with 
Vanuatu since 1980 were far less troublesome for French Governments and the 
staff of the Quai d'Orsay than maintaining relations with, say, Chad in the early 
1980s, Lebanon in 1983, Iraq in 1991, or Algeria in 1993. Having endured 
various contretemps with Port Vila, in the early 1990s the way was open for 
more cordial relations, enabling the reinforcement of French influence in 
Vanuatu. 
Whereas in the course of the 1980s, the improvement of relations with 
Fiji and the Polynesian island states of the South Pacific displaced the 
importance of Vanuatu in French aid distribution, of the three founding members 
of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, Vanuatu remained the only country with 
substantial links to Paris into the 1990s. The absence of any heritage of a French 
presence in the Solomon Islands and in Papua New Guinea, along with the 
animosity of these two nations to French regional policy, combined to limit the 
development of French relations . 
. The Solomon Islands was the Spearhead Group member with which 
France had the least important bilateral relationship. Although diplomatic 
relations had been established between Honiara and Paris in 1978,148 the 
ambivalence of the Solomon Islanders to France prevented any great progress 
during the 1980s. In January 1982, the Government of Solomon Mamaloni 
cancel1ed a visit by Menguy from Port Vila. It had been intended that the French 
Ambassador to Vanuatu would present his credentials at Honiara, until Ezekiel 
Alebua, the Solomons Foreign Minister, said that accreditation would be 
postponed due to the risk of violent protests in the streets.149 Mamaloni did not 
want to be seen negotiating with France in the face of popular opposition. 
During a visit by Mamaloni to Port Vila in July 1983 on the occasion of 
celebrations of the anniversary of Vanuatu independence, Menguy suggested 
another attempt at presenting his credentials. Mamaloni refused.150 No haste 
was shown to discard this reluctance. In October 1986, eight years after the 
Solomon Islands had established diplomatic relations with France, the Cabinet 
of Prime Minister Peter Kenilorea, Mamoloni's successor, decided to accept the 
credentials of the French Ambassador to Vanuatu. Unfortunately for French 
relations, actual accreditation was yet again postponed because of the effects of 
domestic opposition to the extension of diplomatic links with France. . 
Flosse's first major rapid aid intervention as Secretary of State to the 
South Pacific had occurred in May 1986 in the aftermath of cyclone Namu. In 
the Solomons, 90,000 people were rendered homeless. Flosse oversaw the 
arrival of French disaster relief. The Jacques Cartier arrived from New 
Caledonia laden with machinery and military personnel to assist with recovery 
work. Two French medical teams were also sent, along with 20t of food and It 
of medicine. In all, 1 MFF was allocated by Flosse for disaster relief work in the 
Solomons.15t It was during this operation that Flosse established contacts with 
Kenilorea. Among the French aid Flosse dispensed in the aftermath of cyclone 
Namu, $SI29,000 had been allotted for the reconstruction of a school and 
private housing in Rara, the village where Kenilorea lived. Kenilorea defended 
himself from allegations of corruption from his party colleagues and the 
Opposition by pointing out that he was not the personal beneficiary of French 
funds, and that although he had six children, none of them attended Rara 
School. After he admitted that Rara was in his constituency, he declared that its 
population was too small to affect his electoral following.t52 Three 
parliamentarians in Kenilorea's Nationalist Front for Progress resigned to 
protest this use of French funds, threatening his majority support in Parliament. 
On 17 November 1986, Kenilorea resigned as head of government in 
recognition of the unpopUlarity of what was perceived to be his conciliatory 
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attitude to France, even though he did not accept allegations concerning 
misappropriation of funds.1 53 Kenilorea's resignation in November 1986, 
stemming from his acceptance of French aid, was a sign of the unpopularity of 
closer relations with Paris that the recognition of the Ambassador from Port Vila 
would have marked. 
His replacement, Alebua, periodically decried French policy in the 
following months. He reiterated the support of the Solomon Islands for the 
FLNKS and decried "France's colonial attitude" in the South Pacific.l54 The 
coincidental timing of South Pacific Forum lobbying in the UN in December 
1986 gave the impression that under Alebua the Solomon Islands were having 
greater influence on New Caledonian policy, and were more active in assisting 
the FLNKS.155 Nevertheless Kenilorea too had criticised French handling of 
New Caledonian issues and had advocated action at the UN as early as 1981.156 
Opposition to France voiced by Prime Minister Alebua, and the expulsion of 
Crepin-Leblond from Port Vila in October 1987. effectively excluded any 
prospect of French accreditation occurring via Vanuatu.1S7 Alebua's comments 
from late 1986 also provoked a French reaction. 
In June 1987, France blocked Wilson Ifunaoa. the Solomon Islands 
roving ambassador, from presenting his credentials to the EEC in Brussels. 
Every member of the EEC Council except France was prepared to accredit 
Ifunaoa. British representatives claimed that France was reacting against the anti-
nuclear and anti-colonial policies held by the Solomons,158 The refusal may 
have been a negative reaction merely to the prior refusal of French accreditation 
in Honiara. It was not until 1990 that the French Ambassador to Port Moresby 
presented his credentials at Honiara and opened the way for more substantial 
bilateral relations. 159 Without stable diplomatic links, French relations with the 
Solomon Islands did not progress greatly from 1980. This lack of progress did 
not necessarily concern Paris and, unlike Vanuatu, the Solomons could afford to 
ignore France. Apart from French aid received via multilateral sources such as 
the South Pacific Commission and the Lome Convention, the country had no 
substantial aid relationship with France. Substantial economic relations did not 
exist either. Although the arrival of French development assistance or investment 
would have been a useful supplement to existing sources, this prospect was not 
considered as important in Honiara as solidarity with the FLNKS and opposition 
to nuclear testing. 
Stirn's visit to Port Moresby in January 1980 clearly suggested that 
relations between Papua New Guinea and France were to expand during the 
decade to follow. He announced a soft loan worth 20MFF to the PNG 
Government, proposals for increased technical aid, and the arrival of the first 
resident French Ambassador to Port Moresby in February.t60 Yet the barriers to 
improved bilateral relations that existed also surfaced during this call. Stirn 
informed Ebia Olewale, the Deputy Prime Minister, that PNG advocacy of 
taking New Caledonia's case to the UN decolonisation committee would be 
divisive and that France would simply ignore any UN resolutions concerning the 
territory. He rejected PNG support for Kanak primacy and pointed out that 
France would only accord independence if a majority of the New Caledonian 
electorate desired it. 161 The conduct of successive French Governments in the 
1980s bore out the veracity of his comments. 
While French Ambassadors in Port Moresby did not experience the 
treatment meted out to their counterparts in Port Vila, Papua New Guinea shared 
the militant positions of Vanuatu, advocating French decolonisation and 
opposing French nuclear testing,162 Papua New Guinea, with Australian 
funding, offered material support to Vanuatu when Lini was faced with internal 
unrest in 1980. The expedition at Lini's request of Kumul Force. a detachment 
of the PNG Defence Force, to quell the secession attempt on Santo opened close 
political cooperation between Port Moresby and Port Vila.163 
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PNG cooperation with France was not so close. In the 1980s French 
representatives expressed the hope of expanding French cooperation and 
investment in Papua New Guinea beyond the minor extent then current.164 
There was little sign of great progress in bringing such hopes to fruition in that 
decade. While Papua New Guinea possessed the largest economy and 
population of the South Pacific island states, this was not reflected in French aid 
funding. For 1987, the country was allocated 1.7MFF in bilateral aid by France, 
constituting 1.6% of the total French bilateral aid budget in the South Pacific for 
that year, 107.1MFF.165 The first French trade mission to Port Moresby was 
not organised until November 1991.166 Major French contacts in these areas had 
yet to be formed 17 years after the independence of Papua New Guinea. From 
the late 1980s to the early 1990s bilateral trade fluctuated. In 1988, France 
exported 25.45MFF worth of goods to Papua New Guinea, while it imported 
65.76MFF.t 67 In 1991 the respective totals were 34.17MFF and 30.40MFF. 
By 1992, annual French exports to the country were worth 22.44MFF. while 
imports from Papua New Guinea were valued at 31.66MFF.168 At the time of 
the signature of a cooperation agreement between the Port Moresby Chamber of 
Commerce and the French Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Australia, 
Bernard QuId Yahoui, the French Trade Commissioner in Canberra, stated that 
there were ten French companies operating in Papua New Guinea.169 In the 
1990s, Australian, Japanese, and British investment and aid formed the bulk of 
Papua New Guinea's sources of revenue, while the French contribution formed 
a minor proportion.170 In spite of the fact that after Australia and New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea has the largest population of the South Pacific states, has the 
greatest mineral resources, and the potential for major economic development, 
French interests have not played a great role in the economic growth of the 
country. 
In December 1988, Steven Mokis, the PNG Secretary of Defence, 
described his country's bilateral relations with France as "lukewarm". 171 It was 
an apt characterisation. Events in the 1990s suggested that some mutual 
sentiment existed in Paris, despite talk there since 1981 of expanding French 
relations with the South Pacific. The intention announced in March 1991 of 
closing the French Embassy in Port Moresby as part of austerity measures by 
the Quai d'Orsayt72 was a reflection of the low esteem in which the post was 
held in Paris, and of the lack of progress that diplomats had been able to make 
during the previous decade. The subsequent abandonment of the plan to close 
the post showed that this pessimism did not prevail, although it had yet to be 
shown as unfounded by 1993. Ironically, there was fleeting sign of greater 
interest in maintaining relations on the part of Papua New Guinea in the early 
1990s. Sir Michael Somare, the PNG Foreign Affairs Minister, announced in 
March 1992 that Andrew Yauieb had been appointed resident Ambassador in 
Paris, mainly to solicit French mining investment and agricultural assistance.l73 
This link was not to last. In June 1993, Prime Minister Paias Wingti announced 
that the Embassy in Paris was being closed. As was the case with its French 
counterpart, budgetary reasons were cited. The opening of new PNG 
Consulates in Australia announced at the same time suggests that Wingti was 
redeploying his diplomatic funding and staff to more promising areas of 
commercial activity for Port Moresby,174 Wavering diplomatic intentions in 
Paris and Port Moresby conftrmed that bilateral relations were still "lukewarm" 
in the 1990s. 
In the cases of Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, 
the term cheque-book diplomacy has little, if any, validity. The VP 
Governments of the 1980s exercised foreign policy that ran counter to French 
regional interests regardless of the threat of the reduction of French development 
assistance. Lini exercised an irresponsible disregard for financial considerations 
during the 1980s. Paris, on the other hand, showed no great haste in dispensing 
greater funding and reinstating its diplomatic representation in Port Vila once 
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tensions had calmed during the early 1990s. As far as the Solomon Islands and 
Papua New Guinea were concerned, close relations were not cemented due to 
local resentment of French nuclear policy and anti-colonialism. French relations 
with the founding members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group exhibited an 
ambivalence punctuated by tempestuous disputes, snubs and missed 
opportunities. Under such circumstances, the spread of French influence, 
facilitated by the distribution of development assistance, was not possible for 
much of the period under consideration. The development of better French 
relations with Vanuatu since the appointment of the Carlot Government in 
December 1991 provided an exception to this characterisation. Such an 
improvement might be indicative of a future norm in French relations with the 
other members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, provided that no resurgence 
in pan-Melanesian hostility over French policy in New Caledonia occurs. 
Developing Relations with Fiji and Polynesia 
During the 1980s French relations with Fiji and its Polynesian 
neighbours became more harmonious than was the case with the founders of the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group. WhHe French diplomacy experienced indifferent 
progress in the latter's case, other island governments had fewer quahns about 
accepting French development aid. Fiji and the Polynesian members of the 
South Pacific Forum, while voicing varying degrees of anti-nuclear and anti-
colonialist sentiment, were generally less abrupt in their dealings with French 
representatives than the Melanesian Spearhead Group. . 
The most important example was that of Fiji. It was unfortunate for Lini 
that his altercations with French ambassadorial staff at Port Vila occurred at the 
same time as Flosse was actively working to improve French aid relations with 
other South Pacific nations. The first Fijian coup d'etat occurred just one day 
before the meeting of 15 to 17 May 1987 in Noumea, at which French 
ambassadors and senior officials in the Pacific greeted Flosse's announcement 
of the goal of increased French regional cooperation. Part of the discussions 
concerned the Fijian coup, and what response France should make. Pons 
expressed some disapproval of the coup from a democratic viewpoint, but was 
largely non-committa1.175 
It turned out that for the Chirac Government the promotion of democratic 
values was subordinate to the furtherance of French regional influence. To a 
great degree, the coup was advantageous for France. Relations between France 
and Fiji appeared to be on the verge of deterioration at the election of Bavadra in 
April 1987. Bavadra had been elected on a policy platform which, among other 
issues, stressed the need for more vigorous Fijian opposition to nuclear arms. 
One of the first decisions made by Bavadra's administration, hours after his 
appointment as Prime Minister, was to forbid US warship visits on the grounds 
that Washington would not confmn whether such vessels were nuclear armed or 
not. 176 Since the 1970s governments led by Mara had been the subject of 
repeated criticism from the Fijian anti-nuclear movement. Groups supporting 
Bavadra included the Pacific Council of Churches, the YWCA, the USP 
Students' Association, and the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group, which advocated 
boycotts of French products and reducing diplomatic links with Paris as part of 
their campaigning for a nuclear free, independent Pacific. Rabuka's coup 
allowed the return of Mara and his colleagues to government. 
From May 1987 Fiji offered an expedient candidate for better bilateral 
relations. In the wake of the coup d'etat of May 1987, Fiji's most important aid 
donors, Australia and New Zealand, suspended development aid and military 
cooperation to signal disapproval of the overthrow of the constitutionally elected 
Government of Bavadra. The United States likewise withdrew military 
support,l77 a major setback asmuch of the equipment used by the Fijian Army 
was of American manufacture. Washington did not cut other links, and 
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promised aid if Australian and New Zealand enacted trade embargoes} 78 
Rabuka was constrained to consider other sources to fill the gap these sanctions 
created. The question of French assistance was raised during Flosse's stop in 
Suva from 14 to 15 August. 179 During his stay, Flosse announced that France 
intended to develop its aid to Suva, which was to include military aid. 180 His 
presence resulted in some speculation, including the unfounded rumour that 
France intended to build a naval base near Suva.1S1 
Unlike Wellington and Canberra, Paris had not condemned the coup 
d'etat in May. Long experience of similar situations in dealings with African 
states had resulted in France adopting a different approach when confronted with 
the overthrow of a foreign government. Standing policy was to recognise states 
rather than the governments ruling them, thus dispensing with the problem of 
determining whether constitutionally dubious governments merited diplomatic 
recognition. 182 Generally this approach had served Paris well, although not 
always. Sometimes it was difficult to distinguish who was the commanding 
claimant to state authority. The civil war in Chad in the early 1980s had forced 
Paris to switch allegiance from one side to another as the opposing factions of 
Hiss~ne Habre and Goukouni Oueddei gained and lost control of N'djamena, 
the capital. As a result Paris appeared fickle in its allegiances. 
In Suva there was no opposition which threatened the new regime, so 
France faced no such difficulties in establishing dialogue. In August 1987 
Flosse was able to talk to Rabuka as the Fijian head of state with no qualms that 
the coup instigator might himself soon be overthrown, at a time when his regime 
was being snubbed by Australian and New Zealand representatives. After the 
second coup on 25 September, and Rabuka's proclamation of the Republic of 
Fiji, the French Embassy in Suva informed Dr Jona Senilagakali, the Fijian 
Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that France was prepared to maintain 
relations with Fiji. 183 This was welcome news compared to protests from 
Wellington and Canberra. The Australian and New Zealand positions in this 
instance were based on different criteria. As the leaders of centre-Left Labour 
parties, Lange and Hawke felt sympathy for Bavadra rather than for Rabuka. 
And as Prime Ministers of Commonwealth nations, Hawke and Lange felt 
themselves obliged to some extent to protest the affront that the Republic 
presented to the authority of the British monarchy, and to its local representative, 
the Governor-General. Sir Ratu Penaia Ganilau was less vigorous in this regard, 
as was Mara, one of the founders of the Fijian Constitution of 1970, which had 
been overridden by the creation of the Republic. Both men later collaborated 
with Rabuka in the creation of a new constitution. 
On 22 October, Chirac's Interministerial Committee on the South Pacific 
met in Paris to discuss Fijian requests for aid. Flosse reportedly presented the 
committee with a list of requests from Rabuka which included the despatch of 
military vehicles, French military training for Fijian Army officers, and a GIGN 
mission to assist in security planning.184 Although it was decided to allocate 
additional aid to Fiji for 1988, not all of the Fijian requests would be met. The 
request for a GIGN team was not acted upon, probably because to give policing 
advice to Rabuka would have been too controversial. The arbitrary arrests and 
detainment in 1987 of parliamentarians, unionists, lawyers, journalists, and 
academics from the USP, who were either opponents of, or who were merely 
suspected of opposing, Rabuka had not reflected well on the new regime. It 
might also have been concluded, considering the zeal of members of the Fijian 
Army and Police Force, that Rabuka did not need the advice of foreign experts 
on such matters. The other two requests however, were acted upon. In January 
1988 a package worth approximately 39MFF was announced. It included 53 
Renault trucks and an Ecureuil helicopter, intended partly for development 
work. Thirty-seven of the trucks and the helicopter became the property of the 
F\jian Army, which since 1975 had administered a civilian conservation corps 
using unemployed labour for construction work. I85 
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The end of cohabitation in Paris did not affect relations with Fiji. The 
Rocard Government and its Socialist successors followed up the progress made 
with Fiji under Chirac. Rocard, like Chirac, avoided judgemental declarations of 
the sort issued by Hawke and Lange. When asked during his visit to Suva on 23 
August 1989 by a Fijian Indian journalist whether it might be incongruous in the 
year of the bicentenary of the French Revolution to be lending assistance to a 
regime which had suppressed a democratically elected government and the rights 
of non-indigenous Fijians, Rocard replied circumspectly, yet revealingly: "All I 
can say is that various countries of the world are, in tenns of democracy and 
respect for human rights, evolving at different speeds. "186 
Undemocratic conditions which would have been considered 
unacceptable in the Fifth Republic were left uncriticised in the case of Fiji. 
French Governments since Chirac have not refrained from dealing with a self-
appointed government in Suva affirming Fijian indigenous identity as its right to 
preeminence. On the other hand, in New Caledonia, FLNKS claims on 
sovereignty employing similar arguments of indigenous priority were deemed 
secondary to the Republican argument of equal rights for all citizens irrespective 
of ethnic origin. Just as Paris has expected South Pacific nations not to interfere 
in its internal politics, it has not passed judgement on the internal affairs of Fiji. 
This was a happy, and fortuitous, combination for Franco-Fijian relations, as 
was suggested in a speech given by Rocard in Suva: 
Lorsque votre pays a travers~, it y a maintenant deux ans, une periode difficlle 
de son histoire, la France n'a pas hesit~ a lui marquer sa solidarit~. Partant du 
principe qu'iI ne lui appartenait pas de s'immiscer dans les affaires interieures 
des Fidji et qu'll revenait aux Fidjiens, et a eux seuls. de s'en occuper, la France 
a poursuivi sa coo¢ration.187 
Rocard denied during his time in Suva that France was according 
miHtary aid to the RepubJic.188 Admittedly, whi1e France had not given anything 
as dramatic as Exocet missiles, Mirage fighters or AMX30 tanks to the Fijian 
Republic, both before and since Rocard's visit, Paris dispensed assistance of 
some benefit to the Fijian military. In April 1990, France undertook to provide 
$FI2.5M for the construction of a vehicle repair depot for the Fijian Anny.189 
The Ecureuil helicopter, supplied by France in 1988, was manned by army 
officers, and appears to have been used predominantly for emergency 
evacuations.19o The Ecureuil was supplemented in January 1992 with the 
donation by France of a Dauphin he1icopter, worth $F6M.191 Aid to the Fijian 
military has been a prominent component of French assistance since 1988. 
French training for Fijian military personnel was offered on a small scale 
that did not supplant the programmes offered by Australia and New Zealand 
before the coups, and which had been subsequently been discontinued. In 
August and September 1989 two Fijian Anny lieutenants were able to receive 
training as helicopter pilots, thanks to French funding to enable them to attend a 
flight school in Singapore.192 From April that year a Fijian major spent nine 
months at the French staff college at Compiegne.193 French naval visits 
continued after the coups, and constituted reassuring signs of foreign support 
for a country facing problems with its traditional defence partners. Two French 
patrol boats, La Glorieuse and La Railleuse, called on Suva in October 1987 and 
were greeted by Rabuka. La Rail/euse exercised with a Fijian vessel during its 
departure from territorial waters.t94 From 24 to 28 January 1988, the frigate 
Balny visited Suva, and was greeted by Rabuka.195 While such calls 
represented signs of continued French relations, they were by no means new. 
Naval visits were a long-standing part of the French military presence in the 
South Pacific. 
An innovation in the field of French military cooperation in the South 
Pacific took place in 1990. In June, the French Navy demonstrated the 
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surveillance capacities of one of its Gardian jets. Suva was sufficiently 
impressed to ask France to undertake monitoring of the Fijian EEZ. Prior to the 
coups, this task had been performed by the RNZAF. In the absence of the 
RNZAF, the French Navy assumed this duty, and conducted periodic surveys 
for the Fijian Government.196 From January 1991 to October 1993, French 
Gardians made 22 trips to Fiji, mainly from Noumea, to conduct aerial 
patrols.t97 By 1993, France was spending around $F230,OOO per annum on 
aerial surveillance of the Fijian EEZ.198 
These events were part of Fijian efforts from October 1987 to secure 
substitutes for American, Australian and New Zealand military assistance.l99 
France was not the only country which responded with this policy to benevolent 
help. As the coups had caused the suspension of an Australian plan to provide 
the Fijian Naval Squadron with patrol boats, in 1991 Fiji purchased four Israeli 
patrol boats on credit.200 French aerial patrolling in itself was insufficient to 
police the Fijian EEZ, which covers 1.26Mkm2. Fiji that year secured a $F2M 
loan from Taiwan to buy army vehicles. Suva also increased its national defence 
expenditure in response to the gap created by the withdrawal of Australian, New 
Zealand and US military assistance. The Fijian defence budget increased from 
$FI5M in 1986 to $F25M by 1989.201 
Fijian efforts to maintain a defence programme in the absence of 
Australian, New Zealand and US cooperation were not considered adequate in 
Suva. The few individuals trained with French assistance could not replace the 
extensive training programmes set up with Australia and New Zealand prior to 
the coups. Although France deployed its surveillance aircraft to assist Fiji, and 
made port calls, the primary task of French units in the region was to patrol the 
EEZs of the Pacific TOM, a major mission in itself. When Australia offered to 
resume full military cooperation in July 1992,202 followed by New Zealand in 
September,203 these offers were accepted by Rabuka, who had solicited the 
reinstatement of these links from the time of his appointment as Prime Minister 
in lunethat year. Fol1owing the reopening of Australian and New Zealand 
defence links with Fiji, French cooperation was retained. French naval aircraft 
went on conducting aerial sweeps of the Fijian EEZ.204 French naval vessels 
continued to make port calls. The Rhin and the Dumont d'Urville stopped at 
Suva at the end of July 1992.205 In March 1993, France and Fiji agreed to 
commence troop exchanges.206 A platoon of French soldiers from New 
Caledonia was flown to Fiji for exercises in May, at the same time as a Fijian 
platoon exercised in New Caledonia.207 Such cooperation would have appeared 
fantastic prior to the signing of the Matignon Accords, and the quietening of 
tempers over the political future of New Caledonia. Times had changed radically 
since Mara's declaration in May 1988 that France was indulging in "gunboat 
diplomacy" in the territory.208 
An initially unforeseen consequence of this rapprochement has been to 
facilitate closer cooperation between the military forces of France, Australia and 
New Zealand. Their units were .constrained to liaise over the coordination of 
their respective assistance to Fiji, whether it be funding, training or maritime 
surveillance, if only to avoid duplication of effort. There has been no official 
expression of opposition to such cooperation either from Canberra or 
Wellington. In February 1993, at the time when France accepted a request from 
Vanuatu to begin monitoring its EEZ, John Trotter, the Australian Ambassador 
to Suva, voiced Canberra's support for French surveillance efforts as a 
complement to those of Australia.209 New Zealand has been positive about the 
assistance France can provide to island states in EEZ surveillance. Wellington's 
support was first offered in the case of French sweeps of the Cook Islands' 
waters in 1990.210 Neither Australia nor New Zealand are capable of offering 
continual surveillance of South Pacific EEZs in addition to their own extensive 
territorial waters. French cooperation is a useful extension to their efforts. In 
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May 1993, French, Australian and New Zealand officials met in Honiara to 
discuss the coordination of EEZ surveillance efforts in the South Pacific. It was 
agreed to exchange flight information.211 
Australian and New Zealand military personnel have been combining 
stops at New Caledonia with their missions to Fiji. In September 199230 
RNZAF officer trainees visited New Caledonia to view the operations of their 
French counterparts before travelling on to Suva to make a tour of Fijian military 
bases.212 The following month the patrol boat HMAS Ipswich called in at Suva 
before travelling on to the Loyalty Islands.213 Such contacts occurred in a time 
of already improving defence ties. In May 1991, the HMNZS Southland, in 
mooring at Papeete, became the first New Zealand naval vessel to visit a French 
port since the Greenpeace affair.214 In May 1993 the Jacques Cartier paid the 
first visit to New Zealand by a French naval vessel since the same affair.215 
Two months later the HMNZS Canterbury and the Endeavour arrived at 
Toulon.216 These contacts form part of an important trend. It appears that the 
absence of cooperation between the French, Australian and New Zealand 
military forces is being broken down, to an extent that would have been 
inadmissible during the diplomatic rows of the 1980s. The demands of 
assistance from island states, namely the Cooks, Vanuatu, and Fiji, served as a 
catalyst to multilateral military cooperation. In the early 1990s French forces 
were less isolated in the South Pacific than they were in preceding decades. 
The French maintenance of cooperation with Fiji and other island states 
into the 1990s has challenged the earlier assertion that Paris was motivated by 
fickle self-interest. In November 1987, in response to French negotiations with 
the Fijian Republic over aid links, Foreign Minister Hayden and Kim Beazley, 
the Australian Defence Minister, accused France of short-term pragmatism and 
warned that the country could not be regarded as a serious long-term regional 
partner.217 The Australian and New Zealand Labour Governments displayed 
signs of pragmatism themselves. Neither was a stayer in the sense of opposition 
to the undemocratic foundation of the Fijian Republic. Both recognised the 
Republic, and restored non-military aid, in 1988.218 This about:-turn was 
perhaps made in response to the inroads French assistance was making. The 
pronouncements which Hawke and Lange made in 1987 concerning the defence 
of democracy and the undesirability of Rabuka were not acted on. Neither was 
prepared to offer more than fleeting moral support to Bavadra, despite their 
professions of outrage at the overthrow of his Government. Canberra and 
Wellington were not prepared to commit themselves militarily in the defence of 
Fijian democracy. Such action could have been costly, in both human and 
financial terms. It would also have alienated the other members of the South 
Pacific Forum, who largely supported Rabuka's argument that he was crusading 
to defend the rights of indigenous Fijians in the face of the local Indian 
community. 
Negative analysis in Canberra of French cooperation neglected certain 
precedents, French relations with independent Fiji began in the 1970s and 
predated the events in 1987. Paris had long-term reasons for seeking closer ties 
with Fiji which transcended the diplomatic setting created by the coups of 1987. 
Ties were initially mainly confined to the two countries' membership in the 
South Pacific Commission, and French scientific and technical aid lent to the 
USP,219 contacts which have persisted into the 1990s. Antagonism between 
France and Suva over the question of nuclear testing formed the main obstacle to 
closer diplomatic relations in the 19705. Fiji, represented by Mara, was the 
motive force behind the creation of the South Pacific Forum in 1971, which 
acted as a major vehicle for the expression of regional hostility to French nuclear 
testing. Fiji's anti-nuclear stance was the probable cause of the nine-month wait 
France imposed in 1976 before agreeing to the nomination of a Fijian 
Ambassador to the EEC.220 
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Yet, as elsewhere in the region, differences over nuclear testing did not 
prevent the extension of diplomatic ties. The posting of the first resident French 
Ambassador to Suva in 1980 was a reflection of French interest in furthering 
cooperation with a major player in regional affairs. Suva came to perceive valid 
reasons for exploring better contacts with Paris. As Britain was a major importer 
of Fijian sugar, it was in the interests of Suva to improve its rapport with 
France, a member of the EEC whose displeasure might have had deleterious 
consequences for this trade. The French DOM in the Caribbean were also sugar 
producers for the European market, and it was not necessarily in their interests 
for Paris to facilitate Fijian sugar exports. The Lome Convention added a 
dimension to bilateral relations between Fiji and France. From 1978, Fiji was a 
prominent regional recipient of aid funds from this agreement. The first Lome 
Convention, which lasted from 1978 to 1980, involved only two South Pacific 
states: Fiji received 24.2M ECU, while Papua New Guinea was given 8.9M 
ECU.221 For Lome II (1981 to 1985), Fiji fell to second place out of eight 
countries in the South Pacific receiving this funding, although its 35.8M share 
of the 106.5M ECU in question was not negligible.222 Considering the 
importance of European trade and aid funding to Suva, it was not unnatural for 
Suva to be receptive to the establishment of a French Embassy. 
The basis for Franco-Fijian cooperation was laid, not in the aftermath of 
the coups of 1987, but a decade before. Rocard's visit to Suva in August 1989 
was hailed by French and Fijian representatives as the beginning of a new era in 
bilateral relations. It.s antecedents should not be disregarded. Just as Rocard 
spoke in Suva of the importance of Fiji for French relations with the South 
Pacific, and his hope of improving aid, trade and cultural links,223 on 12 
September 1980 Fran~ois-Poncet, as French Foreign Minister, had used similar 
terms during a reception held in Paris for Mara. Fran~ois-Poncet praised Fiji for 
its handling of negotiations under the Lome Convention, its successful 
collaboration with France in UN peace-keeping efforts in Lebanon since 1978, 
and expressed the hope for enhanced relations between France, Fiji, and its 
regional neighbours.224 
It was however not until 1987 that French bilateral aid to Fiji climbed to 
a level which reflected well upon the glowingly positive sentiments offered by 
Fran~ois-Poncet. Before the coups Fijian anti-nuclear policy and, from 1986, 
Suva's backing for the FLNKS, acted as disincentives to a major increase in 
bilateral aid. Such aid to Fiji accounted for 5% of the French foreign aid budget 
to the South Pacific for 1987, 5.3MFF out of 107.1MFF.225 Funding escalated 
from 1987. In September 1987, 30MFF had originally been reserved for aid to 
Fiji, 28.65% of the 104.7MFF in regional funding allocated. This figure was 
increased further in 1988.226 On 6 April 1988, during a visit to Paris which 
included an audience with Chirac, Mara obtained a development loan for 
43MFF.227 The loan agreement, signed on behalf of the French Government by 
Balladur, then Minister of Finance, stipulated a low interest rate of 3%, and the 
debt was repayable in 30 years.228 The Fijian Government denied that there 
were any strings attached to this or other French aid. Inoke Kubuabola, the 
Minister for Information, wrote in April 1990: 
The provision by France of financial and technical assistance to Fiji has in no 
way inhibited or amended the interim government's policy on French nuclear 
testing in the South Pacific. The interim government has consistently and 
categorically condemned French nuclear testing in the region and will continue 
to do so. ( ... ] May I also categorically state that the government of France has 
never requested Fiji to relinquish its policy and position on nuclear testing as a 
condition to French aid. 229 
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While the members of the Fijian anti-nuclear movement have rejected such 
claims, they have not presented conclusive evidence to suggest that Fiji has 
changed its foreign policy on testing since the coups. 
Fiji has in fact by no means been a submissive recipient of French aid. 
Although relations between France and Fiji had, by the 199Os, improved greatly 
since the middle of the 1980s, Fiji retained its capacity to distance itself from 
France on certain issues, and not only on the questions of the future of New 
Caledonia and nuclear tests. From 1990 to 1992, Fiji lobbied, in the face of 
strenuous opposition from France, for the relocation of the headquarters of the 
South Pacific Commission from Noumea to Suva. Fijian representatives argued, 
not disinterestedly, that the buildings in question, dating from the 1940s, had 
outlived their usefulness and that a modem, more centrally located complex 
should be constructed in Suva. The relocation of the Commission to Suva would 
be logical in that other major regional bodies such as the USP and Secretariat of 
the South Pacific Forum were already there. Having the Commission in Suva 
would have provided an additional source of prestige for Fiji. The construction, 
staffing and maintenance of the buildings would have provided employment for 
Fijians. The Fijian Government received support from an unexpected quarter. 
As President of the South Province, Jacques Lafleur wanted the Commission to 
vacate its valuable site on the Anse Vata beachfront so that hotels or other 
tourism-related deve10pments could be built there. In addition he resented the 
presence of the Commission, characterising it as a hot-bed of subversive pro-
Kanak researchers.230 By March 1992, after extended argument, the Fijian 
proposal was rejected and it was resolved that the headquarters would stay in 
Noumea, although it would be relocated to another location. France united with 
Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu in opposing the 
measure. Paris did not wish to see the headquarters moved, as this would not be 
in the interests of direct French cooperation with the region. The Melanesian 
Spearhead Group members contended that the presence of the Commission in 
Noumea was useful in providing development assistance and expertise to 
Kanaks. Other Commission members were against the expense involved in 
relocating the headquarters to Fiji,231 
A more short-lived tiff between France and Fiji peaked at the end of 
January 1993. Carine Kobler, a diplomat working in the French Embassy in 
Suva, was expelled for refusing to pay $FI5,OOO customs duty on a 10m yacht 
which she had imported from the United States. She argued that it counted as 
diplomatic baggage and should therefore be exempt from any levy.232 The 
expulsion took place in spite of protests from French diplomats that the Fijian 
Government's interpretation of the Vienna Convention was too narrow. The 
French Embassy in Suva issued a declaration declaring the expulsion to be an 
"unfriendly initiative" which tarnished bilateral relations.233 There was little 
likelihood however that Paris would allow a dispute over a yacht to threaten 
bilateral relations built up since the 1970s. In the months that followed it was 
apparent that links had not been greatly disturbed by the matter. France did not 
halt its aid to Fiji, which continued to be dispensed in sizeable quantities,234 or 
take any other clear-cut action in retaliation. 
In 1993, the two nations retained a healthy relationship into the second 
period of cohabitation in Paris. The first high-level meeting with a member of 
the Balladur Government took place from 17 to 20 June, when Perben visited 
Suva. In discussions with Rabuka, Perben assured him that his Government 
held Fiji in high esteem and that his stop during his ftrst tour of the Pacific TOM 
was evidence of this. Rabuka declared that the Republic valued French 
assistance.23S Cordial ties between the two states appear set to persist in the 
1990s, to the mutual beneftt of French efforts toward regional integration, and to 
the advantage of Fijian national development 
Unlike the French Embassies at Port Vila and Port Moresby, the post at 
Suva served as the hub for a network of diplomatic links with several 
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neighbouring island states. During the 1980s, the French Ambassador received 
accreditation to Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Nauru.236 Formerly, French 
embassy staff at Wellington had generally been in charge of relations with the 
independent states of Polynesia. The Suva post was more convenient because of 
its geographical proximity. The Suva embassy took charge of relations with 
Tuvalu, Nauru and Tonga in 1981, followed by Kiribati in 1982. Personnel 
from Suva liaised with these Polynesian micro-states for the establishment of 
appropriately small-scale development projects that contributed to the objective 
of improving the image of France.237 Since May 1990, aid to these countries 
has been overseen by a regional councillor for cooperation and development. 238 
Staff at Wellington were still formally responsible for liaison with Western 
Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, because of these islands' history 
of close relations with Wellington, and the presence of representatives cfrom 
these micro-states in New Zealand. During his stewardship of French regional 
relations from 1986 to 1988, Flosse cut across these divisions, particularly in 
the case of the Cook Islands. This delimitation has also been overlooked in other 
cases, for example cyclone relief funding. After cyclone Ofa crossed the South-
West Pacific in February 1990, the French Embassy in Suva was responsible 
for distributing a total of 350,000FF to Western Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Tokelau and Niue.239 
Tonga expressed no reluctance to accept French aid during the 1980s. 
Traditionally the kingdom had had good relations with Paris since Napoleon III 
became the first European head of state to recognise the kingdom in 1855.240 
This sentimental motive retained some vigour in the 1980s. The decade began 
cordially when, during his visit to Nuku'alofa in January 1980, Stirn renewed 
the treaty of friendship between France and Tonga.241 As the Tongan monarchy 
concurred with the French attitude that what happened in the French Pacific 
TOM was an internal matter, in the 1980s there were no grounds for disputes 
between French and Tongan representatives, and no local moral objections to aid 
links. King Tupou IV and Prince Tupouto'a have viewed French relations 
positivel y. 242 
While relations have been friendly, they have not presaged a major 
implantati(;m of French development assistance in Tonga. From 1980 to 1985, 
French funding constituted only 0.5% of total foreign bilateral aid to the 
kingdom, although French assistance rose to 12.0% from 1988 to 1989.243 The 
bulk of this increase consisted of $T2.8M in funds for the construction of 
Laperouse Outdoor Stadium at Teufaiva, inaugurated by Avice on 22 August 
1989 on the occasion of the Third South Pacific Mini-Games.244 Avice, as 
Delegate Minister.to Foreign Affairs, was the most senior French representative 
to have arrived in Tonga, and her visit was considered a special occasion. 
French aid to Tonga has otherwise been concentrated on agricultural 
development. French agricultural cooperation began in 1980 when the first 
French project worker arrived. Dr Paul Luu became the head of the French 
Tonga Project at the Vaini Research Farm, which has worked on the 
development of vanilla production from 1980 to 1986, appropriate technologies 
from 1982, and joint projects with New Zealand on coffee production and with 
Australia on black pepper production. In 1990, there were three French 
specialists in Tonga working on the production of vanilla and spices for 
export.245 In May 1991 six trucks and two cars worth approximately 1.58MFF 
were presented to the Tongan Government by Jacolin, the French Ambassador 
to Fiji, for use by the Tongan Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.246 
Other French assistance has taken the form of funds for reconstruction 
work. In September 1990 Jean Gardere and Jean Frimat, officials from the 
French Embassy at Suva, presented the Tongan Government with a cheque for 
approximately 53,OOOFF to assist in cyclone recovery work.247 Paris has also 
provided funding for the operations of the Nuku'alofa branch of the Alliance 
fran~aise, which opened in 1987.248 This event marked the beginning in Tonga 
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of French language teaching, an important agent for the transmission ·of French 
culture. Francophone Tongans were still rare in 1993. with only one national. 
Lolomana'ai Fili, having obtained a degree at a French university. He studied 
agronomy at the University of the French Antilles. on Guadeloupe, graduating 
in 1992.249 Tonga has also played a part in greater French military cooperation 
in the South Pacific. In September 1993, the kingdom hosted French troops 
from New Caledonia and US troops from Hawaii for training exercises with the 
Tonga Defence Force.250 Such cooperative developments constitute small 
beginnings which should lead to further diversification of French aid to Tonga in 
the 1990s. 
The efforts in Tuvalu, Nauru and Kiribati of French diplomats based in 
Fiji have been similarly modest. Although in January 1986 Tuvalu distanced 
itself from France by refusing a warship visit in order to express opposition to 
nuclear testing. the Tuvalu Government has subsequently shown signs of 
cooperation with France. Since the accreditation of the French Ambassador at 
Suva in 1981, the most significant diplomatic consequence for France has been 
the signature of a territorial delimitation agreement in September 1986.251 In 
] 991, negotiations took place concerning the opening of a shipping link between 
Tuvalu and Wallis and Futuna.252 Nothing has been heard of these talks since. 
The line would doubtless have been unprofitable to run. French aid in the late 
1980s was a minor part of Tuvalu's total aid. In 1987, it comprised less than 
5.5% of total aid received, far behind the contribution of Britain (50.1 % of total 
aid).253 The link with France has nevertheless remained active in the 1990s. 
Jacolin visited Funafuti in September 1990 to offer French funding for 
reconstruction work in the aftermath of cyclone Ofa.254 In July 1992 Prime 
Minister Bikenibeu Paeniu travelled to Fiji to discuss further aid funding and to 
attend Bastille Day ce1ebrations at the French Embassy in Suva.255 
French aid efforts to the Polynesian island states have on the whole been 
small-scale and have not matched the importance of French links with Vanuatu 
or Fiji. French cooperation remains unevenly scattered, with surprising 
consequences in some cases. The oldest independent island state of the South 
Pacific, Western Samoa, founded in 1962, has been little affected by French 
bilateral development efforts. From the late 1970s, French aid was prominent in 
the activities of one man, Dr Rene Esser, an orthopedic surgeon who 
intermittently worked at Apia National Hospital under French funding.256 His 
presence led to greater things. From 1987, Western Samoan medical staff 
studied orthopedics in French Polynesia with French financial support. 257 In 
March 1990. the construction of an orthopedics centre thanks to approximately 
19.6MFF assistance from France was announced,258 This extension to the 
National Hospital in Apia was officially opened by Gabriel de Bellescize, the 
French Ambassador to New Zealand, in February 1993.259 This assistance was 
not the sole form French aid has assumed in Western Samoa. Cyclone 
reconstruction aid has also been provided. The relative significance of these 
developments should not be overestimated in a country with a population of 
around 160,000, for which developmental, economic and cultural ties with New 
Zealand remain paramount. Of the European nations, West Germany was the 
most important to Western Samoa. In 1989 West Germany purchased 23.2% of 
the country's exports, second only to New Zealand (34.5%),260 Although 
German sovereignty over Apia ended in 1914, the German presence in Western 
Samoa was of greater commercial significance than France's, and its bilateral aid 
funding has been more generous,261 
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The Emerging Role of the Pacific TOM 
Preceding sections have examined the role of the French Government in 
improving French South Pacific integration through the establishment of aid and 
cooperation initiatives, in accordance with regional policy goals discussed in 
chapters 1 and 5. This concluding section is devoted to the part that the political 
leaders of the Pacific TOM have played. The activities of territorial leaders in 
improving French relations with the South Pacific constituted a new trend in the 
1980s, a consequence in part of the greater autonomy that they were accorded 
under the territorial statutes introduced during that decade. If the regional 
integration of the TOM described as desirable by French Governments since the 
19708 is to become a reality, territorial leaders must, of necessity, participate in 
that process. The effects of their participation are discussed below in order to 
gauge the extent to which French regional relations have developed at territorial 
level. 
Although the signature of the Matignon Accords has been hailed by Paris 
and regional governments as the beginning of a new era of regional cooperation 
with the Pacific TOM, as territorial leaders were allowed an active role in 
negotiating external trade and foreign investment,262 similar steps had already 
taken place in the early 1980s. For example, 1982 was an important year for 
furthering the participation of the Pacific TOM in regional cooperation. At the 
Saipan conference of the South Pacific Commission, delegates agreed to allow 
New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia to have separate 
representation at commission meetings.263 Independently of the Commission, 
French Polynesian political leaders had been active in improving cooperation 
with the region since the early 1980s. Unlike the multilateral contacts developed 
by New Caledonian leaders with the assistance of the French State from 1988, 
this earlier contact was bilateral in nature, involving the Cook Islands. 
Following several hundred years of separate cultural development, and 
over a century of differing European influences, Rarotonga and Papeete did not 
enjoy important economic and diplomatic links prior to the 1980s. The 
introduction of English culture and administrative models in the Cooks since the 
1880s, paral1eled by the introduction of Gallic institutions in what became 
known as French Polynesia, served to isolate the two territories. The disparate 
European heritages of the Cook Islands and French Polynesia hindered their 
mutual cooperation. So too did the Cooks' opposition to French nuclear testing, 
which was voiced from 1963, two years before the islands gained autonomy in 
association with New Zealand.264 
None the less, an abiding tie between the Cook Islands and French 
Polynesia survived the advent of Franco-British colonial rivalry in the South 
Pacific: a common Polynesian heritage. Tahiti and its adjacent isles are the 
ancestral homelands of Cook Islanders, and after several hundred years of 
separate cultural development, Cook Islands Maori and Tahitian were still 
mutually comprehensible languages. Territorial boundaries imposed by France 
and Britain could not dispel this dimension. The Cooks and Tahiti are both 
culturally and geographically closer to one another than Tahiti is to some parts of 
French Polynesia, notably the Marquesas. In addition, geographically the Cooks 
are closer to Tahiti than to New Zealand. 
The barriers of Rarotonga's and Tahiti's disparate colonial heritages did 
not start to be significantly broken down in the fields of trade and political links 
until the early 1980s. In July 19.83, during talks in Papeete, the CIP 
Government of Geoffrey Henry negotiated access to the Tahitian market for the 
Cook Islands' fruit and vegetables.265 Six months after the installation of his DP 
Government in November 1983, Tom Davis was in Papeete for further 
discussions.266 It was agreed that Cook Islands and French Polynesian leaders 
would hold biannual meetings to discuss trade, agricultural and technical 
cooperation. These contacts predated the promulgation of the French Polynesian 
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Internal Autonomy Statute in September 1984, as well as setting the stage for 
further cooperation between Rarotonga and Papeete. In spite of the fact that the 
Cook Islands' formal link with Paris was through the French Embassy at 
Wellington, this channel was arguably less important for French relations than 
direct contacts with Papeete. 
As Territorial Vice-President before the establishment of the Internal 
Autonomy Statute, Plosse led negotiations with Cooks representatives in 1983 
and 1984. Plosse held the Cook Islands in high esteem, reflecting his desire to 
develop closer ties between French Polynesia and its Polynesian neighbours, 
and because he admired the territory as a model for the degree of autonomy that 
French Polynesia might attain.267 The appointment of Plosse as Secretary of 
State to the South Pacific was a fortunate choice for the Cooks. This obscure 
territory of around 15,000 inhabitants found for the first time that it had an active 
advocate at ministeria1level in Paris. Flosse facilitated meetings with Chirac and 
his Ministers that in tum had positive effects in Paris. In July 1986, Davis met 
Chirac in Paris in his capacity as South Pacific Forum chairman. Among the 
issues discussed was New Caledonia. Chirac received a sympathetic hearing of 
his plans for New Caledonia. Significantly, Davis was the only representative to 
defend these reforms at the annual meeting of the South Pacific Forum in August 
that year. 268 
During cohabitation, the Cooks became the recipients of unprecedented 
levels of French assistance, thanks largely to Plosse. After cyclone Sally hit 
Rarotonga on 2 January 1987 Plosse organised a relief team comprised of 57 
military and civilian personnel from Tahiti, which disembarked to help with 
reconstruction work on 7 January. Plosse fostered considerable good-will, and 
publicity, with the presentation of two excavators, three front-end loaders, 30 
chainsaws, and 40t of food and medicine. One hundred pre-fabricated houses 
were promised too. Only 33 of these had arrived by the time of the disbandment 
of Plosse's secretariat. 269 
French assistance did not end with the relief operation organised by 
Flosse. The Chirac Government budgeted 6.9MFF in aid to the Cooks for 1987, 
a figure larger than the initial allocation to Fiji of 5.3MFF.270 From 2 to 9 
September 1987 Davis's successor, Prime Minister Pupuke Robati (OP), visited 
Paris, accompanied by Plosse, to meet Chirae and his Ministers. Robati returned 
with a French commitment to a 50MFF soft loan for further reconstruction work 
and hotel development in Avarua.271 The amount to be loaned was eonfmned in 
July 1988, when the Cooks Foreign Minister Nonnan George met Avice in 
Paris to gain reassurance that the Rocard Government intended to honour the 
existing commitment to make the loan transfer in 1989.272 The agreement was 
honoured, and was the first of a series of loan agreements to be signed with 
Socialist Governments. In February 1992, the Cooks negotiated a French loan" 
worth approximately 5MFF to upgrade Rarotonga's water supply. Around the 
same time, it was estimated that French funding for the renovation of the 
Rarotonga electrical grid had exceeded 14MFF.273 
Development loans have been just one feature of diversified cooperation 
between France and the Cook Islands since the late 1980s, in which French 
Polynesia has played a function. On 12 April 1989 France appointed a 
permanent representative in Avarua in the form of an Honorary Consul, Dianne 
McKegg.274 In May 1990 the Cook Islands agreed to allow a French Polynesian 
fishing vessel to operate in the Cooks' EEZ in exchange for part of the catch. 
French Polynesia in addition offered technical assistance to the Cooks on pearl 
farming.275 Three months later de Bellescize and Geoffrey Henry, then Prime 
Minister of the Cook Islands, signed a territorial delimitation agreement 
concerning the boundary between the Cooks and French Polynesia.276 In 
October 1990 the Dumont d'UrviUe called at Rarotonga to transport 
approximately 360,OOOFF worth of French-donated solar power equipment to 
Pukapuka and Palmers ton Islands.217 
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In 1989, Alexandre Leontieff, as the French Polynesian Territorial 
President, invited Henry to Papeete to meet Rocard during his tour of the South 
Pacific. In Papeete on 24 August Henry and Rocard discussed the possibility of 
French assistance in monitoring the Cook Islands' EEZ, and a meeting was 
arranged to take place in Paris on 17 October to discuss the matter further. 278 
From 5 to 7 September 1990, a Gardian jet conducted the first French aerial 
sweep for the Cook Islands. In February 1991, the French Navy sent a Oardian 
and a patrol boat to conduct a joint patrol with the Cook Islands' lone patrol boat 
and an RNZAF Orion.279 Henry pointed out that his government needed all the 
help it could get in the way of maritime surveillance: "We have approximately 
two million square kilometres of water and only one patrol boat to look after it 
with an inadequate supply of diesel".280 Wellington's reaction to this initiative 
was positive. Don McKinnon, the New Zealand Foreign Minister, responded in 
February 1991 by saying that the National Government had no objection to the 
French helping with the maritime surveillance of the Cooks, or to the friendship 
treaty under discussion.281 The latter was signed by Henry and Cresson in Paris 
during October 1991, and entailed an undertaking to continue French cultural, 
technical and financial aid.282 
The Cooks' contacts with Papeete and Paris were a response to the need 
to find sources of aid to supplement New Zealand budgetary support, which is 
scheduled to be phased out by 2007.283 Closer ties with the neighbouring 
islands of French Polynesia and the acceptance of French finance were part of 
attempts to diversify sources of foreign development assistance. While French 
cooperation with the Cook Islands has necessarily been on a smaller scale than 
funding for Fiji, a reflection of the different sizes of the two island states more 
than of any hierarchy, it stands as one of the successes of French regional 
diplomacy from the 1980s. Aid to the Cooks helped the cultivation of a 
comparatively sympathetic member of the South Pacific Forum, which has 
refrained from taking a pro-Kanak stand on New Caledonia, and has not been 
particularly forceful in the expression of anti-nuclear policy since the 1980s. 
The Matignon Accords allowed New Caledonia to participate in French 
regional cooperation through article 88, which authorised territorial and 
provincial leaders to represent New Caledonia in negotiations with South Pacific 
states. The potential of this particular article was not neglected in the first five 
years of the implementation of the agreement. From 1988 to 1993, New 
Caledonian leaders, in close association with representatives of the French State, 
mainly the High Commissioner and ambassadorial staff in neighbouring 
countries, have been active in exploring contacts in the fields of trade, culture, 
education and agriculture. 
New Caledonian representatives, aided by the High Commissioner and 
French diplomats in the region, have negotiated various training programmes 
between the territory and its neighbours. In November 1989 a New Caledonian 
delegation comprised of members from all three provinces held talks in Australia 
with the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau, which had set 
aside an allocation of $A400,OOO for a training programme for New 
Caledonians. This programme commenced in 1990.284 That year the Australian 
Foreign Ministry funded the diplomatic training of a Loyalty Islander in 
Canberra at the request of Richard Kaioi, the President of the Loyalties 
Province, who wanted a provincial representative with knowledge of the 
Australian administration.285 In April 1992, an agreement was signed to set up a 
student exchange programme between the Port Vila branch of the University of 
the South Pacific and the Noumea campus of the French University of the South 
Pacific.286 Although territorial leaders did not playa representative role in the 
signing of the agreement, international educational cooperation has been initiated 
by the Loyalty Islands Province. Following a visit to Port Vila by Kaloi in May 
1992, a teacher exchange programme was opened between the Loyalties and 
Vanuatu. From August to December 1992 three English teachers from Vanuatu 
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worked in the Loyalties teaching primary school pupils. This transfer was the 
beginning of a scheme which for 1993 was expanded to allow five Vanuatu 
English teachers to work in the Loyalties, and three Loyalty Islanders to travel to 
Vanuatu to teach French.287 In April 1993 Kaloi met with John Kaputin, the 
PNG Foreign Minister, during his tour of New Caledonia, and held preliminary 
talks concerning a training scheme for Loyalty Islanders, to be run by the PNG 
Foreign Affairs Department.288 The Republic of Fiji has also offered some 
assistance, dedicated specifically to young Kanaks, as a sign of Melanesian 
solidarity. In January 1991 Fiji funded the training of two Kanak medical 
students in Suva.289 Fijian support for the South Pacific Forum's Kanak 
Training Fund, offered in July 1992, consisted of a donation of $F50,OOO. The 
PNG Government donated $FI40,000 to the fund, which was administered by 
the Forum Secretariat in Suva.290 
Agricultural exchanges have been of particular interest, both to New 
Caledonia and to its island neighbours. In the case of New Caledonian missions 
to New Zealand and Australia, technical advice has flowed toward the territory, 
a reflection of greater Australian and New Zealand techniCal expertise. New 
Caledonians have sought information on new fields such as deer farming, and 
on export standards for packing and processing.291 On the other hand, land 
reform is an issue of mutual interest in Vanuatu, Fiji and New Caledonia. Work 
carried out by ADRAF on land redistribution and rural development has been 
studied by Vanuatu officials for ideas that could be applied by Port Vila. In 
October 1990 Vanuatu's Minister of Agriculture, Jacques Hopa, and William 
Mahit, the Land Minister, visited New Caledonia to study the land reform 
schemes of ADRAF.292 Fijian land reform and management have similarly 
interested New Caledonian officials. In August 1990, an ADRAF delegation 
travened to Fiji to study Fijian land reform andmanagement.293 A year later, 
Kaloi travelled to Suva as well, to see what Loyalty Islanders could learn from 
Fijian systems.294 The Loyalty Islands showed even greater interest when, in 
November 1993, it sent a 21-member delegation to investigate Fijian land 
tenure. 295 
Regional trade with New Caledonia has been facilitated under the 
Matignon Accords through the relaxation of territorial import restrictions, and 
through the multiplication of trade missions since 1988. (See Appendix 11) In 
1990, Australia lent its support to French Pacific trade by offering the facilities 
of its Market Advisory Services to the French Pacific TOM, allowing acce&s to 
Australian market research data, facilitation of trade delegations and the use of 
Australian Trade Development Centres.296 The French Embassy in Suva has 
played its part in improving business links between the Pacific TOM and the 
region through the Trade Commission it opened in March 1990.297 Its liaison 
has benefited French Polynesia as well as New Caledonia. In September 1990 a 
Fijian trade mission was sent to Papeete.298 The following year, a Fijian trade 
delegation went to New Caledonia in April, which prompted the visit of a New 
Caledonian group to Fiji in August.299 Although Fijian trade with the French 
Pacific in the early 1990s was still low, the Fijian Trade Minister in 1990, 
Berenado Vunibobo, held out hopes for its increase in years to come.3OO 
New Caledonian trade with Vanuatu has traditionally been more 
important than that with Fiji. Under the Matignon Accords, trade appears set to 
increase between the two parties, and has been promoted in Noumea and Port 
Vila. In January 1992 a ministerial delegation from Port Vila arrived in Noumea 
to discuss increasing activity between Vanuatu and New Caledonia.30t A month 
later a New Caledonian trade delegation made a trip to Port Vila for the same 
purpose.302 The announcement of the establishment of a Vanuatu Consulate in 
Noumea in August, was made with the intention of promoting trade.303 This 
orientation was confirmed by the appointment in April 1993 of Serge Bourdet, 
formerly the Secretary-General of the Port Vila Chamber of Commerce, as the 
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new Consul in Noumea.304 The appointment took place in the same month as 
the official opening of the Consulate, which was presided over by Carlot. 
During his stay in N oumea, Carlot and High Commissioner Christnacht agreed 
to arrange meetings between New Caledonian and Vanuatu representatives every 
three months to review ongoing bilateral aid and cooperation. Metropolitan 
French products shipped to Vanuatu accounted for 5.4% of its imports in 1989. 
New Caledonian products represented 3.0% of imports that year.305 Noumea is 
a significant entrepot for Vanuatu's exports to metropolitan France (9.6% of 
total Vanuatu exporl~ in 1989). Vanuatu's exports to New Caledonia, mainly 
beef, represented an additional 7.7% of its annual total.306 
On 19 November 1993, cooperation between New Caledonia and 
Vanuatu was officially recognised by a friendship and cooperation accord. 
Christnacht, Simon Loueckhote, the President of the Territorial Congress, 
provincial representatives, and Lafleur, acting as the representative of the 
Balladur Government, arrived in Port Vila to sign an agreement covering 
ongoing aid and cooperation in the areas of education, commerce, sport and 
health. Christnacht hailed the document as a good example of the spirit of the 
Matignon Accords being put into practice.307 The friendship and cooperation 
agreement was consistent with the orientations of article 88 of the Accords, 
which called for greater territorial integration in the region via the participation of 
territorial representatives in international agreements.308 It was estimated that by 
the time of the signature of the agreement, the value of bilateral aid and 
cooperation funding between New Caledonia and Vanuatu had exceeded 
2MFF.309 This was a proportionately large amount. 
On a larger scale, the links opened between French Polynesia, New 
Caledonia and their regional neighbours since the 1980s have generally been of a 
minor nature, and are unlikely to displace the dependence of these three TOM on 
metropolitan France. But these links, along with those established by French 
diplomats based in the South Pacific, offered signs to suggest that by the early 
1990s French hopes of regional integration had gone beyond being little more 
than talk, as they were in the 1970s. The exception to this trend lies in Wallis 
and Futuna. Whereas the administrative leeway offered by the Internal 
Autonomy Statute (in the case of French Polynesia) and the Matignon Accords 
(in the case of New Caledonia) had helped reduce territorial isolation from the 
region, no such statute reforms were introduced in Wallis and Futuna in the 
1980s. Mata Utu has not participated in the increased regional cooperation 
reflected in greater numbers of official delegations shuttling to and from Noumea 
and Papeete in the pursuit of expanded cooperation. 
While French bilateral aid became more widely distributed in the 1980s, 
to Vanuatu's relative disadvantage, it did not become so significant by the early 
1990s that it had displaced the contributions of established donors such as 
Australia, New Zealand or Britain. However French assistance became a useful 
supplement to other sources for island nations, and played an important part in 
improving bilateral relations in the cases of Fiji, the Cook Islands, Tonga, and 
eventually Vanuatu. Other than in the Melanesian Spearhead Group nations the 
deployment of French aid was not greatly hindered by local anti-colonial or anti-
nuclear policy. Claims of French cheque-book diplomacy buying the 
acquiescence of Pacific countries on foreign policy issues are difficult to 
substantiate, except perhaps in the cases of Tonga and the Cook Islands. Like 
Australia and New Zealand with regard to French trade, most South Pacific 
island states were reluctant to refuse French assistance on the grounds of 
opposition to French testing or New Caledonian policy. Economic constraints 
outweighed ideological considerations in this respect. 
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Conclusion 
This conclusion integrates the themes of parts 1 and 2, the domestic 
politics of the Pacific TOM and French foreign relations in the region, as the 
basis for a summary of French policy in the South Pacific since 1981. As 
became evident in part 2, there has been some interplay between French national 
politics and external relations in the South Pacific, with both positive and 
negative consequences for the perception of France by governments in the zone. 
In encouraging the economic development of the Pacific TOM, French 
Governments worked towards furthering links with these territories' regional 
neighbours. Political debate over Kanak nationalism in New Caledonia and over 
the role of nuclear testing in French Polynesia spilled into the arena of 
international politics, with the South Pacific Forum members acting as advocates 
of anti-colonial and anti-nuclear policies perceived in Paris as anti-French. 
There are two major pitfalls in considering French policy which this 
work has endeavoured to avoid. The first consists of explaining presumed shifts 
in policy through analytical preoccupation with what are assumed to be major 
dilemmas. One French commentator, Jean-Christophe Victor, has suggested that 
progress came from crisis in the South Pacific. South Pacific countries' 
criticisms of French conduct in the region made Paris rethink and reshape its 
policy.l To some extent this is a valid judgement. The formation of high level 
committees to consider French policy in the South Pacific in part reflected a 
response to events in the zone. It was not merely coincidental that Mitterrand 
oversaw the creation of the South Pacific Council in December 1985, at a time 
when the South Pacific Forum was promoting the Rarotonga Treaty, when the 
Greenpeace affair had yet to reach its protracted conclusion, and when the issue 
of New Caledonian self-determination remained unsettled. The activities of 
Flosse as Secretary of State to the South Pacific demonstrated the concern of the 
Chirac Government too to respond to regional critics of France. 
Yet while the administrative bodies dealing with the South Pacific came 
and went, the standing goal of furthering the integration of France into the 
region through patient dialogue and cooperation with the states of the South 
Pacific, articulated by Cheysson in the National Assembly in November 1981,2 
stood as a policy orientation which predated and transcended disputes later in the 
1980s. The South Pacific Council, as well as the posts of Secretary of State to 
the South Pacific and Permanent Secretary to the South Pacific, were 
expressions of a French willingness to improve relations with the zone which 
has subsisted regardless of changing governments in Paris. Two integral parts 
of that South Pacific presence, whether administered by Socialist Governments 
or under cohabitation, were the maintenance of support for nuclear testing until 
April 1992 for reasons of national defence, and an unbending refusal to 
unilaterally grant independence to the Kanak minority in New Caledonia because 
of basic democratic and constitutional considerations. Such continuity in policy 
should not be obscured by analytical fixation with disputes that have not durably 
threatened the French presence in the region. 
The crisis resolution assessment of French policy formulation preferred 
by some French political writers3 should not moreover be taken too far in the 
context of French external relations with the South Pacific. Placing aside the 
sensationalism of contemporary press accounts, and the overstated comments of 
political leaders of the day, it might be asked if this model was entirely 
appropriate. As neither the Rarotonga Treaty nor the Rainbow Warrior affair 
posed a serious threat, either to Mitterrand, to the Fabius Government, or to 
French sovereignty in the South Pacific, to what extent might these issues 
validly be considered crises for the Fifth Republic? They might be better 
described as passing contretemps. The influence of Forum lobbying on French 
policy for the South Pacific should not be overestimated. For all their individual 
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and joint efforts, it cannot be said that the nations of the South Pacific brought 
about any policy changes in Paris on the major issues of New Caledonian self-
determination or nuclear testing. Nor, more notably, did the varying degrees of 
discontent expressed by these countries over French policy on these subjects 
weaken the resolve of Paris to pursue greater cooperation with the South 
Pacific. 
The scenario of French Governments responding, or failing to respond, 
to encroaching crises has some greater appJicability to their exercise of domestic 
policy in the French Pacific, although here too its importance should not be 
misjudged. The succession of statutes prepared for New Caledonia in the 1980s 
constituted evolving responses to Kanak activism and French loyalism in the 
territory, but at no point did local discontent menace state institutions or 
sovereignty, in spite of pessimistic predictions of civil war and secession. 
Neither claims by the RPCR from 1984 to 1985 that Socialist reforms were 
leading inexorably to Kanak independence, nor Tjibaou's apocalyptic assertions 
from 1987 to 1988 that the Chirac Government was attempting to eliminate 
Kanaks, proved to be more than wild, politically-motivated invective, as 
unconstructive as the divisive, cliche-ridden declamations French 
parliamentarians voiced over New Caledonia. The predilection shown by party 
leaders in Noumea and Paris from 1984 to 1988 for the politics of confrontation 
has receded to some degree since the signature of the Matignon Accords. The 
political fits and starts of the earlier period have been replaced by sustained 
efforts which, whatever their shortcomings, have been designed to improve the 
status of Melanesians in New Caledonian society, through the accordance of 
greater economic and administrative responsibilities to them, and by working 
toward the wider economic development of the territory. 
While unrest disturbed New Caledonia in 1984, French Polynesia, on 
the other hand, could only with difficulty be described as experiencing crisis. 
The smooth implementation of the Internal Autonomy Statute that year 
contrasted with the rapid abandonment of the Lemoine Statute, which had been 
promulgated at the same time. The renovation of French Polynesian 
administration by the introduction of the new statute in 1984, and its 
modification in 1990, were calm, ordered responses to the lobbying of French 
Polynesian political leaders. Nevertheless a decade later the territory faced major 
problems to which statute reform alone could not adequately respond. 
Mismanagement by Territorial Governments since the granting of greater 
autonomy in 1984, political infighting in Papeete taken to absurd extremes, and 
the reduction of the fiscal support to the local economy provided by the nuclear 
test programme since the test suspension announced in April 1992, placed 
French Polynesia in an exceedingly difficult situation. 
The second pitfall to avoid in the analysis of French relations with the 
South Pacific is uncritical acceptance of the responses of regional governments 
to French policy. This work began with examination of the administrative policy 
and reforms implemented in the Pacific TOM, as investigation of their 
functioning and problems is central to understanding the French presence in the 
South Pacific. The fundamental limitation of regional perspectives on France in 
the zone in the 1980s and into the 1990s, noted at length in chapters 6 and 7, 
has resided in an inability to accept or to understand the constraints French 
Governments faced over self-determination in New Caledonia, as well as 
regional incomprehension over Mitterrand's acceptance of nuclear deterrence 
and the implications for French Polynesia. Certain double standards evident in 
the stances of South Pacific states should not be disregarded. In addressing 
nuclear policy and decolonisation issues Australia, the largest nation in the zone, 
exercised a penchant for taking anti-colonial and anti-nuclear positions at 
France's expense while turning a blind eye to its own colonial heritage and its 
continuing nuclear alliance with the United States. Prime Minister Lini's 
acceptance of French aid at the same time as making anti-colonialist and anti-
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nuclear remarks was the most pronounced example of an island leader who 
attacked French Government policy while accepting its benevolent aspects. 
This work has preferred to look at the French Pacific from the French 
viewpoint in order to better understand why governments in Paris behaved in a 
certain manner which South Pacific Forum nations frequently found difficult to 
comprehend, or to sympathise with. The reactions of South Pacific states to 
French policy are less important in comprehending the reasoning for French 
regional policy than an examination of the economic, social and pol tical 
structures of the Pacific TOM, the influences of French political parties, the 
constitutional workings of the Fifth Repub1ic, as well as the view of the region 
from Paris. Regional perceptions, often clouded by misunderstandings and 
partisan political outlooks, have constituted more of an obstruction than an aid to 
rigorous examination of French regional policy. 
For this reason, as well as transcending the view of French policy 
conduct as a response to a series of flashpoints, this conclusion presents an 
assessment of the implementation of French internal and external policy in the 
South Pacific since 1981 judged by the criteria set in Paris. A balance sheet is 
drawn up to enable assessment of the extent to which French Governments 
achieved their policy goals under Mitterrand's presidency. 
In addition to dispelling the myths and misunderstandings associated 
with South Pacific perspectives on France and the region, sO.too this work has 
attempted to penetrate French party political posturing with the .aim of seeing the 
extent to which French Governments differed from one another in policy 
conduct. In the process a great degree of continuity has been described. Just as 
the French preoccupation in external policy, whether overseen by Socialist or 
liberal-conservative governments, was to improve the Fifth Republic's relations 
with the South Pacific, in the administration of the Pacific TOM similar 
continuity was perceptible. Party propaganda of the 1980s concerning future 
prospects was misleading in this regard. For instance right-wing 
scaremongering in Noumea and Papeete at the time of the elections of 1981 
about the imminent encroachment of communism under the Socialists did not 
come to pass any more than did the excessively optimistic Socialist promises of 
a transformation of life in the French Pacific. 
Over a decade has passed since Joseph Franceschi's statement of 
Socialist intent, offered in the National Assembly debate on the DOM-TOM in 
1980, of "une nouvelle politique economique, sociale et culturelle" for the 
DOM-TOM "sans oublier qu'il faut rendre la parole aux interesses".4 This 
reference to the need for political consultation with the inhabitants of the DOM-
TOM, also outlined in the Eighth Plan, had certainly been acted upon in the 
French Pacific by the early 1990s. Kanak militantism by the PI and later by the 
FLNKS played no small part in prompting government reforms for New 
Caledonia, whether to the advantage or to disadvantage of the Fronts. The 
creation by the Mauroy Government of the Internal Autonomy Statute in French 
Polynesia, in consultation with Plosse, showed the degree to which Paris was 
prepared to transcend party political differences. It was the Socialists, in 
government for most of the period examined by this work, who played the 
major part in reforms in the Pacific TOM. From 1986 to 1988 their reforms in 
New Caledonia were overturned under Chirac, but not durably, while in French 
Polynesia, his administration was content to leave in place legislation which had 
been introduced by them. During the first months of the second period of 
cohabitation from March 1993 there was no indication that the Balladur 
Government was contemplating statute reform. 
Statute reform in New Caledonia and in French Polynesia implemented 
by Socialist Governments from 1981 gave the inhabitants of French Polynesia 
and New Caledonia greater control of their own administration, and enabled 
them to take charge of elements of local economic, social and cultural policy. 
The Internal Autonomy Statute created a Territorial Government in French 
Polynesia, with its own Ministers, within the context of the Fifth Republic. The 
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Statute fonnally recognised local culture, and equipped territorial representatives 
with the means to fonnulate social and economic policy. After abortive attempts 
at statute refonn by Socialist Governments and by the Chirac Government from 
1984 to January 1988, the promulgation in November 1988 of the new 
territorial statute set up by the Matignon Accords allowed Kanaks and loyalists 
in New Caledonia greater influence over economic. social and cultural policy by 
ceding them administrative control at provincial level. Any assessment of the 
Matignon Accords prior to their culmination in 1998 is necessarily provisional, 
but as long as the cooperation between the French State and territorial parties is 
not disrupted by a return to violent militantism, they can be judged to have 
worked. This state cession of greater powers was not necessarily a good thing 
in the case of French Polynesia, where territorial politicians' profligate 
spending, divisive bickering and unimaginitive administration contributed to 
rising debt and budgetary problems, which were in tum aggravated by the loss 
of territorial revenue derived from the French military presence following the 
suspension of nuclear testing. The administrative renovations implemented in 
New Caledonia and in French Polynesia were not contemplated for Wallis and 
Futuna, arguably the part of France least touched by Socialist refonns under 
Mitterrand. The modernisation of local public works went on there, largely 
unaffected by changing governments in Paris, as did a refusal to contemplat~ 
statute refonn in Paris until 1991. 
White introducing territorial administrative changes, refonns undertaken 
by Paris from 1981 did not transform the economic situation of the French 
Pacific. What were described in the Eighth Plan in 1980 as the underlying socio-
economic disadvantages of the Pacific TOM remained present in the early 
1990s. The geographic situation of these territories limited the extent to which 
economic growth might occur. The distance of the French Pacific from 
metropolitan France meant that goods imported from Europe, on which all three 
territories remained dependent, continued to be expensive owing to high freight 
costs. The competitive pricing of exports to Europe was likewise hindered by 
shipping costs, and by competition from producers closer to metropolitan 
France. That over 90% of New Caledonian nickel was exported to Japan rather 
than to France was due to the availability of nickel from sources closer to 
France, resulting in lower import costs to metropolitan French industry. 
Although developing trade links has been a part of the integration of the French 
Pacific with its regional neighbours, these links, as in the DOM, have yet to 
advance to the point of displacing dependence on expensive imports from 
metropolitan France.s In 1993 the General Planning Commission estimated that 
an absolute majority of the imports of the TOM came from metropolitan France, 
and that an absolute majority of their exports were destined for metropolitan 
France.6 Trade with Pacific neighbours was restricted by the limited market 
potential of island state economies and, in the case of the larger Australian and 
New Zealand markets, by their own production capacity, as well as by the 
Australasian capacity to import goods more cheaply from other island exporters 
such as Fiji. 
The Eleventh Plan for the DOM-TOM. published in 1993, reiterated the 
structural problems which had been described by the Eighth Plan thirteen years 
before. The economic development of the Pacific TOM was restricted by their 
small population bases, the narrow range of exploited resources, and their 
"massive" dependency on state subsidies and expertise.? It was urged, as in past 
plans, that local production bases should be expanded, both for import 
substitution and for export growth, if lasting economic development was to take 
place. However, as mentioned above, the geographic and demographic barriers 
to such progress remained considerable. Past unrealistic targets such as the hope 
that the TOM would become self-sufficient in food had been abandoned by the 
Eleventh Plan. By the 1990s attempts to promote commercial agriculture in the 
French TOM, as in the DOM, had fallen far short of expectations held in the 
1970s. State and territorial development initiatives had been unable to restore 
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agriculture in New Caledonia and in French Polynesia to levels it had enjoyed 
three decades before. Manufacturing and light industry were still of marginal 
importance, a reflection of small local markets. lack of resources, and the 
distances from major export markets. Tourism was referred to in terms of its 
great potential, but this potential was likewise hindered by distance from major 
markets, and by high prices. Plans for EEZ exploitation had still not gone 
beyond talk of great potentialities, whether in the fields of deep sea fishing or 
mining. 
Apart from established industries such as mineral exploitation in New 
Caledonia and pearl farming in French Polynesia, no major chances for export-
led economic growth in the Pacific TOM presented themselves. According to the 
Eleventh Plan, of the Pacific TOM, New Caledonia appeared set for the most 
prosperous future, although this scenario was dependent on the resolution of 
political tensions under the Matingon Accords.8 The French Polynesian 
economy was described by the Eleventh Plan as being in a perillous situation.9 
Reduction in the past level of funding from the nuclear programme, difficulties 
in attracting tourists to the territory, and the absence of major new production 
areas were considered to be major troubles that needed addressing. A single 
sentence devoted to development prospects in Wallis and Futuna concluded that 
what finances locals enjoyed existed thanks solely to the presence of state 
administrative and social services. to Considering the low level of exports from 
Wallis in Futuna this was a reasonable assessment. 
As was indicated in the Eighth Plan, the existence of proportionately 
large state and territorial administrative and social services in the Pacific TOM 
served as a brake on the promotion of primary and secondary sector production. 
As civil service jobs continued to be better paid and more secure than private 
sector posts, they attracted the better educated inhabitants of the French Pacific. 
The gap between high civil service salaries and those received by workers and 
management in the private sector had not been closed and was regarded as a 
problem still to be solved. t t Although the presence of large state and territorial 
administrations overseeing the operation of welfare facilities in line with 
metropoHtan French standards had resulted in improved standards of living. in 
the absence of employment opportunities to welfare recipients an assistance 
mentality had also been instilled.t 2 Welfare had to be displaced by job 
creation. 13 The traditional nostrums of encouraging private investment in a 
variety of areas were suggested as the best manner of overcoming the 
employment problems of the Pacific TOM, even while past inadequacies in 
private sector job creation were admitted.14 
The Eleventh Plan added that an evolution of mentalities was required. 
both in Paris, and among representatives from the DOM-TOM. The leaders of 
the DOM-TOM had to go beyond begging for state funding and take the 
initiative of resolving socio-economic problems by themselves.15 This latter 
point was particularly relevant to French Polynesia.t6 The Plan questioned the 
deficiencies of state administration in the Pacific TOM. The various Ministries in 
Paris had to improve their coordination in the DOM-TOM and train more 
administrators with specialised knowledge of local conditions. Again, French 
Polynesia presented a good example of the consequences of lopsided planning 
by one Ministry without adequate coordination with others. Thirty years after 
the implantation of the CEP in French Polynesia, while the demands of national 
defence had been satisfied, officials in Paris and Papeete were still trying to 
resolve the social and economic consequences of the greater dependence the 
presence of the nuclear testing programme had promoted. Referring to the use of 
French Polynesia as a platform for nuclear testing, the Eleventh Plan observed: 
"La stnttegie nationale est imparfaite quand ne sont pas mesures et pris en 
compte tant les effets de civilisation de ces apports que les consequences de 
leurs evolutions, de leurs suspensions ou deJeurs reductions. "17 A similar case 
could have been made for New Caledonia. French settlement there in the 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries, facilitated by the confiscation of tribal lands 
from the indigenous inhabitants, and their cultural and social marginalisation by 
colonial society, had created inequalities and interethnic enmity which state 
reforms in the 1980s only partially addressed. Whether current and future 
leaders of the Fifth Republic will be capable of setting right the damage caused 
by their predecessors remains to be seen. 
The Eleventh Plan was a revelatory document in that it highlighted the 
degree to which past optimism has been replaced by greater realism in Parisian 
administrative circles. The Plan demonstrated that the Socialist hope of radical 
social and economic change in the Pacific TOM from 1981 had been restricted 
by a range of structural considerations that government reforms may never 
overcome. While the idealistic Socialist future projected for France by 
Mitterrand and the Mauroy Government in 1981 had receded into history by 
1993, the social inequalities and economic deficiencies they faced in the French 
Pacific remained to test the imagination of the Balladur Government and its 
successors. 
By 1993, the Balladur Government faced fewer substantial challenges in 
the domain of foreign relations than in the administration of the Pacific TOM. 
Differences over nuclear testing and the fate of New Caledonia, to which much 
speculation and commentary had been devoted in the 1980s, had been calmed by 
the French test suspension from April 1992, and by the implementation of the 
Matignon Accords from 1988. The positive response of the South Pacific 
Forum to these two developments facilitated the dialogue with regional nations, 
and the greater cooperation, that French Governments had been pursuing since 
the 1970s. 
The improvement of French relations with South Pacific countries 
through diplomacy and aid has been a more durable feature of French regional 
relations than the periodic expression of differences over nuclear testing and the 
fate of New Caledonia. With only rare exceptions (the Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu), South Pacific states have generally hesitated to harm their relations 
with France over these issues. Only the Solomons and Vanuatu were prepared 
to disrupt diplomatic contacts by expelling or refusing to accredit French 
diplomats on political grounds. With the minor exception of the Hawke 
Government's embargo of uranium sales to France from 1983 to 1986, no 
South Pacific government in the 1980s adopted trade sanctions against France 
on the grounds of anti-nuclear or anti-colonial policy. The Lange Government, 
in spite of protesting the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior as a breach of New 
Zealand sovereignty, had not been willing to participate in anti-nuclear protests 
in waters of Moruroa when approached by Greenpeace earlier in 1985. 
France, for its part, usually offered a conciliatory response to regional 
criticisms of its presence, while refusing steadfastly to tolerate South Pacific 
attempts to influence the exercise of domestic policy in the Pacific TOM. The 
French response to Forum lobbying in the UN over New Caledonia consisted of 
patient, unbending explanation of the constitutional and democratic motives for 
its actions, regardless of the degree of hostility to the exercise of French 
sovereignty over its Pacific possessions. On the subject of testing in French 
Polynesia, France has invoked the prerogative of its sovereignty over the 
territory, and the dictates of national defence policy, as adequate justification for 
its activities. Protests over French policy in these two areas have rightly been 
seen by Paris as constituting a regional challenge to its authority over the Pacific 
TOM. Sometimes the French defence of its policy from this challenge has 
involved overly peremptory ripostes. The Rainbow Warrior bombing proved 
that certain officials in the Ministry of Defence were capable of making an ill-
measured response on the basis of faulty intelligence and paranoia, action which 
damaged France's image in the region. The expUlsion in 1987 of the Australian 
Consul in Noumea, for having distribued innocuous aid to Melanesians, was 
unconvincingly trumped up by the Chirac Government as political interference at 
a time when Australian comments on New Caledonian policy were an irritation. 
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On other occasions, French Governments have been notably patient. The 
maintenance of relations with the Uni Government in the 1980s. however 
reduced, was an example of fortitude under trying circumstances for the sake of 
retaining French influence in Vanuatu. 
In other cases, what was considered evidence of 'French arrogance' by 
regional leaders when Paris refrained from meekly accepting their criticisms, 
was no more than the sort of reaction they themselves might have offered if a 
foreign power had challenged aspects of their own national policies. That 
French Governments refrained from international lobbying taking to task Fiji for 
its ethnic troubles, Australia for its heritage of discrimination against 
Aborigines, or Papua New Guinea for its handling of atrocities on Bougainville, 
is demonstrative of a degree of restraint and tolerance absent in the foreign 
policy conduct of the South Pacific Forum. French comments made on such 
issues were instead limited to their use as illustrations of why South Pacific 
nations should address their own internal problems before venturing to advise 
France on its domestic affairs. 
This French avoidance of treating the internal affairs of South Pacific 
countries as a legitimate domain for commentary proved advantageous in 
improving aid relations with Fiji from the time of the coups in 1987. Good 
relations with Tonga were a constant during the 1980s. In spite of the 
philosophical distance between French Republican and Tongan monarchic 
values, there were no grounds for mutual discord because neither Paris nor 
Nuku'alofa impinged on the other's domestic policies. In these instances French 
circumspection, combined with the expression of good-will through aid and 
cooperative efforts, contributed to the aim of generally improving relations in the 
South Pacific. 
The expansion of the French diplomatic network in the South Pacific 
from 1980 as Paris's response to the changing international situation there 
occurred in spite of both regional antipathy to France, and past French 
disinterest in the zone. French diplomatic relations. trade and cooperation, built 
up with Australia and New Zealand since the 1940s. continued regardless of 
certain differences of opinion. As well, France made important progress in 
increasing its participation in the grouping of independent nations established in 
the South Pacific as a result of British decoionisation from the 1960s. Although 
relations with the Melanesian Spearhead Group members were not a model for 
success in the 1980s, in the 1990s the possibility for improvement remains 
provided divisions in New Caledonia and French nuclear testing do not 
experience a resurgence. In contrast, inroads made by French diplomacy in Fiji 
and Polynesia have produced more positive results for Paris. 
For all the improvements in French relations with the South Pacific since 
the 1970s, the global importance of these developments should not be 
exaggerated. As a consequence of the marginal importance of the South Pacific 
in world affairs, and considering French foreign policy preoccupations 
elsewhere, the zone is-not likely to be a major priority for France in the rest of 
the 199Os. None the less, since the 1970s Paris has shown a greater awareness 
of its South Pacific presence, working actively to maintain its Pacific TOM and 
to improve its foreign relations in the zone. Unless a majority of the electorate in 
one or more of its Pacific Territories claims independence, France should 
maintain its existing presence in the South Pacific into the twenty-frrst century. 
Whether or not the Pacific TOM become independent, French Government 
policy is to promote their integration into the region in order to lessen 
dependence on a distant mainland, a positive precondition for the maintenance of 
good relations with neighbouring states and the furtherance of bilateral and 
multilateral links. 
Should France's relations sour in the event of the resumption of nuclear 
testing or the resurgence of political violence in New Caledonia, any 
recommencement of South Pacific Forum lobbying over these issues will 
probably not greatly harm the maintenance of a French South Pacific presence. 
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French representation in the region has survived adverse Forum reactions 
before: 25 years of objections to nuclear testing in French Polynesia. 
disapproval of the French handling of the decolonisation of the New Hebrides. 
pro-independence lobbying over New Caledonia, and protests over the Rainbow 
Warrior bombing, to list but the most prominent examples. If the 1980s offer 
any precedent, the more beneficial aspects of the French presence in the South 
Pacific in terms of trade, cooperation and aid will limit the extent to which the 
Forum would be prepared to campaign against French interests. As in the 
1980s, France would in any case pursue its domestic policies in the Pacific 
TOM and, as far as possible, its foreign policy of regional integration, 
regardless of any regional hostility. 
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Notes 
1 "In politics, as well as in other areas. progress is often made out of crisis. Some of these 
elements have been obviously and purposely 'anti-French' - or, more accurately, 'anti-French 
policy'. But they have probably also been useful to the French diplomatic service, obliging it 
to rethink and reshape its policy in this part of the world." Victor: "France in the Pacific" 
p.344. 
2 See note I, chapter 5. 
3 For analysis of the traditional view of the role of crisis resolution in French politics from 
1789 up till the Fifth Republic see "Government by Fits and Starts" in Pierre Avril: Politics 
ill France pp.29-46. For a "crisis"-strewn analysis of French relations with the South Pacific 
from 1985 to 1988 see Cordonnier: La France dans Ie Pacifique Sud 1962-1988 ch.3 "La 
France dans Ie cyclone et dynHlnique poJitique accelcree pour Ie Pacifique Sud (1985-1988)." 
4 )0. De/Jats de I'Assemb/ee NatiOllale II juin 1980 p.1662. 
5 [ ... lles effets economiques bien modestes de la cooperation region ale ne sont pas encore pour 
I'Outre-Mer un levier quantativement significatif." Commissariat General du Plan. Groupe 
«Oulre-Mef»: Outre-mer: Ie deft des sillgularites. Preparation du onzieme plan p.21. 
6 Tbid. p.22. 
7 Ibid. pp.19, 24-25, 36. 
R Thid. p.36. 
9 Ihid. p.37. 
10 Ibid. p.38. 
11 Ibid. p.97. 
12 Ibid. p.99. 
13 Ibid. p.45. 
14 Ibid. pp.IOO-102. 
15 Ibid. pp.49-50. 
10 The Internnl Autonomy Statute was considered to represent an obstacle to better fiscal 
management. Reference was made 10 "gestions laxistes non maitrisees par I'Etat [ ... J en 
PQlynesie (dont I'autonomie exclut quasiment Ie controle)". Ibid. p.41. 
17 Ibid. p.29. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. New Caledonia. Chronology 
1981-1993 
26 April, 10 May. French presidential elections. In New Caledonia, 64.97% of 
votes in the second round are for Giscard d'Estaing. 
14,21 June. French legislative elections. In New Caledonia Roch Pidjot (UC) 
and Jacques Lafleur (RPCR) are elected. 
7-12 August. Henri Emmanuelli, Secretary of State to the DOM-TOM, visits 
New Caledonia. He calls for radical social change through land reform and 
Melanesian development. 
19 September. Pierre Declercq, the Secretary-General of the UC, is murdered in 
Noumea. 
1982 
4 February. Government reform law for New Caledonia. 
22 July. The MOP occupies the Territorial Assembly. 
15 October. Government ordinances concerning New Caledonian economic 
development; the creation of the Kanak Cultural, Scientific and Technical Office; 
recognition of the priority of Kanak clans to New Caledonian land. 
1983 
18-20 May. Georges Lemoine, the new Secretary of State to the DOM-TOM, 
visits the territory. The FI boycotts his visit, demanding that the Government 
undertake tangible steps towards independence. 
20 May. Lemoine announces his policy goals for New Caledonia: social 
progress, recognition of Kanak identity and further land reform. 
12 July. Nainville les Roches declaration. 
25 September. French senatorial elections. Dick Ukeiwe (RPCR) is elected. 
November. Lemoine announces for the first time that a self-determination 
referendum will be held in New Caledonia, after the adoption of a new territorial 
statute. 
1984 
31 July. The Lemoine Statute is approved by the National Assembly. 
24 September 1984. Creation of the FLNKS. 
18 November. Territorial elections in New Caledonia. They are boycotted by the 
FLNKS. LKS participates. 
24 November. Lemoine states that the Government favours more rapid progress 
toward self-determination in New Caledonia. 
Six former French Prime Ministers and Giscard d'Estaing calion- Mitterrand to 
oppose government policy leading New Caledonia to independence. 
1 December. Establishment of the provisional government of Kanaky. Its 
president is Jean-Marie Tjibaou. 
Edgard Pisani is appointed special government delegate to New Caledonia 
2 December. Jacques Toubon. Secretary-General of the RPR. states his party's 
opposition to New Caledonian independence. 
4 December. Prime Minister Laurent Fabius announces he is assuming direct 
responsibility of the New Caledonia portfolio. 
5 December. Ten Kanak activists are killed in an ambush near Hienghene. 
12 December. Pons declares that Pisani has failed to establish order in New 
Caledonia. He calls for the dissolution of the Kanak provisional government. 
15-17 December. Pisani begins talks with New Caledonian political leaders. 
16 December. Mitterrand, speaking on TFl, states he is in favour of autonomy, 
leading to independence, for New Caledonia. 
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1985 
7 January. Pisani announces his Propositions for New Caledonia. 
12 January. Two FLNKS leaders, Eloi Machoro and Marcel Nonnaro. are killed 
by gendarmes near La Foa. 
Pisani declares a state of emergency in New Caledonia. 
17 January. Mitterrand pays a one day visit to New Caledonia. 
25 April. Fabius presents the PisanilFabius Interim statute bill. 
28 April. LKS announces its support for the statute bill. 
8 May. Riot in Noumea. A curfew is declared. 
9 May. Seven representatives supporting independence (including six for LKS) 
resign from the Territorial Assembly to protest RPCR statements. 
24 May. Pisani becomes Minister for New Caledonia. 
25 May. The FLNKS, with the exception of the FULK, announces it will 
participate in the forthcoming regional elections. 
31 May. The Territorial Assembly rejects the statute bill. 
2 June. LKS decides to participate in the scheduled regional elections. 
14 June. The curfew is lifted. 
24 July. Pisani announces that New Caledonian independence is inevitable. 
8 August. After complaints from the opposition, the Constitutional Council 
declares the PisanilFabius Interim Statute invalid. 
20 August. A new version of the statute is adopted by the National Assembly. 
23 August. The Constitutional Council rejects further complaints about the 
amended statute. 
14 September. Toubon and Chirac announce at La Foa that, should an RPR-Ied 
government be appointed in 1986. it will draw up a new statute for New 
Caledonia and organise a self-determination referendum 
29 September. Regional elections in New Caledonia. 
1986 
16, 23 March. French legislative elections. Lafleur and Maurice Nenou (RPCR) 
are elected Deputies for New Caledonia. Pidjot is not a candidate due to an 
FLNKS boycott. 
29 April. Pons, now Minister to the DOM-TOM, presents his plan for New 
Caledonia. 
17 July. Pons introduces a territorial development plan, and details of the self-
determination referendum scheduled for 1987. 
9 December. Pons meets an FLNKS delegation in Noumea. They disagree over 
voter eligibility for the self-determination referendum. 
10 December. The FLNKS calls unsuccessfully for Pons's dismissal. 
1987 
1-7 August. Pons announces an aid and development plan for New Caledonia. 
6 August. Pons bans political marches in New Caledonia before the referendum. 
22 August. An FLNKS demonstration in Noumea is dispersed by gendarmes. 
13 September. Self-determination referendum in New Caledonia. The FLNKS 
boycotts it. 98.30% of the 58.04% of the electorate which votes supports New 
Caledonia's continued adherence to the French Republic. 
2-3 October. Pons visits New Caledonia for consultations over the forthcoming 
statute. The FLNKS refuses to meet him 
29 October. The seven people responsible for the Hienghene ambush in 
December 1984 are acquitted by a Noumean court. 
1988 
22 January. The Pons Statute is promulgated. 
22 April. On Ouvea, Kanak activists kill four gendarmes and take 27 hostage at 
Fayaoue. 
24 April. First round of the French presidential elections. 
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Regional elections in New Caledonia. 
4 May. The 23 remaining hostages held by Kanak militants on Ouv6a are freed 
after a military assault. Two soldiers and 19 Kanaks are killed. . 
7 May. The FLNKS declares that after their capture, four Kanaks were killed by 
French soldiers on Ouvea. 
8 May. Mitterrand is re-elected with 52.06% of the national vote. In New 
Caledonia, 89.54% of votes are for Chirac. 
5, 12 June. French legislative elections. Lafleur and Nenou are re-elected 
Deputies for New Caledonia. 
26 June. Signature of the Matignon Accord. 
14 July. Beginning of one year of direct administration of New Caledonia by the 
French Government. 
20 August. Signature of the Oudinot Accord 
6 November. French national referendum on the acceptance of the Matignon 
Accords. Voters support them. 
1989 
4 May. Assassination on Ouvea of Tjibaou, the FLNKS President, and Yeiwene 
Yeiwene, his Vice-President, by Djubelli Wea. 
11 June. Provincial elections in New Caledonia. 
July. The USTKE withdraws from the FLNKS. 
14 July. Transfer of powers of government to New Caledonia's provinces. 
1990 
10 January. A new law extends the amnesty on political crimes included under 
the Matignon Accords. Henceforth, the amnesty applies to those convicted of 
murder. 
The FLNKS elects Paul Neaoutyine as its new President, and Rock Wamytan as 
its new Vice-President. 
April. Lafleur sells his mining company to the North Province. 
1991 
31 January. The North Province announces its decision to increase its holdings 
in the mining company formerly owned by Lafleur. Asa result, the North 
Province holds a 95% interest in the company. 
11 April. LKS withdraws from the Matignon Accords. 
27 April. Lafleur announces at an RPCR convention his hope of reaching a 
consensual solution with the FLNKS that would avoid any confrontation 
implied in the 1998 self-determination referendum. 
The FLNKS. holding its tenth congress at La Foa, does not respond to this 
announcement, but reiterates its goal of independence for New Caledonia. 
28 June. Alain Juppe, the RPR Secretary-General, declares in Noumea that 
territorial autonomy and decentralisation should be increased. He states also that 
the RPR has no intention of upsetting the Matignon Accords should it form a 
government before 1998. 
10 August. Neaoutyine criticises the pace of land redistribution in New 
Caledonia. 
19 September. A Noumean administrative tribunal annuls the Advisory Council 
on Custom, upholding complaints from tribal chiefs concerning biased 
appointments to the Council. 
17-18 October. At the third annual meeting of the Matignon Accords Monitoring 
Committee in Paris, Prime Minister Edith Cresson states her intention of 
continuing the work of her predecessor, Rocard, in supporting the accords. 
1992 
26 January. The FULK announces its dissolution in order to form a new party, 
Congres Populaire. 
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3 March. The FLNKS accuses the Government of failing to meet its obligations 
in increasing the number of Kanaks receiving tertiary education. 
13-14 March. A riot in central Noumea started by around 100 Kanak youths 
results in the destruction of the Prisunic department store. 13 Kanaks are 
arrested. 
16 April. Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy meets Fran~ois Burck, the UC 
President, and Leopold Joredie, the UC Vice-President, in Paris. Beregovoy 
states the Government's continued support for the Matignon Accords. 
2 May. After a visit to meet government representatives in Paris, Neaoutyine 
announces that the Matignon Accords appear to be benefiting the South Province 
to a greater extent than the rest of New Caledonia. 
29-31 August. FLNKS congress at Touho reaffirms the goal of Kanak 
independence through ongoing participation in the Matignon Accords. 
November. After the North Province purchases a controlling interest in 
Noumea's Surf Novotel, Hotel Ibis and its Casino, Lafleur protests that it has 
violated the spirit of the Matignon Accords in not using its development funds 
for local projects. 
Tribal chiefs on Lifou occupy the town hall at We to protest the municipal 
council's construction of new port facilities without the agreement of custom 
authority. 
1993 
January. Juppe informs Burck that, if in government after the legislative 
elections in 1993, the RPR would pursue the implementation of the Matignon 
Accords, but with some adjustments. 
2-4 February. In Paris, the mid-term review of the implementation of the 
Matignon Accords takes place. Beregovoy reiterates government support for the 
accords. 
26 February.,Mitterrand, in an RFO broadcast to the DOM-TOM, declares that 
he is open to a revision of the Matignon Accords, if desired by the FLNKS and 
the RPCR. 
March. In the French legislative elections, Lafleur and Nenou are re-elected 
Deputies for New Caledonia. 
15 April. Dominique Perben, Minister to the DOM-TOM in the Government of 
Edouard Balladur, states in an RFO interview that he does not wish to agitate 
statute debate in the DOM-TOM, and prefers to concentrate on socio-economic 
problems. 
14 June. Perben visits New Caledonia, declaring his wish to pursue the 
dialogue installed by the Matignon Accords. 
13 November. The UC declares that it wants a negotiated independence in 1998, 
with a predetermined calendar for the transfer of adminstrative powers. 
24 November. Palika announces that it will not be attending the meeting of the 
Matignon Accords coordinating committee, scheduled to be held in Paris from 6 
to 9 December. Palika considered the meeting routine and not worth the effort. 
21 November. Considering its agenda to be unproductive, Neaoutyine, as 
President of the FLNKS, decides not to go to the coordinating committee 
meeting in Paris. 
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Appendix 2. Nainville les Roches Declaration 
12 July 1983 
1) Volonte commune des participants de voir confirmer definitivement 
l'abolition du fait colonial par Ia reconnaissance a l'egalite de la civilisation 
melanesienne et la manifestation de sa representativite par la coutume dans des 
institutions a definir. 
2) Reconnaissance de la Iegitimite du peuple kanak, premier occupant du 
territoire, se voyant reconnaitre en tant que tel un droit inne et actif a 
l'independance dont l'exercice doit se faire dans Ie cadre de I'autodetermination 
ouverte egalement pour des raisons historiques aux autres ethnies dont la 
Iegitimite est reconnue par les representants du peuple kanak. 
3) Favoriser l'exercice de l'autodetennination est "une vocation de la France", 
qui doit pennettre d'aboutir aun choix, y compris celui de l'independance. II 
faut preparer cette demarche vers l'autodetennination, qui sera Ie fait du peuple 
caledonien dUini par la logique ci-dessus admise, lorsqu'U en ressentira la 
necessite. Pour preparer celte demarche, chacun est con scient qu'it faut elaborer 
un statut d'autonomie interne qui sera specifique, qui sera evolutif et qui 
marquera done une phase de transition en prenant en compte les donnees 
politiques et economiques, car it n'y aura de developpement economique 
qu'avec stabilite politique. 
Adopted by the FI, FNSC and Georges Lemoine on behalf of the French 
Government. 
Source: Cited inLe Monde 14 juillet 1983. 
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Appendix 3. Wallis and Futuna. Chronology 
1980-1993 
28 September. French senatorial elections. Sosefo Papilio (RPR), Wallis and 
Futuna's Senator, is re-elected. 
1981 
26 April, 10 May. French presidential elections. In the second round, Giscard 
d'Estaing obtains 97.37% of the vote in Wallis and Futuna. 
21, 28 June. French legislative elections. Benjamin Brial, RPR Deputy for 
Wallis and Futuna, is re-elected with 51.36% of the vote. 
12 August. Emmanuelli visits Wallis and Futuna. He announces a public works 
programme. 
1982 
21 March. Territorial elections. Brial's RPR group gains 11 of 20 seats. 
Manuele Lisiahi (RPR) is elected Territorial Assembly President. 
1983 
6, 13 March. Municipal elections. In New Caledonia, Uvea mo Futuna, a 
Wallisian party, presents candidates in Noumea. None are elected. 
November. Futuna's two kings unsuccessfully demand TOM status for Futuna. 
Three RPR Councillors in the Territorial Assembly join the UDF group to form 
an 11 member coalition. One of the defectors, Falakiko Gata, is elected 
Territorial Assembly President. 
1984 
17 June. European parliamentary elections. In Wallis and Futuna, the 
UDF/RPR coalition gains 82.41 % of the vote. 
18 November. Territorial elections in New Caledonia. Uvea mo Futuna presents 
a Wallisian list in the South Region, but fails to win any seats. 
1985 
January. In Noumea, six custom chiefs from Wallis and Futuna declare their 
opposition to independence for New Caledonia. 
27 March. The Fabius Government's development plan for Wallis and Futuna is 
finalised. 
April. Falakiko Gata forms UPL, an independent, local party. 
8 May. At Ponerlhouen, in New Caledonia, Kanak activists occupy a farm to 
protest against its employment of Wallis ian labour. 
June. Falakiko Gata meets Mitterrand and Fabius in Paris. He reaffIrms Wallis 
and Futuna's ties with Fmnce, but criticises French development plans. 
October. Confrontations between Kanaks and Wallisians on the outskirts of 
Noumea. 
29 November. Near Poya, in New Caledonia, the FLNKS takes ten hostages in 
an attempt to force Wallisian labourers to leave the area. 
1986 
13 January. Pierre Joxe, then Minister of the Interior, visits Wallis and Futuna. 
16, 23 March. French legislative elections. Brial is re-elected Deputy for Wallis 
and Futuna. 
May. Pons, FIosse and Lafleur visit the territory together to announce the policy 
goals of the Chimc Government. 
29 July. Public television broadcasting begins on Wallis. 
31 August-l September. Chirac visits Wallis and Futuna. He announces 
increased development funding. 
383 
29 October. After verbal threats from Wallisians for his refusal to repatriate an 
unpopular functionary, Jacques Le Henaff, the Superior Administrator of Wallis 
and Futuna, declares a state of emergency. 
31 October. The state of emergency is lifted after the arrival of a platoon of 
gendarmes from New Caledonia. 
27-28 December. Cyclone Raja hits Futuna, destroying 340 homes and killing 
one person. 
1987 
15 March. Territorial elections. Seven of the 20 seats in the Territorial Assembly 
are obtained by the RPR group, seven by the UDF and six by UPL. 
17 March. Falakiko Gata is elected to the post of Territorial Assembly President, 
leading a UPl./RPR coalition with 13 seats. 
28 October. Appointment of Gerard Lambette, Le Henaffs replacement as 
Superior Administrator. 
9-11 December. Pons visits Wallis and Futuna to consult local leaders. 
1988 
16 March. Pons pays a one-day visit to Mata Utu to open a new high school. 
24 April, 8 May. French presidential elections. In WalJis and Futuna, 73.19% 
of votes go to Chirac in the second round. 
5,12 June. French legislative elections. Brial is re-elected Deputy. 
23 June. Kamilo Gala (UDF), Brial's opponent in the elections, lodges a 
complaint about electoral irregularities with the Superior Administrator. 
23 December. Promulgation of the decision by the Constitutional Council to 
annul Brial's election due to polling fraud. 
1989 
15 January. Kamilo Gata defeats Brial in a rerun of 1988 legislative elections. 
Gata is elected Deputy on a presidential majority platform. 
May. Creation of the UO in Noumea. 
11 June. Provincial elections in New Caledonia. The VO wins two seats in the 
South Province. 
18 June. European parliamentary elections. In Wallis and Futuna 54.86% of the 
vote is for the PS. 
24 August. Rocard visits Wallis and Futuna. He calls for development and 
solidarity with France. 
1990 
6 February. Cyclone Ofa causes 52MFF worth of damage on Wallis and 
Futuna. 
31 July. Le Pensec visits Wallis to open a college. 
1 August. In Papeete, just after his departure from Mata Utu, Le Pensec 
announces that round table discussions on territorial economic development will 
be held in 1991. 
1991 
13 June. A delegation from the Territorial Assembly meets Le Pen sec in Paris to 
discuss a territorial development plan. 
1992 
22 March. Territorial elections. Independents gain 11 seats, the RPR gains six, 
and presidential majority gains three. 
25 March. Soane Uhila is elected Territorial Assembly President, leading an 
alliance of presidential majority and independent Councillors. For the fIrst time 
since 1964, the RPR is not in the governing majority in the Territorial 
Assembly. 
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29-31 July. Le Pensec visits Mata Utu. He announces to the Territorial 
Assembly that he wants to receive reform proposals from local representatives 
as a basis for the redefmition of Wallis and Futuna's statute. 
1993 
12 March. An earthquake hits Futuna, killing three people and injuring twelve 
others. Le Pen sec allocates 4MF CFP of emergency aid and sends around 100 
relief workers to the island. 
28 March. Kamilo Gata (MRG) is re-elected Deputy for Wallis and Futuna in 
the second round of the French legislative elections. 
May. The two kings of Futuna decree that, to appease God after the earthquake, 
their subjects must dedicate their Sundays to worship, to the exclusion of 
business and leisure activities. 
June. Philippe Legrix, the Superior Administrator, cuts off state funding to the 
kings, declaring that their decree infringes civil liberties. He warns that the 
decree must be lifted by 30 September or further state reprisals will be made. 
18 June. Perben visits Wallis and Futuna. He announced that a further 400MF 
CFP is to be provided for cyclone reconstruction. 
3 October. After a power cut, interpreted as state reprisals against Futunan 
dissent, several Futunans beat up Jean Mauro, Legrix's delegate on Futuna. The 
local administrative office and official vehicles are vanda1ised. 
4 October. Ten gendarmes arrive from Noumea. Two people are arrested. The 
two Wallisian kings lift their decree. 
1981 
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Appendix 4. French Polynesia. Chronology 
1981-1993 
26 April, 10 May. French presidential elections. Giscard d'Estaing gains 
50.45% of votes cast in French Polynesia. 
21 June. In the first round of the legislative elections in French Polynesia, 
Gaston Flosse (RPR) is re-elected Deputy for East Polynesia (second 
constituency). 
5 July. Jean Juventin (UDF) is re-elected Deputy for West Polynesia (first 
constituency). 
13-20 August. Emmanuelli visits French Polynesia. He announces the creation 
of a working party on a new territorial statute and development plan. 
1982 
23 May. Territorial elections in French Polynesia. Tahoeraa Huiraatira, led by 
Flosse, forms a coalition government. 
29 August. Flosse resigns as Deputy after being elected Territorial Vice-
President. Tutaha Salmon (RPR) is elected in a by-election as Deputy for East 
Polynesia. 
1984 
17 June. European parliamentary elections. The UDF/RPR coalition gains 
61.63% of French Polynesian votes. Flosse is elected as a French representative 
to the European Parliament. 
6 September. French Polynesia's Internal Autonomy Statute is promulgated. 
14 September. Rosse becomes the first elected Territorial President. 
1985 
13 February. In Noumea, Flosse signs the Interritorial Alliance between French 
Polynesia and New Caledonia with Ukeiwe. 
10 April. Following proceedings instigated by Pisani, the Interterritorial Alliance 
is annulled. 
29 June. In Papeete, Flosse and Ukeiwe sign a new Interterritorial Alliance, 
which omits the clause contested by Pisani. 
18 December. The number of seats in the Territorial Assembly is increased to 
41. 
27 December. At Flosse's request, Mitterrand dissolves the Territorial Assembly 
after the collapse of the Territorial Government 
1986 
16 March. First round of the French legislative elections. Flosse is elected 
Deputy for East Polynesia. Alexandre Uontieff (RPR) wins the other seat. 
20 March. Edouard Fritch, Flosse's proxy, becomes Deputy of East Polynesia 
after Flosse is appointed Secretary of State to the South Pacific. 
16, 23 March. Territorial elections. Tahoeraa Huiraatira wins 23 seats. 
15 April. Flosse is re-elected Territorial President. He announces education, 
jobs and housing for the young as his priorities. 
May. Pons visits French Polynesia. He announces the support of the Chirac 
Government for the Internal Autonomy Statute. 
1-2 September. Chirac visits French Polynesia and meets local leaders. 
24 November. A series of strikes in French Polynesia since early November 
culminate in a general strike. 
11 December. The general strike ends. 
1987 
9 February. Flosse resigns as Territorial President due to his work as Secretary 
of State to the South Pacific. 
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12 February. Jacques Teuira (Tahoeraa Huiraatira) is elected Territorial 
President. 
23 October. Rioting and looting in Papeete as conflict over a dockers' strike 
escalates. 
24 October. High Commissioner Pierre Angeli declares a 12-day state of 
emergency and imposes a curfew on Papeete and its suburbs. 
1 November. After the quelling of the riot and the arrest of trade unionists, 
Angeli lifts the curfew. 
7 December. Teuira resigns after Alexandre Uontieff breaks with Tahoeraa 
Huiraatira, fonns a new majority coalition party in the Territorial Assembly, and 
tables a no-confidence vote in the President. 
9 December. Uontieff is elected Territorial President. 
1988 
8 May. Second round of the French presidential elections. In French Polynesia 
Mitterrand receives 53.47% of the vote. 
12, 26 June. French legislative elections in French Polynesia. Uontieff 
(RPR/PS) is elected Deputy for West Polynesia. Emile Vernaudon (Ai'a Api) is 
elected Deputy for East Polynesia. 
1989 
21 January. The French Government and the Territorial Government sign a 
development plan for 1989-1993. 
16 May. The Territorial Assembly receives documents on European integration 
and the TOM, but only after the Rocard Government's signature of them. 
26 May. In protest, the Territorial Assembly recommends that French 
Polynesian voters boycott the forthcoming European parliamentary elections. 
18 June. European parliamentary elections. 89.24% of French Polynesian 
voters abstain. 
24-27 August. Rocard visits French Polynesia. He calls for continued 
development and partnership with France. He also announces a reduction in the 
annual number of nuclear tests made in French Polynesia. 
1990 
14 February. Vernaudon is excluded from Uontieffs administration for having 
negotiated with FIosse over forming a new majority in the Territorial Assembly. 
9 April. Supporters of FIosse and Vernaudon disrupt a Territorial Assembly 
meeting by occupying the debating chamber after the failure of a vote of censure 
against the Uontieff Government. 
15-18 May. Mitterrand visits French Polynesia. He calls for labour and social 
refonn as well as the introduction of personal income tax. 
31 May. At the Elysee, Mitterrand reconciles Uontieffand Vernaudon. 
12 July. The Internal Autonomy Statute is modified. 
1991 
17 March. Territorial elections in French Polynesia. Tahoeraa Huiraatira wins 
18 seats. 
21 March. Rosse and Vernaudon fonn a coalition government. 
4 April. Flosse is elected Territorial President, with Vernaudon as Territorial 
Assembly President. 
21 June. Beginning of a three week-long truckers' strike in Papeete in protest 
against FIosse's decision to increase taxes on petrol and various consumer 
items. In response to these protests, FIosse abandons the legislation. 
September. FIosse overturns his alliance with Vernaudon and fonns another 
with Juventin. Vernaudon retaliates by refusing to convoke the Territorial 
Assembly. Consequently, no territorial budget can be approved for 1992. 
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1992 
3 April. Michel Jau, the High Commissioner. confirms the legality of the 
election of Juventin as Territorial Assembly President at a meeting held by a 
majority of Territorial Councillors outside the Territorial Assembly. 
22 April. Flosse leaves Papeete for Paris to discuss French Polynesia's 
economic future with Le Pen sec after the announcement of the suspension of 
nuclear testing in the territory for 1992. 
13 May. Mitterrand reassures Flosse and other members of a French Polynesian 
delegation in Paris that they should not worry about the suspension of testing: it 
would only be temporary. Mitterrand promises compensatory economic 
assistance to French Polynesia. 
14 May. A territorial development charter is initiated by the French Polynesian 
delegation and the French Government. 
July. Jau seizes control of the territorial budget due to the Territorial 
Government's refusal to reduce spending. 
The conclusions of the territorial development charter are presented. They 
express broad disenchantment with the Territorial Government and the 
Opposition. 
1993 
January. Flosse and Juventin lead a delegation to Paris to negotiate territorial 
funding. Talks with Le Pen sec end in disagreement. The delegation asks for a 
meeting with Beregovoy due to its dissatisfaction over the level of proposed 
development funding. 
28 January. The French Government agrees to provide an extra amount of 
approximately 115MFF for special development funding. 
13 March. First round of the legislative elections in French Polynesia. Flosse is 
elected Deputy for East Polynesia. 
28 March. Second round of the French legislative elections. Juventin (RPR) is 
elected Deputy for West Polynesia. 
11 June. Flosse introduces a progressive income tax which peaks at 3% on 
monthly incomes over 8,250FF, as well as new taxes on wine, petrol and 
unearned income. . 
21 June. Perben addresses the Territorial Assembly, assuring its members that 
the Balladur Government will retain existing development agreements, and 
announcing an advance of 160-200MFF to allow the Territorial Government to 
cover its budget deficit. 
22 July. In Paris Perben opens negotiations on territorial development with a 
delegation from French Polynesia. 
15 September. Flosse announces in Papeete that the Balladur Government has 
undertaken to deploy 3,4lOMFF to assist territorial economic recovery from 
1994-1998. 
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Appendix 5. Interritorial Alliance, 13 February 1985 
Protocole d'Alliance des Territoires Fran~ais du Pacifique 
Les Gouvernements des territoires fran~ais de Polynesie et de Nouvelle-
Catedonie, habilites par deliberation de leurs Assemblees Territoriales et 
representes par leur Presidents. 
Conscients d'appartenir a une meme civilisation dont la valeur est, au-
dela des identites ou des diversites culturelles, universelle et qui est fondee sur 
l'idee de liberte. 
Profondement attaches a cette conception du destin de l'homme et a son 
expression politique - la democratie. 
Respectueux des principes de legalite n5publicaine et de souverainete 
nationale qui assurent l'egalite devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction 
d'origine, de race ou de religion, par Ie suffrage universel, egal et secret. 
Fideles a la Constitution et aux lois qui definissent les statuts de leurs 
Territoires en vertu desquelles i1 beneficient d'une large autonomie interne dans 
Ie cadre de la Republique leur permettant de s'administrer librement par leurs 
representants elus. 
Constatant que l'idee de civilisation et Ie concept de democratie qu'ils 
partagent sont mis en peril, dans cette partie du Pacifique, par des tentatives 
d'hegemonie faites sous couvert d'ideologies. 
Constatant aussi que la legalite republicaine, Ie respect de la Constitution 
et l'application des lois statutaires sont actuellement menaces dans run des 
terri toires. fran~ais du Pacifique. 
Constatant en fin qu'it existe entre eux une communaute d'interets, 
fondee non seulement sur leur appartenance a Ia nation fran~aise dont ils 
partagent la langue et la culture, mais aussi sur leur situation geographique et Ie 
niveau de leur developpement economique et social. 
Convaincus qu'ilsont Ie devoir de participer a la defense du monde libre 
dans cette partie du Pacifique, de proteger les droits de l'homme et du citoyen 
sur leur sol et de preserver l'integrite du territoire national. 
Persuades en outre qu'une alliance entre les territoires fran~ais du 
Pacifique, etabHe sur la base d'un ideal commun de liberte, d'egalite et de 
fraternite et sur la solidarite des peuples qui les composent est devenue 
necessaire pour assurer la prosperite economique, Ie progres social et Ie 
developpement culturel de leurs habitants. 
Article ler - Les Territoires fran~ais du Pacifique conc1uent une Alliance pour 
defendre et proteger leurs interets communs en matiere politique, economique, 
sociale et culturelle. 
Article 2 - Vne conference des Presidents des Gouvernements de la Polynesie 
Fran~aise et de la Nouvelle-Caledonie est creee. 
Cette conference se n5unit au moins quatre fois par an, successivement 
dam; chacun des Territoires composant I'Alliance et sous Ia presidence du 
representant du Territoire dans lequel elle a eu lieu. La premiere reunion se 
tiendra a Noumea dans Ie mois qui suit la signature du present protocole. 
Article 3 - La conference des Presidents a pour objet de permettre a ses 
membres: 
- de prendre contact, au nom de I'Alliance, avec d'autres territoires ou Etats du 
Pacifique, afin de nouer avec eux des relations de nature a favoriser un 
rapprochement entre les peuples du Grand Ocean. 
- d'echanger des informations concernant la situation de chacun des territoires de 
l'Alliance. 
- d'elaborer une politi que commune de developpement economique, notamment 
en matiere de tourisme, d'agriculture, d'aquaculture. 
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- de mettre en commun l'experience acquise au cours de la mise en place des 
institutions territoriales issues de leurs statuts respectifs afin d'ameliorer Ie 
fonctionnement de l'autonomie interne. 
La conference des Presidents fixe en outre la periodicite et l'ordre du jour 
de la commission permanente. 
Article 4 - Les Presidents des Gouvernements des territories fran~ais du 
Pacifique membres de I'Alliance designent chacun deux ministres ou conseillers 
territoriaux pour participer aux travaux de la Commission Permanente. Us se 
notifient mutuellement la composition de leur delegation respective avant chaque 
reunion de la dite commission 
Les membres de la delegation permanente peuvent s'adjoindre des 
experts ou des commissaires qui n'ont pas voix deliberative. Us se reunissent 
sur convocation de la Conference des Presidents dans Ie territoire qui a organise 
la derniere conference et sous la presidence de run des representants de ce 
territoire. 
Article 5 - La commission permanente est charge 
- de mettre en reuvre les pro jets adoptes par la conference des presidents. 
- de proposer a la dite conference toute mesure de nature a faciliter 
l'harmonisation des diverses reglementations des territoires membres de 
l'Alliance. 
Article 6 - Le secretariat de l'Alliance est assure par un Secretaire General 
designe par la conference des Presidents, de sa propre initiative ou a la demande 
de la Commission permanente, afin d'approfondir l'etude d'un domaine ou d'un 
probJeme particuJier. 
Article 8 - Chaque Terrltoire supporte la charge financiere resultant du 
deplacement et de l'Mbergement des membres de sa delegation. 
Le Territoire concerne assure en outre les frais d'organisation de la 
conference des Presidents et de la commission permanente qui se tiennent chez 
lui. 
Article 9 - Le financement des actions qui ont ete conjointement decidees est 
apporte par chacun des territoires, membres de l'Alliance. Des conventions 
particulieres definiront, Ie cas echeant, la repartition des charges entre les 
Territoires. 
Article 10 - Le territoire des iles Wallis et Futuna peut adherer au present 
protocole: un avenant determinera alors les modifications qui doivent y etre 
apportees pour tenir compte du statut de ce Territoire. 
Article 11 - Le present protocole est conclu pour une duree indeterminee. 11 
pourra etre denonce it tout moment par run des Territoires qui y a adhere a 
condition que les autres Territoires en soient avise. Dans ce cas un accord 
particulier definira les mesures transitoires applicables au reglement des actions 
en cours et les modalites de liquidation des financements conjoints vises it 
l'article 9. 
Article 12 - Les decisions prises en application du present protocole s'executent 
dans Ie cadre des pouvoirs et des attributions qui ont ete conferees aux 
institutions de chacun des territoires adherents. 
Le president du Gouvernement de la Polynesie Fran~aise 
Gaston Rosse 
Le President du Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Caledonie 
DickUkeiwe 
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Ratified in Noumea on 13 February 1985. 
Source: Cited in La Depeche de Tahiti 25 j~vier 1985. 
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Appendix 6. French Regional Diplomacy. Chronology 
1980-1993 
June. Robert Puissant, the first resident French Ambassador in Fiji, arrives in 
Suva. 
30 July. Yves Rodriguez assumes his responsibilities as the frrst resident French 
Ambassador to Vanuatu. 
12 November. Antoine Colombani, France's first resident Ambassador to Papua 
New Guinea, has his accreditation received in Port Moresby. 
1982 
4-8 May. Staff from the Elysee and the Quai d'Orsay organise a·conference in 
Paris, attended by French ministers, diplomats and other officials associated 
with the Asia-Pacific region. Claude Cheysson, the Foreign Minister. underlines 
the importance of greater French economic activity in the region. 
1983 
9-10 March. An official landing party from Vanuatu hoists the national flag on 
Hunter Island and claims it and neighbouring Matthew Island for Vanuatu. 
Late March. France stations marines on Matthew Island to reinforce its territorial 
claim to it and Hunter Island. 
13-23 June. Regis Debray, the French presidential envoy to the South Pacific. 
tours the region. 
14-15 November. Cheysson visits New Zealand. This is the frrst time a French 
Foreign Minister has visited the country. In Wellington, he discusses the EEC. 
French testing and New Caledonia. 
1985 
12 January. Robert McFarlane, the US Ambassador to France, expresses 
continued American support for the French presence in the South Pacific. 
29-30 January. Rocard, then Minister of Agriculture, visits Canberra. He meets 
his Australian counterpart, John Dawkins, as well as Bill Hayden. the 
Australian Foreign Minister, and Bob Hawke. the Prime Minister. 
31 January -1 February. Rocard visits New Zealand. He meets Prime Minister 
Lange, Colin Moyle, the Minister of Agriculture, and Mike Moore, the Minister 
of Overseas Trade and Marketing. Discussions concern trade. New Caledonia 
and nuclear testing. 
8 September. In Paris Mitterrand creates the South Pacific Coordination 
Committee to review French regional policy. 
14 September. Mitterrand visits Moruroa. He restates France's intention of 
maintaining its Pacific presence and of continuing nuclear testing. He presides 
over the first meeting of the South Pacific Coordination Committee. 
23 December. The Council of Ministers announces the creation of the South 
Pacific Council, which replaces the South Pacific Coordination Committee. 
1986 
18 January. Debray is appointed Secretary-General of the South Pacific 
Council. 
26 February. First meeting of the South Pacific Council in Paris. Plans are 
announced for the construction of a French University of the South Pacific. and 
for increased regional scientific cooperation. 
March. Gaston Flosse is appointed Secretary of State to the South Pacific. 
28 May. In Paris, Flosse outlines French South Pacific policy to the Council of 
Ministers. He states the importance of the South Pacific to France and expresses 
his opinion that French aid, commerce and technical cooperation in the region 
should increase. 
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October. Eight years after the establishment of diplomatic relations with France, 
the Solomon Islands Government decides to allow the French Ambassador in 
Vanuatu to present his credentials in Honiara, but the plan is abandoned in face 
of local opposition. 
November. A conference of high officials and French diplomats in the South 
Pacific is held in Papeete. 
1987 
24-29 January. Flosse visits the United States to outline French Pacific policy. 
15-17 May. A conference in Noumea for French ambassadors and senior 
officials in the Pacific is chaired by Flosse. He announces the South Pacific aid 
programme for 1988 and increased French regional cooperation. 
7 April. In Paris, Chirac and seven of his ministers hold a meeting of his 
Interministerial Committee devoted to the South Pacific. They decide to open 
Consulates in Hawaii and in Micronesia. 
June. In Brussels, Wilson Ifunoa, the Solomon Islands' roving ambassador, is 
blocked by France from presenting his credentials to the EEe. 
4-8 June. Flosse visits Hawaii to discuss the opening of a French Consulate 
there with Governor John Waihee. Flosse also visits the US naval base at Pearl 
Harbour and the University of Hawaii. 
22 October. The Interministerial Committee devoted to the South Pacific meets 
in Paris to discuss and approve some Fijian requests for French aid. 
1 December. Meeting of the Interministerial Committee devoted to the South 
Pacific. It approves more welfare spending in French Polynesia and confirms 
plans for the construction of the French University of the South Pacific. 
1988 
10-12 March. A conference is held at Huahine, in French Polynesia, for French 
ambassadors and senior officials in the South Pacific. The meeting resolves to 
promote reforms in the Pacific TOM, and to improve French relations with the 
region. 
June. Following the defeat of the Chirac Government in the French legislative 
elections, the Secretariat of State to the South Pacific is disbanded by the Rocard 
Government. Flosse's portfolio becomes the concern of the Permanent 
Secretary to the South Pacific. 
September. In Paris, Le Pen sec announces the reactivation of the South Pacific 
Council. 
December. France estabHshes a Consulate in Hawaii. 
1989 
10-12 February. Meeting in Noumea of French ministers and other high 
officials involved with the South Pacific, attended by Le Pen sec and Edwige 
A vice, Delegate Minister to Foreign Affairs. Announcement of the aim of 
opening the Pacific TOM to regional trade and cooperation. 
Late February. Avice visits Australia, Western Samoa, American Samoa and 
Hawaii. 
12 April. France's first Honorary Consul to the Cook Islands, Dianne McKegg, 
is appointed. 
14-15 July. Philippe Baude, Permanent Secretary to the South Pacific, visits 
Kiribati for the first dialogue meeting between South Pacific Forum 
representatives and other regional states. 
18-19 August. Rocard, the first French Prime Minister to visit Australia, stops 
in Canberra and Sydney. In Canberra, he speaks to the CSIRO, the Australian 
Parliament, and meets Hawke and Andrew Peacock, leader of the Opposition. 
23 August. Rocard visits Suva. He is both the first French Prime Minister to 
visit Fiji, and the first French head of government to visit an island state of the 
South Pacific. 
393 
12-15 N ovem ber. Kolpakas, the Vanuatu Foreign Minister, visits Paris to 
discuss bilateral links. This is the first visit by a Vanuatu Minister since 1982. 
On 13 November, he meets Avice. 
1990 
17 May. In Papeete, Mitterrand presides over the second meeting of the South 
Pacific Council, inactive since 1986. Announcement of the expansion of courses 
offered by the French University of the South Pacific, increased French support 
for regional environmental protection, the establishment of a disaster relief 
reserve, and the intention of offering French maritime surveillance of island 
states' EEZs. 
1991 
29 April-l May. Rocard makes the first visit to New Zealand by a French Prime 
Minister. 
14 March. The Quai d'Orsay announces the closure of the French Embassy at 
Port Moresby. The decision is reversed in 1992. 
October. A Cook IslandslFrance friendship agreement is signed in Paris by 
Henry and Prime Minister Cresson. 
1992 
March. Papua New Guinea opens its Embassy in Paris, headed by Ambassador 
Andrew Yauieb. 
July. Meeting in Noumea of French ministers and other high officials involved 
with the South Pacific. The meeting resolves that France should coordinate its 
disaster relief efforts with Australia and New Zealand. 
1993 
June. Paias Wingti, the PNG Prime Minister, announces the closure of his 
country's Embassy in Paris for budgetary reasons. 
20 July. Lafleur is appointed by Balladur as French trade delegate to South-east 
Asia and the Pacific, in order to improve French trade relations~ 
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Appendix 7. Decret no. 85-1410 du 30 decembre 1985 
relatif au Conseil du Pacifique Sud 
[ ... ] 
Article ler. - II est cree un Conseil du Pacifique Sud preside par Ie President de 
la Republique el, en cas d'empechement de celui-ci, par Ie Premier ministre ou, 
It defaut, par Ie ministre des relations exterieures. 
Le conseil comprend: 
10 Le premier ministre, Ie ministre des relations exterieures, Ie ministre 
de la defense et Ie ministre charge des tenitoires d'outre-mer; 
20 Les ambassadeurs de France dans les Etats suivants: Australie, 
Nouvelle-zelande, Samoa occidentales, Vanuatu, iles Salomon, iles Fidji, 
Tonga, Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinee; 
30 Le premier ou Ie second delegue de la France 11 la commission du 
Pacifique Sud cre6e par la convention signee 11 Canberra Ie 6 fevrier 1947; 
40 Les hauts-commissaires de la Republique en Polynesie fran~aise et en 
Nouvelle-Caledonie, ainsi que l'administrateur superieur a Wallis-et-Futuna; 
50 Le commandant superieur des forces armees de Ia Polynesie fran~aise, 
commandant du Centre d'experimentations du Pacifique, Ie directeur des centres 
d'experimentations nucleaires et ]e commandant superieur des forces armees en 
Nouvelle-Caledonie. 
Des membres du Gouvernement et des hauts fonctionnaires civils et 
militaires non mentionnes a ratinea precedent, ainsi que loute autre personnalite 
qualifiee, peuvent etre appeles par Ie President de la Republique a prendre part 
aux travaux du conseil sur les questions relevant de leur competence. 
Article 2. - Le president du gouvernment du tenitoire de la Polynesie fran~aise, 
Ie president du congres du territoire de la Nouvelle-Caledonie et dependances et 
Ie president de l'assemblee terri tori ale du territoire des iles Wallis-et-Futuna 
peuvent etre invites a participer aux travaux du conseil. 
Article 3. - Le conseil coordonne les differents aspects de la politique de la 
France dans Ie Pacifique Sud, notamment la cooperation culturelle, scientiflQue 
et technique avec les Etats de Ia region. 
Article 4. - Le secretariat du conseil est assure par un secretaire general nomme 
par decret du President de la Republique. 
Article 5. - Le conseil se reunit a Paris ou dans un territoire d'outre-mer du 
Pacifique Sud. 
Article 6. - Le Premier ministre et Ie ministre des relations exterieures sont 
charges de l'execution du present deeret, qui sera publie au Journal Ojficiel de la 
Republique fran~aise. 
Fait a Paris, Ie 30 decembre 1985. 
Par Ie President de la Republique: 
FRAN<X>IS MITTERRAND 
Le Premier min istre, 
LAURENT FABIUS 
Le ministre des relations exterieures, 
ROLAND DUMAS 
Source: Journal Officiel. Lois et decrets. 
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Appendix 8. Letter to the Secretary of State Charged with the 
Problems of the South Pacific 
Paris, Ie 23 avril 1986 
Le Premier ministre 
Monsieur Ie Secretaire d'Etat et Cher Ami, 
L'une des innovations dans la composition de l'actuel Gouvemment a 
laquelle j'attache une importance particuliere est la creation d'un secretariat 
d'Etat charge des problemes du Pacifique Sud. 
Le decret definissant vos attributions prevoit que vous assistez Ie 
Ministre des Departements et Territoires d'Outre-Mer pour les problemes de 
cette zone; mais j'ai estime, en accord avec lui, que ce cadre ne pouvait definir a 
lui seul votre mission au sein du Gouvemement et qu'il convenait de preciser 
celle-ci par la presente lettre. 
Vous exercerez la competence definie par ce decret sur l'ensemble des 
territoires de la Republique dans la zone du Pacifique Sud. II conviendra, en 
outre, que vous soyez etroitement associe a la conduite de la politique de la 
France a l'egard des Etats insulaires et riverains de cette region. Cette 
association prendra notamment la forme d'une participation aux negociations 
relatives aux droits de peche, aux droits de trafic aerien et aux droits de diffusion 
concernant Ie Pacifique Sud. 
Dans Ie cadre de la politique exterieure fran~aise et en liaison avec Ie 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, vous pourrez etablir avec les Etats de votre 
zone de competence, les relations qui seront necessaires a l'accomplissement des 
missions qui vous seront confiees. 
Mais au-dela de ces missions specifiques, votre action tendra 
essentiellement a assurer Ie rayonnement de nos activites economiques et de 
notre technologie, de nos scientifiques et de notre capacite de recherche, de notre 
culture et de celie des peuples du Pacifique. Cette action suppose la mobilisation 
des moyens dont dispose notre pays afin de develop per Ies territoires fran~ais du 
Pacifique Sud ainsi que la cooperation que ces demiers peuvent avoir avec les 
pays de la zone. II vous appartient de donner sa pleine efficacite a cette 
mobilisation. 
Ainsi que Ie prevoit Ie decret d'attribution, vous disposerez pour 
accomplir votre mission des services du Ministere des Departements et 
Territoires d'Outre-Mer. En outre, vous recevrez en tant que de besoin Ie 
concours du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et du Ministere de Ia 
Cooperation. Vous disposerez en outre, par l'intermediaire des representants du 
Gouvemement, des services exterieurs des Ministeres techniques dans chacun 
des territoires de la zone. 
Wotre mission, qui s'exercera au creur d'un ocean appe1e a jouer un rOle 
croissant dans Ies annees a venir, vous conduira a resider tres largement sur 
place, tout en disposant de la possibilite d'entretenir avec Ie Gouvemement les 
relations necessaires. Je veillerai done a ce que les moyens qui vous sont 
attribues tiennent compte des contraintes particulieres qui vous sont imposees. 
Je vous prie d'agreer, Monsieur Ie Secretaire d'Etat, l'assurance de mes 
sentiments les meilleurs. 
Aussi rna tres cordiale amitie, 
Jacques CHIRAC 
Source: photocopy. 
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Appendix 9. France and South Pacific Nuclear Issues. 
Chronology 1981·1993 
1981 
29 May. Hernu announces a freeze on French nuclear testing while a study is 
made concerning the test programme's future. 
2 June. The French Defence Ministry announces the resumption of its nuclear 
testing. 
17 June. Prime Minister Muldoon meets Mitterrand in Paris. Mitterrand 
confirms the Socialist Government's willingness to continue nuclear testing. 
10-11 August. A South Pacific Forum meeting at Port Vila calls for a halt to 
French nuclear testing. 
12 September. The Australia/France Nuclear Transfers Agreement, regulating 
Australian uranium exports and signed on 7 January 1981, comes into force. 
1982 
11 March. Prime Minister Mara, on his second official visit to Paris, meets 
Mitterrand. He reiterates Fijian opposition to French nuclear testing. 
2-29 June. The Pacific Trade Union Forum boycotts French consumer products 
in the South Pacific to express opposition to French nuclear testing. The boycott 
is largely ineffectual. 
24 June. The PNG representative at the UN General Assembly calls for a South 
Pacific nuclear free zone and for the halt of French testing. 
26-28 June. The Tazieff mission surveys Moruroa. 
28 July. The PNG Public Service Union protests outside the French Embassy in 
Port Moresby against French testing. 
October. At the UN General Assembly in New York, Rabbie Namaliu, the PNG 
Foreign Minister, expresses his country's opposition to French testing. 
10 October. At the UN General Assembly Mosese Qionibaravi, the Fijian 
Foreign Minister, criticises French nuclear testing. 
1983 
17 May. Dennis Lulei, the Solomons Foreign Minister, faxes a statement 
condemning French testing to the French Embassy in Port Vila. 
8-9 June. Prime Minister Hawke meets Mauroy and Cheysson in Paris. 
10 June. In Paris, Hawke announces that Australia will suspend its uranium 
shipments to France until at least October 1984, to protest against continued 
French nuclear testing. 
17 June. Sione Tongilava, the Tongan Lands Minister, condemns nuclear 
testing in the South Pacific. 
20 June. Debray meets Muldoon in Wellington. He proposes the organisation of 
a scientific mission to Moruroa. 
22 June. Debray meets Hawke in Canberra. He proposes to Hawke that 
Australia send a, scientific observer to Moruroa. Hawke and Hayden state their 
Government's continued rejection of French nuclear testing. 
24 June. Debray visits Port Moresby. Mr Nilkare, the PNG Foreign Minister, 
protests to him over continued French nuclear testing. 
July. In Port Vila, the French Ambassador to Vanuatu asks Solomon Mamaloni, 
the Solomon Islands Prime Minister, if he can present his credentials in 
Honiara. Mamoloni refuses due to his government's opposition to French 
nuclear testing. 
Debray visits Fiji. Jonati Mavoa, the Fijian Foreign Minister, tells him of Fiji's 
continued rejection of French nuclear testing. 
28-29 August. South Pacific Forum meeting at Canberra. The Forum's 
declaration opposes French nuclear testing. 
18 September. Australia accepts the French invitation to participate in a scientific 
inspection of Moruroa. 
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October. At the UN General Assembly. Fiji calls for an international ban on 
French nuclear testing. 
25-29 October. The Atkinson mission visits Moruroa. 
1984 
July. An ALP conference resolves that the Hawke Government should continue 
its ban on uranium exports to France until French nuclear testing is halted. 
11 July. Tony Bais, the PNG acting Foreign Minister, describes the Atkinson 
Report on Moruroa as "inconclusive" and reiterates his country's opposition to 
French testing. 
13 July. Mamaloni restates the Solomon Islands' rejection of French testing. 
27-28 August. South Pacific Forum conference in Tuvalu. The Forum assesses 
the Atkinson Report, finds it inconclusive. and reiterates its .opposition to 
French testing. 
8 October. Michael Somare, the PNG Prime Minister, restates his country's 
condemnation of the continuation of French testing. 
10 October. Senator Peter Walsh, the Australian Energy and Resources 
Minister, offers confmnation of the Government's decision to continue its ban 
on uranium shipments to France by declaring it would buy eight shipments of 
uranium contracted to be shipped there between 1982 and 1988. 
14 October. The Australian Government gives official confirmation of its 
decision to halt uranium exports to France for another two years. 
1985 
10 July. DOSE agents sink the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour. 
12 July. Arrest of Alain Mafart and Dominique Prieur, two French agents 
implicated in the bombing, in Auckland. 
19-27 July. Jean-Michel Baylet, the French Secretary of State to External 
Relations, tours New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga, and 
Samoa to explain French support for nuclear deterrence. . . 
4-6 August. South Pacific Forum meeting on Rarotonga. On 6 August, the 
Rarotonga Treaty is signed. Vanuatu refuses to sign the Treaty, calling it 
"incomprehensive". Tonga also refuses, because it does not oppose French 
testing, and does not wish to obstruct the US regional nuclear presence. 
7 August. Mitterrand condemns the Rainbow Warrior bombing . and orders 
French police to cooperate with New Zealand police inquiries. 
17 August. Le Monde announces the responsibility of the DGSE for the 
bombing. 
26 August. Public release of the Tricot Report, an inquiry into the responsibility 
for the Rainbow Warrior bombing,ordered by Mitterrand. Bernard Tricot, in 
charge of the inquiry, declares that DGSE agents were probably not to blame for 
the bombing. David Lange, the New Zealand Prime Minister, denounces the 
report as a whitewash. 
1 Septtmber. In Washington Kim Beazley, the Australian Defence Minister. 
declares that the Rarotonga Treaty was aimed primarily at France. . . 
6 September. The New Zealand Government informs France of its intention to 
seek compensation for the Rainbow Warrior bombing through the offices of the 
UN and the International Court. . 
12 September. Hayden calls Bernard Follin, the French Ambassador to 
Australia, into his Canberra office. He delivers a message condemning 
"provocative" French actions in the South Pacific. . . 
14 September. Mitterrand visits Moruroa. He restates France's intention of 
maintaining its Pacific presence and of continuing nuclear testing. 
16 September. After Mitterrand's visit to Moruroa, Mara condemns Mitterrand's 
announcement that France intends to continue nuclear testing in French 
Polynesia. 
398 
20 September. Vice-Admiral Pierre Lacoste, head of the DGSE, is dismissed for 
his role in the organisation of the mission that sunk the Rainbow Warrior. 
Hernu tenders his resignation. 
23 September. On behalf of the French Government, Fabius apologises to 
Lange for the Rainbow Warrior bombing. In New York Geoffrey Palmer, the 
New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister, meets French Foreign Minister Roland 
Dumas to set up an arbitration working party. 
9 October. At the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Lini of Vanuatu, Mr 
Giheno, the PNG Foreign Minister, and Richard Woolcott, the Australian 
representative, condemn continued French nuclear testing. 
10 October. At the UN General Assembly, Fiji, Columbia, Chile, Ecuador and 
Peru repeat calls for the end of French nuclear testing. 
22 November. Prieur and Mafart are sentenced in Auckland by the New Zealand 
High Court to ten years' imprisonment for manslaughter. 
2 December. Tofilau Eti Alesana, the Western Samoan Prime Minister, calls on 
France to conduct its tests in metropolitan France. 
1986 
5 February. Tuvalu announces it barred a visit by a French naval vessel in 
January to protest French testing. . 
6-7 February. A South Pacific Forum delegation visits Paris to obtain French 
support for the Rarotonga Treaty. The French delegation warns that the Treaty 
conflicts with French security interests. 
26 February. France decides to suspend the importation of New Zealand lambs' 
brains, a decision which is followed from February to April by the 
announcement of the blocking of, or added customs checks on, New Zealand 
wool, meat, fish, potatoes, and kiwi fruit. 
23 April. In Christchurch Crown Prince Tupouto'a, the Tongan Foreign 
Minister, announces that Tonga is not concerned about French nuclear testing 
and recognises France's right to conduct nuclear tests in French Polynesia. 
31 May. Lange declares that New Zealand witt not negotiate with France over 
the release of Mafart and Prieur. 
19 June. The French Government announces that France and New Zealand have 
agreed to submit their differences over the Rainbow Warrior bombing to the 
arbitration of the Secretary-General of the UN, Perez de Cuellar. 
7 July. France and New Zealand announce de Cuellar's arbitration ruling of 6 
July. Both countries agree to adhere to it. Mitterrand declares his approval of the 
ruling. 
9 JUly. Signature by Chirac and John MacArthur, the New Zealand Ambassador 
to France, of the Rainbow Warrior arbitration agreement in Paris. 
23 July. Mafart and Prieur are flown to Wallis, and then to Hao Atoll for 
internment, as agreed to in the arbitration accord. 
19 August. Paul Keating, then Australian Treasurer, announces that the Hawke 
Government has decided to lift its uranium embargo on France. It will sell the 
uranium it has purchased in order to make good a budget shortfall. 
6 October. Mr Quionibaravi, representing Fiji at the UN General Assembly, 
suggests that France should conduct its nuclear tests in Nevada. 
23 November. New Zealand, the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, Palau, 
Western Samoa, the United States, and France sign the Convention for the 
Protection of South Pacific Natural Resources and the Environment. The 
Convention opposes nuclear waste dumping in the region. In spite of the 
presence of nuclear waste stored on Moruroa, France announces that its nuclear 
tests do not breach the convention as they do not pollute the environment. 
12 December. In the Solomon Star, Ezekiel Alebua, the Solomon Islands Prime 
Minister, is reported announcing his government's reaffirmation of support for 
the FLNKS, and of opposition to French nuclear testing. 
14 December. Jean-Bernard Raimond, the French Foreign Minister, announces 
the return of Mafart to Paris from Hao due to medical problems. 
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1987 
26 January. Flosse meets George Shultz, the US Secretary of State, in 
Washington to voice French opposition to the Rarotonga Treaty. 
February. France formally notifies the South Pacific Forum that it will not ratify 
the Rarotonga Treaty. 
20-25 June. Jacques Cousteau and his team visit Moruroa to conduct an 
underwater examination of the atoll. 
July. Shultz states US support for French nuclear testing while in Singapore. 
15 July. King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV of Tonga, Pupuke Robati, the Prime 
Minister of the Cook Islands, and Le Tagaloa Pita, the Western Samoan Foreign 
Minister, visit Moruroa. 
29-30 August. Robati and his Foreign Minister, Norman George, visit 
Moruroa. They declare that the Cook Islands Government is satisfied with 
safety standards there. 
1988 
1 January. Energy Resources of Australia announces a new contract to supply 
uranium to France. 
26 March. Vice-Admiral Thireaut announces that nuclear tests will be held on 
Fangataufa, an atol1 35km from Moruroa. 
7 May. Prieur leaves Hao Atoll to return to metropolitan France. She is reported 
to be pregnant. 
June. Roland Dumas, the French Foreign Minister, announces that France will 
declare the number of tests it makes annually. 
3 June. Russell Marshall, the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister, meets 
Dumas in Paris to negotiate the return of Mafart and Prieur to Hao Atoll. He 
does not succeed. 
22 September. Marshall announces that New Zealand will submit its dispute 
with France over the breach of the Rainbow Warrior arbitration agreement to 
further arbitration. 
October. The Fijian representative at the UN General Assembly calls for French 
testing to be moved to metropolitan France. 
21 November. France and New Zealand name an arbitration court under UN 
supervision to consider the resolution of their differences. 
1989 
14 February. In New York, New Zealand and France agree on arbitration 
procedures. 
7 May. Palmer, now Prime Minister of New Zealand, meets Rocard in Noumea 
while attending the funeral of Tjibaou and Yeiwene. Palmer reiterates New 
Zealand's opposition to French nuclear testing. 
October. At the UN General Assembly, the representatives of the Solomon 
Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu welcome French reforms in New 
Caledonia, but reiterate their rejection of French nuclear testing. 
30 October. Oral hearings for New Zealand's Rainbow Warrior arbitration case 
begin in New York. 
1990 
20 March. A Lome Convention meeting in Port Moresby calls on France to halt 
its nuclear testing. 
7 May. The UN arbitration tribunal in New York condemns France for 
prematurely releasing Mafart and Prieur from Hao Atoll. It declares that France 
has breached the Rainbow Warrior arbitration agreement of July 1986. It calls 
on France to pay $US2M in reparations to New Zealand, which will be used to 
establish a friendship fund between the two countries. 
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17 October. At the UN General Assembly, Robert Van Lierop, the Vanuatu 
representative, declares South Pacific Forum opposition to French nuclear 
testing and its continued demand that it be halted. 
18 October. The French Ministry of Defence allows a camera crew from the 
SBS channel to visit Moruroa. They are the first Australian TV reporters to visit 
the island. 
1991 
29 April. In Wellington Rocard apologises for the Rainbow Warrior bombing. 
21 May. An External Relations and Trade Ministry spokesman announces that 
New Zealand will no longer protest after each French nuclear test, but only once 
after each annual series. This policy is abandoned weeks later. 
14 July. After the announcement that France is to award the Order of Merit to 
Mafart on Bastille Day, senior National Government Ministers boycott Bastille 
Day celebrations at the French Embassy in Wellington. Instead Wyatt Creech, 
the most junior New Zealand Minister, attends. 
27 September. At the UN General Assembly, the PNG Education Minister, 
Utala Samana, attacks French nuclear testing. 
23 November. Gerald Andries, one of the French agents implicated in the 
Rainbow Warrior bombing, is arrested by Swiss police after they discovered 
that a New Zealand international warrant for his arrest was stil1 in force. 
18 December. Paul East, the New Zealand Attorney-General, announces that 
New Zealand will not seek to extradite Andries from Switzerland, and that 
charges against him and other suspected participants in Operation Satanic have 
been dropped. 
1992 
8 April. In Paris, Bercgovoy announces the suspension of French nuclear 
testing in 1992. Fiji welcomes France's decision. 
9 April. Jim Bolger, the New Zealand Prime Minister, praises the French 
decision to suspend testing, as do representatives for Australia and the other 
South Pacific Forum members. 
13 April. Geoffrey Henry, the Cook Islands Prime Minister, announces that he 
has sent a letter to the French Government, congratulating it on its decision to 
suspend French nuclear testing for 1992. 
22 June. Inaugural meeting of the New ZealandlFrance Friendship Fund Board 
in Paris. 
8-9 July. South Pacific Forum meeting in Honiara. The Forum welcomes the 
French suspension of nuclear testing. 
1993 
6 May. The South Pacific Forum warns France that any resumption of nuclear 
testing would harm its relations with the region. 
18 June. Dominique Perben, the Minister to the DaM-TOM, meets Ieremaia 
Tabai, the Secretary-General of the South Pacific Forum, in Suva. Tabai 
reiterates the hope of the South Pacific Forum that French testing will be 
suspended indefinitely. 
4 July. Mitterrand announces that France will continue its suspension of nuclear 
testing indefinitely. Balladur announces that he and Mitterrand have decided to 
appoint a commission to study the feasibility of maintaining the nuclear 
strikeforce without testing. 
11 August. The South Pacific Forum calls on France, the United States and 
Britain to sign the protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty, welcomes the Russian, 
US and French decisions to maintain their test suspensions, and urges France to 
implement a permanent test ban. 
25 October. In spite of continued Chinese nuclear testing, Mitterrand announces 
that France will not recommence its tests while he is President, unless Britain, 
the United States or Russia do first. 
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17 December. In the National Assembly a parliamentary committee presents its 
conclusions on whether France would need to conduct tests to continue 
developing the nuclear strike force. The committee concludes that a further 20 
tests would need to take place before they could be replaced by simulations. 
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Appendix 10. France and Decolonisation Issues. 
Chronology 1980-1993 
1980 
30 July. Vanuatu declares its independence from France and Britain. 
1981 
17 June. Mitterrand informs Muldoon that the Socialist Government has no 
intention of organising self-determination referenda in the Pacific TOM. 
1982 
t March. Tjibaou meets Muldoon in Wellington. Tjibaou declares after the 
meeting that Muldoon was unsupportive of Kanak independence claims. 
13 March. Mara leads a Forum delegation to Paris to press the issues of New 
Caledonian and French Polynesian self-determination. 
9-10 August. South Pacific Forum meeting in Rotorua. Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu propose taking New Caledonia's case to the UN decolonisation 
committee, but this proposal is rejected. 
1983 
17 May. Bm Hayden, the Australian Foreign Minister, is reported by Les 
Nouvelles Caledoniennes as saying that Australia supports New Caledonian 
independence, but not by violent means. 
28-29 August. South Pacific Forum meeting at Canberra. The Forum's 
declaration supports New Caledonian independence. 
1984 
3-4 October. Frank O'Flynn, the New Zealand Deputy Foreign Minister, visits 
Paris and meets Rocard to discuss trade issues. He declares New Zealand's 
confidence in French initiatives in New Caledonia. 
6-7 October. Prime Minister Lange visits New Caledonia. 
17 November. Prime Minister Lini expresses Vanuatu's concern over the 
political troubles in New Caledonia and reiterates Vanuatu support for Kanak 
independence. 
27 November. Hayden describes New Caledonia as one of the last vestiges of 
colonialism in the South Pacific. 
28 November. In Paris, the Australian Ambassador, Peter Curtis, is called to the 
Quai d'Orsay by Michel Combal, Director for Asia and Pacific Mfairs. Curtis is 
told of the Fabius Government's astonishment over Hayden's comment about 
New Caledonia, and that the future of the territory is a French concern only. 
29-30 November. Tjibaou and Yeiwene visit Vanuatu to meet VP Government 
Ministers and discuss the situation in New Ca1edonia. 
December. At its first meeting in Wellington, the South Pacific Forum's 
ministerial group welcomes the appointment of Pisani as envoy to New 
Caledonia. 
6 December. UN General Assembly debate on New Caledonia. Papua New 
Guinea congratulates France on its appointment of Pisani, and on its efforts to 
promote reform in New Caledonia. 
1985 
8 January. Lange welcomes the Pisani Plan. 
16 January. Alan Rombers, spokesman for the US State Department, expresses 
US support for Pisani's reforms and states that the United States wants to see a 
peaceful vote on self-determination in New Caledonia. 
18 January. Hayden congratulates Mitterrand on his decision to visit New 
Caledonia. 
14 February. Tjibaou leads an FLNKS delegation to Port Vila to meet the VP 
Government. Vanuatu reiterates its support for Kanak independence. 
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5 May. At a UN decolonisation committee meeting in Tunis, Papua New Guinea 
accuses France of wishing to retain New Caledonia as a part of the Fifth 
Republic indefinitely. 
t t May. After further violence in New Caledonia, Vanuatu condemns France's 
handling of the situation there. 
2-4 June. Uregei, the FLNKS foreign minister, meets Sela Molisa, John 
Giheno and Daniel Sande, Foreign Ministers of Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea 
and the Solomon Islands respectively. to discuss events in New Caledonia. 
28 June. Uregei meets Hayden in Canberra and urges Australia to be more 
active in its support of New Caledonian independence. 
19-27 july. Baylet tours New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea. Fiji, 
Tonga, and Samoa. He outlines French policy on New Caledonia and attempts 
to dissuade Forum members from considering taking New Caledonia's case to 
the UN. 
August. Mara refuses to meet Uregei in Suva. 
4-6 August. South Pacific Forum meeting on Rarotonga. The Forum reiterates 
its support for New Caledonian independence. 
29 December. New Zealand customs officers find 5,500 rounds of ammunition 
on the freighter lie de Lumiere, bound for Noumea. 
1986 
17-22 March. Two New Zealand Labour and two National MPs visit New 
Caledonia. RPCR leaders refuse to meet the Labour MPs, but privately meet the 
National MPs. Geoffrey Palmer calls the two National MPs irresponsible for 
doing so. 
24 May. Hayden visits New Caledonia. He meets High Commissioner Wibaux, 
FLNKS, and RPCR representatives. Hayden does not meet Lafleur or Ukeiwe 
as they are in Paris. He refrains from making any statement to the French press 
during his stay. 
17 July. Meeting, in Goroka, Papua New Guinea, of what becomes known as 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group. Foreign Ministers from Papua New Guinea, 
the Solomons and Vanuatu meet with Yann Celene Uregei to discuss New 
Caledonia. 
8-11 AugusL. South Pacine Forum meeting in Suva. The Forum rejects the self-
determination referendum proposed for New Caledonia and resolves to take 
New Caledonia's case to the UN decolonisation committee. 
9 August. Pons criticises the decision made by the South Pacific Forum to take 
New Caledonia's case to the UN. 
30 August. At a press conference in Noumea. Chirac berates Australian policy 
on New Caledonia. 
31 August. Hawke replies, stating his surprise at Chirac's comments. 
19 December. Raimond informs the Australian Ambassador in Paris of the 
French decision to suspend ministerial exchanges with Australia due to its 
leaders' comments about the policy conduct of the Chirac Government in New 
Caledonia. 
September. Non-Aligned Movement summit in Harere. Vanuatu lobbies to 
obtain observer status for the FLNKS, which is granted. Vanuatu also obtains 
the Movement's support for the South Pacific Forum proposal to add New 
Caledonia to the UN decolonisation list. 
6 October. Quionbaravi, representing Fiji at the UN General Assembly, calls for 
New Caledonian independence. 
2 December. The UN General Assembly reinscribes New Caledonia on its list 
of non self-governing territories. 
12 December. In the Solomon Star, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Ezekiel 
Alebua is reported announcing his Government's reaffirmation of support for 
the FLNKS. 
19 December. Following disparaging comments from Hawke and his colleagues 
about the conduct of New Caledonian policy, the Australian Ambassador in 
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Paris is informed by Raimond that the Chirac Government had decided to 
suspend ministerial contacts between the two countries. 
1987 
10 January. The Quai d'Orsay announces the expulsion of John Dauth, the 
Australian Consul-General, for his "interference" in local politics. 
11 January. Hayden declares that the decision is unjustified. 
23 January. Alebua states the Solomons' opposition to the scheduled self-
determination referendum in New Caledonia and restates support for New 
Caledonian independence. 
3 March. A South Pacific Forum meeting in Auckland adopts a resolution 
demanding that the Chirac Government abandon its proposed self-determination 
referendum for New Caledonia and start political dialogue in the territory. 
17 March. The UN decolonisation committee urges France to organise its self-
determination referendum in New Caledonia in cooperation with the UN. 
29-30 May. South Pacific Forum meeting in Apia. Condemnation of the 
forthcoming self-determination referendum in New Caledonia. 
2 June. FJosse meets Lange in Apia. They discuss the future of New Caledonia 
and general South Pacific issues. 
20 June. Seven Kanak chiefs visit Vanuatu, led by Yeiwene. The government 
and the FLNKS group sign an Act of Union between Vanuatu and Kanaky. 
August. Prime Minister Robati states that the Cook Islands Government has no 
position on New Caledonia. 
5 September. The VP supports a protest in Port Vila against the self-
determination referendum in New Caledonia. 
26 September. Ministerial contacts between France and Australia are resumed 
when Raimond meets Hayden in New York to discuss South Pacific issues. 
28 September. The UN decolonisation committee proposes that the UN General 
Assembly reject the results of the self-determination referendum held in New 
Caledonia. The motion fails. 
9-15 October. Fran Wilde, the New Zealand Associate Foreign Minister, visits 
New Caledonia for the fortieth anniversary celebration of the South Pacific 
Commision. She meets Leopold Joredie and Nidoish Naisseline during her stay 
in the territory. She describes New Caledonian problems as a matter for Paris 
and Noumea to resolve. 
4 December. The UN decolonisation committee has a resolution adopted by the 
UN, reaffirming the right of New Caledonia to independence. 
1988 
21 February. Andre Giraud, the French Defence Minister, visits Australia as 
France's representative at the Australian bicentenary celebrations. His visit 
marks the official renewal of suspended ministerial contacts between Canberra 
and Paris. 
7 March. Russell Marshall, the New Zealand Foreign Minister, visits New 
Caledonia. During his stay, he meets Raimond, Pons and Rocard. They discuss 
New Caledonia, nuclear testing, and the Rainbow Warrior arbitration. 
9 March. An interview with Marshall is published in Le Monde (dated 10 
March). He states that France has a role to play in the South Pacific. 
24 April. During the Ouvea hostage incident, Hawke cautions the Chirac 
Government against the use of violence as a solution to New Caledonian 
political problems. 
26 April. The Australian Ambassador in Paris is called to the Quai d'Orsay. He 
is informed of France's "astonishment" at Australian "interference" in French 
domestic affairs in New Caledonia. 
Lange blames the Chirac Government for unrest in New Caledonia and declares 
his hope that Mitterrand's re-election will restore peace there. 
Paias Wingti, the PNG Prime Minister, states that French actions in New 
Caledonia are destabilising regional security. 
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27 April. The New Zealand Ambassador in Paris is called to the Quai d'Onay, 
where New Zealand is accused of interference in French internal affairs due to 
Lange's comments on New Caledonia. 
28 April. Lini attacks the Chirac Government for the escalation of violence in 
New Caledonia. 
30 April. Marshall declares that the Chirac Government is responsible for the 
implementation of repressive policies in New Caledonia. 
2 May. Raimond describes Marshall's comment on New Caledonia as 
"intolerable interference" in French affairs. 
3 May. Mara denounces France's "gunboat diplomacy" in New Caledonia after 
the events on Ouvea. 
5 May. Papua New Guinea and Western Samoa protest the French assault on 
Ouvea. Hayden expresses Australia's regret over the deaths on Ouvea. He calls 
for restraint and a peaceful resolution to New Caledonian problems. , 
6 May. Lini protests the French attack on Ouvea and the deaths resulting from it. 
8 May. Sope, now Immigration and Tourism Minister, chains and padlocks the 
gate to the French Embassy in Port Vila in protest against French policy in New 
Caledonia and to support the FLNKS boycott of the elections. Around 200 
protesters hinder French citizens residing in Vanuatu frpm voting in the French 
presidential elections. 
21 May. In the Sydney Morning Herald, Hayden denies Australia had ever 
supported Kanak independence. 
September. The VP Government sends messages to Rocard and Mitterrand, 
congratulating them on the Matignon Accords and their progress toward peace in 
New Caledonia. 
7 September. Opening of a Non-Aligned Movement conference in Nicosia, 
Cyprus. The FLNKS does not attend. The Movement expresses satisfaction 
with the Matignon Accords but deplores the violence on Ouvea. 
13 September. Gareth Evans, the Australian Foreign Minister, visits New 
Caledonia. He meets High Commissioner Grasset, Tjibaou and Ukeiwe, and 
expresses support for the Matignon Accords, as well as for closer relations 
between New Caledonia and Australia. 
22 December. The UN General Assembly announces that the 19908 will be the 
International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism. , The Assembly'S 
resolution expresses approval of the Malignon Accords. 
1989 
13-15 February. During a visit to Canberra, Edwige Avice, Delegate Minister to 
Foreign Affairs, declares that France's disagreement with Australia over New 
Caledonia is a thing of the past. She calls for increased bilateral and multilateral 
exchanges between France, Australia, and its South Pacific neighbours. 
20 February. Marshall visits New Caledonia to meet RPCR and FLNKS leaders 
and to discuss the implementation of the Matignon Accords. 
22-26 April. An Australian parliamentary delegation visits New Caledonia to 
meet local political leaders, and to view the implementation of the Malignon 
Accords. 
16-20 June. Hawke visits Paris. He meets Rocard, Avice, and Roger Fauroux, 
the French Industry and Regional Development Minister. On 19 June he meets 
Chirac, who he calls "my friend" in a subsequent press conference. . 
28 August-l September. Marshall visits New Caledonia. He meets FLNKS and 
RPCR representatives. Marshall expresses New Zealand's support for the 
Matignon Accords. 
September. At the Belgrade summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, Vanuatu 
raises the issue of New Caledonia. The summit reaffmns its support for New 
Caledonian independence and urges the continuation of peaceful political 
dialogue there. 
8-15 September. Paul Neaoutyine and .Rock Wamytan visit New Zealand as 
spokesmen for the FLNKS on a national speaking tour. 
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October. At the UN General Assembly, the representatives of the Solomon 
Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu welcome French refonns in New 
Caledonia. 
1990 
9 March. Melanesian Spearhead Group meeting in Honiara. The Group calls on 
France to take further steps to address the issue of New Caledonian 
independence and criticises the UN for its perceived lack of monitoring of the 
Matignon Accords. 
11 March. At Honiara, the FLNKS officially becomes a full member of the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group. 
30 April. Evans visits New Caledonia. He meets FLNKS and RPCR leaders 
and discusses the possibility of obtaining observer status at the South Pacific 
Forum for the two parties. The FLNKS expresses interest, the RPCR does not 
6 July. Neaoutyine and Wamytan meet Lini in Port Vila to discuss FLNKS 
representation at the South Pacific Forum. 
27-28 July. Hawke visits New Caledonia, the first visit to the territory by an 
Australian Prime Minister since 1941. Hawke congratulates France on progress 
in New Caledonia with the Matignon Accords, but announces that Australia will 
continue to oppose French nuclear testing. 
30 July. Le Pen sec represents France at Vanuatu's tenth anniversary 
celebrations of independence. 
17 August. The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution approving the 
implementation of the Matignon Accords, but calls on France to take further 
measures to promote peaceful self-determination in New Caledonia. 
9-10 October. At the UN General Assembly, Francis Bogutu, the Solomons 
representative, calls on the UN to add French Polynesia to its decolonisation 
list. Bogutu also criticises the Matignon Accords, stating that they do not 
guarantee independence to the FLNKS. 
1991 
July. Somare, now the PNG Foreign Minister, meets his French counterpart 
Roland Dumas in Paris. Somare expresses PNG support for the Matignon 
Accords and his country's hope of improving trade and cooperation. 
11-21 July. Berenado Vunibobo, the Fijian Trade Minister, and Sir Peter 
Kenilorea, the Solomons Foreign Minister, visit New Caledonia together to 
view the implementation of the Matignon Accords and to discuss them with local 
political leaders. 
22 July. Geoffrey Henry, the Cook Islands Prime Minister, states that the South 
Pacific Forum should leave France to solve its problems in New Caledonia. He 
opposes giving the FLNKS observer status at Forum meetings. 
29-30 July. South Pacific Forum meeting in Palikir. Expression of support for 
decolonisation in New Caledonia. 
21-24 November. Don McKinnon, the New Zealand Foreign Minister, visits 
New Caledonia to discuss trade and the progress of the Matignon Accords with 
local leaders. McKinnon refuses to comment on the issue of New Caledonian 
independence and declares that New Zealand will not push the issue at South 
Pacific Forum meetings. 
1992 
31 January. Evans meets Lafleur in Noumea. Evans declares Australian 
satisfaction with the ongoing implementation of the Matignon Accords. 
8-9 July. South Pacific Forum meeting at Honiara. The Forum approves the 
implementation of the Matignon Accords, while calling for greater social 
assistance to Kanaks. 
1-6 September. Non-Aligned Movement summit in Jakarta. Neaoutyine attends 
with an FLNKS delegation. Papua New Guinea calls on the summit to renew its 
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support for Kanak independence, as does Neaoutyine. The summit renews its 
support for New Caledonian decolonisation. 
20 October. At a meeting of the UN decolonisation committee Bernard 
Bata'anisia, the Solomons representative, expresses South Pacific Forum 
approval of the implementation of the Matignon Accords. 
1993 
18 June. Tabai expresses continued South Pacific Forum support for the 
Matignon Accords to Dominique Perren, Minister to the DOM-TOM, during his 
visit to Fiji. 
JUly. A South Pacific Forum Ministerial Delegation on New Caledonia tours the 
territory to compile infonnation for its report to the South Pacific Forum meeting 
in 1993. 
11 August. At its meeting on Nauru, the South Pacific Forum urges France to 
allow a UN team to monitor the New Caledonian self-determination referendum 
in 1998. 
13 August. Jacques Le Blanc, the Pennanent Secretary to the South Pacific, 
representing France in a post-forum dialogue meeting on Nauru, rejects the 
South Pacific Forum's demands, arguing that there is tio need for a monitoring 
team because the vote will be carried out according to UN guidelines. 
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Appendix 11. French Cooperation in the South Pacific. 
Chronology 1981-1993 
1981 
3 February. Expulsion of Yves Rodrigues, the French Ambassador to Vanuatu, 
and five of his staff, as reprisal from the VP Government for French refusal to 
allow its delegation into New Caledonia to meet PI leaders. 
5 February. The Quai d'Orsay announces it will withdraw 200 French aid 
workers from Vanuatu. This decision is not implemented. 
8 February. Lini declares that he recognises the importance of French aid to 
Vanuatu and states that his Government's differences with France are only 
temporary. 
2 March. Kalpokor Kalsakau, Vanuatu's Finance Minister, agrees to accept 
French aid on France's condition that Paris controls the allocation of funds. 
10 March. France and Vanuatu sign aid and cooperation accords, worth 
approximately 33.05MFF. Both parties pledge under the agreement to avoid 
interfering in each other's internal affairs. 
3 June. An accord signed between France and Fiji opens a French air link to 
Wallis and Futuna via Suva. 
2 October. Marc Menguy is named as Rodrigues's replacement. 
16-21 November. Lini, Kalsakau and Donald Kolpakas, the Vanuatu Education 
Minister, visit France to discuss development funding. They meet Mauroy, 
Jean-Pierre Cot, Minister of Cooperation, Le Pensec, then Minister of the Sea, 
and Alain Savary, Minister of Education. 
9 December. Lini announces that France will donate approximately 24.1MFF 
worth of health and education aid to Vanuatu. 
1982 
13 May. Upon receiving the credentials of Barak Sope, Vanuatu's new 
Ambassador to Paris, Mitterrand declares that differences between France and 
Vanuatu have been resolved. 
26 May. The French Council of Ministers approves cultural, scientific and 
technica1 cooperation accords with Vanuatu. 
] 2-] 9 Ju]y. Ati George Sokomanu, the President of Vanuatu, visits France. On 
15 July, he meets Mitterrand. On 19 July, he meets Cheysson. 
1983 
5-14 February. Michel Jobert, the French Exterior Commerce Minister, visits 
Australia to discuss trade. 
1985 
15 July. France and Australia sign an accord on the exchange of classified 
defence contract information, primarily in relation to Mirage fighters and 
helicopters. 
8 December. France finalises a loan of 78MFF to Vanuatu for coffee plantation 
development on the island of Tanna. Philippe Baude, then the French 
Ambassador to Vanuatu, signs the agreement in Port Vila. 
1986 
1 January. France gives Vt8.75M to Vanuatu for the renovation of a hospital in 
Port Vila. 
May. Cyclone Namu renders 90,000 people homeless in the Solomon Islands. 
Plosse organises French aid: the Jacques Cartier is sent to assist with recovery 
work. French medical teams are sent, along with 21 t of food and medicine, as 
part of 1 MFF in French aid for cyclone relief. 
28 May. In Paris, Plosse outlines French South Pacific policy to the Council of 
Ministers. He announces the importance of the South Pacific to France and 
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expresses his opinion that French aid, commerce and technical cooperation in 
the region should increase. 
17 November. Peter Kenilorea, Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, resigns 
fol1owing opposition criticism of his acceptance of a $S129,OOO loan for the 
reconstruction of his village (damaged by cyclone Namu) from Flosse. 
Kenilorea is also criticised for plans to accredit the French Ambassador to 
Vanuatu. 
1987 
8 January. A 57 member team, led by Flosse, arrives in the Cook Islands to 
help with cyclone relief work, days before the New Zealand aid team arrives. 
27-31 March. Flosse visits American Samoa, Western Samoa and Tonga to 
discuss French aid proposals with local leaders. 
April. Vanuatu's Department of Civil Aviation receives fire fighting vehicles 
under a soft loan from France. 
Vanuatu complains that its meteorological service is undennanned as a result of 
French cuts in aid. 
13 April. Election of a coalition government in Fiji, led by Dr Timoci Bavadra. 
14 May. Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka overthrows the Bavadra Government in a 
coup d'etat. 
15-17 May. A conference in Noumea for French ambassadors and senior 
officials in the Pacific is chaired by Flosse. He announces the French South 
Pacific aid programme for 1988 and increased French regional cooperation. 
3 July. France approves a projected 50MFF loan to the Cook Islands, scheduled 
for 1989. 
August. Flosse visits Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Niue. 
14-15 August 1987. Flosse visits Fiji, and offers French aid. He meets Mara, 
Rabuka, and Sir Ratu Penaia Ganilau, the Governor-General. 
2-9 September. Robati visits France as Prime Minister of the Cook Islands to 
discuss trade and aid issues. He meets Chirac. 
25 September. Second coup d'etat by Rabuka. 
Flosse visits Fiji to discuss French aid. 
October. Flosse revisits Niue, Nauru, and Kiribati. Niue asks for French 
funding to improve its telephone network. France's offer of a satellite 
communication ground station, worth approximately 2.8MFF, is later refused 
due to local opposition to dealing with France, and to differences over aspects of 
the proposal. Nauru asks for French help in its court case against Australia, 
New Zealand and Britain. It is not forthcoming. 
Flosse hosts visits to Paris by the Tongan Education Minister, the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Western Samoa, Tupuola Eft, and by the Lieutenant Governor of 
American Samoa, Eni Hunkin. 
The French Navy patrol boats La Glorieuse and La Railleuse visit Suva. 
1 October. Vanuatu expels Henri Crepin-Leblond, the French Ambassador to 
Vanuatu, for allegedly interfering in local politics. 
16 October. The French Embassy in Suva indicates that France is prepared to 
continue relations with Fiji. 
22 October. Chirac's Intenninisterial Committee meets in Paris to discuss, and 
increase, French aid to Fiji. 
2 November. Three more French diplomats are expelled from Port Vila. France 
responds by reducing its ambassadorial staff to two, by cutting back aid and by 
withdrawing 30 French aid workers. 
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1988 
January. Announcement of a major French aid package to Fiji, which will 
include an Ecureuil helicopter and 52 trucks, mainly for the Fijian Army. 
24-28 January. The French frigate Balny visits Suva and is greeted by Rabuka. 
28 March. President Sokomanu of Vanuatu urges the VP Government to 
normalise relations with France due to the adverse economic effects of the 
reduction of French aid. 
5 April. Mara visits Chirac and Plosse in Paris to discuss future French aid to 
Fiji. 
6 April. Mara signs an economic development agreement worth 43MFF with 
Edouard Bal1adur, at that time the French Finance Minister. 
8 April. Bavadra criticises Fiji's acceptance of French aid, claiming it is a 
French attempt to influence and weaken Fijian policy on New Caledonia and on 
French nuclear testing. 
June. France offers Fiji $FL96M to broaden Melanesian participation in local 
business. 
24 October. A scientific and technical cooperation accord is signed by France 
and Australia. 
2 November. Vanuatu receives a cheque for Vt1.487M for the training of 
French-speaking secondary school teachers. 
1989 
January. A French loan agreement with Fiji worth approximately 45.79MFF is 
signed in Paris. The funds are distributed to the Fijian Civil Aviation Authority, 
the Post and Telecommunications Department and the Fiji Sugar Corporation. 
April. A Fijian Major, Samu Saumatu, travels to France for a nine month 
training course at the French staff college at Compiegne. 
May. Going back on its earlier refusal, Niue accepts the installation of a French 
satellite ground station. 
15 June. The Fijian Foreign Secretary, Mr Vakatale, states that increased French 
aid does not affect Fiji's opposition to nuclear testing. 
August-September. Two Fijian Army lieutenants undergo helicopter pilot 
training in Singapore with French Government funding. 
22 August. Avice leaves Rocard's mission to the South Pacific for a one day 
visit to Tonga. She is a guest at the Third South Pacific Mini-Games, where she 
sees Laperouse Stadium in use. The stadium was constructed with $T2.8M in 
funds provided by France. 
23 August. Rocard visits Suva. He denies that France has lent military aid to 
Fiji. 
24 August. Geoffrey Henry, the Cook Islands Prime Minister, meets Rocard in 
Papeete. They discuss the possibility of French assistance in monitoring the 
EEZ of the Cook Islands. 
30 November-9 December. Bernard Grasset, the High Commissioner of New 
Caledonia, and Jacques Iekawe, a territorial representative for New Caledonia, 
visit New Zealand to discuss technical cooperation with New Caledonia. 
1990 
15 March. The French Embassy in Suva announces it has set up a Trade 
Commission. 
May. The Australia-France Foundation is created to serve as an agent for the 
development of bilateral relations. 
20-21 June. A French Navy Gardian jet gives a demonstration of its maritime 
surveillance capabilities to Fijian Government representatives. Following the 
demonstration, Fiji asks for, and receives, French assistance in maritime 
surveillance of its EEZ. 
July. Atanroi Baiteke. Secretary-General of the South Pacific Commission, 
makes his first visit to Paris. He meets Rocard and Le Pen sec to discuss 
multilateral aid in the South Pacific. 
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22 July. Australia and France agree to work together on promoting international 
environmental protection policies. 
29 July. Le Pensec visits Port Vila to open a telephone exchange funded by 
France. This is the first French ministerial visit there since July 1980. 
6-7 August. Jacques Manent, Assistant Director of the Asia/Oceania Directorate 
of the French Foreign Ministry, visits New Zealand to discuss regional 
cooperati on. 
12-23 August. An ADRAF delegation from New Caledonia studies Fijian land 
reform and management. 
September. A Fijian trade delegation visits French Polynesia. 
5-7 September. A French Navy jet conducts the first French surveillance sweep 
of the Cook Islands' EEZ. 
11 September. Jean Gardere and Jean Frimat, representatives frdm the French 
Embassy in Suva, visit Tonga to discuss aid programmes. They present a 
cheque for approximately 53,000FF to assist Tonga in reconstruction following 
cyclone Ofa. 
During a meeting with Vanuatu's Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Nikenike 
Vurobaravo, Mitterrand says France will cancel some of Vanuatu's debts to 
encourage economic growth. . 
1-4 October. The Vanuatu Minister of Agriculture, Jacques Hopa, and Land 
Minister Wi11iam Mahit, visit New Caledonia to study ADRAF's land reform 
schemes. 
1991 
9-16 February. Jean-Fran~ois Carenco, the Secretary-General of the New 
Caledonian Territorial Congress, visits New Zealand. He discusses trade and 
investment between New Zealand and New Caledonia with National 
Government Ministers. 
16-23 February. Simon Loueckhote, the President of the New Caledonian 
Territorial Congress, leads a four-member delegation to New Zealand to discuss 
bilateral cooperation. 
February. France donates Vt1.76M worth of teaching materials to Vanuatu. 
April. A Fijian trade delegation visits New Caledonia. 
May. Louis de Corial, a French embassy official from Suva, visits Tuvalu. 
Discussion of the opening of a shipping route between Tuvalu and Wallis and 
Futuna. Review of local French aid projects. 
23 May. Tonga receives two cars and six trucks from France, for its Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. 
27 May. HMNZS Southland visits Papeete; the first New Zealand naval vessel 
to do so since 1979. 
July. Somare, now the PNG Foreign Minister, meets his French counterpart, 
Roland Dumas, in Paris. Somare expresses the hope of improving bilateral trade 
and cooperation. 
Jacques Le Blanc, the Permanent Secretary to the South Pacific, visits Fiji for 
five days. He announces an increase in French aid to Fiji. 
]6-20 JUly. Alain Vivien, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, visits 
Papua New Guinea. He meets Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu, and Somare, to 
discuss future trade. 
23 July. In Paris, Vivien declares the desirability of developing French 
economic cooperation with Papua New Guinea. He expresses disagreement 
with the decision to close the Port Moresby Embassy. 
7-14 August. A New Caledonian trade delegation visits Fiji. 
5 November. The first French trade mission to Papua New Guinea is welcomed 
by government officials. 
2 December. Defeat of the VP Government in Vanuatu's legislative elections. 
Maxime Carlot, a French-speaking moderate, leads a coalition government. 
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1992 
January. Fiji receives a Dauphin surveillance and cargo helicopter, worth 
approximately 30MFF, from France. 
A ministerial delegation from Vanuatu visits New Caledonia to meet local 
political leaders and Christnacht. Discussions centre on increasing trade between 
Vanuatu and New Caledonia. 
February. The Cook Islands Government signs a loan agreement worth 
approximately 5MFF with France to fund the renovation of Rarotonga's water 
supply. 
1-2 February. Carlot proposes to Vice-Admiral Querat, the Commander-in-
Chief of the French Pacific Naval Squadron, that France should assist Vanuatu 
in its maritime surveillance to supplement Australian assistance. The proposal is 
accepted. . 
7 February. Henri Jacolin, the French Ambassador to Fiji, visits Tonga to 
discuss French aid. 
29 March-3 April. Lafleur visits New Zealand to discuss trade and agricultural 
technical assistance to New Caledonia. 
24 April. Philippe Guerin, France's charge d'affaires in Port Vila, and Romain 
Batick, the Vanuatu Education Minister, sign a student exchange programme 
between the Port Vila branch of the University of the South Pacific and the 
Noumea campus of the French University of the South Pacific. 
6-7 May. Richard Kaloi, President of the Loyalty Islands Province, visits Port 
Vila to discuss provincial cultural, agricultural and educational cooperation with 
Vanuatu. 
11-20 May. Carlot visits Paris. He meets Beregovoy and they normalise 
relations between Vanuatu and France. 
8-9 JUly. At its meeting in Honiara, the South Pacific Forum declares its 
approval of increased New Caledonian representation in regional affairs. 
14 July. Bikenibeu Paeniu, Prime Minister of Tuvalu, meets Jacolin in Suva to 
discuss increasing French aid to Tuvalu. 
August Kaloi pays a five day visit to Fiji to investigate Fijian land reform. 
Vanuatu establishes a Consulate in Noumea. 
I September. The nomination of Jean Mazeo as France's first Ambassador to 
Vanuatu since 1987 is announced. 
22-29 November. A New Caledonian delegation visits, including Christnacht, 
Kaloi, Joredie, and South Province Councillors. They visit Massey University 
and Fortex in Christchurch to investigate agricultural technology, and meet 
Government representatives in Wellington. 
December. Serge Vohor, the Vanuatu Education Minister, concludes an 
exchange agreement permitting French teachers to assist in Francophone 
education in Vanuatu. 
22 December. Signature in Wellington of a South Pacific disaster relief 
coordination agreement between France, New Zealand and Australia. Le Pensec 
signs on behalf of France, McKinnon on behalf of New Zealand, and Stephen 
Martin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, signs on behalf of 
Australia. 
1993 
January. After two cyclones cause serious damage in Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomons, Fiji, Tonga, and Niue, the disaster relief coordination agreement is 
implemented for the first time. 
February. Official opening of the orthopedic ward constructed with French 
funds at the Western Samoan National Hospital in Apia. 
23 March. The French Embassy in Suva announces that France and Fiji have 
signed an agreement on a military training exchange. From May to June, a 
platoon of French soldiers based in New Caledonia will train in Fiji, while a 
platoon of Fijian soldiers trains in New Caledonia. 
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30 March. Cyclone Prema hits Vanuatu. France, Australia and New Zealand 
coordinate a joint relief effort. 
April. John Kaputin, the PNG Foreign Minister, tours New Caledonia to view 
progress under the Matignon Accords. In the Loyalty Islands, he holds talks 
with Kaloi about a training scheme for Loyalty Islanders, to be run by the PNG 
Foreign Mfairs Department. 
19-24 April. Prime Minister Carlot makes an official tour of New Caledonia. 
21 April. Official opening of the Vanuatu Consulate in N oumea, presided over 
by Carlot. Serge Bourdet, former Secretary-General of the Port Vila Chamber of 
Commerce, is appointed as the first Consul. 
10-14 May. Jacques Cartier, the first French Navy ship to visit New Zealand 
since 1984, calls at Devonport naval base in Auckland. 
31 May. French, Australian and New Zealand officials meet in Honiara to 
discuss coordination of EEZ surveillance in the South Pacific. They agree to 
exchange flight information. 
June-December. Vanuatu sends 20 men from its Mobile Force to receive police 
training in New Caledonia as security men. They receive instruction in shooting, 
self-defence and security procedures in preparation for their assignment in 
December as body guards for VIPs at the South Pacific Mini-Games in Port 
Vila. 
17 June. Prime Minister Rabuka tells Perben, the Minister to the DaM-TOM, 
during his visit to Suva that F~ii values French aid and friendship. Perben 
assures Rabuka that France holds Fiji in high esteem. 
18 June. Tabai, during his meeting with Perben in Suva, tells him that the South 
Pacific Forum aims to strengthen regional cooperation with France and its 
Pacific TOM. 
September. French troops from New Caledonia, along with US troops and the 
Tonga Defence Force participate in joint training exercises in Tonga. 
13-18 July. Carlot and a Vanuatu delegation spend time in Paris. Carlot meets 
Perben to discuss ongoing aid and cooperation, and discusses cultural links with 
Jaccques Toubon, Minister of Culture and Francophonie in the Balladur 
Government. In his capacity as Mayor of Paris, Chirac offers Carlot municipal 
aid to Port Vila, while with Balladur Carlot discusses the draft of a bilateral 
friendship and cooperation accord. 
1 October. A New Caledonian delegation including Lafleur, Joredie, Kaloi, and 
Christnacht concludes a week-long tour of Brisbane, Sydney and Canberra, 
during which they met Paul Keating, the Australian Prime Minister. 
November. A 21-member delegation from the Loyalty Islands visits Fiji to 
investigate Fijian land reform. 
19 November. A development and cooperation agreement between Vanuatu and 
New Caledonia is signed in Port Vila. The document covers the areas of trade, 
education, health, training and sports. 
December. Under the disaster relief coordination agreement between France, 
Australia and New Zealand, Prairial, a French naval vessel, departs from 
Darwin to transport $A35,OOO worth of medical supplies and 5t of powdered 
milk to earthquake victims in Papua New Guinea. 
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